Lesson of Munich

Last updated

Munich Conference.jpg Bundesarchiv Bild 183-R69173, Munchener Abkommen, Staatschefs.jpg
Munich Conference.jpg

The lesson of Munich, in international relations, refers to the appeasement of Adolf Hitler at the Munich Conference in September 1938. To avoid war, France and the United Kingdom permitted Nazi Germany to incorporate the Sudetenland. Earlier acts of appeasement included the Allied inaction towards the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the Anschluss of Austria, while subsequent ones included inaction to the First Vienna Award, the annexation of the remainder of Czech Lands to form the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, as well as the 1939 German ultimatum to Lithuania forcing it to cede the Klaipėda Region.

Contents

The policy of appeasement underestimated Hitler's ambitions by believing that enough concessions would secure a lasting peace. [1] Today, the agreement is widely regarded as a failed act of appeasement toward Germany, [2] and a diplomatic triumph for Hitler. It facilitated the German takeover of Czechoslovakia and caused Hitler to believe that the Western Allies would not risk war over Poland the following year, an assessment openly expressed in his famous quote: "I saw my enemies in Munich, and they are worms", which proved partially correct in light of the popularity of the slogan "Why Die for Danzig?" in France and, crucially, the events known as the Phoney War.

Background

The foreign policy of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain has become inextricably linked with the events of the Munich Crisis. The policy of appeasement and Chamberlain's delusionary announcement of a Peace for our time has resonated through the following decades as a parable of diplomatic failure. [3] :276 Together with "Waterloo" and "Versailles", the Munich Agreement has come to signify a disastrous diplomatic outcome. [3] :iv The lessons of Munich have profoundly shaped Western foreign policy ever since. US Presidents have cited those lessons as justifications for war in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. [1]

In the United States and the United Kingdom, the words "Munich" and "appeasement" are frequently invoked when demanding forthright, often military, action to resolve an international crisis and characterising a political opponent who condemns negotiation as weakness. [4] After the 1986 bombing of Libya, US President Ronald Reagan argued, "Europeans who remember their history understand better than most that there is no security, no safety, in the appeasement of evil." [5] Although appeasement, which is conventionally defined as the act of satisfying grievances by concessions with the aim of avoiding war, was once regarded as an effective and even honourable strategy of foreign policy, the term has since the Munich Conference symbolised cowardice, failure and weakness. Winston Churchill described appeasement as "one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last". [1]

The policies have been the subject of intense debate ever since. Historians' assessments have ranged from condemnation for allowing Germany to grow too strong to believing that Germany was so strong that it might well win a war and so postponement of a showdown was in the best interests of Britain and France. The historian Andrew Roberts argues in 2019 regarding British historians, "Indeed, it is the generally accepted view in Britain today that they were right at least to have tried". [6]

In the same vein, Robert Williamson noted, "Britons and French were deeply traumatized by the horrors of the First World War, and felt quite correctly that their leaders in 1914 had let themselves be drawn, far too easily, into terrible war. The Munich Agreement made sure that no one would think so again. In 1940, when Londoners had to endure the intensive German bombing, no one could say that Britain did not try to avoid this war.... Indeed, Czechoslovakia was abandoned. But when Britain and France did go to war in 1939, they were still unable to save Poland from being conquered and occupied. Clearly, had they gone to war a year earlier, they would not have been able to save Czechoslovakia, either". [7]

Munich analogies

"Munich and appeasement", in the words of scholars Frederik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, "have become among the dirtiest words in American politics, synonymous with naivete and weakness, and signifying a craven willingness to barter away the nation's vital interests for empty promises." They claimed that the success of US foreign policy often depends upon a president withstanding "the inevitable charges of appeasement that accompany any decision to negotiate with hostile powers." The presidents who challenged the "tyranny of Munich" have often achieved policy breakthroughs and those who had cited Munich as a principle of US foreign policy had often led the nation into its "most enduring tragedies." [8] [ full citation needed ]

Many later crises were accompanied by cries of "Munich" from politicians and the media. In 1960, the conservative US Senator Barry Goldwater used "Munich" to describe a domestic political issue by saying that an attempt by the Republican Party to appeal to liberals was "the Munich of the Republican Party." [9] In 1962, General Curtis LeMay told US President John F. Kennedy that his refusal to bomb Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich", a pointed barb given that his father Joseph P. Kennedy Sr. had supported appeasement in general in his capacity as Ambassador to Britain. [10] [11] In 1965, US President Lyndon Johnson, in justifying increased military action in Vietnam, stated, "We learned from Hitler and Munich that success only feeds the appetite for aggression." [8]

The West German policy of staying neutral in the Arab–Israeli conflict after the Munich massacre and the following hijack of the Lufthansa Flight 615 in 1972, rather than taking a pro-Israel position, led to Israeli comparisons with the Munich Agreement of appeasement. [12]

Citing Munich in debates on foreign policy has continued to be common in the 21st century. [13] During negotiations for the Iran nuclear agreement mediated by Secretary of State John Kerry, Representative John Culberson, a Texas Republican Representative, tweeted the message "Worse than Munich." Kerry had himself invoked Munich in a speech in France advocating military action in Syria by saying, "This is our Munich moment." [14]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Neville Chamberlain</span> Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1937 to 1940

Arthur Neville Chamberlain was a British politician who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from May 1937 to May 1940 and Leader of the Conservative Party from May 1937 to October 1940. He is best known for his foreign policy of appeasement, and in particular for his signing of the Munich Agreement on 30 September 1938, ceding the German-speaking Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany led by Adolf Hitler. Following the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, which marked the beginning of the Second World War, Chamberlain announced the declaration of war on Germany two days later and led the United Kingdom through the first eight months of the war until his resignation as prime minister on 10 May 1940.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Munich Agreement</span> 1938 cession of German-speaking Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany

The Munich Agreement was an agreement concluded at Munich on 30 September 1938, by Nazi Germany, the United Kingdom, the French Republic, and Fascist Italy. The agreement provided for the German annexation of part of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland, where more than three million people, mainly ethnic Germans, lived. The pact is also known in some areas as the Munich Betrayal, because of a previous 1924 alliance agreement and a 1925 military pact between France and the Czechoslovak Republic.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Jan Masaryk</span> Czechoslovak diplomat and politician (1886–1948)

Jan Garrigue Masaryk was a Czech diplomat and politician who served as the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia from 1940 to 1948. American journalist John Gunther described Masaryk as "a brave, honest, turbulent, and impulsive man".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Appeasement</span> Diplomatic policy to avoid conflict

Appeasement, in an international context, is a diplomatic policy of making political, material, or territorial concessions to an aggressive power to avoid conflict. The term is most often applied to the foreign policy of the British governments of Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain towards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy between 1935 and 1939. Under British pressure, appeasement of Nazism and Fascism also played a role in French foreign policy of the period but was always much less popular there than in the United Kingdom.

The events preceding World War II in Europe are closely tied to the bellicosity of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Imperial Japan, as well as the Great Depression. The peace movement led to appeasement and disarmament.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Édouard Daladier</span> French radical socialist politician

Édouard Daladier was a French Radical-Socialist (centre-left) politician, and the Prime Minister of France who signed the Munich Agreement before the outbreak of World War II.

Fall Grün was a pre-World War II plan for the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany. Although some preliminary steps were taken to destabilise Czechoslovakia, the plan was never fully realised since Nazi Germany achieved its objective by diplomatic means at the Munich Conference in September 1938, followed by the unopposed military occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the creation of a nominally independent Slovakia, in March 1939.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Robert Vansittart, 1st Baron Vansittart</span> British diplomat (1881–1957)

Robert Gilbert Vansittart, 1st Baron Vansittart,, known as Sir Robert Vansittart between 1929 and 1941, was a senior British diplomat in the period before and during the Second World War. He was Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister from 1928 to 1930 and Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1938 and later served as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government. He is best remembered for his opposition to appeasement and his strong stance against Germany during and after the Second World War. Vansittart was also a published poet, novelist and playwright.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Causes of World War II</span> Causes of World War II

The causes of World War II have been given considerable attention by historians. The immediate precipitating event was the invasion of Poland by Nazi Germany on September 1, 1939, and the subsequent declarations of war on Germany made by Britain and France, but many other prior events have been suggested as ultimate causes. Primary themes in historical analysis of the war's origins include the political takeover of Germany in 1933 by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party; Japanese militarism against China, which led to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Second Sino-Japanese War; Italian aggression against Ethiopia, which led to the Second Italo-Ethiopian War, the consent of Western countries to Germany's actions on the annexation of Austria and the partition of Czechoslovakia and Germany's initial success in negotiating the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet Union to divide the territorial control of Eastern Europe between them.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Horace Wilson (civil servant)</span>

Sir Horace John Wilson, was a senior British government official who had a key role, as Head of the Home Civil Service, with government of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the appeasement period just prior to the Second World War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nevile Henderson</span> British diplomat (1882–1942)

Sir Nevile Meyrick Henderson was a British diplomat who served as the ambassador of the United Kingdom to Germany from 1937 to 1939.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Remilitarisation of the Rhineland</span> 1936 treaty violation by Adolf Hitler

The remilitarisation of the Rhineland began on 7 March 1936, when military forces of the German Reich entered the Rhineland, which directly contravened the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties. Neither France nor Britain was prepared for a military response, so they did not act. After 1939, commentators often said that a strong military move in 1936 might have ruined the expansionist plans of Adolf Hitler, the dictator of Germany. However, recent historiography agrees that both public and elite opinion in Britain and France strongly opposed a military intervention, and neither had an army prepared to move in.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry</span>

The European foreign policy of the Chamberlain ministry from 1937 to 1940 was based on British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's commitment to "peace for our time" by pursuing a policy of appeasement and containment towards Nazi Germany and by increasing the strength of Britain's armed forces until, in September 1939, he delivered an ultimatum over the invasion of Poland, which was followed by a declaration of war against Germany.

The history of French foreign relations covers French diplomacy and foreign relations down to 1981. For the more recent developments, see foreign relations of France.

A Total and Unmitigated Defeat was a speech by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons at Westminster on Wednesday, 5 October 1938, the third day of the Munich Agreement debate. Signed five days earlier by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, the agreement met the demands of Nazi Germany in respect of the Czechoslovak region of Sudetenland.

The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia was an initiative of the British government initiative that was aimed at resolving an international crisis threatening to lead to war in Europe in the summer of 1938. The Mission, headed by a former British cabinet minister Lord Runciman, was sent to mediate in a dispute between the Government of Czechoslovakia and the Sudeten German Party (SdP), representing the countruy's mostly-radicalised ethnic German minority. The British mediators were active on the ground in Czechoslovakia during the late summer and issued their report shortly before the Munich Conference in September.

The May Crisis was a brief episode of international tension in 1938 caused by reports of German troop movements against Czechoslovakia that appeared to signal the imminent outbreak of war in Europe. Although the state of high anxiety soon subsided when no actual military concentrations were detected, the consequences of the crisis were far-reaching.

International relations (1919–1939) covers the main interactions shaping world history in this era, known as the interwar period, with emphasis on diplomacy and economic relations. The coverage here follows the diplomatic history of World War I and precedes the diplomatic history of World War II. The important stages of interwar diplomacy and international relations included resolutions of wartime issues, such as reparations owed by Germany and boundaries; American involvement in European finances and disarmament projects; the expectations and failures of the League of Nations; the relationships of the new countries to the old; the distrustful relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world; peace and disarmament efforts; responses to the Great Depression starting in 1929; the collapse of world trade; the collapse of democratic regimes one by one; the growth of economic autarky; Japanese aggressiveness toward China; fascist diplomacy, including the aggressive moves by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany; the Spanish Civil War; the appeasement of Germany's expansionist moves toward the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, and the last, desperate stages of rearmament as another world war increasingly loomed.

Robert Coulondre was a French diplomat who served as the last French ambassador to Germany before World War II.

The Carlsbad Programme was an eight-point series of demands, addressed to the government of Czechoslovakia, issued by Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German Party (SdP), at a party gathering in Carlsbad on 24 April 1938.The programme demanded full autonomy for the mainly German-inhabited areas of Czechoslovakia, known as the Sudetenland. Under pressure from its allies, Britain and France, the Czechoslovak government reluctantly accepted the demands. But the SdP, instructed by Nazi Germany not to reach a settlement with the Czechoslovak authorities, broke off negotiations, thus precipitating the Munich crisis.

References

  1. 1 2 3 Ripsman, Norrin M.; Levy, Jack S. (2008). "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s". International Security. 33 (2): 148–181. doi:10.1162/isec.2008.33.2.148. JSTOR   40207135. S2CID   57567749.
  2. "Munich Agreement". Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved 6 August 2018.
  3. 1 2 Lukes, Igor; Goldstein, Erik (1999). The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II. Routledge.
  4. Yuen Foong Khong (1992). Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton UP. pp. 4–7. ISBN   0691025355.
  5. Beck, Robert J. (1989). "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered". International Security. 14 (2): 161–191. doi:10.2307/2538858. JSTOR   2538858. S2CID   154668071.
  6. Roberts, Andrew (1 November 2019). "'Appeasement' Review: What Were They Thinking? Britain's establishment coalesced around appeasement and bared its teeth at those who dared to oppose it". Wall Street Journal.
  7. Dr. Robert D. Williamson, lecture in Munich - Fifty Years Later, 1988 International Symposium.
  8. 1 2 Logevall, Fredrik; Osgood, Kenneth (2010). "THE GHOST OF MUNICH: America's Appeasement Complex". World Affairs. 173 (2): 13–26. JSTOR   27870285.
  9. Dallek, Matthew (December 1995). "The Conservative 1960s". The Atlantic. p. 6. Retrieved 5 September 2020.
  10. Dobbs, Michael (2008). One minute to midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the brink of nuclear war (1st ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN   9780307269362. OCLC   608213334.
  11. Wheatcroft, Geoffrey (3 December 2013). "On the Use and Abuse of Munich" . Retrieved 11 January 2018.
  12. "Deutsche Feigheit". Der Spiegel (in German). 11 November 1972. Archived from the original on 19 October 2013. Retrieved 16 July 2013.
  13. Record, Jeffrey (2002). Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo.
  14. "Kerry: 'This is our Munich moment'". BBC News. Retrieved 4 October 2021.

Further reading