Defence Review

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A Defence Review is the process by which government of the United Kingdom decides upon its overall defence policy and upon the means and resources devoted to achieving its defence objectives. Such reviews can happen when political or economic factors dictate, such as upon a change of Government. The Defence Review will normally result in the publication of a policy document, styled a White Paper and released to parliament as a Command paper, setting out the broad aims, objectives, and rationale for the policy and strategy.

Contents

Post World War II Defence Reviews

The United Kingdom governmental carries out Defence Reviews infrequently, usually upon a change of government or major political event, such as just after the Collapse of Communism. They can also be necessitated by economic crises, as in 1974 and 2010.

British Defence Reviews since the end of World War II include:

Other Defence Policy Statements

United Kingdom governments have also conducted policy reviews which cover specific aspects of defence but do not purport to be fundamental reappraisals of overall defence policy and strategy. Examples of these include:

Comparison with the United States

The main difference between the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence and the United States Department of Defense as pertains to the review cycle is frequency. The U.S. DoD carries out its review, styled the Quadrennial Defense Review, on a set four-year cycle, whereas the UK MoD has no set timetable for any such review.

Related Research Articles

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Franklin Miller</span>

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Timeline of strategic nuclear weapon systems of the United Kingdom</span>

In 1952, the United Kingdom was the third country to develop and test nuclear weapons, after the United States and Soviet Union. and is one of the five nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, often known as the Integrated Review, and titled as Global Britain in a Competitive Age, was a review carried out by the British government led by Boris Johnson into the foreign, defence, security and international development policies of the United Kingdom. Described by Johnson as "the largest review of its kind since the Cold War", the review was published on 16 March 2021.

References

  1. Peter Hennessy (2012). Distilling the Frenzy: Writing the History of One's Own Times. Biteback Publishing. p. 31. ISBN   9781849544320.
  2. Hennessy (2012). Distilling the Frenzy. p. 31. ISBN   9781849544320.
  3. John Baylis (1995). Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964. Clarendon Press. pp. 104–5. ISBN   978-0-19-828012-5.
  4. Hennessy (2012). Distilling the Frenzy. p. 31. ISBN   9781849544320.
  5. Hennessey, p. 31.
  6. Hennessey, p. 31.
  7. Hennessey, p. 31.
  8. "Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter (Cm5566)". mod.uk. Ministry of Defence. 2002. Archived from the original on 26 October 2012.

Further reading