The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United States (and to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom) and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject.(February 2024) |
Judicial immunity is a form of sovereign immunity, which protects judges and others employed by the judiciary from liability resulting from their judicial actions. [1] It is intended to ensure that judges can make decisions free from improper influence exercised on them, contributing to the impartiality of the judiciary and the rule of law. [2] In modern times, the main purpose of "judicial immunity [is to shield] judges from the suits of ordinary people", [3] primarily litigants who may be dissatisfied with the outcome of a case decided by the judge.
Though judges may be immune to suits, in many constitutional democracies judicial misconduct or bad personal behavior is not completely protected – total impunity is considered contrary to the rule of law. [4] Depending on the jurisdiction, they may be criminally charged for courtroom behavior unrelated to the decision-making process (for example, by shooting someone and committing a murder) and judges may be removed. The method by which judges are removed varies by the judicial system in question, they include removal by other judges on the same or a higher court (in the United States, a judicial council), by a recall election, by the next regular election, or following impeachment by a legislature.
The extent and importance of judicial immunity over time are not wholly clear. A consensus of jurisprudential opinion however shares the view that judicial immunity developed gradually over time, evolving into its current-day position. The early origins of the doctrine may be, according to some sources, traced to the preservation of judicial independence from the political forces of the day, [5] [6] although today judicial independence is regarded as a separate principle, and immunity mainly justified from the judge's distance and independence from the parties to a case.
The United States, upon independence, inherited from England, a common-law heritage of judicial immunity, the Supreme Court even holding that "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction". [7] Notably, in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 US (13 Wall.) 335, the Supreme Court, referring in dicta to contemporary precedent in England, held that an action ought not to be entertained against a judge for his judicial acts even where allegedly done "maliciously and corruptly", at 349. The breadth of this view, however is often disputed.
Whilst scholars disagree on the exact history of judicial immunity at common law, most generally agree that its key purposes include preserving the impartiality of the judge, and avoiding attacks on judicial officers as an alternative or a bypass to appeals. [8]
Judges enjoy absolute immunity from prosecution for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function, under section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. [9] [10] [11] But it does not prevent Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge. [9] [11]
In the United Kingdom, tribunals are considered judicial in nature and so judicial immunity applies to them at common law. This was accepted by the Employment Appeal Tribunal and subsequently the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in respect of police misconduct hearings constituted under the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985 (since superseded by the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008) in Heath v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis. [12] However, in P v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, in which a police officer (an officer of the Crown, but under the Equality Act 2010 treated as an employee in employment discrimination cases) sought review of her dismissal as constituting disability discrimination due to post-traumatic stress disorder, the Supreme Court ruled that the Employment Equality Framework Directive provided directly applicable rights of access to justice in cases of employment discrimination, which, given the supremacy of EU law, overrode the common law rule of judicial immunity. [13] [14]
In the United States, judicial immunity is among a handful of forms of absolute immunity, along with prosecutorial immunity, legislative immunity, and witness immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized judicial immunity as providing "the maximum ability [of judges] to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public". [15] The justification is as follows: because of the likelihood of innocent individuals being convicted in a court of law under false claims, the "burden" of being subjected to a court of law (a trial) would "dampen" the judges "enthusiasm" or "passion". [16] Opponents of judicial immunity argue that this doctrine is not adequately justified. [17] For example, judges could be shielded from any personal capacity liability, and still be subject to official capacity liability so that they may be held accountable for their injurious acts – thus "balancing" the "evil" to better protect the fundamental rights of victims.
Judicial immunity does not protect judges from suits stemming from administrative decisions made while off the bench, like hiring and firing decisions. But immunity generally does extend to all judicial decisions in which the judge has proper jurisdiction, even if a decision is made with "corrupt or malicious intent". [18] By way of counterexample: in 1997 West Virginia Judge Troisi became so irritated with a rude defendant, he stepped down from the bench, took off his robe, and bit the defendant on the nose. [19] He pleaded no contest to state charges but was acquitted of federal charges of violating the defendant's civil rights. [20] He spent five days in jail and was put on probation. [21]
Because the immunity is attached to the judicial nature of the acts, not the official title of the officeholder, judicial immunity also applies to administrative hearings, although in some situations, only qualified immunity applies. [22] In determining whether absolute or qualified immunity applies, the U.S. Supreme Court has identified the following factors, according to the Shriver Center's Federal Practice Manual for Legal Aid Attorneys: [22]
(a) The need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal.
The following are a few significant or illustrative cases on judicial immunity in the United States:
One of the leading decisions on judicial immunity is Stump v. Sparkman . In 1971, Judge Harold D. Stump granted a mother's petition to have a tubal ligation performed on her 15-year-old daughter, whom the mother alleged was "somewhat retarded". The daughter was told that the surgery was to remove her appendix. In 1975 the daughter, going by her then-married name of Linda Sparkman, learned that she had been sterilized. She sued the judge. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the judge could not be sued, because the decision was made in the course of his duties. In that regard, it was irrelevant that the judge's decision may have been contrary to law and morally reprehensible.
One significant case where a judge was sued and did not receive immunity is Harris v. Harvey. [23] [24] Sylvester Harris, an African-American police lieutenant in Racine, Wisconsin, was attacked in a variety of ways by Judge Richard G. Harvey. Harris sued Harvey because of (a) comments Harvey made to the news media, (b) threatening letters Harvey wrote to city and county officials who attempted to defend Harris, and (c) parties Harvey held for ranking state officials during which he attempted to get Harris removed from law enforcement. The jury concluded that Harvey was not eligible for judicial immunity for these actions, as such acts were not part of the judge's normal duties (i.e. they were "outside his jurisdiction"). The jury awarded Harris $260,000 in damages. Another judge later added $7,500 in legal fees. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concurred with the jury's decision. Judge Harvey petitioned the Seventh Circuit court for an en banc rehearing, and petitioned to the Supreme Court, both of which were denied. Harris v. Harvey is the first case in the United States where a sitting court judge has been sued and lost in a civil action; it is a binding precedent in the Seventh Circuit and is persuasive authority in the other circuits. [25] [26] [27]
In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Supreme Court of Virginia did not have immunity from being enjoined in its enforcement capacity where state law gave the court independent authority to initiate certain proceedings against attorneys. [28] Consumers Union was hindered in compiling an attorney directory because many attorneys declined to provide information for fear of violating regulations promulgated by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Consumers Union filed a lawsuit in federal court against the Supreme Court of Virginia and others, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to have the regulation declared unconstitutional and to enjoin the defendants from enforcing it. [29] The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Virginia's possession of legislative immunity in some cases, however. [30]
In the case of Mireles v. Waco (1991), [31] when a defense lawyer failed to appear for a scheduled hearing, the judge not only issued a bench warrant for his arrest, but instructed the police sent to arrest him to "rough him up a little" to teach him not to skip court dates. Although this was entirely unprofessional and possibly criminal, the judge was held, by the Supreme Court, to have absolute immunity from a lawsuit arising from the resulting beating, because the misbehavior occurred entirely within his activities as a judge presiding over a court.
Sovereign immunity, or crown immunity, is a legal doctrine whereby a sovereign or state cannot commit a legal wrong and is immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution, strictly speaking in modern texts in its own courts. State immunity is a similar, stronger doctrine, that applies to foreign courts.
In law, standing or locus standi is a condition that a party seeking a legal remedy must show they have, by demonstrating to the court, sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's participation in the case. A party has standing in the following situations:
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), is the leading United States Supreme Court decision on judicial immunity. It involved an Indiana judge who was sued by a young woman who had been sterilized without her knowledge as a minor in accordance with the judge's order. The Supreme Court held that the judge was immune from being sued for issuing the order because it was issued as a judicial function. The case has been called one of the most controversial in recent Supreme Court history.
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), is a landmark legal case decided in 1953, which saw the formal recognition of the state secrets privilege, a judicially recognized extension of presidential power. The US Supreme Court confirmed that "the privilege against revealing military secrets ... is well established in the law of evidence".
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33 (2006), was a California Supreme Court case concerning online defamation. The case resolved a defamation claim brought by Stephen Barrett, Terry Polevoy, and attorney Christopher Grell against Ilena Rosenthal and several others. Barrett and others alleged that the defendants had republished libelous information about them on the internet. In a unanimous decision, the court held that Rosenthal was a "user of interactive computer services" and therefore immune from liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
A court of general jurisdiction, in the law of the United States, is a court with authority to hear cases in law and in equity of all kinds – criminal, civil, family, probate, and other legal claims.
In the United States, qualified immunity is a legal principle of federal constitutional law that grants government officials performing discretionary (optional) functions immunity from lawsuits for damages unless the plaintiff shows that the official violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known". It is comparable to sovereign immunity, though it protects government employees rather than the government itself. It is less strict than absolute immunity, by protecting officials who "make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions", extending to "all [officials] but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law". Qualified immunity applies only to government officials in civil litigation, and does not protect the government itself from suits arising from officials' actions.
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), was a landmark Supreme Court of the United States decision in which the Court held unconstitutional prior restraints on media coverage during criminal trials.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), was a United States Supreme Court decision written by Justice Lewis Powell dealing with presidential immunity from civil liability for actions taken while in office. The Court found that a president "is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts."
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), was a United States Supreme Court case deciding on the issue of immunity of cabinet officers from suits from individuals.
Judicial misconduct occurs when a judge acts in ways that are considered unethical or otherwise violate the judge's obligations of impartial conduct.
In United States law, absolute immunity is a type of sovereign immunity for government officials that confers complete immunity from criminal prosecution and suits for damages, so long as officials are acting within the scope of their duties. The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that government officials deserve some type of immunity from lawsuits for damages, and that the common law recognized this immunity. The Court reasons that this immunity is necessary to protect public officials from excessive interference with their responsibilities and from "potentially disabling threats of liability."
In United States law, the federal government as well as state and tribal governments generally enjoy sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, from lawsuits. Local governments in most jurisdictions enjoy immunity from some forms of suit, particularly in tort. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides foreign governments, including state-owned companies, with a related form of immunity—state immunity—that shields them from lawsuits except in relation to certain actions relating to commercial activity in the United States. The principle of sovereign immunity in US law was inherited from the English common law legal maxim rex non potest peccare, meaning "the king can do no wrong." In some situations, sovereign immunity may be waived by law.
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), was a case decided on by the United States Supreme Court. The case restricted judicial immunity in certain instances.
Judicial independence is protected by Singapore's Constitution, statutes such as the State Courts Act and Supreme Court of Judicature Act, and the common law. Independence of the judiciary is the principle that the judiciary should be separated from legislative and executive power, and shielded from inappropriate pressure from these branches of government, and from private or partisan interests. It is crucial as it serves as a foundation for the rule of law and democracy.
Byrne v Ireland[1972] IR 241 is an Irish Supreme Court case where the court held that the State was not immune from tortious liability and thus abolished the immunity of the State in tort. Therefore, the State could be sued for the actions of its servants. This case also determined that the Attorney General was the appropriate party to represent the State in these tort cases.
Harris v. Harvey 605 F.2d 330 was a landmark decision on judicial immunity, brought under the Civil Rights Act. In it, the United States court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that intentional acts of public defamation inspired by racial prejudice are not judicial functions, thus establishing that neither judicial or prosecutorial immunity protects a judge who uses the power of their state office to engage in such acts. It has been cited as the first case in the United States where a sitting court judge was sued and lost in a civil action. As decision of the Seventh Circuit, the case is binding precedent in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, and has been used as persuasive authority in other appellate and district courts.
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that U.S. states lack sovereign immunity from private lawsuits filed against them in the courts of another state. The majority opinion held that "nothing in the Constitution authorizes or obligates" states to grant sister states immunity in court. States may grant sister states immunity if they choose. This decision was overturned by the 2019 case Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court first introduced the justification for qualified immunity for police officers from being sued for civil rights violations under Section 1983, by arguing that "[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he had probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does."
A sitting president of the United States has both civil and criminal immunity for their official acts. Neither civil nor criminal immunity is explicitly granted in the Constitution or any federal statute.
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