NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization

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Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization [1] is a program and competition by NIST to update their standards to include post-quantum cryptography. [2] It was announced at PQCrypto 2016. [3] 23 signature schemes and 59 encryption/KEM schemes were submitted by the initial submission deadline at the end of 2017 [4] of which 69 total were deemed complete and proper and participated in the first round. Seven of these, of which 3 are signature schemes, have advanced to the third round, which was announced on July 22, 2020.

Contents

Background

Academic research on the potential impact of quantum computing dates back to at least 2001. [5] A NIST published report from April 2016 cites experts that acknowledge the possibility of quantum technology to render the commonly used RSA algorithm insecure by 2030. [6] As a result, a need to standardize quantum-secure cryptographic primitives was pursued. Since most symmetric primitives are relatively easy to modify in a way that makes them quantum resistant, efforts have focused on public-key cryptography, namely digital signatures and key encapsulation mechanisms. In December 2016 NIST initiated a standardization process by announcing a call for proposals. [7]

The competition is now in its third round out of expected four, where in each round some algorithms are discarded and others are studied more closely. NIST hopes to publish the standardization documents by 2024, but may speed up the process if major breakthroughs in quantum computing are made.

It is currently undecided whether the future standards will be published as FIPS or as NIST Special Publication (SP).

Round one

Under consideration were: [8]
(strikethrough means it had been withdrawn)

TypePKE/KEM SignatureSignature & PKE/KEM
Lattice
  • Compact LWE
  • CRYSTALS-Kyber
  • Ding Key Exchange
  • EMBLEM and R.EMBLEM
  • FrodoKEM
  • HILA5 (withdrawn and merged into Round5)
  • KCL (pka OKCN/AKCN/CNKE)
  • KINDI
  • LAC
  • LIMA
  • Lizard
  • LOTUS
  • NewHope
  • NTRUEncrypt [9]
  • NTRU-HRSS-KEM
  • NTRU Prime
  • Odd Manhattan
  • Round2 (withdrawn and merged into Round5)
  • Round5 (merger of Round2 and Hila5, announced 4 August 2018) [10]
  • SABER
  • Three Bears
  • Titanium
Code-based
  • BIG QUAKE
  • BIKE
  • Classic McEliece + NTS- KEM
  • DAGS
  • Edon-K
  • HQC
  • LAKE (withdrawn and merged into ROLLO)
  • LEDAkem
  • LEDApkc
  • Lepton
  • LOCKER (withdrawn and merged into ROLLO)
  • McNie
  • NTS-KEM
  • ROLLO (merger of Ouroboros-R, LAKE and LOCKER) [13]
  • Ouroboros-R (withdrawn and merged into ROLLO)
  • QC-MDPC KEM
  • Ramstake
  • RLCE-KEM
  • RQC
  • pqsigRM
  • RaCoSS
  • RankSign
Hash-based
  • Gravity-SPHINCS
  • SPHINCS+
Multivariate
  • CFPKM
  • Giophantus
  • DualModeMS
  • GeMSS
  • Gui
  • HiMQ-3
  • LUOV
  • MQDSS
  • Rainbow
  • SRTPI
  • DME
Braid group
  • WalnutDSA
Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny
Satirical submission
Other
  • Guess Again
  • HK17
  • Mersenne-756839
  • RVB
  • Picnic

Round one submissions published attacks

Round two

Candidates moving on to the second round were announced on January 30, 2019. They are: [32]

TypePKE/KEMSignature
Lattice
  • CRYSTALS-Kyber [33]
  • FrodoKEM [34]
  • LAC
  • NewHope [35]
  • NTRU (merger of NTRUEncrypt and NTRU-HRSS-KEM) [9]
  • NTRU Prime [36]
  • Round5 (merger of Round2 and Hila5, announced 4 August 2018) [10]
  • SABER [37]
  • Three Bears [38]
Code-based
Hash-based
Multivariate
Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny
Zero-knowledge proofs

Round three

On July 22, 2020, NIST announced seven finalists ("first track"), as well as eight alternate algorithms ("second track"). The first track contains the algorithms which appear to have the most promise, and will be considered for standardization at the end of the third round. Algorithms in the second track could still become part of the standard, after the third round ends. [52] NIST expects some of the alternate candidates to be considered in a fourth round. NIST also suggests it may re-open the signature category for new schemes proposals in the future. [53]

On June 7–9, 2021, NIST conducted the third PQC standardization conference, virtually. [54] The conference included candidates' updates and discussions on implementations, on performances, and on security issues of the candidates. A small amount of focus was spent on intellectual property concerns.

Finalists

TypePKE/KEMSignature
Lattice
Code-based
Multivariate

Alternate candidates

TypePKE/KEMSignature
Lattice
  • FrodoKEM
  • NTRU Prime
Code-based
Hash-based
  • SPHINCS+
Multivariate
  • GeMSS
Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny
Zero-knowledge proofs
  • Picnic

Intellectual property concerns

After NIST's announcement regarding the finalists and the alternate candidates, various intellectual property concerns were voiced, notably surrounding lattice-based schemes such as Kyber and NewHope. NIST holds signed statements from submitting groups clearing any legal claims, but there is still a concern that third parties could raise claims. NIST claims that they will take such considerations into account while picking the winning algorithms. [55]

Round three submissions published attacks

Adaptations

During this round, some candidates have shown to be vulnerable to some attack vectors. It forces these candidates to adapt accordingly:

CRYSTAL-Kyber and SABER
may change the nested hashes used in their proposals in order for their security claims to hold. [57]
FALCON
side channel attack by . A masking may be added in order to resist the attack. This adaptation affects performance and should be considered while standardizing. [58]

Selected Algorithms 2022

On July 5, 2022, NIST announced the first group of winners from its six-year competition. [59] [60]

TypePKE/KEMSignature
Lattice
Hash-based

Round four

On July 5, 2022, NIST announced four candidates for PQC Standardization Round 4. [61]

TypePKE/KEM
Code-based
Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny

Round four submissions published attacks

Additional Digital Signature Schemes Round One

NIST received 50 submissions and deemed 40 to be complete and proper according to the submission requirements. [64] Under consideration are: [65]
(strikethrough means it has been withdrawn)

TypeSignature
Lattice
Code-based
MPC-in-the-Head
Multivariate
  • 3WISE ("the submitter agrees that the scheme is insecure, but prefers to not withdraw in the hope that studying the scheme will advance cryptanalysis" [82] )
  • Biscuit [83]
  • DME-Sign ("Our first impression is that the attack works and we are checking the details of the attack .We are implementing a variant of the DME that may resist the attack but we have to verify it." [84] )
  • HPPC
  • MAYO [85]
  • PROV [86]
  • QR-UOV [87]
  • SNOVA [88]
  • TUOV [89]
  • UOV [90]
  • VOX [91]
Supersingular elliptic curve isogeny
Symmetric-based
  • AIMer [93]
  • Ascon-Sign
  • FAEST [94]
  • SPHINCS-alpha
Other
  • ALTEQ [95]
  • eMLE-Sig 2.0
  • KAZ-SIGN
  • Preon
  • Xifrat1-Sign.I

Additional signature round one submissions published attacks

See also

Related Research Articles

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  76. ↑ "MIRA".
  77. ↑ "MiRitH".
  78. ↑ "MQOM".
  79. ↑ "PERK".
  80. ↑ "RYDE".
  81. ↑ "SD-in-the-Head".
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  83. ↑ "Home".
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  85. ↑ "MAYO".
  86. ↑ "PROV".
  87. ↑ "QR-UOV".
  88. ↑ "SNOVA". snova.pqclab.org. Retrieved 23 September 2023.
  89. ↑ "TUOV".
  90. ↑ "UOV".
  91. ↑ "VOX".
  92. ↑ "SQIsign".
  93. ↑ "AIMer Signature".
  94. ↑ "Come and join the FAEST | FAEST Signature Algorithm".
  95. ↑ "ALTEQ".
  96. ↑ Tibouchi, Mehdi (17 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: EagleSign".
  97. ↑ Bernstein, D.J. (17 July 2023). "OFFICIAL COMMENT: KAZ-SIGN".
  98. ↑ Fluhrer, Scott (17 July 2023). "KAZ-SIGN".
  99. ↑ Panny, Lorenz (17 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: Xifrat1-Sign.I".
  100. ↑ Tibouchi, Mehdi (18 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: EagleSign".
  101. ↑ Beullens, Ward (18 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: HPPC".
  102. ↑ Perlner, Ray (21 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: HPPC".
  103. ↑ Saarinen, Markku-Juhani O. (18 July 2023). "OFFICIAL COMMENT: ALTEQ".
  104. ↑ Bouillaguet, Charles (19 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: Biscuit".
  105. ↑ Niederhagen, Ruben (19 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: MEDS".
  106. ↑ van Woerden, Wessel (20 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: FuLeeca".
  107. ↑ Persichetti, Edoardo (21 July 2023). "OFFICIAL COMMENT: LESS".
  108. ↑ Saarinen, Markku-Juhani O. "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: DME-Sign".
  109. ↑ "OFFICIAL COMMENT: DME Key Recovery Attack". groups.google.com. Retrieved 10 September 2023.
  110. ↑ van Woerden, Wessel (25 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: EHTv3".
  111. ↑ Suhl, Adam (29 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: EHT".
  112. ↑ VASSEUR, Valentin (29 July 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: Enhanced pqsigRM".
  113. ↑ "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: Enhanced pqsigRM". groups.google.com. Retrieved 30 September 2023.
  114. ↑ Saarinen, Markku-Juhani O. (27 July 2023). "Buffer overflows in HAETAE / On crypto vs implementation errors".
  115. ↑ Saarinen, Markku-Juhani O. (29 July 2023). "HuFu: Big-flipping forgeries and buffer overflows".
  116. ↑ Carrier, Kevin (3 August 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: SDitH".
  117. ↑ Carrier, Kevin; Hatey, Valérian; Tillich, Jean-Pierre (5 December 2023). "Projective Space Stern Decoding and Application to SDitH". arXiv: 2312.02607 [cs.IT].
  118. ↑ Furue, Hiroki (28 August 2023). "Round 1 (Additional Signatures) OFFICIAL COMMENT: VOX".
  119. ↑ Liu, Fukang; Mahzoun, Mohammad; Øygarden, Morten; Meier, Willi (10 November 2023). "Algebraic Attacks on RAIN and AIM Using Equivalent Representations". IACR ePrint (2023/1133).
  120. ↑ Ikematsu, Yasuhiko; Akiyama, Rika (2024), Revisiting the security analysis of SNOVA , retrieved 28 January 2024
  121. ↑ Ferreira, River Moreira; Perret, Ludovic (2024), Polynomial-Time Key-Recovery Attack on the ${\tt NIST}$ Specification of ${\tt PROV}$ , retrieved 4 April 2024
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