Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner

Last updated
Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner
United States Court of Appeals For The Second Circuit Seal.svg
Court United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Full case nameFarid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
DecidedApril 11, 1947
Citation(s)160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947)
Court membership
Judge(s) sitting Thomas Walter Swan, Harrie B. Chase, Charles Edward Clark
Case opinions
MajorityChase, joined by Swan
DissentClark

Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1947) [1] is a United States federal income tax case. It is notable (and thus appears frequently in law school casebooks) for the following holding:

Contents

Facts

The taxpayer-wife sold stock which she had received from her husband, S. S. Kresge, pursuant to an antenuptial agreement, under which she accepted the shares in consideration for surrendering all marital property rights in her husband's estate. (When they married, she was 32 years old; he was 57 years old and worth approximately $375,000,000 and owned real estate of the approximate value of $100,000,000.) The stock had a basis in the husband's hands of 15 cents a share, but a fair market value of $10 a share when transferred to her.

The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's basis in the shares was the same as her husband's--15 cents—because the shares had been received by her as a "gift," as used in Sec. 113(a) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1936. The taxpayer sued, arguing the transfer from husband to wife was not a gift for income tax purposes, but an exchange of valuable property interests—stock for marital property rights—such that her basis for the shares should be $10, their fair market value at the date transferred.

Issue

"The problem presented by this petition is to fix the cost basis to be used by the petitioner in determining the taxable gain on a sale she made in 1938 of shares of corporate stock. She contends that it is the adjusted value of the shares at the date she acquired them because her acquisition was by purchase. The Commissioner's position is that she must use the adjusted cost basis of her transferor because her acquisition was by gift."

Holding

There was sufficient consideration, underlying the taxpayer's receipt of the corporate stock pursuant to an antenuptial contract in exchange for relinquishing her inchoate interest in her affianced husband's property, because this inchoate interest greatly exceeded the value of the stock transferred to her. Hence she did not acquire the stock by “gift”, and need not take her husband's cost basis in determining her taxable gain on subsequent sale of the stock. Revenue Act 1938 §113(a)(2), 26 U.S.C.Int.Rev.Acts, page 1048.

Academic Commentary

The Farid and Davis decisions are undoubtedly defensible in terms of the realization criterion: in general, transfers of property in satisfaction of contract obligations, fixed or disputed, are taxable events, with the amount realized being measured by the value of the property transferred. But as against the larger Code policy embodied in the gift exclusion--§102 and its corollary, §1015—the cases seem misguided, or at least doubtful, in result. [2]

The presence of a contract obligation, though it otherwise justifies a finding of taxable event, seems insufficient on the whole to remove pre-marital and (much more important) post-marital property arrangements from the ambit of the gift provisions. Quite obviously, family wealth is being divided between husband and wife in both instances, and it is this circumstance—rather than the presence of "consideration" in Farid or of arm's length dealing in Davis—that ought to govern the tax outcome.

Related Research Articles

Division of property, also known as equitable distribution, is a judicial division of property rights and obligations between spouses during divorce. It may be done by agreement, through a property settlement, or by judicial decree.

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), was a tax case before the United States Supreme Court that is notable for the following holdings:

A gift tax or known originally as inheritance tax is a tax imposed on the transfer of ownership of property during the giver's life. The United States Internal Revenue Service says that a gift is "Any transfer to an individual, either directly or indirectly, where full compensation is not received in return."

Nonrecourse debt or a nonrecourse loan is a secured loan (debt) that is secured by a pledge of a collateral, typically real property, but for which the borrower is not personally liable. If the borrower defaults, the lender can seize and sell the collateral, but if the collateral sells for less than the debt, the lender cannot seek that deficiency balance from the borrower — its recovery is limited only to the value of the collateral. Thus, nonrecourse debt is typically limited to 50% or 60% loan-to-value ratios, so that the property itself provides "overcollateralization" of the loan.

Marital deduction is a type of tax law that allows a person to give assets to his or her spouse with reduced or no tax imposed upon the transfer. Some marital deduction laws even apply to transfers made postmortem. The right to receive property conveys ownership for tax purposes. A decree of divorce transfers the right to that property by reason of the marriage and is also a transfer within a marriage. It makes no difference whether the property itself or equivalent compensation is transferred before, or after the decree dissolves the marriage. There is no U.S. estate and gift tax on transfers of any amount between spouses, whether during their lifetime or at death. There is an important exceptions for non-citizens. The U.S. federal Estate and gift tax marital deduction is only available if the surviving spouse is a U.S. citizen. For a surviving spouse who is not a U.S. citizen a bequest through a Qualified Domestic Trust defers estate tax until principal is distributed by the trustee, a U.S. citizen or corporation who also withholds the estate tax. Income on principal distributed to the surviving spouse is taxed as individual income. If the surviving spouse becomes a U.S. citizen, principal remaining in a Qualifying Domestic Trust may then be distributed without further tax.

Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), was a United States Supreme Court case from 1960 dealing with the exclusion of "the value of property acquired by gift" from the gross income of an income taxpayer.

Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), was a case heard before the United States Supreme Court concerning the value, for tax purposes, of inherited property with a nonrecourse mortgage encumbering it. According to Boris I. Bittker, Crane "laid the foundation stone of most tax shelters."

Amount realized, in US federal income tax law, is defined by section 1001(b) of Internal Revenue Code. It is one of two variables in the formula used to compute gains and losses to determine gross income for income tax purposes. The excess of the amount realized over the adjusted basis is the amount of realized gain or realized loss.

Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940), was an income tax case before the Supreme Court of the United States. It is notable for holding that under section 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, a landlord realizes a taxable gain when he repossesses property, the value of which has increased because the property was improved by a tenant.

<i>United States v. Gotcher</i>

United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, is a tax case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

<i>Zarin v. Commissioner</i> Court of Appeals case

Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110 is a United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision concerning the cancellation of debt and the tax consequences for the borrower for U.S. federal income tax purposes.

United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), is a federal income tax case argued before the United States Supreme Court in 1962, holding that a taxpayer recognizes a gain on the transfer of appreciated property in satisfaction of a legal obligation.

<i>Salvatore v. Commissioner</i>

Salvatore v. Commissioner is an opinion from the United States Tax Court that holds that a taxpayer cannot avoid paying taxes on the sale of property by first conveying that property to someone else. This opinion was later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This case outlines some limitations on the "fruit-and-tree" metaphor established in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) and further developed in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). Decided in 1970, the case arose when a taxpayer tried to avoid paying capital gains tax from sale of property by giving a share in that property to her children. She then paid a gift tax, which is significantly less than the tax on the gain would have been if she had not given a share to her children.

Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), was a case before the United States Supreme Court.

According to section 1001(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, all realized gains and losses must be recognized "except as otherwise provided in this subtitle." While the general rule of recognition applies in most cases, there are actually several exceptions located throughout the Internal Revenue Code. These exceptions are commonly referred to as nonrecognition provisions.

<i>Wolder v. Commissioner</i> American legal case

Wolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided whether 26 U.S.C. 102(a)'s exclusion of "bequests" from gross income included those made in consideration for services and whether the "detached and disinterested" standard applied to gifts made at death-time.

<i>Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner</i>

Warren Jones Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 524 F.2d 788 was a taxation decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

<i>Early v. Commissioner</i>

Early v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 166 was a United States income tax case, holding that an agreement between taxpayers and heirs of decedent—pursuant to which taxpayers received a joint life interest in income from the trust estate in return for the surrender of stock allegedly given to them by the decedent—was actually a compromise of the taxpayers' disputed right to the stock, and since they claimed the stock as donees, they were to be treated as having acquired their life estate in that capacity for federal income tax purposes.

Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956), was an income tax case before the United States Supreme Court.

Taxes in Germany are levied by the federal government, the states (Länder) as well as the municipalities (Städte/Gemeinden). Many direct and indirect taxes exist in Germany; income tax and VAT are the most significant.

References

  1. Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.1947).
  2. Chirelstein, Marvin (2005). Federal Income Taxation: A Law Student's Guide to the Leading Cases and Concepts (Tenth ed.). New York, NY: Foundation Press. p. 92. ISBN   978-1-58778-894-9.