Corporate governance are mechanisms, processes and relations by which corporations are controlled and operated ("governed").
In a corporation, a stakeholder is a member of "groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist", as defined in the first usage of the word in a 1963 internal memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute. The theory was later developed and championed by R. Edward Freeman in the 1980s. Since then it has gained wide acceptance in business practice and in theorizing relating to strategic management, corporate governance, business purpose and corporate social responsibility (CSR). The definition of corporate responsibilities through a classification of stakeholders to consider has been criticized as creating a false dichotomy between the "shareholder model" and the "stakeholder model", or a false analogy of the obligations towards shareholders and other interested parties.
A controlling interest is an ownership interest in a corporation with enough voting stock shares to prevail in any stockholders' motion. A majority of voting shares is always a controlling interest. When a party holds less than the majority of the voting shares, other present circumstances can be considered to determine whether that party is still considered to hold a controlling ownership interest.
Shareholder value is a business term, sometimes phrased as shareholder value maximization. It became prominent during the 1980s and 1990s along with the management principle value-based management or "managing for value".
An agency cost is an economic concept that refers to the costs associated with the relationship between a "principal", and an "agent". The agent is given powers to make decisions on behalf of the principal. However, the two parties may have different incentives and the agent generally has more information. The principal cannot directly ensure that its agent is always acting in its best interests. This potential divergence in interests is what gives rise to agency costs.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich 459; 170 NW 668 (1919), is a case in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that Henry Ford had to operate the Ford Motor Company in the interests of its shareholders, rather than in a manner for the benefit of his employees or customers. It is often taught as affirming the principle of "shareholder primacy" in corporate America, although that teaching has received some criticism. At the same time, the case affirmed the business judgment rule, leaving Ford an extremely wide latitude about how to run the company.
The duty of loyalty is often called the cardinal principle of fiduciary relationships, but is particularly strict in the law of trusts. In that context, the term refers to a trustee's duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries, and following the terms of the trust. It generally prohibits a trustee from engaging in transactions that might involve self-dealing or even an appearance of conflict of interest. Furthermore, it requires a fiduciary to deal with transparency regarding material facts known to them in interactions with beneficiaries.
John C. Coffee Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law and director of the Center on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School.
A Company secretary is a senior position in the corporate governance of organizations, playing a crucial role in ensuring adherence to statutory and regulatory requirements. This position is integral to the efficient functioning of corporations, particularly in common law jurisdictions. The Company Secretary serves as a guardian of compliance, a facilitator of communication between the board of directors and other stakeholders, and a custodian of corporate records.
The Modern Corporation and Private Property is a book written by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published in 1932 regarding the foundations of United States corporate law. It explores the evolution of big business through a legal and economic lens, and argues that in the modern world those who legally have ownership over companies have been separated from their control. The second, revised edition was released in 1967. It serves as a foundational text in corporate governance, corporate law, and institutional economics.
Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (1993) is a seminal book in UK company law by J.E. Parkinson. Its focus is corporate governance from a progressive perspective which charts the flaws and maps the reforms needed to match the responsibility modern corporations have to their responsibility.
United States corporate law regulates the governance, finance and power of corporations in US law. Every state and territory has its own basic corporate code, while federal law creates minimum standards for trade in company shares and governance rights, found mostly in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by laws like the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The US Constitution was interpreted by the US Supreme Court to allow corporations to incorporate in the state of their choice, regardless of where their headquarters are. Over the 20th century, most major corporations incorporated under the Delaware General Corporation Law, which offered lower corporate taxes, fewer shareholder rights against directors, and developed a specialized court and legal profession. Nevada has attempted to do the same. Twenty-four states follow the Model Business Corporation Act, while New York and California are important due to their size.
The Friedman doctrine, also called shareholder theory, is a normative theory of business ethics advanced by economist Milton Friedman which holds that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. This shareholder primacy approach views shareholders as the economic engine of the organization and the only group to which the firm is socially responsible. As such, the goal of the firm is to increase its profits and maximize returns to shareholders. Friedman argues that the shareholders can then decide for themselves what social initiatives to take part in, rather than have an executive whom the shareholders appointed explicitly for business purposes decide such matters for them.
Regulatory competition, also called competitive governance or policy competition, is a phenomenon in law, economics and politics concerning the desire of lawmakers to compete with one another in the kinds of law offered in order to attract businesses or other actors to operate in their jurisdiction. Regulatory competition depends upon the ability of actors such as companies, workers or other kinds of people to move between two or more separate legal systems. Once this is possible, then the temptation arises for the people running those different legal systems to compete to offer better terms than their "competitors" to attract investment. Historically, regulatory competition has operated within countries having federal systems of regulation - particularly the United States, but since the mid-20th century and the intensification of economic globalisation, regulatory competition became an important issue internationally.
An uncorporation is an unorthodox form of large business organization. The term appears to embrace any unincorporated business.
D. Gordon Smith was the dean of the J. Reuben Clark Law School of Brigham Young University (BYU) from 2016 to 2023. Smith has taught classes in business associations, contracts, corporate finance, law & entrepreneurship, and securities regulation.
Kent Greenfield is an American lawyer, Professor of Law and Law Fund Research Scholar at Boston College, and frequent commentator to The Huffington Post. He is the author of The Myth of Choice: Personal Responsibility in a World of Limits and The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities, published by University of Chicago Press in 2006, and scholarly articles. He is best known for his "stakeholder" critique of the conventional legal doctrine and theory of corporate law, and for his leadership in a legal battle between law schools and the Pentagon over free speech and gay rights.
The Berle-Dodd debate is the name for a series of exchanges over the purposes of the corporation between the New Deal architect, A. A. Berle, and Merrick Dodd, a law professor. In this debate, Berle argued that corporations should "serve... all society" through legally enforceable rules, and argued that shareholders' interests should ultimately be "equal" or "subordinated to a number of claims by labor, by customers and patrons, by the community". Dodd argued that corporate powers should be regarded as held on "trust" by directors and managers, and considered it "undesirable... to give increased emphasis... to the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders". This debate has become well known in corporate governance, with widely conflicting interpretations, for the conflict over the extent to which corporations should pursue "shareholder value" or the "public interest". Both Berle and Dodd agreed that the corporation should pursue the public interest, but were initially at odds in how this was achieved.
Trading of shareholder votes is the practice of exchanging one's shareholder votes in corporate elections for cash or other forms of payment. Trades may involve multiple shareholders with varying interests in corporate matters, but may be of particular value to activist investors or a company's board of directors.
Shareholder democracy is a concept relating to the governance structure of modern corporations. In this structure, shareholders bear ultimate controlling authority over the corporation, as they are the owners and may exercise control within their economic rights. Although shareholders own the corporation, they generally take a passive interest in managing the day-to-day operations of the company. Shareholders who are interested in actively influencing corporate affairs are called activist shareholders.
