Nebraska v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler (Gremlin) | |
---|---|
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Full case name | State of Nebraska v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler (Gremlin) |
Decided | March 14, 1974 |
Citation | 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974) |
Case opinions | |
Decision by | Chief Justice White |
Concurrence | Justice Spencer, Justice Boslaugh and Justice Newton |
Concur/dissent | 4–2 |
Dissent | Justice McCown, Justice Clinton |
Nebraska v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler (Gremlin) 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974) is a Nebraska Supreme Court civil forfeiture case. It was brought by the American state of Nebraska to seize a Rambler Gremlin on the sole grounds it was transporting illegal marijuana. The owner appealed against the forfeiture decision on the grounds of a claimed lack of due process. The court ruled 4–2 and sustained the confiscation as lawful. [1] [2]
The form of the styling of this case—the appellant and defendant being an object, rather than a legal person—is because this is a jurisdiction in rem (power over objects) case, [upper-alpha 1] rather than the more familiar in personam (over persons) case. [2] [6] [7] [8] [9]
On February 14, 1972, Donald Ruyle was arrested in possession of marijuana after he had driven in his 1970 Rambler Gremlin to a friend's house in Beatrice, Nebraska, that was under surveillance by the police. His car was locked and the next day he granted permission for the police to search it while in custody. Inside, the police found marijuana joint butts. Ruyle was sentenced to a week in jail for possession and transportation of marijuana and fined $350. Accordingly, they seized his car for transporting drugs; Ruyle appealed the seizure order. [1]
Ruyle contended that the notice informing him of the seizure was an arrogation in violation of the due process clause of the United States Constitution. He argued he had not been properly notified nor had a hearing taken place to discuss the legality of the seizure. [1] Rejecting the claim, the court held that the car was seized immediately on the street and taken as evidence to an impound lot to remove the drugs before the seizure order was issued, all within process and Ruyle had been notified. Ruyle also contended that under Nebraskan state law, the word "transport" meant drug trafficking, not merely carrying drugs. The court ruled that though "transport" was not clearly defined in law, it decided to take the public's general understanding that it meant "to carry or convey from one place or station to another". [1]
The court ruled 4–2 in favor of the seizure. The judgment was read by Chief Justice White. It was concurred with by Justices Spencer, Boslaugh and Newton. Justice Smith abstained from issuing a ruling. [1] Justice McCown dissented on the grounds that the court declined to rule that Fuentes v. Shevin , which the defendant cited, was controlling. McCown ruled that it was and accordingly the seizure would have been unlawful. Justice Clinton also dissented on the grounds that the court's interpretation of "transport" was too broad, meaning that someone who had a box of Kleenex in their glove compartment, would be "transporting" the Kleenex. [10]
The case has since been cited in other state supreme court opinions as precedent. [11] It was also used by the Drug Enforcement Administration as grounds for asserting that Nebraska followed the federal rules for forfeiture of conveyances when they are discovered with illegal substances within them. [12]
The case is illustrative of bedrock legal practices in the United States. In deciding a forfeiture case rooted in a forfeiture prohibition, the Supreme Court stated the principle: "But whether the reason [for the forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of this country to now be displaced." [13] [14]
As one law review notes:
When certain kinds of property are involved in the commission of a crime or as instrumentality of a crime, they may be subject to seizure and forfeiture to the government. Yet neither the fact of the crime nor the participation of the owner to the property may be critical to the forfeiture. The property may be beneficial in its own right, and its owner unaware of the illegal use, and the forfeiture will attach. [14]
The case name has been the source of bemusement. [2] [7] However, its format is a result of an in rem civil forfeiture, which is against the offending thing, and not a person. The burden of proof in such proceedings is placed on the object to prove its innocence. [upper-alpha 2] [upper-alpha 3]
When the property is on trial, as it was in a Texas case, the burden of proof is on the property to prove the negative. Some critics opine that "Cash is not a crime" and this is "Violating the American justice system's cornerstone presumption of innocence, those whose property has been taken via civil asset forfeiture must prove their property wasn't involved in a crime – or lose it forever...." In Texas, such cases can be initiated by the filing of a simple affidavit, even by officers who did not witness the underlying event itself. [19]
There was an Indiana case (involving forfeiture of a Land Rover) [upper-alpha 4] which successfully alleged that civil forfeitures may violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution's ban on excessive fines, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and thereby applicable to the states. [22] In fact, the court held in Timbs v. Indiana 586 U.S. _____, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) [23] that the 8th Amendment applied to the State of Indiana, and that the forfeiture might be excessive and unlawful. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine the factual question of excessiveness. [20] [24] The case was also noteworthy for its omissions. While discussing "excessive" broadly, it did not mention ability to pay or the effect of the forfeiture on the fortunes and employment of the loser. [20]
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against imposing excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishments. This amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791, along with the rest of the United States Bill of Rights. The amendment serves as a limitation upon the state or federal government to impose unduly harsh penalties on criminal defendants before and after a conviction. This limitation applies equally to the price for obtaining pretrial release and the punishment for crime after conviction. The phrases in this amendment originated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
The Institute for Justice (IJ) is a non-profit public interest law firm in the United States. It has litigated twelve cases before the United States Supreme Court dealing with eminent domain, interstate commerce, public financing for elections, school vouchers, tax credits for private school tuition, civil asset forfeiture, and residency requirements for liquor license. The organization was founded on September 3, 1991. As of 2023, it employed a staff of 157 full-time staff members in Arlington, Virginia and seven offices across the United States.
Confiscation is a legal form of seizure by a government or other public authority. The word is also used, popularly, of spoliation under legal forms, or of any seizure of property as punishment or in enforcement of the law.
In rem jurisdiction is a legal term describing the power a court may exercise over property or a "status" against a person over whom the court does not have in personam jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in rem assumes the property or status is the primary object of the action, rather than personal liabilities not necessarily associated with the property.
Asset forfeiture or asset seizure is a form of confiscation of assets by the authorities. In the United States, it is a type of criminal-justice financial obligation. It typically applies to the alleged proceeds or instruments of crime. This applies, but is not limited, to terrorist activities, drug-related crimes, and other criminal and even civil offenses. Some jurisdictions specifically use the term "confiscation" instead of forfeiture. The alleged purpose of asset forfeiture is to disrupt criminal activity by confiscating assets that potentially could have been beneficial to the individual or organization.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), is a U.S. Supreme Court case holding that asset forfeiture is unconstitutional when it is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense", citing the Excessive Fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. It was the first time the Court struck down the federal government's "aggressive use of forfeiture" and the only time it has held that an imposed fine was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
United States of America v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, 458 F.3d 822, was a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that was handed down on August 18, 2006.
Scott G. Bullock is an American lawyer who focuses on property rights issues such as eminent domain and civil forfeiture. He has been president and General Counsel at the Institute for Justice since 2016, a nonprofit libertarian public interest law firm. He represented Susette Kelo in Kelo v. City of New London, an eminent domain case decided by the Supreme Court in 2005. Bullock was a senior attorney before becoming the president of the institute and directed many cases on state and federal level. In 1994 he represented the institute in a forum on C-SPAN.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates several constitutional rights, limiting governmental powers focusing on criminal procedures. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), was a Supreme Court of the United States case handed down in 1965. The Court ruled that civil forfeiture could not apply where the evidence used to invoke the forfeiture was obtained illegally.
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801), was a United States Supreme Court case. It was one of a series of cases resolving disputes over ships captured during the undeclared Quasi-War between the United States and France from 1798 to 1800. The vessel was ordered returned to France.
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the innocent owner defense is not constitutionally mandated by Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in cases of civil forfeiture.
A Krimstock hearing is an administrative law proceeding that offers vehicle owners the opportunity to recover possession of a vehicle confiscated by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) during an arrest. Police have authority to impound vehicles used as an instrument of a crime, and later to seek permanent ownership of these vehicles in civil forfeiture actions. Such forfeiture actions, like the Krimstock administrative hearings, are entirely separate from any criminal charges the vehicle owner may face stemming from his or her arrest.
Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87 (2009), was a United States Supreme Court decision on seizure of property by the Chicago Police Department, however the case was declared moot by the Court as the parties agreed that there was no longer contention over the property seized.
In the United States, civil forfeiture is a process in which law enforcement officers take assets from people who are suspected of involvement with crime or illegal activity without necessarily charging the owners with wrongdoing. While civil procedure, as opposed to criminal procedure, generally involves a dispute between two private citizens, civil forfeiture involves a dispute between law enforcement and property such as a pile of cash or a house or a boat, such that the thing is suspected of being involved in a crime. To get back the seized property, owners must prove it was not involved in criminal activity. Sometimes it can mean a threat to seize property as well as the act of seizure itself. Civil forfeiture is not considered to be an example of a criminal justice financial obligation.
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies to civil forfeiture cases.
Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court considered whether the excessive fines clause of the Constitution's Eighth Amendment applies to state and local governments. The case covered the asset forfeiture of the petitioner's truck after the police found a small quantity of drugs within it and he was convicted on non-felony possession charges.
United States v. 422 Casks of Wine, 26 U.S. 547 (1828), is an 1828 United States Supreme Court civil forfeiture case between the United States and 422 casks of Malaga wine. The case was brought after the United States moved to seize the wine on the grounds that it had been deliberately mislabeled as sherry to get a tax drawback, and the buyers objected. The original trial was ruled in favor of the United States but was ordered to be retried after errors were discovered concerning jurisdiction. In the subsequent retrial, the Supreme Court ruled against the United States; however, it did grant a certificate of seizure on probable cause.
South Dakota v. Fifteen Impounded Cats, 785 N.W.2d 272, is a 2010 Supreme Court of South Dakota civil forfeiture case brought by the American state of South Dakota against fifteen cats that they had seized on the grounds of interfering with a driver's visibility. The seizure was challenged by the owner of the cats and the court found on a 3–2 majority that the seizure was lawful because of the risk to pedestrians as well as to the cats.
Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377 (2024), is a case decided by Supreme Court of the United States regarding the timing of post-seizure probable cause hearings under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court has been asked to determine whether the "speedy trial" test from Barker v. Wingo or the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge applies to a judicial-forfeiture proceeding.
That particular case illustrates that, even where a crime is charged, civil asset forfeiture can still be the instrument of terrible injustice: Police seized the Gremlin after arresting its owner for mere marijuana possession, saying it had been used to 'transport' marijuana. The seizure was upheld by the state supreme court.
If police suspect a property is somehow attached to a crime, they can seize the property and, unlike most other legal actions, the burden then shifts to the owner to prove that the property is innocent. That phrasing sounds odd, but the suit is considered in rem, meaning against the property and not the person who owned the property.
Timbs may be more notable for the protection it did not guarantee. Historically, an individual's ability to pay a fine or forfeiture was an essential factor in determining the fine's excessiveness. Yet even after acknowledging this history, the Court in Timbs refrained from setting out a test that would consider a defendant's ability to pay. Instead, it implicitly left that choice to the lower courts.