Prompt launch

Last updated February 02, 2021

Prompt-launch status and delayed launch status are generic classifications of combat readiness applied to describe nuclear-armed missiles.

Prompt-launch vs delayed launch

Almost all deployed U.S. nuclear-armed missiles, such as the Minuteman III (pictured), are kept at a prompt-launch status. Minuteman3launch.jpg — Almost all deployed U.S. nuclear-armed missiles, such as the Minuteman III (*pictured*), are kept at a prompt-launch status.

Prompt-launch, colloquially known as "hair trigger alert", is a state of combat readiness during which nuclear-armed missiles can be launched immediately upon receipt of a firing order, with no or minimal preparations.^[1]

Keeping weapons systems at a prompt-launch status allows a nation-state to launch on warning, thereby increasing the likelihood it could successfully retaliate against an attack, or initiate a nuclear first strike without alerting an enemy. Even for states that have proscribed launch on warning or first strike, prompt launch may help guarantee that nuclear-armed missiles which themselves have survived a first strike could actually be fired in a timely manner before being destroyed in follow-on, "mop-up" attacks.^[1]

During delayed launch status, nuclear-armed missiles require some type of preparation prior to firing, such as fueling, warhead mounting, or the manual removal of static launch barriers.^[2]

In nuclear warfighting strategy, weapons kept at delayed launch status are at risk of being destroyed in their silos in the event of a nuclear first strike by an adversary. Even if weapons survive a first strike, a nation's command and control system may collapse by the time they are readied for firing. A 1993 analysis of future improvements in U.S. command and control predicted the United States government might only be able to continue operating for a few hours after an initial attack and would be unable to manage a "protracted" nuclear war, rendering surviving weapons kept in delayed launch status useless.^[3]

Proponents of keeping some or all of a nation's nuclear deterrent at delayed alert status note several benefits, including decreased risk of accidental launch and minimized cost of crewing.

SLBMs

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), when deployed aboard ballistic missile submarines, are generally not vulnerable to an enemy's own weapons and may be kept at delayed launch status without risking their future launch potential. However, methods for keeping ICBMs at a delayed launch status, such as warhead-missile separation or placing static launch barriers on silo doors, may not be possible in the case of SLBMs due to the nature of submarine-deployment. Several methods have been proposed by which SLBMs could be kept at a delayed launch status, such as deploying ballistic missile submarines in remote oceanic locations out-of-range of the nation's primary adversary.

Status by operator

Nation	Launch status	Notes	Source
China	Mixed	China maintains as many as 30 ICBMs at a prompt-launch status ready for a first strike or immediate retaliation, however, the majority of its ballistic missiles do not regularly have warheads mounted; warheads for these missiles are stored in a separate location. During periods of heightened international tension, missiles kept at delayed launch status can be mounted with warheads and upgraded to prompt-launch status.	^[4]
France	Prompt	The deployed portion of the Strategic Oceanic Force's SLBMs are kept at the equivalent of a prompt-launch status. (Aircraft tasked to the Strategic Air Forces Command have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons in the form of gravity bombs but are not routinely kept on an alert status that would allow them to do so.)
India	Delayed	All Indian nuclear warheads designed for missile fitting are stored separately from their ballistic missiles, in a delayed launch status.	^[4]
Israel	Unknown	At present, very little is known about Israeli nuclear capabilities or warfighting doctrine.
North Korea	Unknown	At present, very little is known about North Korean nuclear capabilities or warfighting doctrine.
Pakistan	Delayed	All Pakistani nuclear warheads designed for missile fitting are stored separately from their ballistic missiles, in a delayed launch status.	^[4]
Russia	Prompt	Russia keeps almost all of its deployed nuclear-armed missiles at a prompt-launch status.	^[4]
United States	Prompt	The United States keeps almost all of its deployed nuclear-armed missiles at a prompt-launch status.	^[4]
United Kingdom	Delayed	The United Kingdom keeps just one SSBN on patrol, which carries its entire deployed nuclear arsenal. According to multiple sources, this deployed portion of British nuclear forces probably requires several days advance notice to prepare its weapons for launch.	^[5]^[4]

Related Research Articles

An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is a missile with a minimum range of 5,500 kilometres (3,400 mi) primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery. Similarly, conventional, chemical, and biological weapons can also be delivered with varying effectiveness, but have never been deployed on ICBMs. Most modern designs support multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), allowing a single missile to carry several warheads, each of which can strike a different target. Russia, United States, China, France, India, United Kingdom, and North Korea are the only countries that have operational ICBMs.

UGM-27 Polaris Type of Submarine-launched ballistic missile

The UGM-27 Polaris missile was a two-stage solid-fueled nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile. As the United States Navy's first SLBM, it served from 1961 to 1996.

The Trident missile is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). Originally developed by Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation, the missile is armed with thermonuclear warheads and is launched from nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Trident missiles are carried by fourteen United States Navy Ohio-class submarines, with American warheads, as well as four Royal Navy Vanguard-class submarines, with British warheads. The missile is named after the mythological trident of Neptune.

In nuclear strategy, a first strike is a preemptive surprise attack employing overwhelming force. First strike capability is a country's ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation while the opposing side is left unable to continue war. The preferred methodology is to attack the opponent's strategic nuclear weapon facilities, command and control sites, and storage depots first. The strategy is called counterforce.

Mutually assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy's use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.

LGM-30 Minuteman American ICBM, in service

The LGM-30 Minuteman is a U.S. land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in service with the Air Force Global Strike Command. As of 2020, the LGM-30G Minuteman III version is the only land-based ICBM in service in the United States and represents the land leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, along with the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and nuclear weapons carried by long-range strategic bombers.

A submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a ballistic missile capable of being launched from submarines. Modern variants usually deliver multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) each of which carries a nuclear warhead and allows a single launched missile to strike several targets. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles operate in a different way from submarine-launched cruise missiles.

A ballistic missile submarine is a submarine capable of deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with nuclear warheads. The United States Navy's hull classification symbols for ballistic missile submarines are SSB and SSBN – the SS denotes submarine, the B denotes ballistic missile, and the N denotes that the submarine is nuclear powered. These submarines became a major weapon system in the Cold War because of their nuclear deterrence capability. They can fire missiles thousands of kilometers from their targets, and acoustic quieting makes them difficult to detect, thus making them a survivable deterrent in the event of a first strike and a key element of the mutual assured destruction policy of nuclear deterrence.

The LGM-118 Peacekeeper, originally known as the MX for "Missile, Experimental", was a MIRV-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) produced and deployed by the United States from 1985 to 2005. The missile could carry up to 12 Mk.21 reentry vehicles, although treaty-limited to 10, each armed with a 300-kiloton W87 warhead. Initially, 100 MX ICBMs were planned to be built and deployed, but budgetary concerns eliminated the final procurement and only 50 entered service. Disarmament treaties signed after the Peacekeeper's development concluded in its eventual withdrawal from service in 2005.

The UGM-133A Trident II, or Trident D5 is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), built by Lockheed Martin Space in Sunnyvale, California, and deployed with the American and British navies. It was first deployed in March 1990, and remains in service. The Trident II Strategic Weapons System is an improved SLBM with greater accuracy, payload, and range than the earlier Trident C-4. It is a key element of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad and strengthens U.S. strategic deterrence. The Trident II is considered to be a durable sea-based system capable of engaging many targets. It enhances the U.S. position in strategic arms negotiation with performance and payload flexibility that can accommodate active treaty initiatives. The Trident II's increased payload allows nuclear deterrence to be accomplished with fewer submarines, and its high accuracy—approaching that of land-based missiles—enables it to be used as a first strike weapon.

The Enduring Stockpile is the United States' arsenal of nuclear weapons following the end of the Cold War.

The W76 is a United States thermonuclear warhead, designed for use on the UGM-96 Trident I sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and subsequently moved to the UGM-133 Trident II as Trident I was phased out of service. The first variant, the W76 mod 0 (W76-0) was manufactured from 1978 to 1987, and was gradually replaced by the W76 mod 1 (W76-1) between 2008 and 2018, completely replacing the Mod 0 in the active stockpile. In 2018 it was announced that some Mod 1 warheads would be converted to a new low-yield W76 mod 2 (W76-2) version. The first Mod 2 warheads were deployed in late 2019.

Nuclear weapons delivery is the technology and systems used to place a nuclear weapon at the position of detonation, on or near its target. Several methods have been developed to carry out this task.

Launch on warning (LOW) or fire on warning is a strategy of nuclear weapon retaliation that gained recognition during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the invention of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), launch on warning became an integral part of mutually assured destruction (MAD) theory. Under the strategy, a retaliatory strike is launched upon warning of enemy nuclear attack while its missiles are still in the air and before detonation occurs. U.S. land-based missiles can reportedly be launched within five minutes of a presidential decision to do so, and submarine-based missiles within 15 minutes.

A nuclear triad is a three-pronged military force structure that consists of land-launched nuclear missiles, nuclear-missile-armed submarines, and strategic aircraft with nuclear bombs and missiles. Specifically, these components are land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. The purpose of having this three-branched nuclear capability is to significantly reduce the possibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack. This, in turn, ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and thus increases a nation's nuclear deterrence.

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High-alert nuclear weapon(s) commonly refers to a launch-ready ballistic missile(s) armed with a nuclear warhead(s) whose launch can be ordered and executed within 15 minutes or less. This can include any weapon system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead in this time frame.

In nuclear strategy, a counterforce target is one that has a military value, such as a launch silo for intercontinental ballistic missiles, an airbase at which nuclear-armed bombers are stationed, a homeport for ballistic missile submarines, or a command and control installation.

STRAT-X, or Strategic-Experimental, was a U.S. government-sponsored study conducted during 1966 and 1967 that comprehensively analyzed the potential future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent force. At the time, the Soviet Union was making significant strides in nuclear weapons delivery, and also constructing anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect strategic facilities. To address a potential technological gap between the two superpowers, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara entrusted the classified STRAT-X study to the Institute for Defense Analyses, which compiled a twenty-volume report in nine months. The report looked into more than one hundred different weapons systems, ultimately resulting in the MGM-134 Midgetman and LGM-118 Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Ohio-class submarines, and the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, among others. Journalists have regarded STRAT-X as a major influence on the course of U.S. nuclear policy.

References

1 2 Coté, Owen (1991). "The Trident and the Triad: Collecting the D-5 Dividend". International Security . 16 (2): 117–145. doi:10.2307/2539062. JSTOR 2539062. S2CID 153840036.
↑ "President-elect Trump's Nuclear Agenda: Modernization and More". nti.org. Nuclear Threat Initiative . Retrieved January 11, 2017.
↑ Derber, Charles (1993). The Nuclear Seduction: Why the Arms Race Doesn't Matter - And What Does. University of California Press. pp. 233–234. ISBN 0520082834.
1 2 3 4 5 6 "Reframing Nuclear De-Alert" (PDF). Stanford University . EastWest Institute. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 30, 2015. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
↑ "A guide to Trident and the debate about replacement". BBC News . July 18, 2016. Retrieved January 11, 2017.

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[is-1] 1 2 Coté, Owen (1991). "The Trident and the Triad: Collecting the D-5 Dividend". International Security . 16 (2): 117–145. doi:10.2307/2539062. JSTOR 2539062. S2CID 153840036.

[2] "President-elect Trump's Nuclear Agenda: Modernization and More". nti.org. Nuclear Threat Initiative . Retrieved January 11, 2017.

[3] Derber, Charles (1993). The Nuclear Seduction: Why the Arms Race Doesn't Matter - And What Does. University of California Press. pp. 233–234. ISBN 0520082834.

[ew-4] 1 2 3 4 5 6 "Reframing Nuclear De-Alert" (PDF). Stanford University . EastWest Institute. Archived from the original (PDF) on September 30, 2015. Retrieved January 11, 2017.

[5] "A guide to Trident and the debate about replacement". BBC News . July 18, 2016. Retrieved January 11, 2017.

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