Knight v. Jewett | |
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Decided August 24, 1992 | |
Full case name | Kendra Knight v. Michael Jewett |
Citation(s) | 3 Cal.4th 296 (1992) 834 P.2d 696 (1992) 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 |
Case history | |
Prior history | 275 Cal.Rptr. 292 (1990) (affirmed) |
Holding | |
Assumption of risk is still a defense to liability even under a comparative negligence scheme. | |
Court membership | |
Chief Justice | Malcolm M. Lucas |
Associate Justices | Edward A. Panelli, Joyce L. Kennard, Stanley Mosk, Armand Arabian, Ronald M. George, Marvin R. Baxter |
Case opinions | |
Plurality | George, joined by Lucas, Arabian |
Concur/dissent | Mosk |
Concur/dissent | Panelli, joined by Baxter |
Dissent | Kennard |
Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296 (1992), was a case decided by the California Supreme Court, ruling that the comparative negligence scheme adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California did not eliminate the defense of assumption of risk in an action for negligence. [1]
The plaintiff sued for personal injuries after the defendant stepped on her hand during a touch football game.
The court recognized two categories of assumption of risk. One was primary assumption of risk in which the defendant owes no duty of care to protect the plaintiff from the risk that caused the injury. The other is secondary assumption of risk in which the defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff, who knowingly encounters the risk created by the defendant's breach of that duty.
The court held that secondary assumption of risk had been merged into the comparative negligence scheme adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California but that primary assumption of risk could still serve as a defense to negligence. The court determined that in a touch football game, the only duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is to not be reckless and wanton. Because the plaintiff was injured in the normal course of the touch football game, the injury fell under primary assumption of risk, and she was barred from recovery. [2]
Negligence is a failure to exercise appropriate care expected to be exercised in similar circumstances.
Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine in common law and Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions under which a court can infer negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how any defendant behaved in the context of tort litigation. Although specific criteria differ by jurisdiction, an action typically must satisfy the following elements of negligence: the existence of a duty of care, breach of appropriate standard of care, causation, and injury. In res ipsa loquitur, the existence of the first three elements is inferred from the existence of injury that does not ordinarily occur without negligence.
A tort is a civil wrong that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm, resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act. Tort law can be contrasted with criminal law, which deals with criminal wrongs that are punishable by the state. While criminal law aims to punish individuals who commit crimes, tort law aims to compensate individuals who suffer harm as a result of the actions of others. Some wrongful acts, such as assault and battery, can result in both a civil lawsuit and a criminal prosecution in countries where the civil and criminal legal systems are separate. Tort law may also be contrasted with contract law, which provides civil remedies after breach of a duty that arises from a contract. Obligations in both tort and criminal law are more fundamental and are imposed regardless of whether the parties have a contract.
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This article addresses torts in United States law. As such, it covers primarily common law. Moreover, it provides general rules, as individual states all have separate civil codes. There are three general categories of torts: intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability torts.
Assumption of risk is a defense, specifically an affirmative defense, in the law of torts, which bars or reduces a plaintiff's right to recovery against a negligent tortfeasor if the defendant can demonstrate that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumed the risks at issue inherent to the dangerous activity in which the plaintiff was participating at the time of their injury.
In tort law, a duty of care is a legal obligation that is imposed on an individual, requiring adherence to a standard of reasonable care to avoid careless acts that could foreseeably harm others, and lead to claim in negligence. It is the first element that must be established to proceed with an action in negligence. The claimant must be able to show a duty of care imposed by law that the defendant has breached. In turn, breaching a duty may subject an individual to liability. The duty of care may be imposed by operation of law between individuals who have no current direct relationship but eventually become related in some manner, as defined by common law.
In some common law jurisdictions, contributory negligence is a defense to a tort claim based on negligence. If it is available, the defense completely bars plaintiffs from any recovery if they contribute to their own injury through their own negligence.
Comparative negligence, called non-absolute contributory negligence outside the United States, is a partial legal defense that reduces the amount of damages that a plaintiff can recover in a negligence-based claim, based upon the degree to which the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to cause the injury. When the defense is asserted, the factfinder, usually a jury, must decide the degree to which the plaintiff's negligence and the combined negligence of all other relevant actors all contributed to cause the plaintiff's damages. It is a modification of the doctrine of contributory negligence that disallows any recovery by a plaintiff whose negligence contributed even minimally to causing the damages.
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