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References
- ↑ "Economic Theory Fellows – SAET" . Retrieved 2019-06-25.
- ↑ "Distinguished professor at WBS" (PDF). WBS Website. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2017-12-15.
- ↑ Karni, Edi; Safra, Zvi (1987). ""Preference Reversal" and the Observability of Preferences by Experimental Methods". Econometrica. 55 (3): 675. doi:10.2307/1913606. ISSN 0012-9682. JSTOR 1913606.
- ↑ Karni, Edi (1979). "On Multivariate Risk Aversion". Econometrica. 47 (6): 1391–1401. doi:10.2307/1914007. ISSN 0012-9682. JSTOR 1914007.
- ↑ Hong, Chew Soo; Karni, Edi; Safra, Zvi (1987). "Risk aversion in the theory of expected utility with rank dependent probabilities". Journal of Economic Theory. 42 (2): 370–381. doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90093-7 . ISSN 0022-0531.
- ↑ "Subjective Expected Utility With Incomplete Preferences". Econometrica. 81 (1): 255–284. 2013. doi: 10.3982/ecta9621 . ISSN 0012-9682.
- ↑ Karni, Edi. (1985). Decision making under uncertainty : the case of state-dependent preferences. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. ISBN 0674195256. OCLC 11812479.
- ↑ Karni, Edi (2012-02-02). "Bayesian decision theory with action-dependent probabilities and risk attitudes". Economic Theory. 53 (2): 335–356. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.360.2882 . doi:10.1007/s00199-012-0692-4. ISSN 0938-2259. S2CID 28407506.
- ↑ Karni, Edi Vierø, Marie-Louise (2014). Awareness of Unawareness: A Theory of Decision Making in the Face of Ignorance. Kingston, Ont.: Queen's Economics Dep., Queen's Univ. OCLC 951025796.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ↑ Darby, Michael R.; Karni, Edi (1973). "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud". The Journal of Law and Economics. 16 (1): 67–88. doi:10.1086/466756. ISSN 0022-2186. S2CID 53667439.
