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Administrative law is the division of law that governs the activities of executive branch agencies of government. Administrative law concerns executive branch rule making, adjudication, or the enforcement of laws. Administrative law is considered a branch of public law.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a court cannot impose rulemaking procedures on a federal government agency. The federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and an agency's statutory mandate from Congress establish the maximum requirements for an agency's rulemaking process. An agency may grant additional procedural rights in the regulatory process. However, a reviewing court cannot "impose upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good"; to do so would exceed the limits of judicial review of agency action.
United States federal administrative law encompasses statutes, common law, and directives issued by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Executive Office of the President, that together define the extent of powers and responsibilities held by administrative agencies of the United States government. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the U.S. federal government cannot always directly perform their constitutional responsibilities. Specialized powers are therefore delegated to an agency, board, or commission. These administrative governmental bodies oversee and monitor activities in complex areas, such as commercial aviation, medical device manufacturing, and securities markets.
Statutory interpretation is the process by which courts interpret and apply legislation. Some amount of interpretation is often necessary when a case involves a statute. Sometimes the words of a statute have a plain and a straightforward meaning. But in many cases, there is some ambiguity in the words of the statute that must be resolved by the judge. To find the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and purpose. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory interpretation both to legislation enacted by the legislature and to delegated legislation such as administrative agency regulations.
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court declared in a 6–3 decision that the administrative law principle of Chevron deference to statutory interpretations by administrative agencies tasked with executing the statute trumped the precedents of the United States Courts of Appeals unless the Court of Appeals had held that the statute was "unambiguous" under the Chevron deference. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the Federal Communications Commission's determination that a cable Internet provider is an "information service", and not a "telecommunications service" and as such competing internet service providers (ISPs) like Brand X Internet were denied access to the cable and phone wires to provide home users with competing internet service.
In law, the standard of review is the amount of deference given by one court in reviewing a decision of a lower court or tribunal. A low standard of review means that the decision under review will be varied or overturned if the reviewing court considers there is any error at all in the lower court's decision. A high standard of review means that deference is accorded to the decision under review, so that it will not be disturbed just because the reviewing court might have decided the matter differently; it will be varied only if the higher court considers the decision to have obvious error. The standard of review may be set by statute or precedent. In the United States, "standard of review" also has a separate meaning concerning the level of deference the judiciary gives to Congress when ruling on the constitutionality of legislation.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), was a landmark case in which the United States Supreme Court set forth the legal test for determining whether to grant deference to a government agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers. The decision articulated a doctrine now known as "Chevron deference". The doctrine consists of a two-part test applied by the court, when appropriate, that is highly deferential to government agencies: "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction [emphasis added] of the statute", so long as Congress has not spoken directly to the precise issue at question.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), was a case heard by the United States Supreme Court to determine and delineate several questions concerning administrative procedure in Social Security disability cases. Among the questions considered was the propriety of using physicians' written reports generated from medical examinations of a disability claimant, and whether these could constitute "substantial evidence" supportive of finding nondisability under the Social Security Act.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), is a United States Supreme Court case that concerns the standard that the Court should apply when it reviews an executive department's interpretation of regulations established under federal legislation. The specific issue was whether sergeants and lieutenants in the St. Louis Police Department should be paid for working overtime. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 established the overtime pay requirement, and the US Department of Labor issued regulations to determine if an employee was covered by the overtime requirement.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court that addressed the issue of when Chevron deference should be applied. In an 8–1 majority decision, the Court determined that Chevron deference applies when Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 332 U.S. 194 (1947), is a United States Supreme Court case. It is often referred to as Chenery II.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), is a United States Supreme Court decision holding that an administrative agency's interpretative rules deserve deference according to their persuasiveness. The court adopted a case-by-case test, which considers the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of the administrator. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), is a Supreme Court of the United States case holding that a county's policy of requiring employees to schedule time off to avoid accruing time off was not prohibited by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court which held that, in a union security agreement, unions are authorized by statute to collect from non-members only those fees and dues necessary to perform its duties as a collective bargaining representative. The rights identified by the Court in Communications Workers of America v. Beck have since come to be known as "Beck rights," and defining what Beck rights are and how a union must fulfill its duties regarding them is an active area of modern United States labor law.
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999), is a United States Supreme Court holding that Chevron deference is appropriate for regulations issued by Customs on behalf of the Treasury. The statutes authorizing customs classification regulations were found consistent with the usual rule that regulations of an administering agency warrant judicial deference; and nothing in the regulation in question persuaded the Court that the Customs and Border Patrol intended the regulation to have some lesser force and effect. The statutory scheme did not support the importer's argument that the regulation only applied to customs officers themselves as opposed to the adjudication of importers' refund suits in the Court of International Trade. The Customs Service is charged with fixing duties applicable to imported goods under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub.L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237, enacted June 11, 1946, is the United States federal statute that governs the way in which administrative agencies of the federal government of the United States may propose and establish regulations and grants U.S. federal courts oversight over all agency actions. According to Hickman & Pierce, it is one of the most important pieces of United States administrative law, and serves as a sort of "constitution" for U.S. administrative law.
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court that reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Water Act regulations with regard to cooling water intakes for power plants. Existing facilities are mandated to use the "Best Technology Available" to "minimize the adverse environmental impact." The issue was whether the agency may use a cost–benefit analysis (CBA) in choosing the Best Available Technology or (BAT) to meet the National Performance Standards (NPS).
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015), was a 6–3 decision by the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Court's decision upheld, as consistent with the statute, the outlay of premium tax credits to qualifying persons in all states, both those with exchanges established directly by a state, and those otherwise established by the Department of Health and Human Services.
NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001), is a US labor law case, concerning the scope of labor rights in the United States.
Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that agencies should not be presumed to have the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is expressly authorized by Congress. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for a unanimous court that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had exceeded his rulemaking authority under the Medicare Act in promulgating a wage index rule in 1984 under which he would recoup Medicare reimbursements paid to hospitals, including Georgetown University Hospital, that had been disbursed since 1981 according to the pre-1984 rule. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in the judgment, writing separately that, in addition to the particular language of the Medicare Act, the Administrative Procedure Act more broadly prohibits retroactive rulemaking because it defines rules as having exclusively future effect, as opposed to adjudicative orders.
References
- ↑ Block v. Community Nutrition Institute 467 U.S. 340, Findlaw.com, 1984, retrieved 2016-12-10.
- ↑ Bowen v. Academy of Family Physicians 476 U.S. 667, Findlaw.com, 1986, retrieved 2016-12-10.