Hertz Corp. v. Friend

Last updated

Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued November 10, 2009
Decided February 23, 2010
Full case nameThe Hertz Corporation v. Melinda Friend, et al.
Docket no. 08-1107
Citations559 U.S. 77 ( more )
130 S. Ct. 1181; 175 L. Ed. 2d 1029; 78 U.S.L.W. 4153; 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2181; 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2667; 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 130; 2010 U.S. LEXIS 1897
Argument Oral argument
Opinion announcement Opinion announcement
Case history
PriorMotion to remand granted, 2008 WL 7071465 (N.D. Cal. 2008); upheld, 297 Fed. Appx. 690 (9th Cir. 2008); cert. granted, 556 U.S. 1281(2009)
SubsequentOn remand, 375 Fed. Appx. 757 (9th Cir. 2010)
Holding
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation's principal place of business is its "nerve center."
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Samuel Alito  · Sonia Sotomayor
Case opinion
MajorityBreyer, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
28 U.S.C.   § 1332

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010), was a United States Supreme Court case ruling that, for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation's principal place of business is its "nerve center:" the primary state from where its high-level executives work and direct the corporation. Diversity jurisdiction, described in the Judiciary Act of 1789, allows federal courts to hear cases on state law if the parties are "citizens" of different states; a corporation's citizenship is determined based on its principal place of business and where it is incorporated.

Contents

In 2007, John Nhieu and Melinda Friend, employees of The Hertz Corporation who lived in California, sued the company over unpaid overtime, a violation of California state law. Hertz sought to remove the case from California state court to federal court, on the basis that it was a "citizen" of New Jersey, where its headquarters was, and Delaware, where it is incorporated, and hence diversity jurisdiction applied. At the time of the case, the Ninth Circuit, which covers federal courts in California, determined a corporation's principal place of business based on which state it conducted most of its business. Hertz, doing most of its business in California, argued in the Supreme Court that this test should be replaced with a "headquarters test" that designated a corporation's headquarters as its principal place of business.

The Supreme Court unanimously rejected both the Ninth Circuit's test and Hertz's proposal, opting instead to determine the principal place of business based on the corporation's "actual center of direction, control and coordination." This test, the "nerve center" test, had prior only been used by the Seventh Circuit, and the Court's decision resolved a circuit split in the country. Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the Court, argued that the nerve center test best reflected the language of the Judiciary Act, was administratively simple, and best fulfilled Congress's intent in passing the Act. Hertz was considered a win for business defendants, who prefer litigating in federal courts, and a loss for plaintiffs across the country, who had a new obstacle in suing national corporations. The decision is considered a landmark opinion in American civil procedure and is taught in law schools as part of their elementary civil procedure curriculum.

Background

"Principal place of business" tests used before Hertz, by state

.mw-parser-output .legend{page-break-inside:avoid;break-inside:avoid-column}.mw-parser-output .legend-color{display:inline-block;min-width:1.25em;height:1.25em;line-height:1.25;margin:1px 0;text-align:center;border:1px solid black;background-color:transparent;color:black}.mw-parser-output .legend-text{}
Nerve center
Center of corporate activity
Place of operations, primarily
Total activity
No test Pre-Hertz principal place of business tests.svg
"Principal place of business" tests used before Hertz, by state
  Nerve center
  Center of corporate activity
  Place of operations, primarily
  Total activity
  No test

The Judiciary Act of 1789 grants federal courts the ability to hear cases concerning state law (as opposed to federal law) under a limited set of circumstances, with the case having to be heard in state court otherwise. One of these circumstances is "diversity jurisdiction," where the parties in the case are "citizens" of different states. [1] For natural persons (i.e. human beings), "citizenship" is determined based on where the parties are domiciled, which is in essence where they primarily live. [2] [a]

Corporations, not being natural persons, are treated differently: since 1958, the Judiciary Act specifies that they are citizens of the state they are incorporated in as well as the state where their "principal place of business" is located. [5] The latter term was ill-defined, and throughout the years jurisdictions developed their own methods of determining a corporation's principal place of business, each with their own justifications, which broadly coalesced into one of three different categories:

At the time of Hertz, the various federal courts of appeals had individually adopted tests based on one or more of these categories, resulting in a circuit split:

Case

The Supreme Court justices in 2009 Supreme Court US 2009.jpg
The Supreme Court justices in 2009

In September 2007, Melinda Friend and John Nhieu, both citizens of California, sued their employer, [8] The Hertz Corporation, a car rental company headquartered in New Jersey, [9] alleging that they had not been paid overtime wages in violation of California state law, [10] with the case developing into a class action. Pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which grants federal courts greater authority to hear class actions, Hertz removed the case from California state court, where it had been filed, to the Northern District of California, a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit. However, the plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court, claiming that the case failed to meet one of CAFA's key prerequisites: diversity jurisdiction.

In January 2008, the district court granted the motion to remand. Applying the Ninth Circuit's place of operations test, it found that Hertz was a citizen of California because the large plurality of the company's business activities were performed in California. Since the plaintiffs were also Californians, this meant that the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction and had no authority to hear the case. Hertz, claiming to be a citizen of New Jersey and Delaware (where it is incorporated), argued that the test should be adjusted for population, since California had a much larger population than any other state, but the district court was unpersuaded. Hertz appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the district court had misapplied the test. [11] The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. Hertz appealed again and the Supreme Court granted certiorari . [12]

In their briefings to the Court, the plaintiffs defended the Ninth Circuit test as the fairest and closest to the intended meaning of the Judiciary Act, while Hertz changed its tactics and argued for a "headquarters test" that would simply designate a corporation's headquarters as its principal place of business, arguing that this was the simplest, matched best with the phrasing of the law, and prevented forum shopping. The Legal Aid Society wrote an amicus brief for the plaintiffs, [13] while the United States Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, and American Trucking Associations provided a joint amicus brief for Hertz. [14]

The court held oral arguments on the case on November 10, 2009. The Court and parties primarily discussed the practical implications of their offered tests and how they would affect large corporations like Wal-Mart and Starbucks. [b] The members of the Court showed sympathy towards the simpler headquarters test, with Anthony Kennedy praising its accessibility, though Sonia Sotomayor noted the possibility of the test being abused via a "shell headquarters." [15] Conversely, the justices criticized the center of corporate activities test across the board. Antonin Scalia emphasized that the phrase "principal place of business" implied a headquarters-focused test rather than one focused on business activity. Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens criticized the test as overly complex, which creates heavy costs for less wealthy litigants. Ginsburg, Scalia, and John Roberts noted that the place of operations test disproportionately favored large and heavily populated states, particularly California, which by their nature often contain most of a nationally-sized corporation's business.

In addition to the practicality of the test, the parties discussed Congress's intent in creating and later amending the Judiciary Act; the plaintiffs particularly emphasized that the place of operations test was more difficult for a corporation to manipulate to their benefit and that the phrase "principal place of business" had long been used by bankruptcy courts to refer to a place of operations, even before the term was used in the Judiciary Act. [16] The plaintiffs had also argued in their brief that the district court's remand was not reviewable by an appellate court. However, during oral arguments, no justice asked a question about the claim and Roberts expressly stated that he was not personally interested in discussing it. [17]

Before the decision, it was generally expected that the Court would rule in favor of Hertz and adopt the headquarters test. [18] Nonetheless, the case was closely watched for its potential to dictate the course of civil cases, particularly class actions and multidistrict litigation. [19]

Decision

Stephen Breyer wrote the Court's unanimous opinion. Stephen Breyer official SCOTUS portrait crop.jpg
Stephen Breyer wrote the Court's unanimous opinion.

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of Hertz, but endorsed the nerve center test rather than the headquarters test. Justice Stephen Breyer, writing for the Court, [20] gave three reasons for the decision: the language of the Judiciary Act, practical considerations, and the Act's legislative history. [21]

Breyer first noted that the phrasing of the term "principal place of business" implied that the citizenship of a corporation depended on a single location rather than a spread-out area, favoring the nerve center test. [22] His primary concern, however, was administrative simplicity. Criticizing more complex tests for "eating up time and money as the parties litigate" issues secondary to the actual merits of the case, the opinion endorsed the nerve center test for its straightforwardness and predictability, being based on a single location at a time.

Lastly, Breyer discussed the legislative history of the Judiciary Act and the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, which to him was "to find the State where a corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state prejudice when it is sued in a local court." He concluded that the nerve center test was most likely to effectuate this goal, [23] also suggesting that Congress in passing the Act did not intent to create a cumbersome or complicated rule. [24] Breyer wrote that the test was not perfect, stating that in some cases officers may be in many different locations and that "anomalies" could result if a company's nerve center and business activities were in different states. [25]

The opinion rejected Hertz's arguments for a headquarters test, noting that while in most circumstances a corporation's headquarters would be its nerve center, the nature of a nerve center was that it was the "actual center of direction, control and coordination" for the corporation; an empty building, for example, could be a headquarters, but it could not be a nerve center.

Significance

Hertz is considered a landmark decision in American civil procedure. Sina Kian, a professor at Stanford Law School writing for SCOTUSblog, remarked that "the sparse media attention afforded to the decision should not obscure its significance," noting that prior to Hertz, only the Seventh Circuit had adopted the nerve center test and that many large corporations which had previously been considered citizens of California by dint of their business activities there were now citizens of different states. [26] Hertz and the nerve center test are taught in foundational civil procedure classes in law schools. [27]

The ruling in Hertz was seen as a win for business defendants and a loss for plaintiffs in general. The former prefer federal courts because they tend to perceive federal courts as friendlier to them, while the latter now had a new obstacle in suing national companies. [28] Attorneys, particularly those representing employers, praised the ruling as clarifying an important part of civil procedure and providing a simple rule for corporations to follow. [29] On the other hand, one lawyer for the plaintiffs remarked that the ruling would result in more federal cases, overburdening the courts and making lawsuits more expensive. [30] Following Hertz, firms tended to increase their operations in states with less business-friendly courts. Conversely, the ruling "pinned" firms to the location of their nerve center, restricting their ability to remove lawsuits in their "headquarters state" to federal court. [31] Hertz only applies to corporations. Other types of businesses, such as limited liability companies, require different tests to determine their citizenship, even though they may have "nerve centers." [32]

Attorney John T. Mitchell wrote in GPSolo Magazine that Hertz, in recognizing that corporations had a "brain," represented a step in their gradual humanization, comparing it to Citizens United v. FEC , which had also been decided in 2010. He also criticized the decision for allowing inexact results, particularly in the age of teleconferencing, and being unclear as to when an executive performs "nerve center activity." [33] Saru M. Matambanadzo of Tulane Law School also compared Hertz to other "corporate personhood" cases, noting their similar usage of body-based metaphors. [34]

Sri Srinivasan, one of the lawyers who represented Hertz, [35] would later become a prominent judge in his own right. He currently serves as the chief judge of the D.C. Circuit. [36]

See also

Other diversity jurisdiction cases:

Other jurisdiction topics:

Notes and references

Notes

  1. "Citizenship" of a state is not to be confused with literal citizenship of the United States, which involves different criteria. [3] In 1988 and again in 2011, Congress amended the Judiciary Act to clarify that one can be a noncitizen of the United States but a citizen of a state within the country for diversity jurisdiction purposes. [4]
  2. Wal-Mart is headquartered in Arkansas, while Starbucks is headquartered in Washington. According to the place of operations test, however, they would have likely been citizens of Texas and California, respectively, due to the large number of employees and facilities in those states.

References

  1. Dodson, Scott (August 2024). "Why Do In-State Plaintiffs Invoke Diversity Jurisdiction?". Law & Social Inquiry . 49 (3): 1283–1285. doi: 10.1017/lsi.2023.32 . eISSN   1747-4469. ISSN   0897-6546. OCLC   9918299981. S2CID   259702207. SSRN   4375328.
  2. Weckstein, Donald T. (January 1972). "Citizenship for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction" (PDF). Southwestern Law Journal. 30 (2): 362. ISSN   0038-4836. S2CID   157701945.
  3. Fins, Antonio (July 1, 2025). "Want to be a US citizen? Here are 5 things that Trump could soon change in that process". Palm Beach Post . Archived from the original on July 14, 2025. Retrieved August 2, 2025.
  4. Brown, Geraldine Soat (January–February 2015). "When Is a Foreigner Diverse? Diversity Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Foreign Citizens and Businesses" (PDF). The Federal Lawyer . p. 68. ISSN   1080-675X.
  5. Miller, Marc (Autumn 1983). "Diversity Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations" (PDF). University of Chicago Law Review . 50 (4): 1460–1461. doi:10.2307/1599478. eISSN   1939-859X. ISSN   0041-9494. OCLC   8092737477. S2CID   156573749.
  6. Chaplin, Michael E. (Fall 2010). "Resolving the Principal Place of Business Conundrum: Adopting A Single Test for Federal Diversity Jurisdiction". Review of Litigation . 30 (1): 80–86. ISSN   0734-4015. S2CID   141241862.
  7. Hausmann, Keena M.; Rosenthal, Paul A.; Wilson, Sean-Patrick (Spring 2010). "Home is Where the HQ is: Corporate Citizenship Following the Supreme Court's Decision in Hertz Corp. v. Friend" (PDF). Rutgers Business Law Journal. 7 (1): 133–136. ISSN   1937-0563. S2CID   155961114.
  8. Catalano, Jeffrey; Brintzenhofe, Bret (August 2010). "Supreme Court Year in Review" (PDF). The Federal Lawyer . p. 46. ISSN   1080-675X.
  9. Stempel, Jonathan (February 23, 2010). "US top court: Companies are based where execs are". Reuters . Archived from the original on August 15, 2022. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  10. Ecker, Keith (May 2010). "Hertz v. Friend: Supreme Court Defines Headquarters as a Corporation's 'Nerve Center'". InsideCounsel . ProQuest   832368294.
  11. Mullenix, Linda S. (November 2, 2009). "Are All National Corporations Now Californians? Defining a Corporation's 'Principal Place of Business' for Diversity of Citizenship Purposes" (PDF). Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases. 37 (2): 83–84. ISSN   0363-0048. S2CID   155965982. SSRN   2214114.
  12. Hils, M. Gabrielle (February 25, 2011). "Seeking CAFA Clarity: A Summary of Recent Case Law Addressing Challenges to Jurisdiction Under the Class Action Fairness Act". National Law Review . Archived from the original on February 4, 2024. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  13. Benner, Matthew; Kurland, Tom (January 2010). "Hertz Corporation v. Melinda Friend et al. (08-1107)" (PDF). The Federal Lawyer . pp. 67–68. ISSN   1080-675X.
  14. Russ, Hillary (November 6, 2009). "High Court Diversity Case Puts Corporate HQs To Test". Law360 . Retrieved July 26, 2025.(subscription required)
  15. Mauro, Tony (November 11, 2009). "Justices Sympathetic to Applying Headquarters Standard to Corporate Jurisdiction". National Law Journal . Archived from the original on November 15, 2009. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  16. Kian, Sina (November 11, 2009). "The 'Headquarters Test' or a Multifactor Approach?". SCOTUSblog . Archived from the original on June 15, 2025. Retrieved July 21, 2025.
  17. Mauro, Tony (November 11, 2009). "Lawyer Learns that Roberts Speaks Only for Himself". The BLT. Archived from the original on April 17, 2012. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  18. Weiss, Debra Cassens (November 11, 2009). "Is Starbucks' Principal Place of Business in California? Justices Think Not". ABA Journal . Archived from the original on June 1, 2023. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  19. Jaeger, Jaclyn (January 4, 2010). "Nine Cases to Shape the 2010 Legal Landscape". Compliance Week . Vol. 7, no. 2. p. 38. ProQuest   193937807.
  20. Weiss, Debra Cassens (February 23, 2010). "Supreme Court Adopts Headquarters Test, Hampering Forum-Shopping Plaintiffs". ABA Journal . Archived from the original on May 17, 2022. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  21. Quirós, Paul A.; Scott, Lynn S. (December 2010). "Business Associations" (PDF). Mercer Law Review. 64 (1): 44. ISSN   0025-987X.
  22. Maatman, Gerald L. Jr. (Spring 2011). "Recent Developments in Class Action Fairness Act Jurisprudence". Labor Law Journal . 62 (1): 31. ISSN   0023-6586. ProQuest   858660752.
  23. Blanchard, Lindsey D. (January 2013). "Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions" (PDF). McGeorge Law Review. 64 (4): 883–884. ISSN   1520-9245.
  24. Cooley, Michael P. (May 2010). "Will Hertz Hurt? The Impact of Hertz Corp. v. Friend on Bankruptcy Venue Selection". American Bankruptcy Institute Journal. 29 (4): 84. ISSN   1931-7522. ProQuest   207960343.
  25. Sear, John (October 2010). "Supreme Court Adopts Nerve Center Test for Corporate Citizenship" (PDF). LJN Online. p. 4.
  26. Kian, Sina (February 24, 2010). "Identifying corporate 'nerve centers'". SCOTUSblog . Archived from the original on August 4, 2025. Retrieved August 28, 2025.
  27. Robertson, Marc (September 9, 2019). "California-Based Federal Court Properly Invokes Personal Jurisdiction To Dismiss Food-Labeling Suit". Forbes . Archived from the original on August 28, 2025. Retrieved August 28, 2025.
  28. Kendall, Brent (February 23, 2010). "High Court Rules for Hertz in California Case". The Wall Street Journal . Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  29. Hofmann, Mark A. (March 1, 2010). "Venue ruling seen as win for business". Business Insurance. Vol. 44, no. 9. ProQuest   233508994.
  30. Ecker, Keith (May 2010). "Hertz v. Friend May Add to Overburdened Federal Docket". InsideCounsel . ProQuest   832368275.
  31. Colonnello, Stefano; Herpfer, Christoph (May 2021). "Do Courts Matter for Firm Value? Evidence from the US Court System" (PDF). The Journal of Law and Economics. 64 (2): 430–435. doi:10.1086/711593. eISSN   1537-5285. ISSN   0022-2186. OCLC   9291069112. S2CID   238584782. SSRN   2686621.
  32. Coletti, Leslie; Rutledge, Thomas E. (September 20, 2016). "Diversity Jurisdiction and Unincorporated Entities: Recent Developments". Business Law Today . Archived from the original on May 15, 2025. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  33. Mitchell, John T. (October–November 2010). "Home is Where the Nerve Center Is: Locating a Corporation's Principal Place of Business". GPSolo Magazine . Vol. 28, no. 7. pp. 37–39. ISSN   2163-1727. JSTOR   23630619.
  34. Matambanadzo, Saru M. (February 2013). "The Body, Incorporated". Tulane Law Review . 87 (3): 499–500. ISSN   0041-3992. SSRN   2212352.
  35. Wilson, Nick (November 10, 2009). "Diversity Rule for Businesses Challenged in Supreme Court". Courthouse News Service . Archived from the original on June 24, 2024. Retrieved July 20, 2025.
  36. Conrad, Jeremy (July 7, 2023). "D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Sri Srinivasan on Inspiring Ascent to the Bench: 'Highest Sense of Belonging'". Duly Noted . Archived from the original on June 19, 2025. Retrieved July 20, 2025.