October 22 Scud missile attack

Last updated
October 22 Scud missile attack
Part of the Yom Kippur War
R-17 Elbrus Scud missile.jpg
Egyptian personnel setting up a Scud missile
TypeBallistic missile attack
Location
Israeli Army bridgehead at Deversoir, Egypt

30°25′22″N032°20′07″E / 30.42278°N 32.33528°E / 30.42278; 32.33528
Objective Flag of Israel.svg Israeli Army troops
Date22 October 1973
Executed by Flag of Egypt.svg Egyptian Army
OutcomeMissile landed in Israel
Casualties7 Israeli soldiers killed

The October 22 Scud missile attack, which took place in the midst of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, was the first operational use of Scud missiles in the world. It witnessed Egypt launch three Scud missiles against Israeli targets. One of the missiles was fired at Arish and the others at the Israeli bridgehead on the western bank of the Suez Canal, near Deversoir.

Contents

Background

One of the lessons learned by Egypt following the Six-Day War was the need of a weapon able to hit deep inside Israel. The weapon would have to interrupt any Israeli attack manoeuvres and would serve as a deterrent. As a result of the need, Egypt armed itself with three types of weapons:

The Soviets feared equipping Egypt with deep-strike abilities, which caused tensions between Egypt and the Soviet Union. Eventually, the Soviets agreed to supply Egypt with KSR-2 Surface-to-surface missiles, Tupolev Tu-16s (instead of the newer Tupolev Tu-22 Egypt requested) and a division of Scud surface-to-surface missiles. The Mossad was aware of the Scud delivery since June 1973, before the missiles had arrived in Egypt [1] on August 24. The Soviets also trained Egyptian soldiers to operate the systems.

The Scud division included 10 launchers, and Israel Military Intelligence (Aman) estimated that the manpower training would take at least 11–12 months, meaning that Egypt would only be able to use the missiles in the first quarter of 1974 at the earliest. However, it is possible that the Egyptians were operating Scud missiles on their own by October 1973. In addition, Aman learned that the Scud division would be on active duty from the beginning of October 1973. The Agranat Commission later referred to the Scud missiles and saw them as a factor that could have changed the balance of power on the battlefield. [2]

Aman estimated that Egypt would not dare to go to war against Israel without first equipping itself with Scud missiles, which could act as an opposing threat to the IAF's abilities (Aman was still convinced Egypt would not be able to operate the Scud missiles before the beginning of 1974).

The attack

Israeli intelligence received information which stated that between October 12 and October 13 Soviet teams conducted reconnaissance in the area of Port Said, Ismailia and Damietta, searching for launching sites for the Scud missiles. The intelligence estimate was that the Scud missiles could hit deep inside Israel, as far as Netanya, and from some launching areas, the Scuds might even be able to hit Haifa. As a response to the intelligence estimates, Israel launched aircraft sorties in the region and asked the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Simcha Dinitz, to inform the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, about the Soviet missions, so he would discuss the subject with his Soviet counterpart. [3]

On the night between October 14 and October 15, the IDF crossed to the western side of the Suez Canal and started forming a bridgehead as preparation to a deep assault inside Egypt. The following day, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat threatened that he would retaliate with surface-to-surface missiles as a response to attacks deep inside Egypt. As a result, the Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan decided not to attack economical targets in Egypt the following day, in a direct contradiction to his opinion on the subject in the previous days.

On October 20, Moshe Dayan and the Israeli Chief of Staff David Elazar considered conquering Port Said and Port Fuad. During the discussion, the question of Scud launches as an Egyptian response was taken into account. In addition, Israel also bombed the Egyptian missile batteries at Port Said several times. The Egyptians claim that Israel attacked there because of its fear of Scud missiles being positioned there, due to the fact that Scud missiles positioned at Port Said could threaten all of Israel's big cities. [4]

On October 21, out of desperation, the Egyptians moved a battery of Scud missiles that was previously deployed in the eastern area of the Nile's delta (from where Tel Aviv was in the battery's range), to an eastern position in a minimum distance from the canal. [5]

On October 22, the UN Security Council accepted resolution 338. The resolution demanded that a ceasefire be in effect at 19:00.

According to Victor Aisralian, a high-ranking officer in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Scud division was under Soviet control, and fully staffed by Soviet personnel. The Egyptian leadership and the Soviet advisers were disappointed that the war was about to end without them having used the most sophisticated weapon the Soviets had supplied Egypt. As a result, in the hours before the ceasefire took into effect, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt called the Soviet foreign minister and asked for his permission to launch missile strikes against Israel. Unable to reach him, he turned to the Soviet minister of defence, who approved the attack. In the last few minutes before the ceasefire took into effect, the Soviet teams managed to fire three missiles, without Egyptian knowledge or approval. [6] Each of the three Scud missiles carried 2 tons of explosives. One of the missiles exploded near Arish, from which Israel received its aid from the United States. The other two were fired at the Israeli bridgehead at Deversoir, one hitting on the western side of the Suez Canal, the other striking on the eastern side, killing seven soldiers from the 410th battalion of the 600th armored brigade. The explosion left a crater of 15 meter in diameter and a depth of four meters. [7] [8] Later on, Sadat claimed in his book that he commanded the forces to fire the Scuds at the Israeli bridgehead: "I wanted Israel to know that we have such weapons and that we would be able to use them later on in the war". [9] Some additional memories were published in Russian in the Vremya Novostei newspaper at the 30th anniversary of the launch of October 22, 1973. [10]

Aftermath

As a result of the knowledge about the Egyptian Scuds able to hit deep inside Israel, Israel avoided attacking strategic targets deep inside Egypt throughout the entire war. This fear was raised by military intelligence chief Eli Zeira at a situation assessment with the Chief of Staff on October 9. This avoidance is more noticeable when compared to the significant Israeli strikes which were conducted during the 1967-70 War of Attrition. These strikes caused significant damage to the Egyptian military and forced it to defend the Egyptian front, therefore weakening its offensive capabilities. On the Syrian front, however, Israel struck deep inside Syria, damaging the Syrian war effort and even disrupting normal life in the country, attacking important power plants, petrol supplies, bridges and main roads. [3]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Yom Kippur War</span> 1973 war between Israel and a coalition of Arab states

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the Ramadan War, the October War, the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, or the Fourth Arab–Israeli War, was an armed conflict fought from 6 to 25 October 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. The majority of combat between the two sides took place in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights—both of which had been occupied by Israel in 1967—with some fighting in African Egypt and northern Israel. Egypt's initial objective in the war was to seize a foothold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and subsequently leverage these gains to negotiate the return of the rest of the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Israeli Air Force</span> Aerial service branch of the Israel Defense Forces

The Israeli Air Force operates as the aerial and space warfare branch of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It was founded on May 28, 1948, shortly after the Israeli Declaration of Independence. As of April 2022, Aluf Tomer Bar has been serving as the Air Force commander.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">War of Attrition</span> 1967–70 war between Israel and Egypt

The War of Attrition involved fighting between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and their allies from 1967 to 1970.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Latakia</span> 1973 naval battle of the Yom Kippur War

The Battle of Latakia was a small but revolutionary naval action of the Yom Kippur War, fought on 7 October 1973 between Israel and Syria. It was the first naval battle in history to see combat between surface-to-surface missile-equipped missile boats and the use of electronic deception.

The history of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intertwines in its early stages with history of the Haganah.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Badr (1973)</span> Egyptian military operation against Israel

Operation Badr, also known as Plan Badr, was an Egyptian military offensive and operation across the Suez Canal that destroyed the Bar-Lev Line, a chain of Israeli fortifications along the frontline of the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula, on 6 October 1973. It was launched in conjunction with a Syrian military offensive against the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, triggering the Yom Kippur War. During the War of Attrition, which preceded Operation Badr, both Egypt and Syria had been seeking to recover the territories that Israel had captured from them during the 1967 Arab–Israeli War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Nickel Grass</span> U.S. strategic airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur War

Operation Nickel Grass was the codename for a strategic airlift conducted by the United States to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel during the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. Between 14 October and 14 November of that year, the Military Airlift Command of the United States Air Force shipped approximately 22,325 tons of supplies, including tanks, artillery, and ammunition, in multiple flights of C-141 Starlifters and C-5 Galaxys. This initiative was undertaken to help improve the position of the Israeli military in the face of a large-scale joint offensive by Egypt and Syria, both of which had been receiving extensive support from the Soviet Union.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of the Chinese Farm</span> 1973 battle of the Yom Kippur War

The Battle of the Chinese Farm took place during October 15 to October 17, 1973 between the Egyptian Army and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), as part of the Yom Kippur War. It was fought in the Sinai Peninsula, north of the Great Bitter Lake and just east of the Suez Canal, near an Egyptian agricultural research station. The area was known to the Israeli military as the Chinese Farm – a misnomer resulting from the research station's use of Japanese-made equipment, with Japanese writing on the machinery mistaken by Israeli observers for Chinese characters.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Egyptian–Libyan War</span> Four-day border war in July 1977

The Egyptian–Libyan War, also known as the Four Day War, was a short border war fought between Libya and Egypt that lasted from 21 to 24 July 1977. The conflict stemmed from a deterioration in relations that had occurred between the two states after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had rebuffed Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's entreaties to unify their countries and had pursued a peace settlement with Israel in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Soon thereafter Libya began sponsoring dissidents and assassination plots to undermine Sadat, and Egypt responded in kind to weaken Gaddafi. In early 1976 Gaddafi dispatched troops to the Egyptian frontier where they began clashing with border guards. Sadat responded by moving many troops to the area, while the Egyptian General Staff drew up plans for an invasion to depose Gaddafi.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ofira Air Battle</span> 1973 battle of the Yom Kippur War

The Ofira Air Battle was one of the first air battles of the Yom Kippur War. On 6 October 1973, Egypt launched a massive surprise attack on Israel that included over 200 Egyptian aircraft participating in an opening airstrike. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) Base Ofir at Sharm el-Sheikh came under attack by 20 Egyptian Air Force MiG-17s and their eight MiG-21 escorts. Not realizing the extent of the attack, Israel quickly scrambled two F-4E Phantom II fighter jets. The Israeli pilots proceeded to jettison their external fuel tanks and engage all 28 MiGs in aerial combat. In just under six minutes, seven Egyptian MiGs had been shot down and the remaining Egyptian planes disengaged and returned to Egypt. The Israeli Phantoms returned to their base. The Egyptians dispute the Israeli account of the battle, but they never did provide their own version of what happened. One of the Egyptian pilots killed was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's half-brother, Atef.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ashraf Marwan</span> Egyptian businessman and spy (1944–2007)

Ashraf Marwan was an Egyptian billionaire who worked as a spy for both the General Intelligence Directorate (Egypt) and the Israeli Mossad.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2nd Infantry Division (Egypt)</span> Egyptian Army combat formation

The 2nd Mechanized Infantry Division of the Infantry Corps of the Egyptian Army is a heavy infantry formation created after the Second World War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of the Sinai (1973)</span> 1973 battle of the Yom Kippur War

The Battle of the Sinai was one of the most consequential battles of the Yom Kippur war. An Egyptian attacking force that advanced beyond their line of defense at the Bar-Lev Line was repulsed with heavy losses by Israeli forces. This prompted the Israelis to launch Operation Abiray-Lev the next day, penetrating the Egyptian line of defense and crossing the Suez Canal.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Marsa Talamat</span> 1973 naval battle of the Yom Kippur War

The Battle of Marsa Talamat was fought between the Israeli Navy and the Egyptian Navy commando forces on October 7, 1973, during the early stages of the Yom Kippur War. It took place in the small Egyptian naval anchorage of Marsa Talamat, in the central sector of the Gulf of Suez.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Scud missile</span> Series of short-range ballistic missiles

A Scud missile is one of a series of tactical ballistic missiles developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It was exported widely to both Second and Third World countries. The term comes from the NATO reporting name attached to the missile by Western intelligence agencies. The Russian names for the missile are the R-11, and the R-17Elbrus. The name Scud has been widely used to refer to these missiles and the wide variety of derivative variants developed in other countries based on the Soviet design.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Ismailia</span> 1973 battle of the Yom Kippur War

The Battle of Ismailia took place between the Egyptian Army and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the last stages of the Yom Kippur War during October 18–22, 1973, south of the city of Ismailia, on the west bank of the Suez Canal in Egypt. The battle itself took place as part of the larger IDF-launched Operation Abiray-Lev, in an attempt to seize Ismailia and thereby sever the logistical and supply lines of most of Egypt's Second Field Army across the Suez Canal.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">History of Egypt under Anwar Sadat</span> Aspect of Egyptian history

The history of Egypt under Anwar Sadat covers the eleven year period of Egyptian history from Anwar Sadat's election as President of Egypt on 15 October 1970, following the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, to Sadat's assassination by Islamist fundamentalist army officers on 6 October 1981. Though presenting himself as a Nasserist during his predecessor's lifetime, upon becoming President, Sadat broke with many of the core tenets of the domestic and foreign policy ideology that had defined Egyptian politics since the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. In addition to abandoning many of Nasser's economic and political principles via the Infitah policy, Sadat ended Egypt's strategic partnership with the Soviet Union in favor of a new strategic relationship with the United States, initiated the peace process with the State of Israel in exchange for the evacuation of all Israeli military forces and settlers from Egyptian territory, and instituted a form of politics in Egypt that, whilst far removed from Egypt's pre-revolution democratic system, allowed for some multi-party representation in Egyptian politics. Sadat's tenure also witnessed a rise in governmental corruption, and a widening of the gulf between rich and poor, both of which would become hallmarks of the presidency of his successor, Hosni Mubarak.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tanks of the Israel Defense Forces</span>

This article deals with the history and development of tanks of the Israeli Army, from their first use after World War II in the establishment of the State of Israel after the end of the British Mandate, and into the Cold War and what today is considered the modern era.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Abirey-Halev</span> Part of the Yom Kippur War (October 1973)

Operation Abirey-Halev or Operation Abirey-Lev also known as Operation Stouthearted Men and Operation Valiant, code-named Operation Gazelle, was an Israeli operation that took place in the center of the Suez Canal on 15–23 October 1973 during the Yom Kippur War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Egypt–North Korea relations</span> Bilateral relations

Egypt–North Korea relations refer to the bilateral relations between Egypt and North Korea. Egypt has an embassy in Pyongyang whilst North Korea has an embassy in Cairo.

References

  1. ↑ Ronen Bergman and Gil Meltzer, Yom Kippur War - in real time, 2004, p. 182
  2. ↑ Agranat Commission Report: Commission Inquiry of the Yom Kippur War, the third and last part, p. 8–9.
  3. 1 2 Noam Ophir, the long shadow of the Scud, the Israeli Air Force site, October 2006 (in Hebrew)
  4. ↑ ol-EJ I ol-Gamasy, Mosich, Mozcrat to - Gamasy, herev October, 1973, Paris, 1990, p. 215-216; Interview with Ali Fahmi, commander of air defense forces: Suheir Alhosini, co - operation is amazing ', in Arabic sources on the Yom Kippur War, Abraham Robinson (Translator), systems 332, (1993), p. 75.
  5. ↑ Yuval Ne'eman, "operational link between Israel and the United States in the Yom Kippur War", path 3, (June 2005).
  6. ↑ Victor Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War, Pennsylvania State Press, University park Pennsylvania, 1995, pp. 111
  7. ↑ Ramsey, Syed (2016). Tools of War: History of Weapons in Modern Times. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. ISBN   978-93-86019-83-7.
  8. ↑ Avraham Adan, On Both Banks of the Suez, Jerusalem, 1979, p. 284
  9. ↑ Anwar Sadat, the story of my life, Idanim, 1978, p. 199.
  10. ↑ Кто укрыл Россию "теплым одеялом нефтедолларов"? - Vremya Novostei, N°198,Oct.22, 2003 (In Russian)|http://www.vremya.ru/2003/198/5/83088.html
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.