Steven Brams

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Steven J. Brams
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Steven J. Brams, professor at New York University, specializing in game theory; co-inventor with Alan D. Taylor of the fair division procedure, adjusted winner, and one of the independent discoverers of approval voting and the catch-up rule in sports.
Born
Steven J. Brams

(1940-11-28) November 28, 1940 (age 82)
Nationality American
Alma mater Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Northwestern University
Known forIndependent discoverer of approval voting
Solved the problem of envy-free cake-cutting
Has applied game theory to a wide range of strategic situations
Scientific career
Fields Political science
Institutions Syracuse University
New York University

Steven J. Brams (born November 28, 1940 in Concord, New Hampshire) is an American game theorist and political scientist at the New York University Department of Politics. Brams is best known for using the techniques of game theory, public choice theory, and social choice theory to analyze voting systems and fair division. He is one of the independent discoverers of approval voting, [1] as well as extensions of approval voting to multiple-winner elections to give proportional representation of different interests. [2]

Contents

Brams was a co-discoverer, with Alan Taylor, of the first envy-free cake-cutting solution for n people. [3] Previous to the Brams-Taylor procedure, the cake-cutting problem had been one of the most important open problems in contemporary mathematics. [4] He is co-inventor with Taylor of the fair-division procedure, adjusted winner, [5] which was patented by New York University in 1999 (# 5,983,205). [6] Adjusted winner has been licensed to a Boston law firm, which formed a company, Fair Outcomes, Inc., [7] that marketed several fair-division algorithms.

Brams has applied game theory to a wide variety of strategic situations, from the Bible [8] [9] and theology [10] to international relations [11] [12] to sports. [13] [14]

Education

Brams earned his B.S. at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Politics, Economics, and Science in 1962. In 1966, he earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at Northwestern University.

Career

Brams worked briefly in U.S. federal government positions and for the Institute for Defense Analyses before taking an assistant professor position at Syracuse University in 1967. He moved to New York University in 1969, where he is professor in the Department of Politics. He has been a visiting professor at the University of Rochester, the University of Michigan, the University of California, Irvine, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University.

In 1990–1991 he was president of the Peace Science Society (International); [15] in 2004–2006, he was president of the Public Choice Society. [16] He is a Guggenheim Fellow (1986–87), an American Association for the Advancement of Science Fellow (1992), and was a Russell Sage Foundation Visiting Scholar (1998–99).

Bibliography

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Approval voting</span> Single-winner electoral system

Approval voting is an electoral system in which voters can select many candidates instead of selecting only one candidate.

Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interactions among rational agents. It has applications in many fields of social science, used extensively in economics as well as in logic, systems science and computer science. Traditional game theory addressed two-person zero-sum games, in which a participant's gains or losses are exactly balanced by the losses and gains of the other participant. In the 21st century, game theory applies to a wider range of behavioral relations, and it is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, as well as computers.

Fair division is the problem in game theory of dividing a set of resources among several people who have an entitlement to them so that each person receives their due share. That problem arises in various real-world settings such as division of inheritance, partnership dissolutions, divorce settlements, electronic frequency allocation, airport traffic management, and exploitation of Earth observation satellites. It is an active research area in mathematics, economics, dispute resolution, etc. The central tenet of fair division is that such a division should be performed by the players themselves, maybe using a mediator but certainly not an arbiter as only the players really know how they value the goods.

In philosophy and the social sciences, social software is an interdisciplinary research program that borrows mathematical tools and techniques from game theory and computer science in order to analyze and design social procedures. The goals of research in this field are modeling social situations, developing theories of correctness, and designing social procedures.

Social choice theory or social choice is a theoretical framework for analysis of combining individual opinions, preferences, interests, or welfares to reach a collective decision or social welfare in some sense. Whereas choice theory is concerned with individuals making choices based on their preferences, social choice theory is concerned with how to translate the preferences of individuals into the preferences of a group. A non-theoretical example of a collective decision is enacting a law or set of laws under a constitution. Another example is voting, where individual preferences over candidates are collected to elect a person that best represents the group's preferences.

Peter Clingerman Fishburn was an American mathematician, known as a pioneer in the field of decision theory. In collaboration with Steven Brams, Fishburn published a paper about approval voting in 1978.

Robert J. Weber is the Frederic E. Nemmers Distinguished Professor of Decision Sciences at the J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

Divide and choose is a procedure for fair division of a continuous resource, such as a cake, between two parties. It involves a heterogeneous good or resource and two partners who have different preferences over parts of the cake. The protocol proceeds as follows: one person cuts the cake into two pieces; the other person selects one of the pieces; the cutter receives the remaining piece.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kenneth Binmore</span> English mathematician and game theorist born 1940

Kenneth George "Ken" Binmore, is an English mathematician, economist, and game theorist, a Professor Emeritus of Economics at University College London (UCL) and a Visiting Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Bristol. As a founder of modern economic theory of bargaining, he made important contributions to the foundations of game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary game theory and analytical philosophy. He took up economics after holding the Chair of Mathematics at the London School of Economics. The switch has put him at the forefront of developments in game theory. His other interests include political and moral philosophy, decision theory, and statistics. He has written over 100 scholarly papers and 14 books.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Formal science</span> Branch of science

Formal science is a branch of science studying disciplines concerned with abstract structures described by formal systems, such as logic, mathematics, statistics, theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, information theory, game theory, systems theory, decision theory, and theoretical linguistics. Whereas the natural sciences and social sciences seek to characterize physical systems and social systems, respectively, using empirical methods, the formal sciences use language tools concerned with characterizing abstract structures described by formal systems. The formal sciences aid the natural and social sciences by providing information about the structures used to describe the physical world, and what inferences may be made about them.

Alan Dana Taylor is an American mathematician who, with Steven Brams, solved the problem of envy-free cake-cutting for an arbitrary number of people with the Brams–Taylor procedure.

The Brams–Taylor procedure (BTP) is a procedure for envy-free cake-cutting. It explicated the first finite procedure to produce an envy-free division of a cake among any positive integer number of players.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ranked voting</span> Family of electoral systems

The term ranked voting, also known as preferential voting or ranked choice voting, pertains to any voting system where voters use a rank to order candidates or options—in a sequence from first, second, third, and onwards—on their ballots. Ranked voting systems vary based on the ballot marking process, how preferences are tabulated and counted, the number of seats available for election, and whether voters are allowed to rank candidates equally. An electoral system that utilizes ranked voting employs one of numerous counting methods to determine the winning candidate or candidates. Additionally, in some ranked voting systems, officials mandate voters to rank a specific number of candidates, sometimes all; while in others, voters may rank as many candidates as they desire.

Satisfaction approval voting (SAV) is an electoral system that extends the concept of approval voting to a multiple winner election. It was proposed by Steven Brams and Marc Kilgour in 2010.

A picking sequence is a protocol for fair item assignment. Suppose m items have to be divided among n agents. One way to allocate the items is to let one agent select a single item, then let another agent select a single item, and so on. A picking-sequence is a sequence of m agent-names, where each name determines what agent is the next to pick an item.

The Game Theory Society (GTS) is a society for the promotion of research, teaching and application of game theory. It was founded in 1999 by Ehud Kalai and Robert Aumann and is registered in the Netherlands.

The mathematical theory of democracy is an interdisciplinary branch of the public choice and social choice theories conceptualized by Andranik Tangian. It operationalizes the fundamental idea to modern democracies – that of political representation, in particular focusing on policy representation, i.e. how well the electorate's policy preferences are represented by the party system and the government. The representative capability is measured by means of dedicated indices that are used both for analytical purposes and practical applications.

Multiwinner voting, also called multiple-winner elections or committee voting or committee elections, is an electoral system in which multiple candidates are elected. The number of elected candidates is usually fixed in advance. For example, it can be the number of seats in a country's parliament, or the required number of members in a committee.

References

  1. Brams, Steven J.; Fishburn, Peter C. (1978). "Approval Voting". American Political Science Review. Cambridge University Press (CUP). 72 (3): 831–847. doi:10.2307/1955105. ISSN   0003-0554. JSTOR   1955105. S2CID   154191938.
  2. Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Potthoff, Richard F. (2018-10-05). "Multiwinner approval voting: an apportionment approach" (PDF). Public Choice. Springer Science and Business Media LLC. 178 (1–2): 67–93. doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0609-2. ISSN   0048-5829. JSTOR   48703347. S2CID   254934379.
  3. Brams, Steven J.; Taylor, Alan D. (1995). "An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol". The American Mathematical Monthly. Mathematical Association of America. 102 (1): 9–18. doi:10.2307/2974850. ISSN   1930-0972. JSTOR   2974850.
  4. Will Hively (March 1995). "Dividing the spoils - Steven Brams, Alan Taylor devise procedure to divide anything equitably". Discover Magazine. Archived from the original on 2007-04-10.
  5. "Adjusted Winner Website". NYU.
  6. USpatent 5983205,"Computer-based method for the fair division of ownership of goods"
  7. "Fair Outcomes, Inc". fairoutcomes.com. Archived from the original on 2007-12-31.
  8. Brams, S.J. (2003). Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible. MIT Press. ISBN   978-0-262-52332-5.
  9. Brams, S.J. (2011). Game Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds. MIT Press. ISBN   978-0-262-01522-6.
  10. Brams, S.J. (2018). Divine Games: Game Theory and the Undecidability of a Superior Being. MIT Press. ISBN   978-0-262-03833-1.
  11. Brams, S.J. (1985). Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. Yale University Press. ISBN   978-0-300-23640-8.
  12. Brams, S.; Kilgour, D.M. (1991). Game Theory and National Security. Wiley. ISBN   978-1-55786-003-3.
  13. Brams, Steven J.; Ismail, Mehmet S. (2018). "Making the Rules of Sports Fairer". SIAM Review. Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM). 60 (1): 181–202. doi: 10.1137/16m1074540 . ISSN   0036-1445.
  14. Brams, Steven J.; Ismail, Mehmet S.; Kilgour, D. Marc; Stromquist, Walter (2018-10-21). "Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive". The American Mathematical Monthly. Informa UK Limited. 125 (9): 771–796. arXiv: 1808.06922 . doi:10.1080/00029890.2018.1502544. ISSN   0002-9890. S2CID   4691445.
  15. "Peace Science Society (International): Home". pss.la.psu.edu. 1998-12-05. Archived from the original on 2011-04-13.
  16. "About Us - Past Presidents". Public Choice Society. Archived from the original on 2012-12-02.