Kolender v. Lawson

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Kolender v. Lawson
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 8, 1982
Decided May 2, 1983
Full case nameKolender, Chief of Police of San Diego, et al. v. Edward Lawson
Citations461 U.S. 352 ( more )
103 S. Ct. 1855; 75 L. Ed. 2d 903
Case history
Prior658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981)
Holding
The statute, as drafted and as construed by the state court, is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reliable" identification.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr.  · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityO'Connor, joined by Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens
ConcurrenceBrennan
DissentWhite, joined by Rehnquist
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), [1] is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality of vague laws that allow police to demand that "loiterers" and "wanderers" provide "credible and reliable" identification.

Contents

Background

Edward Lawson was a law-abiding black man with suitable knowledge of the U.S. Constitution. Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment in San Diego County, California, where he lived when as a pedestrian he walked in so-called "white neighborhoods". He was detained or arrested approximately 15 times by the San Diego Police within 18 months, was prosecuted twice, and was convicted once (the second charge was dismissed).

Lawson challenged California Penal Code § 647(e), [2] which required persons who loiter or wander on the streets to identify themselves and account for their presence when requested by a peace officer to do so. A California appellate court, in People v. Solomon (1973), 33 Cal. App.3d 429, had construed the law to require "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity. [3]

William Kolender was an appellant who was acting in his capacity as Chief of Police of San Diego, as was John Duffy who was acting in his capacity as Sheriff of San Diego County.

Prior history

The Ninth Circuit, in Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (1981), had additionally held that Penal Code §647(e) violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures because it "subverts the probable cause requirement" by authorizing arrest for conduct that is no more than suspicious. "Vagrancy statutes cannot turn otherwise innocent conduct into a crime". Id. at 1367.

The Ninth Circuit also noted that "police knowledge of the identity of an individual they have deemed 'suspicious' grants the police unfettered discretion to initiate or continue the investigation of the person long after the detention has ended. Information concerning the stop, the arrest and the individual's identity may become part of a large scale data bank." Id. at 1368.

Lawson represented himself up through the conclusion of the Federal Ninth Circuit Court appeal. He was told he could not represent himself before the Supreme Court without a law degree,[ citation needed ] so he had[ clarification needed ] an ACLU lawyer represent him before the Court.

Conclusion

Using the construction of the California appellate court in Solomon, the Court held that the law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause to arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone. [4] The Court hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement. [Note 1] [Note 2]

Because the U.S. Supreme Court was able to resolve Kolender on the issue of vagueness, they did not decide the Fourth Amendment issue.

Subsequent history

Kolender was cited in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada , 542 U.S. 177 (2004), as an example of a "stop and identify" statute the Court had voided on vagueness grounds. In Hiibel, the Court held that a Nevada law [7] requiring persons detained upon reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime to state their name to a peace officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Unlike California Penal Code §647(e) as construed in Solomon, the Nevada statute was apparently interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court as requiring only that persons detained upon involvement in a crime to state their name. [8]

Hiibel does not provide a means of arresting someone for failing or refusing to identify himself. [9] [10] [11] [See People v. Fernandez, 2011 IL App (2d) 100473]

California Penal Code §647(e) was repealed in 2008 at the request of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. [12]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ The Court upheld the circuit court holdings:
    • A person can not be required to furnish identification if not reasonably suspected of any criminal conduct.
    • A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity alone is insufficient to justify a patdown search
    • The person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.
    • Vagrancy ordinances cannot turn otherwise innocent conduct into a crime.
    • Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under U.S. Constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion, to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along the public highways or in public places; and while conducting themselves in a decent and orderly manner, disturbing no other, and interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there, they will be protected under the law, not only their persons, but in their safe conduct. Any law that would place the keeping and safe conduct of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for some breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all the rights, which the Constitution guarantees.
    • An innocent person cannot generally know when a police officer has reasonable cause to believe that his behavior warrants further investigation for criminal activity, and therefore cannot know when refusal to identify himself will be a crime.
    • No one may be required under peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.
    • Police knowledge of the identity of an individual they have deemed "suspicious" grants the police unfettered discretion to initiate or continue investigation of the person long after the detention has ended. Information concerning the stop, the arrest and the individual's identity may become part of a large scale data bank. The serious intrusion on personal security outweighs the mere possibility that identification may provide a link leading to arrest. [5]
  2. ↑ The Court's own holdings:
    • While police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.
    • Fourth Amendment concerns are implicated where a state statute permits investigative detentions in situations where the police officers lack a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on objective facts.
    • The concern with curbing criminal activity cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity.
    • A state criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a credible and reliable identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a valid stop is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a credible and reliable identification.
    • Statutory limitations on individual freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution are examined for substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
    • In providing that a detention under a state statute may occur only where there is the level of suspicion sufficient to justify a constitutional stop, a state insures the existence of neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. [6]

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References

  1. ↑ "KOLENDER, CHIEF OF POLICE OF SAN DIEGO, ET AL. v. LAWSON" (PDF/A). Library of Congress. Retrieved July 8, 2023.
  2. ↑ California Penal Code § 647(e) read, in relevant part,
    "Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor: . . . (e) who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his presence when requested by any peace officer so to do, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification."
    California later removed this section because of this lawsuit, replacing it with what used to be § 647(f).
  3. ↑ In People v. Solomon (1973), the Court construed § 647(e) as requiring that a person detained under that statute’s authority produce "credible and reliable identification . . . carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself". (33 Cal.App.3d 429, 439). The California Supreme Court denied review. Both the Ninth Circuit (658 F.2d 1362, 1364–1365, n. 3) and the U.S. Supreme Court (461 U.S. 352, 356, n. 4) used this construction in voiding § 647(e) for vagueness.
  4. ↑ Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, noted that the law
    "... provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with [the law]", conferring on police "virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation."
  5. ↑ "Lawson v. Kolender". United States Federal Reports. 2 (658). United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit: 1362. October 15, 1981. Archived from the original on May 15, 2010. Retrieved August 14, 2013.
  6. ↑ "Kolender v. Lawson". United States Reports. 461. Supreme Court of the United States: 352. May 2, 1983.
  7. ↑ Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) §171.123(3) provides that:
    The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.
  8. ↑ See Hiibel v. Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 868, at 875.
  9. ↑ Writing for the Court in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Justice Kennedy stated,
    Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more precise. The statute in Kolender had been interpreted to require a suspect to give the officer "credible and reliable" identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted NRS §171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose his name. — 542 U.S. at 184–185
    Justice Kennedy continued,
    As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a drivers license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means—a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make—the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. — 542 U.S. at 185
    Writing for the Nevada Supreme Court in Hiibel v. Dist. Ct., Chief Justice Young said,
    The suspect is not required to provide private details about his background, but merely to state his name to an officer when reasonable suspicion exists. — 118 Nev. 868 at 875
  10. ↑ Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
  11. ↑ http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/opinions/AppellateCourt/2011/2ndDistrict/December/2100473.pdf [ bare URL PDF ]
  12. ↑ California Penal Code §647(e) was repealed by Ch. 302, Stats. 2007 (SB 425, Margett), at the request of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The analysis on 11 June 2007 by the California Assembly Committee on Public Safety noted that "The provision has served no purpose other than to cause confusion since 1983".

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