The Karakhan Manifesto was a statement of Soviet policy toward China dated 25 July 1919. It was issued by Lev Karakhan, deputy commissioner for foreign affairs for Soviet Russia. The manifesto offered to relinquish various rights Russia had obtained by treaty in China, including Chinese territories seized during Tsarism, extraterritoriality, economic concessions, and Russia's share of the Boxer indemnity.[1] These and similar treaties had been denounced by Chinese nationalists as "unequal." The manifesto created a favorable impression of Russia and Marxism among Chinese. It was often contrasted with the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which granted Shandong to Japan.[2]
The manifesto was prompted by the Bolshevik advance into Siberia, which created a need to establish a relationship with China.[3] The Bolsheviks saw the Chinese as one of "the oppressed peoples of the East" and therefore a potential ally against the imperialist powers.[3]
The manifesto is addressed to, "the Chinese people and the Governments of North and South China."[2] Because both Russia and China were in a state of civil war at this time, diplomatic exchanges were often delayed. Although the document was published in Moscow in August 1919, it was not formally presented to Chinese diplomats until February 1920. The version presented at this time includes the passage, "the Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people, without any compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway."[4]
Six months later, Karakhan personally handed the Chinese a second version of the manifesto, one that did not include this remarkable offer. In fact, the Soviet authorities denied ever having made it. The railway offer had been included by "mistake," they explained. The Soviets may have hoped the offer of the railway would generate an enthusiastic response in Beijing, leading to a Sino-Soviet alliance against Japan. The warlords in Beijing, closely tied to Japan, responded hesitantly. When the hoped-for alliance proved unattainable, the Russians withdrew their offer.[2] In any event, traditional Russian interests and rights in China, including control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, were reaffirmed in a series of secret agreements made in 1924–1925.[5]
The manifesto came at a crucial time in the development of Chinese communism. It encouraged interest in Marxism and thus played a role in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.[6]
Question of continued validity
Map showing all of the territories that Imperial and Soviet Russia took from China from 1858 to 1921
From 1918 to October 1922, the Russian Civil War was ongoing between the Bolsheviks (the Reds) and the Whites, who were backed by the Allies: Japan, Poland, France, the United States, the British Empire, and several others. These were uncertain times for the Bolsheviks. At the time in Manchuria, there were over 150,000 former Russian (Tsarist) citizens, most of whom were anti-Bolshevik. Thus, the Reds wanted to return the Chinese Eastern Railway and other territories to China to gain their allegiance and to protect Russia from another Allied front based in Manchuria.[7]
After October 1922, with the civil war over, the Bolshevik regime had stabilized and no longer felt bound to its earlier offers. The USSR annulled the two Karakhan Manifestos, and the current Russian Federation does not see them as valid. Taiwan (the Republic of China) does, while the People's Republic of China has yet to state an official position. The PRC did, however, redraw its map of the Russian Far East in February 2023, calling Vladivostok "Haishenwai" and Khabarovsk "Boli."[8] These were the old Chinese names for both settlements. The Russians consider that the Russia-Border Treaties of 1991 and 2004 have set the Russian-Chinese borders where they stand on the current map.
Nevertheless, two American historians, Bruce A. Elleman and Jon K. Chang, believe that the Karakhan Manifestos are still valid and extant, as unilateral, legally binding declarations. They are not treaties nor accords which need to be signed by both parties.[9] Furthermore, Elleman's Diplomacy and Deception states that the secret protocol reaffirming Russia's territorial claims in China, according to Elleman, simply ruled that the previous agreements (the manifestos) "were not abolished, they were simply not enforced." The decision to accept or annul the Karakhan Manifestos would depend on future conferences and negotiations (pp.100–102).[10]
There are those who disagree, namely Sergey Radchenko, a scholar in international relations. When President Lai Ching-te of Taiwan made a quip (September 2, 2024) about China invading Russia to take back its "lost territories," Radchenko said that Lai was "seriously misguided." Radchenko then spoke for China saying "China fully recognizes Russia's sovereignty over these territories."[11] The next day, September 3, Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, issued a statement mirroring Radchenko's earlier remarks about the validity of China recovering its "lost territories".[12]
12Whiting, Allen S., "The Soviet Offer to China of 1919", The Journal of Asian Studies, August 1951, pp. 355–364, doi:10.2307/2049007
↑Uldricks, Teddy J. "Karakhan Declaration." Encyclopedia of Russian History. 2004. Encyclopedia.com.
↑Elleman, Bruce, "The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924–1925," The Journal of Asian Studies, May 1994, pp. 459–486, doi:10.2307/2059842
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