Hedge (linguistics)

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In applied linguistics and pragmatics, a hedge is a word or phrase used in a sentence to express ambiguity, probability, caution, or indecisiveness about the remainder of the sentence, rather than full accuracy, certainty, confidence, or decisiveness. [1] Hedges can also allow speakers and writers to introduce (or occasionally even eliminate) ambiguity in meaning and typicality as a category member. [2] Hedging in category membership is used in reference to the prototype theory, to signify the extent to which items are typical or atypical members of different categories. Hedges might be used in writing, to downplay a harsh critique or a generalization, or in speaking, to lessen the impact of an utterance due to politeness constraints between a speaker and addressee. [3] [4]

Contents

Typically, hedges are adjectives or adverbs, but can also consist of clauses such as one use of tag questions. In some cases, a hedge could be regarded as a form of euphemism. Linguists consider hedges to be tools of epistemic modality; allowing speakers and writers to signal a level of caution in making an assertion. [5] Hedges are also used to distinguish items into multiple categories, where items can be in a certain category to an extent. [6]

Types of hedges

Hedges may take the form of many different parts of speech, for example:

Using hedges

Hedges are often used in everyday speech, and they can serve many different purposes. Below are a few ways to use hedges with examples to clarify these different functions.

Category membership

A very common use of hedges can be found in signaling typicality of category membership. Different hedges can signal prototypical membership in a category, meaning that member has most of the characteristics that are exemplary of the category. For example;

Epistemic hedges

In some cases, "I don't know" functions as a prepositioned hedge—a forward-looking stance marker displaying that the speaker is not fully committed to what follows in their turn of talk. [8]

Hedges may intentionally or unintentionally be employed in both spoken and written language since they are crucially important in communication. Hedges help speakers and writers indicate more precisely how the cooperative principle (expectations of quantity, quality, manner, and relevance) is observed in assessments.[ citation needed ] For example,

Hedges in non-English languages

Hedges are used as a tool of communication and are found in all of the world's languages. [9] Examples of hedges in languages besides English are as follow:

When this phrase has full syntactic complementation, speakers emphasize their lack of knowledge or display reluctance to answer. However, without an object complement, speakers display uncertainty about the truth of the following proposition or about its sufficiency as an answer. [10]

Hedges in fuzzy language

Hedges are generally used to either add or take away fuzziness or obscurity in a given situation, often through the use of modal auxiliaries [1] or approximates. [1] Fuzzy language refers to the strategic manipulation of hedges so as to deliberately introduce ambiguity into a statement. Hedges can also be used to express sarcasm as a way of making sentences more vague in written form.

Evasive hedging

Hedging can be used as an evasive tool. For example, when expectations are not met or when people want to avoid answering a question. This is seen below:

Hedges and politeness

Hedges can also be used to politely respond negatively to commands and requests by others.

Incorrect usage of hedges

There are cases in which particular hedges cannot be used or are considered strange given the context.

In the first sentence, 'loosely speaking' is used correctly, as it precedes a somewhat inaccurate, perhaps interpretive picture of the computer's identity. [11] In the second sentence, 'loosely speaking' is used when the phrase 'broadly speaking' would be more apt: the description itself is accurate, but more general in nature.

Hedging strategies

Source: [1]

See also

Related Research Articles

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References

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  2. Lewis, Martha; Lawry, Jonathan (2014). "A label semantics approach to linguistic hedges". International Journal of Approximate Reasoning. 55 (5): 1147–1163. arXiv: 1601.06738 . doi: 10.1016/j.ijar.2014.01.006 .
  3. Salager-Meyer, Francoise (1997). "I think that perhaps you should: A study of hedges in written scientific discourse". In Miller, Thomas (ed.). Functional to written text: Classroom applications. Washington, D. C.: United States Information Agency. pp. 105–118. OCLC   40657067.
  4. Lewin, Beverly A. (2005). "Hedging: An exploratory study of authors' and readers' identification of 'toning down' in scientific texts". Journal of English for Academic Purposes. 4 (2): 163–178. doi:10.1016/j.jeap.2004.08.001.
  5. Kranich, Svenja (January 2011). "To hedge or not to hedge: the use of epistemic modal expressions in popular science in English texts, English–German translations, and German original texts". Text & Talk. 31: 77–99. doi:10.1515/text.2011.004. S2CID   154907527.
  6. Fraser, Bruce (2010-08-26). "Pragmatic Competence: The Case of Hedging". New Approaches to Hedging. Studies in Pragmatics. 9: 15–34. doi:10.1163/9789004253247_003. ISBN   9789004253247.
  7. 1 2 Taylor, John R. (2003). Linguistic categorization (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-159397-0. OCLC   719369540.
  8. Weatherall, Ann (October 2011). "I don't know as a Prepositioned Epistemic Hedge". Research on Language & Social Interaction. 44 (4): 317–337. doi:10.1080/08351813.2011.619310. ISSN   0835-1813. S2CID   143939388.
  9. Hennecke, Inga (June 2015). "The impact of pragmatic markers and hedging on sentence comprehension: a case study of comme and genre". Journal of French Language Studies. 27: 1–26 via Cambridge Core.
  10. Helmer, Henrike; Reineke, Silke; Deppermann, Arnulf (December 2016). "A range of uses of negative epistemic constructions in German: ICH WEIß NICHT as a resource for dispreferred actions" (PDF). Journal of Pragmatics. 106: 97–114. doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2016.06.002. ISSN   0378-2166.
  11. "The Adverbial Digest: Broadly speaking / Loosely speaking / Strictly speaking". 5 August 2013.

Further reading