One-way attack drone

Last updated
HESA Shahed 136 2023 IRGC Aerospace Force achievements Exhibition in Qom (33).jpg
HESA Shahed 136

A one-way attack drone (OWA-UAV or OWA drone) is a type of self-destructive unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to strike a target by crashing into it with an integrated warhead. [1] [2] [3] [4] Common terms like suicide drone, kamikaze drone or exploding drone are used to indicate both of the one-way attack drone and the loitering munition. Those type of drones are self destructive similar to the loitering munitions. However, when both are self destructive the functions of loitering munitions and one-way attack drones are not the same. [5] The loitering munitions typically feature human-in-the-loop control and the ability to loiter or "hunt" for targets before striking. [5] On the other hand, one-way attack drones are often launched against pre-programmed coordinates and lack the electro-optical targeting sensor or data links required for terminal guidance or target switching. [2] They are frequently described by defense analysts as functioning more like cost-effective and slower cruise missiles than traditional drones. [6] [7]

Contents

The term gained significant prominence during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, particularly with the widespread use of the Iranian-designed HESA Shahed 136 by Russian forces (under the designation Geran-2). [8]

Terminology and distinction

The terms "one-way attack drone" and "loitering munition" are often used interchangeably in media reports. However, defense analysts and military doctrines have increasingly sought to distinguish OWA-UAVs as a separate category. [9]

The primary distinction lies in the concept of operations (CONOPS) and guidance:

According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), OWA-UAVs are distinct because they are often employed for strategic "fires" against static infrastructure deep behind enemy lines, rather than tactical battlefield support. [2]

Characteristics

Cost and production

The defining characteristic of modern OWA-UAVs is their low cost relative to traditional cruise missiles. For example, a Kalibr cruise missile may cost upwards of $1 million, while a Shahed-136 OWA-UAV is estimated to cost between $20,000 and $50,000. [8] [12] This cost asymmetry allows operators to launch them in "swarms" or large salvos to deplete the defender's expensive surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Those air defense missiles such as MIM-104 Patriot or NASAMS cost significantly more than the drones they are destroying. [8]

Design

Most OWA-UAVs utilize Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components to reduce manufacturing complexity:

Operational history

Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russian invasion of Ukraine saw the first large-scale strategic use of OWA-UAVs. Beginning in late 2022, Russia began launching Iranian-supplied Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 one-way attack drones against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and cities. [8] In response, Ukraine developed its own long-range OWA-UAV program to produce systems such as the "Beaver" (Bober) and the AQ-400. Those OWA-UAVs targets deep inside Russia, including oil refineries and airfields. [2]

Middle East

List of OWA-UAVs

The following systems are frequently classified as One-Way Attack Drones rather than loitering munitions due to their reliance on coordinate-based guidance:

See also

References

  1. Hogg, Kait (May 20, 2024). "Shahed: The one-way attack drone so effective the US had to have one too". Forces Network. British Forces Broadcasting Service. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  2. 1 2 3 4 Plichta, Marcel (2025). "Precise Mass in Action: Assessing Ukraine's One-Way Attack Drone Campaign". The RUSI Journal. 170 (4). Royal United Services Institute. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  3. Wile, Emmett (18 September 2023). "How one-way attack drones challenge security norms in Ukraine and beyond". Project Ploughshares. Archived from the original on November 13, 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  4. SensusQ (September 14, 2025). "SensusQ Analysis on the Shahed 131, 136, 238 One-Way Attack UAVs". SensusQ. Archived from the original on September 14, 2025.
  5. 1 2 Bode, Ingvild; Watts, Tom (May 2023). "Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability: Autonomy in Weapon Systems and Challenges to Human Control" (PDF). Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. Archived (PDF) from the original on February 5, 2026. Retrieved February 5, 2026.
  6. Helfrich, Emma (2025-02-05). "MBDA lands first contract for 'one-way effector' from France". AeroTime. Archived from the original on 2026-02-05. Retrieved 2026-02-05.
  7. 1 2 3 "Loitering Munitions: Kamikaze Drones in Modern Warfare". Drill & Defense. 21 September 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  8. 1 2 3 4 "Calculating the Cost-Effectiveness of Russia's Drone Strikes". Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 19 February 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  9. "Loitering Munitions(LM) and One-Way Attack(OWA) Drones - Establishing Military Terminology in the Era of Drone War". The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology. Korea Science. 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  10. "Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability" (PDF). AutoNorms. June 2023. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  11. 1 2 3 "Shahed-131 & -136 UAVs: a visual guide". Open Source Munitions Portal. 28 August 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  12. 1 2 "Exquisite and Insufficient". Marine Corps Association. 15 November 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  13. Turdef (November 20, 2023). "Iran Unveils Shaheed-238 Jet-Powered Kamikaze UAV". Turdef. Archived from the original on December 1, 2023. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  14. 1 2 "U.S. Navy in Middle East Employs Attack Drone at Sea for First Time". United States Navy. 18 December 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  15. "U.S. Launches One-Way-Attack Drone Force in the Middle East". U.S. Central Command. 3 December 2025. Retrieved 5 February 2026.
  16. "MBDA One-Way Effector Solution: Saturate Enemies' Defences". MBDA Systems. 2026-01-20. Archived from the original on 2026-01-20. Retrieved 2026-02-05.