Trimarco v. Klein | |
---|---|
![]() | |
Court | New York Court of Appeals |
Full case name | Vincent N. Trimarco et al., Appellants, v. Irving Klein et al., Individually and as Copartners Doing Business as Glenbriar Company, Respondents. |
Decided | May 20, 1982 |
Citation(s) | 436 N.E.2d 502; 56 N.Y.2d 98 |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Lawrence H. Cooke, Matthew J. Jasen, Domenick L. Gabrielli, Hugh R. Jones, Sol Wachtler, Jacob D. Fuchsberg, Bernard S. Meyer |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Fuchsberg, joined by Cooke, Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer |
Keywords | |
Trimarco v. Klein Ct. of App. of N.Y., 56 N.Y.2d 98, 436 N.E.2d 502 (1982) is a 1982 decision by the New York Court of Appeals dealing with the use of custom in determining whether a person acted reasonably given the situation. It is commonly studied in introductory U.S. tort law classes.
Trimarco (P) appealed an order which reversed a judgment in favor of P and dismissed P's complaint in a negligence action for personal injuries.
P was severely injured when he fell through the glass door enclosing his tub in his apartment he was renting. It was not possible for P or his wife to determine if the glass was tempered or just ordinary glass. After the accident, the glass was found to be just ordinary glass. P sued Klein (D), his landlord, for the injuries. At trial, P introduced expert evidence about the custom and usage of tempered glass from 1956 to 1976. Since at least the early 1950s, a practice of using shatterproof glazing materials for bathroom enclosures had come into common use, so that by 1976 the glass door here no longer conformed to accepted safety standards. P also showed that over this period bulletins of nationally recognized safety and consumer organizations along with official Federal publications had joined in warning of the dangers that lurked when plain glass was utilized in "hazardous locations", including "bathtub enclosures". Over objection, the trial court also allowed in sections of New York's General Business Law, which, as of July 1, 1973, required, on pain of criminal sanctions, that only "safety glazing material" be used in all bathroom enclosures. D's managing agent admitted that, since at least 1965, it was customary for landlords who had occasion to install glass for shower enclosures, to replace the glass with "some material such as plastic or safety glass". P was given the verdict by the jury. The appellate division reversed the decision awarding P damages; D was under no common law duty to replace the glass unless he had prior notice of the danger. P appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.
The question asked was, does custom and usage per se fix the scope of the reasonable person standard? The response of the court was, custom and usage is highly relevant evidence related to the reasonable person standard but it does not per se define the scope of negligence.
Judge Jacob D. Fuchsberg gave the following decision.
Does custom and usage per se fix the scope of the reasonable person standard? No. Custom and usage is part of the reasonable person standard to show what ought to be done. When "certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of doing things safely, this custom may be proved to show that [the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen below the required standard." This evidence and proof must bear on what is reasonable conduct under all the circumstances, the quintessential test of negligence. When proof of an accepted practice is accompanied by evidence that the defendant conformed to it, this may establish due care. When proof of a customary practice is coupled with a showing that it was ignored and that this departure was a proximate cause of the accident, it may serve to establish liability. Proof of a common practice aids in "[formulating] the general expectation of society as to how individuals will act in the course of their undertakings, and thus to guide the common sense or expert intuition of a jury or commission when called on to judge of particular conduct under particular circumstances." Custom and usage reflects the judgment and experience and conduct of many. Customary practice and usage need be universal to be relevant to a determination of the duty of care. It suffices that it be fairly well defined and in the same calling or business so that "the actor may be charged with knowledge of it or negligent ignorance." Even so a common practice or usage is still not necessarily a conclusive or even a compelling test of negligence. The jury must still be satisfied with the reasonableness of the behavior which adhered to the custom or the unreasonableness of that which did not. As Holmes expressed it, "what usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not." P presented more than an abundance of evidence to the jury to reach and sustain the verdict they passed down. The trial judge properly framed that evidence when he instructed the jury that the evidence only was to be received regarding the reasonableness of the conduct under all the circumstances. The court reversed the dismissal of the trial (from the appellate level), but ordered a new trial because the trial judge had erroneously admitted certain evidence.
Custom and usage evidence is highly relevant to a determination of whether an actor used reasonable care under the circumstances. Such evidence tends to show that taking the omitted precaution that resulted in harm was technologically and economically feasible and that the harm itself was foreseeable. Custom and usage evidence is not treated as negligence per se: the jury or fact finder must still determine if the custom and usage is reasonable. Thus, custom and usage are merely evidence of what ought to be done (often highly persuasive evidence), but evidence of custom and usage must still be reconciled with the reasonable person standard. Custom and usage are not conclusive evidence of negligence.
T.J.Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (opinion by Judge Learned Hand).
Text of Trimarco v. Klein is available from: Leagle
Negligence is a failure to exercise appropriate and/or ethical ruled care expected to be exercised amongst specified circumstances. The area of tort law known as negligence involves harm caused by failing to act as a form of carelessness possibly with extenuating circumstances. The core concept of negligence is that people should exercise reasonable care in their actions, by taking account of the potential harm that they might foreseeably cause to other people or property.
Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine in common law and Roman-Dutch law jurisdictions under which a court can infer negligence from the very nature of an accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how any defendant behaved in the context of tort litigation. Although specific criteria differ by jurisdiction, an action typically must satisfy the following elements of negligence: the existence of a duty of care, breach of appropriate standard of care, causation, and injury. In res ipsa loquitur, the existence of the first three elements is inferred from the existence of injury that does not ordinarily occur without negligence.
In a legal dispute, one party has the burden of proof to show that they are correct, while the other party has no such burden and is presumed to be correct. The burden of proof requires a party to produce evidence to establish the truth of facts needed to satisfy all the required legal elements of the dispute.
In law, a reasonable person, reasonable man, or the man on the Clapham omnibus, is a hypothetical person of legal fiction crafted by the courts and communicated through case law and jury instructions.
The presumption of innocence is a legal principle that every person accused of any crime is considered innocent until proven guilty. Under the presumption of innocence, the legal burden of proof is thus on the prosecution, which must present compelling evidence to the trier of fact. If the prosecution does not prove the charges true, then the person is acquitted of the charges. The prosecution must in most cases prove that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If reasonable doubt remains, the accused must be acquitted. The opposite system is a presumption of guilt.
Beyond (a) reasonable doubt is a legal standard of proof required to validate a criminal conviction in most adversarial legal systems. It is a higher standard of proof than the standard of balance of probabilities commonly used in civil cases because the stakes are much higher in a criminal case: a person found guilty can be deprived of liberty, or in extreme cases, life, as well as suffering the collateral consequences and social stigma attached to a conviction. The prosecution is tasked with providing evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to get a conviction; albeit prosecution may fail to complete such task, the trier-of-fact's acceptance that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt will in theory lead to conviction of the defendant. A failure for the trier-of-fact to accept that the standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been met thus entitles the accused to an acquittal. This standard of proof is widely accepted in many criminal justice systems, and its origin can be traced to Blackstone's ratio, "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer."
The law of evidence, also known as the rules of evidence, encompasses the rules and legal principles that govern the proof of facts in a legal proceeding. These rules determine what evidence must or must not be considered by the trier of fact in reaching its decision. The trier of fact is a judge in bench trials, or the jury in any cases involving a jury. The law of evidence is also concerned with the quantum (amount), quality, and type of proof needed to prevail in litigation. The rules vary depending upon whether the venue is a criminal court, civil court, or family court, and they vary by jurisdiction.
In the common law tradition, testamentary capacity is the legal term of art used to describe a person's legal and mental ability to make or alter a valid will. This concept has also been called sound mind and memory or disposing mind and memory.
Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 132 ER 490 (CP) is a leading English tort law case that first introduced the concept of the reasonable person in law.
In tort law, the standard of care is the only degree of prudence and caution required of an individual who is under a duty of care.
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 is an English tort law case that lays down the typical rule for assessing the appropriate standard of reasonable care in negligence cases involving skilled professionals such as doctors. This rule is known as the Bolam test, and states that if a doctor reaches the standard of a responsible body of medical opinion, they are not negligent. Bolam was rejected in the 2015 Supreme Court decision of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board in matters of informed consent.
R v Lifchus, [1997] 3 SCR 320 is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the legal basis of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal law. Cory J outlined several core principles of the reasonable doubt standard and provided a list of points that must be explained to a jury when they are to consider the standard.
The criminal law of Canada is under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada. The power to enact criminal law is derived from section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Most criminal laws have been codified in the Criminal Code, as well as the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, Youth Criminal Justice Act and several other peripheral statutes.
Actual innocence is a special standard of review in legal cases to prove that a charged defendant did not commit the crimes that they were accused of, which is often applied by appellate courts to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
In English tort law, there can be no liability in negligence unless the claimant establishes both that they were owed a duty of care by the defendant, and that there has been a breach of that duty. The defendant is in breach of duty towards the claimant if their conduct fell short of the standard expected under the circumstances.
R v Davidson, also known as the Menhennitt ruling, was a significant ruling delivered in the Supreme Court of Victoria on 26 May 1969. It concerned the legality of abortion in the Australian state of Victoria. The ruling was not the end of the case, but rather answered certain questions of law about the admissibility of evidence, so as to allow the trial to proceed.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was a landmark Supreme Court case that established the standard for determining when a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by that counsel's inadequate performance.
Martin v. Herzog, Ct. of App. of N.Y., 228 N Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920), was a New York Court of Appeals case.
Ward v. Tesco Stores Ltd. [1976] 1 WLR 810, is an English tort law case concerning the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It deals with the law of negligence and it set an important precedent in so called "trip and slip" cases which are a common occurrence.