Islamism in Kurdistan

Last updated

Islamism in Kurdistan dates back to as early as the 1920s. Islamism is a political movement which aims to implement Islam into political systems. The history of Islamism in Kurdistan is not contiguous and has a different history depending on which part of Kurdistan.

Contents

Background

Islamism in Kurdistan has an early history. During dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the overwhelming majority of Kurds had fought hard to save it. [1] [2] The Ottoman authorities viewed Kurds as a Muslim minority loyal to the empire and treated them equal to other Muslims. [3] However, the Ottoman Empire was dissolved and was replaced by the Republic of Turkey. The new Turkish state, founded upon secularism and Turkish ethnic nationalism, instantly targeted its Kurdish population, going as far as denying its entire existence and killing those who resisted the Turkification. The Kurds were also persecuted in the newly made Syria and Iraq, both also ruled by secular nationalist regimes. The Islamist Kurds fought to separate from the newly made countries, and establish their own country which would return Islamic rule to the Middle East. Islam historically was the mainstay of the Kurdish independence movement, and it remained so until the Kurdish independence movement was later dominated by secular nationalists. [4] This was evident during the Sheikh Said rebellion and Mahmud Barzanji revolts, and also the revolts led by Osman Abdulaziz, Mashouq al-Khaznawi, Sheikh Ubeydullah, and Simko Shikak.

Iraqi Kurdistan

Political Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan was largely introduced by Osman Abdulaziz. He was loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood and was based in Halabja. Prior to Osman Abdulaziz, the religious Kurds were not as involved in politics. Muslim Brotherhood ideas were also first brought into Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 1940s by Kurds who studied in Baghdad. [5] Despite some Kurds holding high positions in the Muslim Brotherhood, the Muslim Brotherhood remained unpopular with Kurds. [6] Mustafa Barzani and Jalal Talabani both knew Osman Abdulaziz and highly respected him. During the First Iraqi–Kurdish War, Barzani allowed Osman Abdulaziz and his followers to freely operate in KDP territory, and in 1974, Osman Abdulaziz went on a diplomatic mission to Saudi Arabia on behalf of Barzani. [7] [8] During the 1970s and 1980s, the main Islamist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan were two independent Muslim Brotherhood factions, one for Sorani Kurds (Halabja, Sulaymaniyah, parts of Kirkuk and Erbil), and one for Kurmanji Kurds (Duhok, parts of Nineveh and Erbil). [9]

During the Iraq-Iran war, many Kurdish Islamists from Iraq sought asylum in Iranian Kurdistan, where they were hosted by Iranian Kurdish Islamists. Iran attempted to convince the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood to fight for Iran, as there had been moments in which the Muslim Brotherhood supported the Iranian Revolution and called for unity between Sunni and Shias, however their relations worsened when Iran accused the Muslim Brotherhood of supporting Saddam Hussein during the war. [10]

Another instance was when Iran ignored the 1982 massacre by the Assad regime, in which Said Hawwa criticised Iran. [11] During the Iran-Iraq war, the Muslim Brotherhood had an increase of Arab nationalism, causing its Kurdish members to split from the Arab members. After splitting, Osman Abdulaziz founded the Kurdistan Islamic Movement, which was the originator of many Kurdish Islamist movements. [12] [13] [14] The IMK fought in the Iran-Iraq war, when Osman Abdulaziz famously declared a Jihad and had thousands of Islamist Kurds in his group, although the IMK only became a significant group when Osman Abdulaziz declared a second jihad during the 1991 Iraqi uprisings. Many Islamist Kurds who were living in exile in Iran, or fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan, returned to Kurdistan and joined Osman Abdulaziz. Among them were Mullah Krekar returning from Afghanistan, and Ali Bapir returning from Iran. [15] [16] [17] Many Kurdish Islamists had been in Afghanistan where they either fought the Soviets or received training from the Taliban or Al-Qaeda to utilise in Kurdistan. [18] Kurdish Islamists would also regularly send delegations to Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden had noticed the factionalism among Kurdish Islamists and advised them to solve their differences and reunite. [19]

Unlike other Islamist Kurds, Salahaddin Bahaaddin, who remained in the Muslim Brotherhood, refused to rebel against Baathist Iraq and called for an Islamic nonviolent campaign instead. [20] Salaheddin Bahaeddin was isolated from other Islamist Kurds, and in 1994 he formed the Kurdistan Islamic Union. Osman Abdulaziz was gaining popularity, and the IMK was rapidly gaining power. Eventually, a conflict erupted between the IMK and the Kurdistan Regional Government led by the PUK and KDP. Later, the conflict ended as part of the truce, the IMK was allowed to participate in the KRG and became its third significant party. [21]

A significant amount of IMK members who viewed democracy as haram left the IMK and split into many different factions. Mullah Krekar later emerged as a leading figure for Kurdish Islamists. Unlike the mainstream Salafi Islamism which mostly advocated for a global caliphate, Mullah Krekar presented a form of Salafi Islamism where it was focused on Kurdish affairs. He was an avid supporter of Kurdish independence and he did not plan on expanding his control past Kurdistan. He held other nationalist views, however he abandoned the components of nationalism which conflicted with religion. [22] [23] [24]

Mullah Krekar was joined by many other Salafi Kurds, including his own Islah group, the KJG, and Jund al-Islam (a merger of the Tawhid Islamic Front, the Islamic Resistance Movement, and the Second Soran Unit). They later captured land in 2001 in Hawraman and formed the Islamic Emirate of Byara. In the Islamic Emirate, Islah and Jund al-Islam merged to form Ansar al-Islam. [25] Ansar al-Islam grew very quickly and had big influence. Ansar al-Islam attacks were so effective that they led to the formation of CTG Kurdistan by the KRG. [26] Ansar al-Islam maintained its control over the Islamic Emirate of Byara until a US bombing campaign during Operation Viking Hammer ended the Islamic Emirate. Ansar al-Islam relocated to the Hamrin Mountains and fought in the Iraqi insurgency. In 2005, Ali Bapir, known for his hatred of the KRG and democracy, took part in elections for the KRG parliament, and the KJG became the third Islamist party after IMK and KIU. [27] [28] The Kurdistan Brigades and Ansar al-Islam both sought to remove all non-Muslims and their influence from Kurdistan. [29] Ansar al-Islam specifically targeted Franso Hariri, an Assyrian Christian, and killed him after 2 failed attempts on his life earlier. [30] [31] [32]

After the fall of Byara, Abu Abdullah al-Shafi'i took leadership of Ansar al-Islam, while Mullah Krekar left for Norway where he founded and led Rawti Shax until his arrest in 2015. [33] [34] When the Islamic State in Kurdistan first emerged in 2014, Ansar al-Islam and the Kurdistan Brigades both fought against the Islamic State. After months of fighting, the Islamic State won. [35] [36] [37] Both the Kurdistan Brigades and Ansar al-Islam drastically declined, and Ansar al-Islam relocated to Jabal al-Akrad. [38] In a 2010 interview, Mullah Krekar complained about Arab jihadists, claiming that when they asked for help, the Kurdish jihadists generously offered help in the Sunni Triangle, while when the Kurdish jihadists asked for help, the Arab jihadists only made excuses to avoid helping. [39]

Iranian Kurdistan

During his campaign in Iran, Simko Shikak was partially motivated by Islamism as well. [40] Kurdish Islamists in Iran were historically strongly oriented towards the Kurdish Islamists in Iraq, as the Iranian Shia authorities had been very strict on Sunni Islamist activities. While most Kurdish Islamists adhered to a Salafi leaning form, Naser Sobhani attempted to spread a Naqshbandi form in Iranian Kurdistan. [41] Ahmad Moftizade had established the Maktab-i Qur’an group in Iranian Kurdistan. Moftizade took from the ideas of Maududi and the Muslim Brotherhood. He also worked with Iranian reformist Muslim thinkers, including Mehdi Bazargan and Ali Shariati. [42] [43] As a known opponent of the Shah, Moftizade attempted to negotiate with the new Islamic Republic of Iran, and proposed a Kurdish autonomous region that would be ruled according to Islamic governance. He later was in conflict with the Iranian government again. The international Muslim Brotherhood attempted to intervene on behalf of Moftizade, however the Iranian government arrested him in 1982, and he died soon after his 1993 release. The Iranian government later arrested Sobhani who died in prison. Both of their movements declined and split into more factions with different ideologies. [44] The Salafi Islamism of Mullah Krekar that spread in Iraqi Kurdistan later spread to Iranian Kurdistan and grew over there. [45] [46] Iranian Kurdish Islamists also smuggled goods across the Iran–Iraq border to the Islamic Emirate of Byara. [18]

Turkish Kurdistan

Secularism first arose in Anatolia during the later Ottoman Empire, and it was enforced during the Republic of Turkey, however, Kurds initially refused to secularise, and secularism only rose among Kurds much later than it did among Turks. The Kurdish region of Turkey was noted for being more religious and prone to radicalisation than the Turkish region. [47] When nationalism also rose among Turks, Kurds also initially rejected it, however it would later rise among Kurds as well. [48] Sheikh Said rebelled against Turkey in 1925, with the goal of reinstating Islamic law and resisting the Turkish government oppression and denial of Kurds. [49] Necmettin Erbakan later became one of the pioneers of Islamism in Turkey. His Millî Görüş ideology was similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, but much more Turkish-centered. [50] Erbakan's MSP was among the first to challenge the government's denial of Kurds, and had recruited many Kurds. When the MSP was part of the coalition government in 1974-1975, four of its seven politicians it assigned to the cabinet were Kurds. Nevertheless, the Kurds in the MSP most often hid their ethnicity and rarely spoke about it. [51] Regardless of the Turkish government attempts at eliminating Islamism, during the 1960s and 1970s it tolerated and even promoted the Turkish–Islamic synthesis, which became the state ideology after the 1980 coup d'état. The ideology was Anti-Kurdish and would later contribute to the split between Kurdish and Turkish Islamists. [52] [53] While the fusion of Turkish nationalism and Islamism was popular at the time, there was no fusion of Islamism and nationalism among Kurds. This changed when the Kurdistan Islamic Party (PIK) was founded in 1979. It was the first Islamist group to directly speak about Kurdish identity. The PIK was mostly active in the diaspora but had a presence in Turkish Kurdistan. It recruited Kurds from other countries and campaigned in both Kurmanji and Sorani. PIK was considered the ideological originator of the Kurdish Hezbollah. [54] [55] The PIK never became a significant movement. [56] The PIK was also active in Iraqi Kurdistan, and supported Osman Abdulaziz. [57] The PIK avoided conflict with secular Kurdish parties and even collaborated with them. However, the PIK refused to take up arms, claiming that they wanted to achieve their goals through dawah rather than violence. [58] The Kurdish Hezbollah was founded in 1993, and immediately fought against both the PKK and Turkish authorities. The Kurdish Hezbollah remained a violent organisation until intensive Turkish government operations defeated and ended the armed activities of Hezbollah. [59] [60] The Kurdish Hezbollah later rebranded into many civil organisations, including the Free Cause Party, and continued to operate through them. [61]

Syrian Kurdistan

In Syrian Kurdistan, the politicisation of Islam had socially been a taboo, even among the religious Syrian Kurds. Regardless, there have been Syrian Kurds participating in Islamist activities. Mashouq al-Khaznawi was the main advocate for Kurds in Syria until his killing. [62] Later, the ruling PYD in the AANES began to enforce secularism. The Movement of Salah al-Din the Kurd and the Kurdish Islamic Front were founded in Syrian Kurdistan during the Syrian civil war. Despite both groups wanting to fight for Kurdish interests, the PYD refused to allow the groups to operate and they both were ineffective due to the pressured by the PYD. [63] [64] The PYD continued its policies, and their alleged interfered with the practice of Islam in Syrian Kurdistan, contributed to a rise of Islamism among Syrian Kurds. When the Islamic State came to Kobani, a group of local Kurds helped them and were the reason why the Islamic State had advanced so far in Kobani. [65] [66]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kurds</span> Iranian ethnic group

Kurds or Kurdish people are an Iranic ethnic group native to the mountainous region of Kurdistan in West Asia, which spans southeastern Turkey, northwestern Iran, northern Iraq, and northern Syria. There are exclaves of Kurds in Central Anatolia, Khorasan, and the Caucasus, as well as significant Kurdish diaspora communities in the cities of western Turkey and Western Europe. The Kurdish population is estimated to be between 30 and 45 million.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kurdistan</span> Region of West Asia with a historical Kurdish presence

Kurdistan, or Greater Kurdistan, is a roughly defined geo-cultural region in West Asia wherein the Kurds form a prominent majority population and the Kurdish culture, languages, and national identity have historically been based. Geographically, Kurdistan roughly encompasses the northwestern Zagros and the eastern Taurus mountain ranges.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan</span> Salafi jihadist militant group in Iraq and Syria

Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan, simply called Ansar al-Islam, is a Kurdish Islamist militant and separatist group. It was established in northern Iraq around the Kurdistan Region by Kurdish Islamists who were former Taliban and former Al-Qaeda volunteers, which were coming back from Afghanistan in 2001 after the Fall of Kabul. It was formed with the motive of establishing an Islamic state around the Kurdistan region and protecting Kurds from other armed insurgent groups during the Iraqi insurgency. It imposed strict Sharia in villages it controlled around Byara near the Iranian border.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mullah Krekar</span> Founder and 1st leader of the Islamic Emirate of Byara and Ansar al-Islam

Najmadin Vahid Faraj Ahmad, better known as Mullah Krekar, is an Iraqi Kurdish Sunni Islamic scholar and militant who was the founder and former leader of Islamist militant group Ansar al-Islam. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Italy, after having been extradited from Norway in 2020. He came to Norway as a refugee from Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991. His wife, Rukhosh Ahmad, and his four children have Norwegian citizenship, but not Krekar himself. He speaks Kurdish, Arabic, Persian, Norwegian and English.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kurdistan Islamic Movement</span> Political party in Iraq

The Kurdistan Islamic Movement is a Kurdish Islamist party founded in 1987 by mufti Osman Abdulaziz and several other Kurdish Islamic scholars who were all part of the non-political "Union of Religious Scholars" group. The party's main support comes from in and around the town of Halabja.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iraqi Kurdish Civil War</span> Kurdish internecine conflict (1994–1997)

The Iraqi Kurdish Civil War was a civil war that took place between rival Kurdish factions in Iraqi Kurdistan during the mid-1990s, mostly between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Over the course of the conflict, Kurdish factions from Iran and Turkey, as well as Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish forces, were drawn into the fighting, with additional involvement from American forces. Between 35,000 and 40,000 fighters and civilians were killed.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iraqi Kurdistan conflict (2001–2003)</span>

From 2001 to 2003, there was a military conflict in Iraqi Kurdistan between the Islamist militant group Ansar al-Islam and its allies against the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The conflict began in 2001 as an insurgency, but subsequently merged with the larger 2003 invasion of Iraq after Operation Viking Hammer. After the invasion, Ansar al-Islam moved southwards to participate in the Iraqi insurgency and, after it was quelled, the Syrian civil war.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ali Bapir</span> Kurdish Islamic intellectual and politician in Iraqi Kurdistan

Ali Bapir, also known as Mamosta Ali Bapir, is a Kurdish Islamic scholar and politician in Iraqi Kurdistan. He is the founder and current president of the Kurdistan Justice Group. He was born in 1961 in the Pshdar district, Iraqi Kurdistan. He has written over 150 books on politics, Islam, society, Kurds, and Kurdistan. He is the most popular politician with the Kurdish Islamism ideology.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mariwan Halabjaee</span> Iraqi writer and human rights activist (born 1963)

Mariwan Halabjaee or Mariwan Halabjayi is an Iraqi Kurdish writer, public speaker, and human rights activist. He is the author of sixteen books and producer of over ninety documentaries, covering topics on theology, psychology, and human rights. He is the author of the book Sex, Sharia and Women in the History of Islam. The book gained international fame when published in 2005, and has since been reprinted eleven times and translated into Arabic, Persian, and Pashto for millions of readers. It is about how Islam and Sharia are allegedly used to oppress Muslim women. "I wanted to prove how oppressed women are in Islam and that they have no rights," said Halabjaee. Halabjaee asserted the book was, "based on Islamic sources such as the Holy Quran, Muslim and Bukhari books and many more." Due to his controversial work, he is often referred to as "the Salman Rushdie of Iraqi Kurdistan".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Religion in Kurdistan</span>

The main religions that exist or historically existed in Kurdistan are as follows: Sunni Islam & Shia Islam. Overall today, Sunni Islam is the most adhered to religion in Kurdistan.

The 2005 Erbil bombing was a suicide attack on the offices of Kurdish political parties in Erbil, Kurdistan Region, on May 4, 2005. The attacker detonated explosives strapped to his body as people lined up outside a police recruiting center in Erbil. Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility. This attack is an example of religious terrorism, groups who commit terrorist acts because of religion believe that their deity or deities are on their side and that their violence is divinely inspired and approved. This attack is also an example of Strategic terrorism. Which is a form of terrorism where the terrorist plans to inflict mass casualties. The goals of Strategic terrorism are normally not local objectives but global objectives or regional objectives. Ansar al-Sunna's goal is to transform the country of Iraq into an Islamic state so their goals are regional.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rawti Shax</span> Kurdish Salafi cyberterrorist group

Rawti Shax was a Kurdish cyberterrorist offshoot of the jihadist group Ansar al-Islam.

Kurdish-Islamic synthesis, or Kurdish-Islamic nationalism, is a form of Kurdish nationalism which is Islamist in nature, unlike mainstream Kurdish nationalism, which is secularist in nature.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kurdish mujahideen</span> Kurdish Islamist rebels

The Kurdish mujahideen is a term used for Kurdish Islamists who fought the Ba'athist Iraqi government.

Kurdish Muslims are Kurds who follow Islam, which is the largest religion among Kurds and has been for centuries. Kurds largely became Muslims in the 7th century.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islamic Emirate of Kurdistan</span> Former unrecognized state in Kurdistan Region

The Islamic Emirate of Kurdistan, was an unrecognized Kurdish Islamic state located in the Halabja Governorate. It had been outside the control of the Iraqi government since 1991, and was a self-governing entity within the Kurdistan Region in 1994, and officially declared independence in 2001. It ended after Operation Viking Hammer.

Mullah Osman Abdulaziz was a Kurdish Islamic scholar and politician in Iraqi Kurdistan. He created the Kurdistan Islamic Movement. He was famous for declaring Jihad against Saddam Hussein's government.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Salvation Force</span> Kurdish Sufi militant group

The Salvation Force was a Naqshbandi Sufi Islamist militant group composed of Kurds, active in the Avroman region of Iranian Kurdistan during the 1979–1983 Kurdistan conflict and Iran-Iraq war. Like other Kurdish separatist groups in Iran, they aligned with and were armed by the Iraqi side. For the period of its existence, it was led by its founder Sheikh Muhammad Uthman Siraj al-Din Naqshbandi, of the prominent Sheikhs of Tawilah family.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islamic State in Kurdistan</span> Kurdish branch of the Islamic State

The Islamic State in Kurdistan refers to various organized clandestine cell systems operating in Kurdistan who gave their allegiance to the Islamic State, as well as the activities of the Islamic State organization in Kurdistan.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Second Soran Unit</span> Kurdish Salafi elite militant group

The Second Soran Unit was a Kurdish Salafi elite militant group active from the late 1980s until 2003.

References

  1. ↑ McDowall, David (1996). A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 131–137. ISBN 1850436533.
  2. ↑ Gingeras, Ryan (2022). The Last Days of the Ottoman Empire. Dublin: Random House. pp. 204–206. ISBN 978-0-241-44432-0.
  3. ↑ Denise Natali (2004) "OttomanKurds and emergent Kurdish nationalism", Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies,13:3, 383-387, DOI: 10.1080/1066992042000300701
  4. ↑ Van Bruinessen, M. (1991) "Religion in Kurdistan." Kurdish Times. New York, vol.4, nos 1-2. pp.5-27
  5. ↑ Karadag, Lokman. 2017. Kürt Siyasal Hareketinde Islami Bir Aktör:Kürdistan, pp. 64-66
  6. ↑ Siwayli, Idris. 2017. Iraqi Kurdish case in Muslim Brotherhood agenda, pp. 4
  7. ↑ Obeid, Adel Ahmad. 2010. 'L'islamisme en mutation : Une étude pluridisciplinaire sur la mouvance islamiste kurde, pp. 17-18
  8. ↑ Obeid, Adel Ahmad. 2010. 'L'islamisme en mutation : Une étude pluridisciplinaire sur la mouvance islamiste kurde, pp. 43-44
  9. ↑ Karadag, Lokman. 2017. Kürt Siyasal Hareketinde Islami Bir Aktör:Kürdistan, pp. 69-83
  10. ↑ Nada, Youssef, with Thompson, Douglas. 2012. Inside the Muslim Brotherhood, 59-64
  11. ↑ Aslan, Yakup. 2014. Bir Rüyanin Ardindan Gerçeklesen Sessiz Devrim, pp. 192
  12. ↑ Romano, David. 2007. An outline of Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraq', pp. 8
  13. ↑ Obeid, Adel Ahmad. 2010. 'L'islamisme en mutation : Une étude pluridiscipli- naire sur la mouvance islamiste kurde, pp. 54-59
  14. ↑ Shareef, Mohammed. 2015. 'Kurdish Islamists in Iraq: from the Muslim Brotherhood to the So-Called Islamic State: Continuity or Departure?, pp. 20-21
  15. ↑ Romano, David. 2007. An outline of Kurdish Islamist groups in Iraq', pp. 8-10
  16. ↑ Shareef, Mohammed. 2015. 'Kurdish Islamists in Iraq: from the Muslim Brotherhood to the So-Called Islamic State: Continuity or Departure?, pp. 27-31
  17. ↑ Obeid, Adel Ahmad. 2010. 'L'islamisme en mutation : Une étude pluridiscipli- naire sur la mouvance islamiste kurde, pp. 80-87
  18. 1 2 "Journey to jihad: Iran's Sunni Kurds fighting a holy war in Idlib". www.rudaw.net. Retrieved 2024-11-19.
  19. ↑ Schanzer, Jonathan (January 2004) "Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq :: Middle East Quarterly". Middle East Quarterly. Archived from the original on 2016-11-29. Retrieved 2016-11-28.
  20. ↑ Obeid, Adel Ahmad. 2010. 'L'islamisme en mutation : Une étude pluridiscipli- naire sur la mouvance islamiste kurde, pp. 58
  21. ↑ Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod, The Kurds: nationalism and politics (London: Saqi), 203-230.
  22. ↑ Gade, Tine; Palani, Kamaran (22 May 2022). "The hybridisation of religion and nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan: The case of Kurdish Islam". Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 5 (3–6): 221–241. doi:10.1080/23802014.2022.2070269. hdl:11250/2999460. S2CID 249036504.
  23. ↑ "Does Kurdish jihadist group threaten Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in north Syria? - Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East". http://www.al-monitor.com. 20 June 2021. Archived from the original on 5 May 2022. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
  24. ↑ Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (11 May 2014). "Key Updates on Iraq's Sunni Insurgent Groups". Brown Moses Blog. Archived from the original on 28 January 2015. Retrieved 26 May 2014.
  25. ↑ "Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan." Human Rights Watch, Date unknown. Web. 18 October 2010.
  26. ↑ "Salafis in Iranian Kurdistan". Zamaneh Media. 2021-05-27. Retrieved 2024-11-18.
  27. ↑ Obeid, Adel Ahmad.'L'islamisme en mutation : Une étude pluridisciplinaire sur la mouvance islamiste kurde, pp. 22-23
  28. ↑ Obeid, Adel Ahmad.'L'islamisme en mutation : Une étude pluridisciplinaire sur la mouvance islamiste kurde, pp. 80-83
  29. ↑ "Iraq: Kurdish Region Under Increasing Threat". www.rferl.org. Retrieved 2024-11-19.
  30. ↑ Education for Peace in Iraq Center > 08/23/02 ( DNN 2.0.3 ) Archived 2006-07-04 at the Wayback Machine
  31. ↑ "Franso Hariri".
  32. ↑ "Assassination of Franso Hariri, a Member of Kurdish Leadership".
  33. ↑ "16 ISIS-Linked Suspects Held in Europe-Wide Sweep: Italy Officials". NBC News. 12 November 2015. Retrieved 13 November 2015.
  34. ↑ "Italy announces swoop on 'jihadist network'". The Local. Retrieved 13 November 2015.
  35. ↑ "تساؤلات بعد "بيعة" أنصار الإسلام لتنظيم الدولة". الجزيرة نت (in Arabic). Retrieved 2024-02-18.
  36. ↑ "IS disciplines some emirs to avoid losing base – Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East". Al-Monitor. 2014-09-02. Archived from the original on 2016-03-08. Retrieved 2014-09-07.
  37. ↑ "Jihadist Group Swears Loyalty to Islamic State – Middle East – News". Arutz Sheva. 29 August 2014. Archived from the original on 1 September 2014. Retrieved 7 November 2014.
  38. ↑ "Military groups calling themselves "the finest factions of the Levant" form joint operations room". Syria Call. 15 October 2018. Archived from the original on 17 October 2018. Retrieved 16 October 2018.
  39. ↑ Brynjar Lia; "A Kurdish al-Qaida? Making Sense of the Ansar al-Islam Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan in the Early 2000s", pp. 5
  40. ↑ O'Leary, Brendan; Ṣāliḥ, Khālid (2005). "The Denial, Resurrection, and Affirmation of Kurdistan". In O'Leary, Brendan; McGarry, John; Salih, Khaled (eds.). The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 3–46. ISBN  [[Special:BookSources/%3Cbdi%3E0-8122-3870-2%3C%2Fbdi%3E |0-8122-3870-2]] Parameter error in {{ISBN}}: invalid character.
  41. ↑ Baghali, Hawzhin. 2019. 'Un salafisme kurde? Sunnisme protestataire et jihadisme en Iran, depuis 2001’, pp. 73-4
  42. ↑ Mofidi, Sabah, 'Religion and Politics in Eastern Kurdistan (With a Focus on Maktab Qur'an During Iranian Revolution, 1979), Journal of Politics and Law 8(3), 36-50
  43. ↑ van Bruinessen, Martin, 'Review article: Islam and politics in Iranian Kurdistan at a time of revolution: the life of Ahmad Moftizadeh', Kurdish Studies 5(1): 80-87.
  44. ↑ Baghali, Hawzhin, “Un salafisme kurde? Sunnisme protestataire et jihadisme en Iran, depuis 2001”, pp. 65-77
  45. ↑ "Salafis in Iranian Kurdistan". Zamaneh Media. 2021-05-27. Retrieved 2024-11-19.
  46. ↑ "سلفی‌ها در ایران: از حضور تا حمله به تهران". www.bbc.com (in Persian). Retrieved 2024-11-19.
  47. ↑ Hastings, James (1908). Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics. Vol. 7. Morrison and Gibb Limited. p. 72.
  48. ↑ McDowall, David (1996). A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 131–137. ISBN 1850436533.
  49. ↑ Hassan, Mona (10 January 2017). Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History. Princeton University Press. ISBN   978-1-4008-8371-4.
  50. ↑ Metiner, Mehmet, Yemyeşil Seriat, Bembeyaz Demokrasi, 25-26
  51. ↑ Çalmuk, Fehmi, Erbakan'ın Kürtleri / Milli Görüş'ün Güneydoğu Politikası, pp. 13
  52. ↑ Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove; Fernandes, Desmond (2008). "Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan: A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation". Genocide Studies and Prevention. 3 (1): 45–46. doi:10.3138/gsp.3.1.43.
  53. ↑ "Turkey's Kurds eye kingmaker role in election against Erdogan". March 21, 2023.
  54. ↑ Bulut, Faik. 1997. İslamcı Örgütler - 2, 3rd edition, 1997, pp. 323-4
  55. ↑ Çakır, Ruşen, Derin Hizbullah: İslamcı Şiddetin Geleceği, pp. 48
  56. ↑ Cumhuriyet, 3 April 1990
  57. ↑ Bulut, Faik. 1997. İslamcı Örgütler - 2, 3rd edition, 1997, pp. 323
  58. ↑ Aslan, Yakup. 2014. Bir Rüyanin Ardindan Gerçeklesen Sessiz Devrim; 284, 290-2
  59. ↑ Kurdish Hizbullah in Turkey, Mehmet Kurt, pp. 43
  60. ↑ Kurdish Hizbullah in Turkey, Mehmet Kurt, pp. 39
  61. ↑ "Release of Radical Group's Leaders Causes Shock in Turkey". Voice of America. 2011-01-31. Archived from the original on March 23, 2024. Retrieved 2024-01-22.
  62. ↑ Stack, Megan K. (August 14, 2005). "Cleric's Slaying a Rallying Cry for Kurds in Syria". Los Angeles Times.
  63. ↑ "Spokesman of Kurdish Islamic Front: Islamic rule guarantees Kurdish rights in Syria". ARA News. 30 December 2013. Archived from the original on 2 August 2019. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
  64. ↑ Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad (2019-08-06). "Kurdish Rebels in Northwest Syria: Interview with Harakat Salah al-Din al-Kurdi". Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi. Retrieved 2024-11-19.
  65. ↑ "Kurds help Islamic militants in battle for Kobani". AP News. 2014-11-04. Retrieved 2024-11-19.
  66. ↑ Speri, Alice (2014-11-07). "Not All Kurds Are Fighting Against the Islamic State — Some Are Joining It". VICE. Retrieved 2024-11-19.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.