Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency | |
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Argued February 26, 1997 Decided May 27, 1997 | |
Full case name | Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency |
Docket no. | 96-243 |
Citations | 520 U.S. 725 ( more ) |
Argument | Oral argument |
Opinion announcement | Opinion announcement |
Case history | |
Prior | 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1996) |
Subsequent | 123 F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997) |
Questions presented | |
1. Whether providing TDRs as compensation for regulatory taking constitute a "final agency decision" by TRPA, thus enabling adjudication? | |
Holding | |
The United States Supreme Court's decision regarding the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency's determination on Suitum's property development eligibility established it as a “final agency decision”. This ruling resulted in Suitum's claim being considered ripe for adjudication. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Souter, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, however, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, joined except as to Parts II-B and II-C |
Concurrence | Scalia, O’Connor, Thomas |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V 42 U.S. Code § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights |
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997), is a United States Supreme Court case pertaining to the regulatory authority of the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) and its impact on private property rights. Bernadine Suitum owned a parcel of land near Lake Tahoe, which she intended to develop. However, TRPA imposed stringent regulations to protect the environment of the Lake Tahoe Basin. Under these regulations, Suitum was denied the permit to develop her property because it was classified as unsuitable for development based on the environmental criteria. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the ripeness of Suitum's claim. The Court concluded that Suitum's takings claim was ripe for adjudication, emphasizing that Suitum was not required to attempt to sell her TDRs before her claim could be considered ripe. The Court based its reasoning on the immediate and direct impact of the regulatory action on her property rights, deeming further administrative actions unnecessary.
Bernadine Suitum owned an 18,300-square-foot parcel of land in Incline Village, Nevada, near the shore of Lake Tahoe. When she purchased the property in 1972, it was zoned for residential development. In 1980, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), which regulates development in the Lake Tahoe Basin, adopted a plan prohibiting any development that exceeded "environmental threshold carrying capacity". In 1987, the Agency adopted an Individual Parcel Evaluation System (IPES) “to rate the suitability of vacant residential parcels for building and other modification." [1] [2]
The IPES also established "Stream Environment Zones (SEZs), which generally collect surface water from upland areas and direct it into Lake Tahoe and its tributaries." To be eligible for construction, a property must achieve a minimum score in the IPES system. However, undeveloped land located in the Stream Environment Zones (SEZs) normatively received an IPES score of zero and was therefore deemed unsuitable for construction. Therefore, as a form of recompense for the infringement of the developmental rights of property owners, TRPA provides property owners with Transferable Development Rights (TDRs). These TDRs, with the agency's approval, enable property owners to sell their development rights to owners of other parcels. [3] [4]
When Suitum applied to the agency for permission to construct a house on her lot, the agency determined that her property was located within a SEZ, assigned it an IPES score of zero, and denied permission to build. Suitum appealed the denial to the agency's governing board, which also denied relief. Suitum, however, did not seek to exercise the rights of the transferable development rights (TDRs) provided to her by the Agency, but filed a complaint for just compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that TRPA's decision constituted a "taking" of her property. [5]
The District Court determined that Suitum's claim was not ripe for adjudication due to her failure to attempt to sell her TDRs, which made it impossible to determine their specific values. As a result, the court concluded that it could not realistically assess whether the agency's regulations had impeded Suitum's reasonable expectations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals supported this rationale and upheld the decision, asserting that the agency's action on a TDR transfer application would constitute the necessary "final decision" regarding the regulation's application to Suitum's property. [6]
Suitum argued that the Agency's restrictions deprived her of “all reasonable and economically viable use” of her property, constituting a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, Suitum argued that any attempt to transfer her Transfer of Development Rights (TDRs) would be an “idle and futile act” because the TDR program was a "sham." [7]
TRPA argued that Suitum's claim was not suitable for adjudication under the "fitness for review" standard established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner . The argument maintained that Suitum's takings claim was unfit for adjudication due to the absence of a final agency decision regarding the permissible extent of development on her land. [3]
TRPA maintained that Suitum had not pursued the available mechanisms to obtain or transfer her TDRs, concluding that she had not exhausted all administrative remedies before filing the lawsuit. [7]
The United States Supreme Court ruled that TRPA's determination regarding Suitum's property development eligibility constituted a final agency decision, thus rendering her claim ripe for adjudication. The Court's decision reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's affirmation of the District Court of Nevada's ruling against Suitum. The Court dismissed the lower court's assertion that a final decision on Suitum's land was pending due to her failure to acquire or transfer her Transferable Development Rights (TDRs). [8] Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner case was not applicable and differentiated it from the Suitum case. Additionally, the Court rejected TRPA's assertion that Suitum's claim was premature based on the "fitness for review" standard established in the Abbott Laboratories case. [9]
The majority underscored the mutual agreement between both parties regarding the TDRs rightfully belonging to Suitum, asserting that no agency decision was required for her to obtain or sell them. [9]
Justice Scalia, joined by O'Connor and Thomas, stated in their concurrence—in part and judgement—that:
...The focus of the “final decision” inquiry is on ascertaining the extent of the governmental restriction on land use, not what the government has given the landowner in exchange for that restriction... [3]
In conclusion, he contended that one could easily resolve whether or not there was a “final decision” in the case solely by looking to the “fixing of [Suitum’s] rights to use and develop her land." TRPA denied Suitum permission to construct a house on her property because the lot was located within a SEZ. Once TRPA conceded that it "...knew the full extent of the regulation’s impact in restricting [Suitum’s] development of her own land", Scalia believed that the final decision requirement had been satisfied. [9] [10]
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Text of Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725(1997) is available from: Cornell Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)