Scott Aikin

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Scott Aikin
Born1971 (age 52–53)[ citation needed ]
Era Contemporary philosophy
Region Western philosophy
School Analytic philosophy
Main interests

Scott F. Aikin (born 1971) is an American philosopher and associate professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, where he also holds a joint appointment in Classics. He earned an M.A. in philosophy from the University of Montana in 1999 and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Vanderbilt University in 2006. His principal areas of research are epistemology, argumentation theory, ancient philosophy, and pragmatism. [1]

Contents

Research

Epistemology

Aikin's work in epistemology is devoted to the elaboration and defense of two views: evidentialism and epistemic infinitism. [2] His case for evidentialism is articulated in his Evidentialism and the Will to Believe, in which he defends William Kingdon Clifford's version of evidentialism against William James's critiques. Clifford holds in "The Ethics of Belief" that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." James denies this, claiming that cases of faith – particularly those in which belief in a truth can help bring about the truth – are exceptional. Replying on behalf of Clifford, Aikin argues that such cases are not exceptions, because knowledge that one's belief in a proposition makes that proposition more likely to be true amounts to evidence for that proposition. Aikin has also contributed to the public debate about the ethics of belief in religious contexts, in Reasonable Atheism. [3] Aikin's case for epistemic infinitism, developed in Epistemology and the Regress Problem, holds that given the requirement that all reasons must have backing, the only options for rational belief are either skepticism or infinite, non-repeating chains of justifying reasons. In "Prospects for Moral Epistemic Infinitism," Aikin argues that these are also requirements of moral knowledge. [4]

Argumentation theory

Aikin is a proponent of the epistemic theory of argument, according to which the primary norms of argumentation are those that promote the communication of knowledge. His central argument for this view is that it uniquely precludes an absurdity that arises on the alternatives. Namely, the possibility that one may be convinced by an argument, yet know no more after the argument than before. Aikin further argues that the main competitor theories of argument are either self-refuting or implicitly epistemic. [5] His work in theory of argument has led Aikin to develop a program of expansive fallacy theory. Aikin poses an analysis of ad hominem tu quoque arguments that establishes the conditions for determining relevance of hypocrisy. [6] He has (with Robert Talisse and John Casey) proposed a variety of straw man fallacies: the representational (straw) man, the selectional (weak) man, the hollow man, and the iron man. [7] [8] Additionally, Aikin and Talisse have proposed a fallacy of ridicule they term "modus tonens," which consists in repeating an interlocutor's claim with an incredulous tone of voice. [9] Finally, Aikin also defends, along with Trudy Govier, the minimally adversarial theory of argument. This view acknowledges that, argumentation, as an act of addressing controversy, must have an essential adversarial component, but maintains that this adversariality must not be permitted to escalate. [10] Aikin, in Why We Argue, offers an introduction to argumentation theory for the context of public political debate. [11] As an author, he has been collected by libraries worldwide. [12]

Ancient philosophy

Aikin's work in ancient philosophy focuses primarily on knowledge and its connection to the good life in the ancient world. Of particular interest are Xenophanes, the Academic Skeptics, and the Stoics. With Xenophanes, Aikin argues that the famous contrary to fact conditional "if horses had had hands and drew their gods, they would look like horses" is an enthymatic argument against self-serving representations of the divine. [13] [14] Aikin's work on the skeptics has focused on the variety of arguments offered for the skeptical viewpoint. In particular, Aikin has argued that the Academics' "Argument from Second Place" is a unique positive epistemic argument for skepticism. [15] Further, Academic epistemology, Aikin has argued, is well-placed to dovetail with republican political views. [16]

Pragmatism

Aikin is a proponent of the neo-pragmatist movement in American philosophy. This movement is posited on the view that there is a fecund interplay between the methods and language of analytic philosophy, and the aspirations of pragmatism. In Pragmatism: A Guide for the Perplexed, Aikin and Talisse argue that the insights of classical pragmatism can be seen to merge with the analytic program, which gives rise to a number of important research agendas – particularly in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and political philosophy. Along with Talisse, Aikin has argued that pragmatism and moral pluralism are in tension, and hence that pragmatists cannot be pluralists. [17]

Bibliography (authored books)

Related Research Articles

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. It studies the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge, epistemic justification, the rationality of belief, and various related issues. Debates in contemporary epistemology are generally clustered around four core areas:

Skepticism, also spelled scepticism in British English, is a questioning attitude or doubt toward knowledge claims that are seen as mere belief or dogma. For example, if a person is skeptical about claims made by their government about an ongoing war then the person doubts that these claims are accurate. In such cases, skeptics normally recommend not disbelief but suspension of belief, i.e. maintaining a neutral attitude that neither affirms nor denies the claim. This attitude is often motivated by the impression that the available evidence is insufficient to support the claim. Formally, skepticism is a topic of interest in philosophy, particularly epistemology.

Justification is the property of belief that qualifies it as knowledge rather than mere opinion. Epistemology is the study of reasons that someone holds a rationally admissible belief. Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of warrant, knowledge, rationality, and probability, among others.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Regress argument (epistemology)</span> Problem in epistemology that any proposition can be endlessly questioned

In epistemology, the regress argument is the argument that any proposition requires a justification. However, any justification itself requires support. This means that any proposition whatsoever can be endlessly (infinitely) questioned, resulting in infinite regress. It is a problem in epistemology and in any general situation where a statement has to be justified.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Straw man</span> Form of argument and informal fallacy

A straw man fallacy is the informal fallacy of refuting an argument different from the one actually under discussion, while not recognizing or acknowledging the distinction. One who engages in this fallacy is said to be "attacking a straw man".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Pragmatism</span> Philosophical tradition

Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition that views language and thought as tools for prediction, problem solving, and action, rather than describing, representing, or mirroring reality. Pragmatists contend that most philosophical topics—such as the nature of knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief, and science—are all best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Applied philosophy</span> Branch of philosophy

Applied philosophy is a branch of philosophy that studies philosophical problems of practical concern. The topic covers a broad spectrum of issues in environment, medicine, science, engineering, policy, law, politics, economics and education. The term was popularised in 1982 by the founding of the Society for Applied Philosophy by Brenda Almond, and its subsequent journal publication Journal of Applied Philosophy edited by Elizabeth Brake. Methods of applied philosophy are similar to other philosophical methods including questioning, dialectic, critical discussion, rational argument, systematic presentation, thought experiments and logical argumentation.

Evidentialism is a thesis in epistemology which states that one is justified to believe something if and only if that person has evidence which supports said belief. Evidentialism is, therefore, a thesis about which beliefs are justified and which are not.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Virtue epistemology</span> Philosophical approach

Virtue epistemology is a current philosophical approach to epistemology that stresses the importance of intellectual and specifically epistemic virtues. Virtue epistemology evaluates knowledge according to the properties of the persons who hold beliefs in addition to or instead of the properties of the propositions and beliefs. Some advocates of virtue epistemology also adhere to theories of virtue ethics, while others see only loose analogy between virtue in ethics and virtue in epistemology.

Laurence BonJour is an American philosopher and Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Washington.

Neopragmatism, sometimes called post-Deweyan pragmatism, linguistic pragmatism, or analytic pragmatism, is the philosophical tradition that infers that the meaning of words is a result of how they are used, rather than the objects they represent.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Infinite regress</span> Philosophical problem

An infinite regress is an infinite series of entities governed by a recursive principle that determines how each entity in the series depends on or is produced by its predecessor.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fallibilism</span> Philosophical principle

Originally, fallibilism is the philosophical principle that propositions can be accepted even though they cannot be conclusively proven or justified, or that neither knowledge nor belief is certain. The term was coined in the late nineteenth century by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce, as a response to foundationalism. Theorists, following Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper, may also refer to fallibilism as the notion that knowledge might turn out to be false. Furthermore, fallibilism is said to imply corrigibilism, the principle that propositions are open to revision. Fallibilism is often juxtaposed with infallibilism.

Metaepistemology is the branch of epistemology and metaphilosophy that studies the underlying assumptions made in debates in epistemology, including those concerning the existence and authority of epistemic facts and reasons, the nature and aim of epistemology, and the methodology of epistemology.

In epistemology, phenomenal conservatism (PC) holds that it is reasonable to assume that things are as they appear, except when there are positive grounds for doubting this.

The following outline is provided as an overview of and topical guide to epistemology:

Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope (limitations) of knowledge. It addresses the questions "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", "What do people know?", "How do we know what we know?", and "Why do we know what we know?". Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief, and justification. It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Robert B. Talisse</span> American philosopher and political theorist

Robert B. Talisse is an American philosopher and political theorist. He is currently Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, where he is also a Professor of Political Science. Talisse is a former editor of the academic journal Public Affairs Quarterly, and a regular contributor to the blog 3 Quarks Daily, where he posts a monthly column with his frequent co-author and fellow Vanderbilt philosopher Scott Aikin. He earned his PhD in Philosophy from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York in 2001. His principal area of research is political philosophy, with an emphasis on democratic theory and liberalism.

Religious epistemology broadly covers religious approaches to epistemological questions, or attempts to understand the epistemological issues that come from religious belief. The questions asked by epistemologists apply to religious beliefs and propositions whether they seem rational, justified, warranted, reasonable, based on evidence and so on. Religious views also influence epistemological theories, such as in the case of Reformed epistemology.

Epistemic democracy refers to a range of views in political science and philosophy which see the value of democracy as based, at least in part, on its ability to make good or correct decisions. Epistemic democrats believe that the legitimacy or justification of democratic government should not be exclusively based on the intrinsic value of its procedures and how they embody or express values such as fairness, equality, or freedom. Instead, they claim that a political system based on political equality can be expected to make good political decisions, and possibly decisions better than any alternative form of government .   

References

  1. ↑ Contemporary authors. Vol. 328. Gale. 2013.
  2. ↑ "Pennavaria, Katherine "Ethical Communication" (PDF).
  3. ↑ "Griffith, Paul "Moral, Not Faithful"". 19 May 2011.
  4. ↑ Aikin, Scott F. (2014). "Aikin, Scott (2014) "Prospects for Moral Epistemic Infinitism." Metaphilosophy. 45 (2): 172-181". Metaphilosophy. 45 (2): 172–181. doi: 10.1111/meta.12071 .
  5. ↑ "Aikin, Scott (2011) "The Rhetorical Theory of Argument is Self-Defeating." Cogency. 3(1): 79-92".
  6. ↑ "Aikin, Scott (2008) "Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of Hypocrisy" Informal Logic. 28(2)".
  7. ↑ Talisse, Robert; Aikin, Scott F. (2006). "Talisse, Robert and Aikin, Scott (2008) "Two Forms of the Straw Man" Argumentation 20: 345-352" (PDF). Argumentation. 20 (3): 345–352. doi:10.1007/s10503-006-9017-8. S2CID   15523437.
  8. ↑ Aikin, Scott; Casey, John (2011). "Aikin, Scott and Casey, John (2011) "Straw Men, Weak Men, and Hollow Men" Argumentation 25: 87-105". Argumentation. 25 (1): 87–105. doi:10.1007/s10503-010-9199-y. S2CID   143594966.
  9. ↑ Aikin, Scott; Casey, John (2011). "Aikin, Scott and Talisse, Robert (2008) "Modus Tonens" Argumentation. 22: 521-529". Argumentation. 25 (1): 87–105. doi:10.1007/s10503-010-9199-y. S2CID   143594966.
  10. ↑ Aikin, Scott (2011-09-03). "Aikin, Scott (2011) "A Defense of War and Sport Metaphors in Argument" Philosophy and Rhetoric. 44(3): 250-72". Philosophy & Rhetoric. 44 (3): 250–272. doi:10.5325/philrhet.44.3.0250. S2CID   145646974.
  11. ↑ "Usery, Stephen "Book Talk"". 2014-01-14.
  12. ↑ "Aikin, Scott F." worldcat.org. Retrieved October 26, 2016.
  13. ↑ Aikin, Scott F. (2016). "Aikin, Scott (2016) "So What if Horses Would Draw Horse Gods?" Sophia". Sophia. 55 (2): 163–177. doi:10.1007/s11841-015-0476-y. S2CID   170293468.
  14. ↑ Aikin, Scott F. (2014). "Aikin, Scott (2014) "Xenophanes the High Rationalist" Epoche. 19(1) 1-14". Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy. 19 (1): 1–14. doi:10.5840/epoche201482215.
  15. ↑ Aikin, Scott (January 2017). "Aikin, Scott (2017) "Ciceronian Academic Skepticism, Augustinian Anti-Skepticism, and the Argument from Second Place" Ancient Philosophy 37". Ancient Philosophy. 37 (2): 387. doi:10.5840/ancientphil201737230.
  16. ↑ Aikin, Scott (2015). "Aikin, Scott (2015) "Citizen Skeptic: Cicero's Academic Republicanism" Symposion. 2(3) 275-285". Symposion. 2 (3): 275–285. doi: 10.5840/symposion20152318 .
  17. ↑ Aikin, Scott F.; Talisse, Robert B. (2005). "Talisse, Robert and Aikin, Scott (2005) "Why Pragmatists Can't Be Pluralists" Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41(1)". Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. 41 (1): 101–118.
  18. ↑ WorldCat
  19. ↑ WorldCat
  20. ↑ WorldCat
  21. ↑ WorldCat
  22. 1 2 WorldCat
  23. ↑ WorldCat
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