Hobbesian trap

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The Hobbesian trap (or Schelling's dilemma) is a theory that explains why preemptive strikes occur between two groups, out of bilateral fear of an imminent attack. Without outside influences, this situation will lead to a fear spiral (catch-22, vicious circle, Nash equilibrium) in which fear will lead to an arms race which in turn will lead to increasing fear. The Hobbesian trap can be explained in terms of game theory. Although cooperation would be the better outcome for both sides, mutual distrust leads to the adoption of strategies that have negative outcomes for both individual players and all players combined. [1] The theory has been used to explain outbreaks of conflicts and violence, spanning from individuals to states. [2]

Contents

History

An early example of Hobbesian trap reasoning is Thucydides's analysis of the Peloponnesian War in Ancient Greece. Thucydides presented that fear and distrust towards the other side led to an escalation of violence. [3] The theory is most commonly associated with English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling also saw fear as a motive for conflict. Applying game theory to the Cold War and nuclear strategy, Schelling's view was that in situations where two parties are in conflict but share a common interest, the two sides will often reach a tacit agreement rather than resort to open conflict. [4]

Examples

Psychology professor Steven Pinker is a proponent of the theory of the Hobbesian trap and has applied the theory to many conflicts and outbreaks of violence between people, groups, tribes, societies and states. [2] [5] Issues of gun control have been described as a Hobbesian trap. [6] A common example is the dilemma that both the armed burglar and the armed homeowner face when they meet each other. Neither side may want to shoot, but both are afraid of the other party shooting first so they may be inclined to fire preemptively, although the favorable outcome for both parties would be that nobody be shot. [7] [8]

A similar example between two states is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Fear and mutual distrust between the actors increased the likelihood of a preemptive strike. [7] Hobbesian traps in nuclear weapons' case can be defused if both sides can threaten second strike, which is the capacity to retaliate with nuclear force after the first attack. This is the basis of Mutual assured destruction. [9]

The Dark Forest , a science fiction novel by Liu Cixin, incorporates a Hobbesian trap into its narrative. The dark forest hypothesis, both diegetically and non-diegetically to the novel, is a form of the Hobbesian trap that has been used to answer the Fermi Paradox by arguing that any two advanced space-faring civilizations will inevitably seek to destroy each other rather than risk being destroyed by the other, like two scared armed men prowling through a dark forest, ready to shoot at anything that so much as snaps a twig. [10]

Avoidance

The Hobbesian trap can be avoided by influences that increase the trust between the two parties. [1] In Hobbes' case, the Hobbesian trap would be present in the state of nature where, in the absence of law and law enforcement, the credible threat of violence from others may justify preemptive attacks. For Hobbes, we avoid this problem by naming a ruler who pledges to punish violence with violence. [11] [12] In the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, Kennedy and Khrushchev realized that they were caught in a Hobbesian trap, which helped them to make concessions that reduced distrust and fear. [7]

See also

Related Research Articles

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Thucydides was an Athenian historian and general. His History of the Peloponnesian War recounts the fifth-century BC war between Sparta and Athens until the year 411 BC. Thucydides has been dubbed the father of "scientific history" by those who accept his claims to have applied strict standards of impartiality and evidence-gathering and analysis of cause and effect, without reference to intervention by the gods, as outlined in his introduction to his work.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">War</span> Intense armed conflict

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The prisoner's dilemma is a game theory thought experiment that involves two rational agents, each of whom can cooperate for mutual benefit or betray their partner ("defect") for individual reward. This dilemma was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in 1950 while they worked at the RAND Corporation. Albert W. Tucker later formalized the game by structuring the rewards in terms of prison sentences and named it the "prisoner's dilemma".

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Brinkmanship</span> Political and military tactic

Brinkmanship or brinksmanship is the practice of trying to achieve an advantageous outcome by pushing dangerous events to the brink of active conflict. The maneuver of pushing a situation with the opponent to the brink succeeds by forcing the opponent to back down and make concessions rather than risk engaging in a conflict that would no longer be beneficial to either side. That might be achieved through diplomatic maneuvers, by creating the impression that one is willing to use extreme methods rather than concede. The tactic occurs in international politics, foreign policy, labor relations, contemporary military strategy, terrorism, and high-stakes litigation.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Thomas Schelling</span> American economist (1921–2016)

Thomas Crombie Schelling was an American economist and professor of foreign policy, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland, College Park. He was also co-faculty at the New England Complex Systems Institute. He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis."

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<i>The Better Angels of Our Nature</i> 2011 book by Steven Pinker

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Thucydides Trap</span> Theorised tendency towards war between emerging and existing powers

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<i>The Dark Forest</i> 2008 Chinese science fiction novel

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The dark forest hypothesis is the conjecture that many alien civilizations exist throughout the universe, but they are both silent and hostile, maintaining their undetectability for fear of being destroyed by another hostile and undetected civilization. In this framing, it is presumed that any space-faring civilization would view any other intelligent life as an inevitable threat, and thus destroy any nascent life that makes itself known. As a result, the electromagnetic spectrum would be relatively quiet, without evidence of any intelligent alien life, as in a "dark forest" filled with "armed hunter(s) stalking through the trees like ghosts".

References

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  2. 1 2 Pinker, Steven (2012). The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined . Penguin Books. ISBN   978-0143122012.
  3. Daron, Acemoglu; Wolitzky, Alexander (April 2014). "Cycles of Conflict: An Economic Model" (PDF). American Economic Review. 104 (4): 1350–1364. doi:10.1257/aer.104.4.1350. hdl: 1721.1/96000 . Retrieved 10 January 2024.
  4. Grimes, William (13 December 2016). "Thomas C. Schelling, Master Theorist of Nuclear Strategy, Dies at 95". The New York Times. Retrieved 28 June 2021.
  5. Pinker, Steven (2002). The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature . New York: Penguin Books. ISBN   978-0142003343.
  6. Ocampo, Dan (16 December 2012). "The Gun Craze". Archived from the original on 19 April 2013.
  7. 1 2 3 Pinker, Steven (29 October 2000). "All About Evil. A moral philosopher makes the case that the 20th century was even worse than we thought". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 July 2015. Retrieved 10 January 2024.
  8. Kent-Stoll, Greta; Porter, Brooke (Spring 2003). "Notes on Pinker's 'The Blank Slate', Chapters 16–17". Archived from the original on 14 February 2014. Retrieved 21 February 2014.
  9. Pinker, Steven (2018). Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress . New York: Penguin Books, p. 315–316.
  10. Liu, Cixin (2016). The Dark Forest . Tor Books. ISBN   978-0765386694.
  11. Pinker, Steven. Enlightenment Now, p. 173.
  12. Hobbes, Thomas (1651). Leviathan, Book 1, Chapter XIII.