Kolender v. Lawson | |
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Argued November 8, 1982 Decided May 2, 1983 | |
Full case name | Kolender, Chief of Police of San Diego, et al. v. Edward Lawson |
Citations | 461 U.S. 352 ( more ) 103 S. Ct. 1855; 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 |
Case history | |
Prior | 658 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1981) |
Holding | |
The statute, as drafted and as construed by the state court, is unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reliable" identification. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | O'Connor, joined by Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens |
Concurrence | Brennan |
Dissent | White, joined by Rehnquist |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. XIV |
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) [1] , is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the constitutionality of vague laws that allow police to demand that "loiterers" and "wanderers" provide "credible and reliable" identification.
Edward Lawson was a law-abiding black man with suitable knowledge of the U.S. Constitution. Lawson was frequently subjected to police questioning and harassment in San Diego County, California, where he lived when as a pedestrian he walked in so-called "white neighborhoods". He was detained or arrested approximately 15 times by the San Diego Police within 18 months, was prosecuted twice, and was convicted once (the second charge was dismissed).
Lawson challenged California Penal Code § 647(e), [2] which required persons who loiter or wander on the streets to identify themselves and account for their presence when requested by a peace officer to do so. A California appellate court, in People v. Solomon (1973), 33 Cal. App.3d 429, had construed the law to require "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity. [3]
William Kolender was an appellant who was acting in his capacity as Chief of Police of San Diego, as was John Duffy who was acting in his capacity as Sheriff of San Diego County.
The Ninth Circuit, in Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (1981), had additionally held that Penal Code §647(e) violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures because it "subverts the probable cause requirement" by authorizing arrest for conduct that is no more than suspicious. "Vagrancy statutes cannot turn otherwise innocent conduct into a crime". Id. at 1367.
The Ninth Circuit also noted that "police knowledge of the identity of an individual they have deemed 'suspicious' grants the police unfettered discretion to initiate or continue the investigation of the person long after the detention has ended. Information concerning the stop, the arrest and the individual's identity may become part of a large scale data bank." Id. at 1368.
Lawson represented himself up through the conclusion of the Federal Ninth Circuit Court appeal. He was told he could not represent himself before the Supreme Court without a law degree,[ citation needed ] so he had[ clarification needed ] an ACLU lawyer represent him before the Court.
Using the construction of the California appellate court in Solomon, the Court held that the law was unconstitutionally vague because it gave excessive discretion to the police (in the absence of probable cause to arrest) whether to stop and interrogate a suspect or leave him alone. [4] The Court hinted that the California statute compromised the constitutional right to freedom of movement. [Note 1] [Note 2]
Because the U.S. Supreme Court was able to resolve Kolender on the issue of vagueness, they did not decide the Fourth Amendment issue.
Kolender was cited in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada , 542 U.S. 177 (2004), as an example of a "stop and identify" statute the Court had voided on vagueness grounds. In Hiibel, the Court held that a Nevada law [7] requiring persons detained upon reasonable suspicion of involvement in a crime to state their name to a peace officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. Unlike California Penal Code §647(e) as construed in Solomon, the Nevada statute was apparently interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court as requiring only that persons detained upon involvement in a crime to state their name. [8]
Hiibel does not provide a means of arresting someone for failing or refusing to identify himself. [9] [10] [11] [See People v. Fernandez, 2011 IL App (2d) 100473]
California Penal Code §647(e) was repealed in 2008 at the request of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. [12]
An arrest warrant is a warrant issued by a judge or magistrate on behalf of the state which authorizes the arrest and detention of an individual or the search and seizure of an individual's property.
In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. There is no universally accepted definition or formulation for probable cause. One traditional definition, which comes from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964 decision Beck v. Ohio, is when "whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."
An arrest is the act of apprehending and taking a person into custody, usually because the person has been suspected of or observed committing a crime. After being taken into custody, the person can be questioned further and/or charged. An arrest is a procedure in a criminal justice system, sometimes it is also done after a court warrant for the arrest.
A citizen's arrest is an arrest made by a private citizen – that is, a person who is not acting as a sworn law-enforcement official. In common law jurisdictions, the practice dates back to medieval England and the English common law, in which sheriffs encouraged ordinary citizens to help apprehend law breakers.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a statute requiring suspects to disclose their names during a valid Terry stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first requires reasonable suspicion of criminal involvement, and does not violate the Fifth Amendment if there is no allegation that their names could have caused an incrimination.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the Court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The Court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.
Disorderly conduct is a crime in most jurisdictions in the United States, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan. Typically, "disorderly conduct" makes it a crime to be drunk in public, to "disturb the peace", or to loiter in certain areas. Many types of unruly conduct may fit the definition of disorderly conduct, as such statutes are often used as "catch-all" crimes. Police may use a disorderly conduct charge to keep the peace when people are behaving in a disruptive manner, but otherwise present no danger.
A Terry stop in the United States allows the police to briefly detain a person based on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause which is needed for arrest. When police stop and search a pedestrian, this is commonly known as a stop and frisk. When police stop an automobile, this is known as a traffic stop. If the police stop a motor vehicle on minor infringements in order to investigate other suspected criminal activity, this is known as a pretextual stop. Additional rules apply to stops that occur on a bus.
False arrest, Unlawful arrest or Wrongful arrest is a common law tort, where a plaintiff alleges they were held in custody without probable cause, or without an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. Although it is possible to sue law enforcement officials for false arrest, the usual defendants in such cases are private security firms.
Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard of proof in United States law that is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch'"; it must be based on "specific and articulable facts", "taken together with rational inferences from those facts", and the suspicion must be associated with the specific individual. If police additionally have reasonable suspicion that a person so detained is armed and dangerous, they may "frisk" the person for weapons, but not for contraband like drugs. However, if the police develop probable cause during a weapons frisk, they may then conduct a full search. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated using the "reasonable person" or "reasonable officer" standard, in which said person in the same circumstances could reasonably suspect a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; it depends upon the totality of circumstances, and can result from a combination of particular facts, even if each is individually innocuous.
Public intoxication, also known as "drunk and disorderly" and "drunk in public", is a summary offense in some countries rated to public cases or displays of drunkenness. Public intoxication laws vary widely by jurisdiction, but usually require an obvious display of intoxicated incompetence or behavior which disrupts public order before the charge is levied.
Knock-and-announce, in United States law criminal procedure, is an ancient common law principle, incorporated into the Fourth Amendment, which requires law enforcement officers to announce their presence and provide residents with an opportunity to open the door prior to a search.
In American constitutional law, a statute is void for vagueness and unenforceable if it is too vague for the average citizen to understand. This is because constitutionally permissible activity may not be chilled because of a statute's vagueness. There are several reasons a statute may be considered vague; in general, a statute might be void for vagueness when an average citizen cannot generally determine what persons are regulated, what conduct is prohibited, or what punishment may be imposed. For example, criminal laws which do not state explicitly and definitely what conduct is punishable are void for vagueness. A statute is also void for vagueness if a legislature's delegation of authority to judges or administrators is so extensive that it could lead to arbitrary prosecutions. A law can also be "void for vagueness" if it imposes on First Amendment freedom of speech, assembly, or religion.
R v Waterfield [1963] 3 All E.R. 659 is an English Court of Appeal decision, a court of binding precedent, outlining the modern limits of the law that authorises a police officer to stop a person.
Edward C. Lawson was an African American civil rights activist, who was the respondent in the case of Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that a California statute authorizing a police officer to arrest a person for refusing to present identification was unconstitutionally vague.
"Stop and identify" statutes are laws in several U.S. states that authorize police to lawfully order people whom they reasonably suspect of a crime to state their name. If there is not reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed, an individual is not required to identify themselves, even in these states.
Loitering is the act of standing or waiting around idly without apparent purpose.
Shopkeeper's privilege is a law recognized in the United States under which a shopkeeper is allowed to detain a suspected shoplifter on store property for a reasonable period of time, so long as the shopkeeper has cause to believe that the person detained in fact committed, or attempted to commit, theft of store property.
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case resulting in a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance being declared unconstitutionally vague. The case was argued on December 8, 1971, and decided on February 24, 1972. The respondent was the city of Jacksonville, Florida.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court determined that the defendant's arrest in El Paso, Texas, for a refusal to identify himself, after being seen and questioned in a high crime area, was not based on a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing and thus violated the Fourth Amendment. It is an important case for Stop and Identify statutes in the United States.
The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.