Dougherty v. Stepp

Last updated
Dougherty v. Stepp
Court North Carolina Supreme Court
Decided1835 (1835)
Citation(s) 18 N.C. 371, 1 Devereux & Battle 371
Case opinions
Every unauthorized, and therefore unlawful entry, into the close of another, is a trespass. From every illegal entry onto another's land, the law infers some damages, even if only the nominal damages of treading down the grass, herbage, or shrubbery.
Case opinions
Decision by Thomas Ruffin

Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 (N.C. 1835) is a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court authored by Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin. For at least a century, this case has been used in first-year Torts classes in American law schools to teach students about the tort of trespass upon real property. [1]

Contents

Background

Stepp incorrectly believed that certain unenclosed land belonging to Doughterty belonged to him. Stepp therefore entered the unenclosed land with a surveyor and chain carriers, who began surveying the land. [2] Before they had marked any trees or cut any bushes, Dougherty challenged their actions. [2]

Dougherty then brought suit against Stepp for trespass quare clausum fregit . [2] A trial was held in Buncombe before Judge Martin. Judge Martin held that since Stepp, the defendant, had not damaged Dougherty's land in any way, Stepp had not committed a trespass. [2] He therefore directed the jury to find for the defendant. [2]

Dougherty then appealed this ruling to the North Carolina Supreme Court. [2] Dougherty's lawyer argued that every unwarrantable entering on another's real property constituted a trespass, even if the defendant mistakenly believed that the land belonged to him. [2] He also argued that every trespass involves some damage to the property, even if it is only the treading down and bruising of the herbage and shrubbery. [2] Stepp's lawyer did not appear before the North Carolina Supreme Court. [2]

Opinion of the Court

In a per curiam decision authored by Chief Justice Ruffin, the Court granted the plaintiff's appeal. [2] The court found that it was error for the trial court to hold that Stepp's actions did not constitute a trespass. [2] The court held that "every unauthorised, and therefore unlawful entry, into the close of another, is a trespass." [2] From every illegal entry onto another's land, the law infers some damages, even if only the nominal damages of treading down the grass, herbage, or shrubbery. [2]

The court therefore granted the appeal and remanded the case for a new trial.

Related Research Articles

A tort is a civil wrong that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm, resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act. Tort law can be contrasted with criminal law, which deals with criminal wrongs that are punishable by the state. While criminal law aims to punish individuals who commit crimes, tort law aims to compensate individuals who suffer harm as a result of the actions of others. Some wrongful acts, such as assault and battery, can result in both a civil lawsuit and a criminal prosecution in countries where the civil and criminal legal systems are separate. Tort law may also be contrasted with contract law, which provides civil remedies after breach of a duty that arises from a contract. Obligations in both tort and criminal law are more fundamental and are imposed regardless of whether the parties have a contract.

Trespass is an area of tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land.

This article addresses torts in United States law. As such, it covers primarily common law. Moreover, it provides general rules, as individual states all have separate civil codes. There are three general categories of torts: intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability torts.

Trespass to chattels is a tort whereby the infringing party has intentionally interfered with another person's lawful possession of a chattel. The interference can be any physical contact with the chattel in a quantifiable way, or any dispossession of the chattel. As opposed to the greater wrong of conversion, trespass to chattels is argued to be actionable per se.

In tort law, detinue is an action to recover for the wrongful taking of personal property. It is initiated by an individual who claims to have a greater right to their immediate possession than the current possessor. For an action in detinue to succeed, a claimant must first prove that he had better right to possession of the chattel than the defendant, and second, that the defendant refused to return the chattel once demanded by the claimant.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Trespass to land</span> Use of land prevented by local property laws

Trespass to land is a common law tort or crime that is committed when an individual or the object of an individual intentionally enters the land of another without a lawful excuse. Trespass to land is actionable per se. Thus, the party whose land is entered upon may sue even if no actual harm is done. In some jurisdictions, this rule may also apply to entry upon public land having restricted access. A court may order payment of damages or an injunction to remedy the tort.

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Clarke v. OHSU, 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418 (2007), was a 2007 decision of the Oregon Supreme Court interpreting Oregon law on the potential tort liability of public employees.

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Conversion is an intentional tort consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability. Its equivalents in criminal law include larceny or theft and criminal conversion. In those jurisdictions that recognise it, criminal conversion is a lesser crime than theft/larceny.

<i>Haslem v. Lockwood</i>

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Eggshell skull</span> Legal principle

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<i>Venning v Chin</i> Australian court case

Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299 is a Supreme Court of South Australia full court judgment, by which it was decided that in trespass cases, the onus lies on the defendant to disprove fault. However, for injuries caused in highway accidents, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove fault on the part of the defendant.

References

  1. See, e.g., James Barr Ames and Jeremiah Smith, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Torts (3rd ed., 1910), Vol. 1, pp. 59-60; Richard Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts (8th ed., 2004), pp. 9-10.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 371 (N.C. 1835).