Le Roy v. Tatham

Last updated
Le Roy v. Tatham
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 16,17, 20, 21, 1852
Decided January 10, 1853
Full case nameThomas Otis Le Roy and David Smith, Plaintiffs in Error v. Benjamin Tatham, Junior, George N. Tatham, and Henry B. Tatham
Citations55 U.S. 156 ( more )
14 How. 156; 14 L. Ed. 367; 1852 U.S. LEXIS 433
Court membership
Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney
Associate Justices
John McLean  · James M. Wayne
John Catron  · Peter V. Daniel
Samuel Nelson  · Robert C. Grier
Benjamin R. Curtis
Case opinions
MajorityMcLean, joined by Taney, Catron, Daniel, Campbell
DissentNelson, joined by Wayne, Grier
Curtis took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that "a newly discovered principle" cannot be patented, and no one can claim in it an exclusive right. This case is considered sometimes as the earliest example of patentable subject matter controversy in the US patent law. [1] This controversy was finally rectified in the 2012 Mayo decision, that requires for a claim, comprising a "natural principle or a law of Nature" to have an additional "inventive concept", which limits the application of the principle to a particular use.

Contents

The inventors had discovered the principle that hot, but congealed, lead under pressure would re-unite as an unbroken solid material, which permitted manufacture of a superior lead pipe. The apparatus to make lead pipe was old and obvious: the inventors, by making slight changes in the old machinery to provide sufficient heat and pressure to remelt the lead, in effect, invented a new use of an old machine. The claim was to the old or obvious apparatus (as an apparatus) "when used to form pipes of metal under heat and pressure in the manner set forth or in any other manner substantially the same." It was not lawful to patent the old apparatus again, however used, so that the patent amounted to an attempt to patent the principle. That made the patent invalid. [2]

Background

John and Charles Hanson, of Huddersfield, England, made the alleged invention in 1837. Having been the first to discover that heating lead under pressure would eliminate discontinuities, such as a seam in cast lead pipe, and that this effect could be achieved by making and using the old, well-known machinery with slight adjustments, obtained a patent in which the specification stated that the inventors "do not claim any of the parts—the cylinder, core, die, or bridge, but that they claim the combination when used to form pipes of metal, under heat and pressure, in the way they have described." They assigned their rights to Tatham, who sued the defendants, Le Roy and Smith, in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York for patent infringement. [3]

The judge charged the jury: "That the originality did not consist in the novelty of the machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered principle into practical application by which a useful article of manufacture is produced, and wrought pipe made, as distinguished from cast pipe." The jury rendered a verdict against the defendants for $11,394. [4] The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

Justice John McLean 1849 Justice John McLean daguerreotype by Mathew Brady 1849.jpg
Justice John McLean 1849

Justice McLean delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice Nelson, joined by Justices Wayne and Grier, dissented.

Majority opinion

The Court emphasized the inventors' statement in the patent:

We do not claim as our invention and improvement, any of the parts of the above-described machinery independently of its arrangement and combination above set forth. What we do claim as our invention and desire to secure is the combination of the following parts above described, to-wit, the core and bridge or guide piece, with the cylinder, the piston, the chamber and the die, when used to form pipes of metal under heat and pressure in the manner set forth or in any other manner substantially the same." [5]

The Court said that it was reversible error for the trial judge to charge the jury that "it was not material whether the mere [prior] combinations of machinery referred to were similar to the combination used by the Hansons, because the originality did not consist in the novelty of the machinery, but in bringing a newly discovered principle into practical application by which a useful article of manufacture is produced and wrought pipe made, as distinguished from cast pipe." Rather:

It is admitted that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in addition to those already known. Through the agency of machinery, a new steam power may be said to have been generated. But no one can appropriate this power exclusively to himself under the patent laws. The same may be said of electricity and of any other power in nature, which is alike open to all and may be applied to useful purposes by the use of machinery.

In all such cases, the processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate natural agencies constitute the invention. The elements of the power exist; the invention is not in discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects. Whether the machinery used be novel or consist of a new combination of parts known, the right of the inventor is secured against all who use the same mechanical power or one that shall be substantially the same.

[6]

Contrary to the charge to the jury, whether the apparatus is novel does make a difference. Here, the inventors conceded that the apparatus was old and they did "not claim as our invention and improvement any of the parts of the above described machinery"; they claimed the old machinery "when used to form pipes of metal, under heat and pressure." [7]

The Court quoted Justice Story, sitting on circuit, in Bean v. Smallwood, [8] for the proposition that "Now I take it to be clear that a machine or apparatus or other mechanical contrivance, in order to give the party a claim to a patent therefor, must in itself be substantially new. If it is old and well known, and applied only to a new purpose, that does not make it patentable." [9] The instruction was wrong, so the judgment had to be reversed.

Justice Nelson Samuel Nelson - Brady-Handy.jpg
Justice Nelson

Dissent

Justice Samuel Nelson argued that the principle was what the inventors contributed and the particular apparatus used was trivial and unimportant:

[W]e see that the leading feature of the invention consists in the discovery of a new property in the article of lead and in the employment and adaptation of it, by means of the machinery described, to the production of a new article, wrought pipe, never before successfully made. Without the discovery of this new property in the metal, the machinery or apparatus would be useless, and not the subject of a patent. It is in connection with this property and the embodiment and adaptation of it to practical use that the machinery is described and the arrangement claimed. The discovery of this new element or property led naturally to the apparatus by which a new and most useful result is produced. The apparatus was but incidental and subsidiary to the new and leading idea of the invention. And hence the patentees set forth as the leading feature of it, the discovery that lead in a solid state, but under heat and extreme pressure in a close vessel, will reunite after separation of its parts as completely as though it had never been separated. It required very little ingenuity, after the experiments in a close vessel, by which this new property of the metal was first developed, to construct the necessary machinery for the formation of the pipe. The apparatus essential to develop this property would at once suggest the material parts, especially in the state of the art at the time. Any skillful mechanic, with [the prior art] before him, would readily construct the requisite machinery. [10]

Nelson argued that the Court ought to "construe specifications benignly, and to look through mere forms of expression, often inartificially used, to the substance, and to maintain the right of the patentee to the thing really invented, if ascertainable upon a liberal consideration of the language of the specification." These inventors did not suppose that their invention was the arrangement of machinery. "They state distinctly that the leading feature of their discovery consisted of this new property of lead and some of its alloys -- this, they say, is the remarkable feature of their invention -- and the apparatus described is regarded by them as subordinate, and as important only as enabling them to give practical effect to this newly discovered property, by means of which they produce the new manufacture [seamless lead pipe]." [11]

In Nelson's view:

[W]here a person discovers a principle or property of nature, or where he conceives of a new application of a well known principle or property of nature and also of some mode of carrying it out into practice so as to produce or attain a new and useful effect or result, he is entitled to protection against all other modes of carrying the same principle or property into practice for obtaining the same effect or result. [12]

He argued further that if someone discovers a "law of nature or property of matter and applied it" to produce a beneficial new result, "he is entitled to be protected against all modes by which the same result is produced by an application of the same law of nature or property of matter." [13]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Invention</span> Novel device, material or technical process

An invention is a unique or novel device, method, composition, idea or process. An invention may be an improvement upon a machine, product, or process for increasing efficiency or lowering cost. It may also be an entirely new concept. If an idea is unique enough either as a stand alone invention or as a significant improvement over the work of others, it can be patented. A patent, if granted, gives the inventor a proprietary interest in the patent over a specific period of time, which can be licensed for financial gain.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">George Westinghouse</span> American engineer and businessman (1846–1912)

George Westinghouse Jr. was an American entrepreneur and engineer based in Pennsylvania who created the railway air brake and was a pioneer of the electrical industry, receiving his first patent at the age of 19. Westinghouse saw the potential of using alternating current for electric power distribution in the early 1880s and put all his resources into developing and marketing it. This put Westinghouse's business in direct competition with Thomas Edison, who marketed direct current for electric power distribution. In 1911 Westinghouse received the American Institute of Electrical Engineers's (AIEE) Edison Medal "For meritorious achievement in connection with the development of the alternating current system." He founded the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1886.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Heat pipe</span> Heat-transfer device that employs phase transition

A heat pipe is a heat-transfer device that employs phase transition to transfer heat between two solid interfaces.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">John Ernst Worrell Keely</span> American inventor and fraud

John Ernst Worrell Keely was an American fraudster and self-proclaimed inventor from Philadelphia who claimed to have discovered a new motive power which was originally described as "vaporic" or "etheric" force, and later as an unnamed force based on "vibratory sympathy", by which he produced "interatomic ether" from water and air.

In a patent or patent application, the claims define, in technical terms, the extent, i.e. the scope, of the protection conferred by a patent, or the protection sought in a patent application. In other words, the purpose of the claims is to define which subject-matter is protected by the patent. This is termed as the "notice function" of a patent claim—to warn others of what they must not do if they are to avoid infringement liability. The claims are of paramount importance in both prosecution and litigation.

Under United States law, a patent is a right granted to the inventor of a (1) process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, (2) that is new, useful, and non-obvious. A patent is the right to exclude others, for a limited time from profiting of a patented technology without the consent of the patent-holder. Specifically, it is the right to exclude others from: making, using, selling, offering for sale, importing, inducing others to infringe, applying for an FDA approval, and/or offering a product specially adapted for practice of the patent.

Patentable, statutory or patent-eligible subject matter is subject matter which is susceptible of patent protection. The laws or patent practices of many countries provide that certain subject-matter is excluded from patentability, even if the invention is novel and non-obvious. Together with criteria such as novelty, inventive step or nonobviousness, utility, and industrial applicability, which differ from country to country, the question of whether a particular subject matter is patentable is one of the substantive requirements for patentability.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Jacob Perkins</span>

Jacob Perkins was an American inventor, mechanical engineer and physicist. Born in Newburyport, Massachusetts, Perkins was apprenticed to a goldsmith. He soon made himself known with a variety of useful mechanical inventions and eventually had twenty-one American and nineteen English patents. He is known as the father of the refrigerator. He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1813 and a member of the American Philosophical Society in 1819.

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), was a 1978 United States Supreme Court decision that ruled that an invention that departs from the prior art only in its use of a mathematical algorithm is patent eligible only if there is some other "inventive concept in its application." The algorithm itself must be considered as if it were part of the prior art, and the claim must be considered as a whole. The exact quotation from the majority opinion is: "Respondent’s process is unpatentable under §101, not because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention." "The fact that the algorithm may not have actually been known previously and that, when taken in combination with other claim elements, it might produce an invention that is novel and nonobvious, plays no part in the analysis."

Victaulic is a developer and manufacturer of mechanical pipe joining systems, and the originator of the grooved pipe couplings joining system. The firm is a global company with 15 major manufacturing facilities, 28 branches, and over 3600 employees worldwide. Currently, its headquarters is located in Easton, Pennsylvania.

Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851), was a United States Supreme Court decision credited with introducing into United States patent law the concept of non-obviousness as a patentability requirement, as well as stating the applicable legal standard for determining its presence or absence in a claimed invention.

Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969), is a 1969 decision of the United States Supreme Court on the legal standard governing the obviousness of claimed inventions. It stands for the proposition that, when old elements are combined in a way such that they do not interact in a novel, unobvious way, then the resulting combination is obvious and therefore unpatentable.

Blake v. City and County of San Francisco, 113 U.S. 679 (1885), was an appeal from a decree that dismissed a bill filed by the appellant to restrain the infringement by the appellees of reissued letters patent granted to the appellant as the assignee of original letters patent issued to Thomas H. Bailey. The original patent was dated February 9, 1864, and the reissue September 18, 1877. They were for "a new and improved valve for water cylinders of steam fire engines and other pump cylinders." The specification, which was substantially the same in both patents, stated that previous to the invention therein described, the only valve used to relieve the pressure upon fire hose to prevent them from bursting was one operated by hand. To obviate the defects of such a valve, the inventor applied at some point between the engine or pump and the hose nozzle a valve which opened automatically by the pressure in the hose or the pump cylinder, so as to discharge an additional stream and thereby relieve the pressure.

In United States patent law, the machine-or-transformation test is a test of patent eligibility under which a claim to a process qualifies for consideration if it (1) is implemented by a particular machine in a non-conventional and non-trivial manner or (2) transforms an article from one state to another. Since the US Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos, machine-or-transformation test is considered "sufficient but not necessary" for patentable subject matter eligibility requirement.

Neilson v Harford (1841) 151 ER 1266 is a 19th-century English patent law decision that several United States Supreme Court patent law opinions rely upon as authority. The question, as Baron Alderson posed it, was “[W]here is the difference between claiming a principle, which is to be carried into effect any way you will, and claiming a mere principle?” The answer, as the opinions of the various courts that have considered the matter develop, is nowhere.

O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853), also known as The Telegraph Patent Case, is an 1854 decision of the United States Supreme Court that has been highly influential in the development of the law of patent-eligibility in regard to claimed inventions in the field of computer-software related art. It holds, essentially, that an abstract idea, apart from its implementation, is not patent-eligible.

Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), is a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that a facially trivial implementation of a natural principle or phenomenon of nature is not eligible for a patent.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Radiator (heating)</span> Heat exchanger for space heating

Radiators and convectors are heat exchangers designed to transfer thermal energy from one medium to another for the purpose of space heating.

Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498 (1874), is an 1874 decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning the patent eligibility of abstract ideas. As explained below in the Subsequent developments section, it is intermediate in the development of that aspect of patent law from Neilson v Harford, through O'Reilly v. Morse, to Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., and then to Parker v. Flook, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l.

In US patent law, non-obviousness is one of the requirements that an invention must meet to qualify for patentability, codified in 35 U.S.C. §103. An invention is not obvious if a "person having ordinary skill in the art" (PHOSITA) would not know how to solve the problem at which the invention is directed by using exactly the same mechanism. Since the PHOSITA standard turned to be too ambiguous in practice, the U.S. Supreme Court provided later two more useful approaches which currently control the practical analysis of non-obviousness by patent examiners and courts: Graham et al. v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City et al., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) gives guidelines of what is "non-obvious", and KSR v. Teleflex (2006) gives guidelines of what is "obvious".

References

The citations in this article are written in Bluebook style. Please see the talk page for more information.

  1. Resources, MPEP. "MPEP". www.uspto.gov. Retrieved 18 June 2023.
  2. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How. ) 156 (1852).
  3. 55 U.S. at 156-57.
  4. 55 U.S. at 157.
  5. 33 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added).
  6. 55 U.S. at 174-75.
  7. 55 U.S. at 176-77.
  8. 2 Story Rep. 408. 2 F. Cas. 1142 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843).
  9. See 55 U.S. at 177.
  10. 55 U.S. at 180.
  11. 55 U.S. at 181.
  12. 55 U.S. at 185.
  13. 55 U.S. at 186-87.