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The philosophy of perception is concerned with the nature of perceptual experience and the status of perceptual data,in particular how they relate to beliefs about,or knowledge of,the world. Any explicit account of perception requires a commitment to one of a variety of ontological or metaphysical views. Philosophers distinguish internalist accounts,which assume that perceptions of objects,and knowledge or beliefs about them,are aspects of an individual's mind,and externalist accounts,which state that they constitute real aspects of the world external to the individual. The position of naïve realism—the 'everyday' impression of physical objects constituting what is perceived—is to some extent contradicted by the occurrence of perceptual illusions and hallucinations and the relativity of perceptual experience as well as certain insights in science. Realist conceptions include phenomenalism and direct and indirect realism. Anti-realist conceptions include idealism and skepticism. Recent philosophical work have expanded on the philosophical features of perception by going beyond the single paradigm of vision.
Experience refers to conscious events in general,more specifically to perceptions,or to the practical knowledge and familiarity that is produced by these processes. Understood as a conscious event in the widest sense,experience involves a subject to which various items are presented. In this sense,seeing a yellow bird on a branch presents the subject with the objects "bird" and "branch",the relation between them and the property "yellow". Unreal items may be included as well,which happens when experiencing hallucinations or dreams. When understood in a more restricted sense,only sensory consciousness counts as experience. In this sense,experience is usually identified with perception and contrasted with other types of conscious events,like thinking or imagining. In a slightly different sense,experience refers not to the conscious events themselves but to the practical knowledge and familiarity they produce. Hence,it is important that direct perceptual contact with the external world is the source of knowledge. So an experienced hiker is someone who has actually lived through many hikes,not someone who merely read many books about hiking. This is associated both with recurrent past acquaintance and the abilities learned through them.
In philosophy of perception and epistemology,naïve realism is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are. When referred to as direct realism,naïve realism is often contrasted with indirect realism.
In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind,direct or naïve realism,as opposed to indirect or representational realism,are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences;out of the metaphysical question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by our conscious experience.
Gregory Paul Currie FAHA is a British philosopher and academic,known for his work on philosophical aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. Currie is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of York and Executive Editor of Mind &Language.
A mental state,or a mental property,is a state of mind of a person. Mental states comprise a diverse class,including perception,pain/pleasure experience,belief,desire,intention,emotion,and memory. There is controversy concerning the exact definition of the term. According to epistemic approaches,the essential mark of mental states is that their subject has privileged epistemic access while others can only infer their existence from outward signs. Consciousness-based approaches hold that all mental states are either conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious states. Intentionality-based approaches,on the other hand,see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the world as the mark of the mental. According to functionalist approaches,mental states are defined in terms of their role in the causal network independent of their intrinsic properties. Some philosophers deny all the aforementioned approaches by holding that the term "mental" refers to a cluster of loosely related ideas without an underlying unifying feature shared by all. Various overlapping classifications of mental states have been proposed. Important distinctions group mental phenomena together according to whether they are sensory,propositional,intentional,conscious or occurrent. Sensory states involve sense impressions like visual perceptions or bodily pains. Propositional attitudes,like beliefs and desires,are relations a subject has to a proposition. The characteristic of intentional states is that they refer to or are about objects or states of affairs. Conscious states are part of the phenomenal experience while occurrent states are causally efficacious within the owner's mind,with or without consciousness. An influential classification of mental states is due to Franz Brentano,who argues that there are only three basic kinds:presentations,judgments,and phenomena of love and hate.
Peter Michael Stephan Hacker is a British philosopher. His principal expertise is in the philosophy of mind,philosophy of language,and philosophical anthropology. He is known for his detailed exegesis and interpretation of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein,his critique of cognitive neuroscience,and for his comprehensive studies of human nature.
In parapsychology,an apparitional experience is an anomalous experience characterized by the apparent perception of either a living being or an inanimate object without there being any material stimulus for such a perception.
Anomalous experiences,such as so-called benign hallucinations,may occur in a person in a state of good mental and physical health,even in the apparent absence of a transient trigger factor such as fatigue,intoxication or sensory deprivation.
Disjunctivism is a position in the philosophy of perception that rejects the existence of sense data in certain cases. The disjunction is between appearance and the reality behind the appearance "making itself perceptually manifest to someone."
John Michael Elliott Hinton was a British philosopher. He was a lecturer at the University of Oxford from 1958 and a fellow of Worcester College,Oxford,from 1960. He was Cowling Visiting Professor at Carleton College in 1978-79. He was previously a lecturer at Victoria University College.
Elisabeth Schellekens is a Swedish philosopher and Chair Professor of Aesthetics at Uppsala University. Previously,she was Senior Lecturer at Durham University (2006-2014). Schellekens is known for her works in aesthetics. Her research interests include aesthetic cognitivism and objectivism,aesthetic normativity,Hume,Kant,aesthetic and moral properties,conceptual art,non-perceptual or intelligible aesthetic value,the relations between perception and knowledge,the aesthetics and ethics of cultural heritage,and the interaction between aesthetic,moral,cognitive and historical value in art.
The theory of sense data is a view in the philosophy of perception,popularly held in the early 20th century by philosophers such as Bertrand Russell,C. D. Broad,H. H. Price,A. J. Ayer,and G. E. Moore. Sense data are taken to be mind-dependent objects whose existence and properties are known directly to us in perception. These objects are unanalyzed experiences inside the mind,which appear to subsequent more advanced mental operations exactly as they are.
Tamar SzabóGendler is an American philosopher. She is the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Yale as well as the Vincent J. Scully Professor of Philosophy and a Professor of Psychology and Cognitive Sciences at Yale University. Her academic research focuses on issues in philosophical psychology,epistemology,metaphysics,and areas related to philosophical methodology.
Berit Oskar Brogaard is a Danish–American philosopher specializing in the areas of cognitive neuroscience,philosophy of mind,and philosophy of language. Her recent work concerns synesthesia,savant syndrome,blindsight and perceptual reports. She is professor of philosophy and runs a perception lab at the University of Miami in Coral Gables,Florida. She was also co-editor of the Philosophical Gourmet Report until 2021.
Susanna Schellenberg is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Rutgers University,where she holds a secondary appointment at the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science. She specializes in epistemology,philosophy of mind,and philosophy of language and is best known for her work on perceptual experience,evidence,capacities,mental content,and imagination. She is the recipient of numerous awards,including a Guggenheim Award,a Humboldt Prize,and a Mellon New Directions Fellowship for a project on the Neuroscience of Perception. She is the author of The Unity of Perception:Content,Consciousness,Evidence. The book won an honorable mention for the American Philosophical Association 2019 Sanders Book Prize.
Susanna Siegel is an American philosopher. She is the Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University and well known for her work in the philosophy of mind and epistemology,especially on perception.
Anil K. Gupta is an Indian-American philosopher who works primarily in logic,epistemology,philosophy of language,and metaphysics. Gupta is the Alan Ross Anderson Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He is also a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His most recent book,Conscious Experience:A Logical Inquiry,was published by Harvard University Press in 2019.
Katherine Jane Hawley (1971-2021) was a British philosopher specialising in metaphysics,epistemology,ethics,and philosophy of physics. Hawley was a professor of philosophy at the University of St Andrews. She was the author of How Things Persist,Trust:a Very Short Introduction,and How To Be Trustworthy. Hawley was elected a Fellow of Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2016,elected a Fellow of the British Academy in 2020,and she was the recipient of a Philip Leverhulme Prize (2003) and a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship (2014–16).
Ophelia Deroy is a French philosopher who is professor of Philosophy of Mind at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich and a member of the Graduate School in Systemic Neuroscience (GSN) in Munich. She is the former deputy director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of London. She received the Prix de la Chancellerie des Universites de Paris in 2007.
References
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- ↑ "Professor Fiona Macpherson to sit on Arts and Humanities Research Council". University of Glasgow. 23 March 2018. Retrieved 27 April 2019.
- ↑ "Kennedy Memorial Trust appointments". Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street. 1 October 2014. Retrieved 12 April 2019.
- ↑ "About us". British Philosophical Association. Retrieved 11 April 2019.
- 1 2 "An Image of Sound". BBC Radio 4. 25 March 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2016.
- ↑ "The Senses". Oxford University Press. Retrieved 17 July 2016.
- ↑ Ross, Peter W. (24 August 2011). "The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- ↑ "Hallucination". The MIT Press. Retrieved 17 July 2016.
- ↑ Sauerbrey, Anna (2 October 2013). "Die Welt in uns". Der Tagesspiegel (in German). Retrieved 17 July 2016.
- ↑ Blaze Carlson, Kathryn (10 August 2012). "Philosophy gender war sparked by call for larger role for women". National Post. Retrieved 17 July 2016.
