Thrasher incident

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Torpedoing of the Falaba, photographed from the conning tower of U-28 Eerste Wereldoorlog, SFA002004958.jpg
Torpedoing of the Falaba, photographed from the conning tower of U-28
Leon Chester Thrasher, deceased in the incident Picture of Leon Chester Thrasher who died on the RMS Falaba.jpg
Leon Chester Thrasher, deceased in the incident

The Thrasher incident, as it became known in US media, was a political and diplomatic incident in 1915, when the United States was still neutral in World War I. The cause for it was the sinking of the British steamer Falaba by a German submarine, where one of the around 100 victims was a passenger from the US, Leon Chester Thrasher.

Contents

On 28 March 1915 the German U-boat U-28 chased and halted the British steamship Falaba. The British crew sighted the submarine from a distance of 3 miles astern, and at first the steamer tried to escape, but after 12 minutes, after the Germans ordered her to stop with flag signals, they obeyed, so only after 20 minutes, the Germans came in hailing distance, and gave 10 minutes to evacuate. Unseamenlike handling of the life boats – three of them merely surf boats – caused some of them falling in the cold water with many people. The majority of them, around 100 drowned or died cause of hypothermia.

The Captain of the German submarine, witnessing the difficulties the British had with launching the boats, decided to wait another 10 minutes, and seeing there were still some on board the ship, kept waiting further. Receiving reports from fast nearing smokes on the horizon, thinking they were of alarmed destroyers, after waiting 23 minutes for the evacuation, and the launched life boats already hundreds of yards away from Falaba, at 12:53 GMT gave order to fire one torpedo. The ship sunk within 8-10 minutes after the hit. About 20 to 30 people were still on board, and one group was busy with belatedly preparing the lowering of the last boat, placed on the poop deck. Forstner claimed, he noticed this activity only after he gave the order to launch the torpedo. The British claimed that this surf boat was full of people, and many died in the explosion. The men remained on board, saved themselves by jumping in the water, some of them, including Captain Frederick Davies, died. A drifter tracking the u-boat and just arriving at the scene rescued most of the survivors, around 120 people from the water and from the life boats.

After the sinking, based on survivor stories, the British press accused the Germans of misusing the White Ensign, of giving only an unadequate time of 5 minutes to evacuate, and jeering about the people struggling for their lives in the water. Inquiries on 30 March in Milford Haven, and in May in London led by Lord Mersey concluded, that after a chase of about 20 minutes, and after waiting only 5 minutes, the submarine torpedoed the Falaba. In these show trials the 43-minute action was reduced to an unrealistic 25-30 minute one, in order to designate the German submarine Captain and the German Government as only responsible for the "manslaughter".

Background

The Thrasher-incident – or Falaba-incident – was one occasion of a row in which German naval activities harmed US interests. On 28 January 1915 a German merchant raider captured and scuttled the US sailing ship William P. Frye. On 4 February Germany declared a war zone around the British Isles, in which the Imperial German Navy's approximately 20 submarines would seek to starve out Britain by sinking merchant shipping. The United Kingdom responded by tightening its naval blockade of Germany. [1]

Under customary international law, attacks on civilian vessels are governed by cruiser rules. A warship may stop and search an unresisting vessel, and capture or sink her only while assuring the safety of the crew and passengers. The British blockade adhered to these rules (but violated the rules for a blocked putting it up far away from enemy shores and diverting neutral shipping on the high seas). In response Germany's declaration signalled an official abandonment of such restrictions, though in practice submarine commanders would adhere to some version of the rules in most attacks until 1917.

The US government, led by President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, protested to the German government on 10 February. Wilson and Bryan called the German intention "an act so unprecedented in naval warfare" and that the US would hold the Germans to "a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities." Germany responded by issuing orders to spare neutral ships, but a number of such vessels were attacked anyway, and mines in the North Sea sank US steamships on 21 and 22 February. [2] [3]

The UK Admiralty gave instructions to merchant ships on dealing with U-boats, including advice to attempt to make an escape. [4] Doing so has been argued to potentially qualify as "resistance" as far as cruiser rules are concerned. [5]

Leon Thrasher

Leon Chester Thrasher (sometimes falsely spelled Thresher) was from Massachusetts. He was born in Hardwick in 1884, and trained in Springfield as a machinist and master mechanic. [6] He was described as a "mechanical engineer" [7] or "mining engineer". [8] He had worked for the Panama Canal Railway, and was traveling from London to Sekondi to work for a British firm, the Broomassie Mining Company, in Gold Coast (now Ghana). [9] [10] Thrasher was issued a US passport in June 1911, but it had expired in June 1912. At first this raised a question of whether he had retained his US citizenship. [7]

Journey of the Falaba

On 27 March 1915 Elder Dempster Lines' Falaba left Liverpool for West Africa. She had a crew of 95 and 151 passengers. The passengers included about 40 British Army soldiers, 10 of them officers on their way to prepare for the Kamerun campaign, 70 Colonial Service officers, [11] and 3 foreign nationals, a Dane, a Greek, and the US-American Leon Thrasher. [12] [13] Her cargo included 13 tons of cartridges and gunpowder. According to the inquiry this was a normal peacetime cargo for the ship. [14] However, in wartime it counted as contraband according to international law, and if caught, the German Navy would rightfully sink the ship.

The Falaba was equipped with eight boats. Four of them (No. 1-4.) were real life boats for 49 people each (except No. 2 certificated for 50), three were so called surf boats, designed for transporting baggage the to shore on the African West Coast, where most ports were open, without natural protection from waves. Two of them (No. 6 and 7) had a capacity of 28, while No. 5 was qualified for 29. And there was a Captain's gig, [15] not included as a life boat, could carry about 30 persons. The certificated boats could carry all together 282 people, just the number with full capacity of passengers and crew. [16]

On the main boat deck there were six of these boats, counted from stern towards the bow, numbered 2, 4 and 6 on the port (left side), and 1, 3 and 5 on the starboard (right side). Hence, the forward ones No. 6 and 5 were both surf boats. On the poop was the gig alongside with the third surf boat. On the day of the incident, the gig was on the left, and the surf boat on the right. The numbering of these two boats caused some confusion during the legal process in May. Some referred to the gig as No. 7 and the surf boat as No. 8, for others they were the other way. The examination of the seven certified boats in December 1914 concluded, that all of them were in good condition and well equipped. [17]

According to his chief engineer two out of the 12 fires under the 4 boilers were kept clean, and instead of the maximal 13,5 knots, the ship was sailing with a speed of about 12,5-12,75 knots, [18] and following the Admiralty instructions kept well away from the usual route. [19] The weather conditions were very moderate, with a little choppy sea. [20] There was a light north-eastern breeze and a swell from the south-west. [21]

Clock settings on board the Falaba

As usual for ocean liners, the clocks of the Falaba were changed in every 24 hours. According to chief officer Walter Baxter, on 28 March the clocks were altered "something like 35 minutes" between 08:00 and 10:00 a.m. by the third officer. The clocks were changed on the bridge and in the saloons, but not in the engine room, where the clock used to be changed after a "Full speed ahead" order through the telegraph at 12:00 new deck time. [22] On the 28 March for undisclosed reasons the clock in the engine room had a time between the GMT and the newly established deck time, with 16 minutes ahead of the deck time, and 19 behind GMT. [23]

The clock of the quartermaster in the wheel house must have differed also from both GMT and deck time, since quartermaster Robert Harrison remembered seeing a time – 12:22 – on it after evacuation ordered, but many minutes before the torpedo was fired. If GMT, it would be in the middle of the chase, if deck time, the Falaba would have been torpedoed already at that time even according to the German log book (12:18), which contained a true timeline. [24] The clock in the "Marconi house" started with Greenwich time (GMT), and this was not changed, since radio operators do not alter it at all when working to a British call station in the British Isles. [25]

In the log book of U-28 the times were given in 1 hour after GMT, that means radio operator Edwin Taylor and Captain Forstner had just that difference, the easisest data to match. 12:00 GMT had the radio operator and some passengers (with unaltered watches) in mind, for Captain Forstner it was 11:00, for Falaba deck time 11:25, and for the engine room it must be about 11:41. The wheel house is uncertain, maybe had the same time as the engine room (possibly from the previous journey?).

The mission of the U-28

The submarine under the command of Kapitänleutnant Georg-Günther von Forstner started her mission on March 16 from the estaury of the river Ems with the aim of cruising in the Irish sea. The next day she sighted the British steamer Leeuwarden, which after firing three warning shots stopped. After evacuation of the crew, the steamer was sunk with gunfire. Then Forstner towed the life boat to the Maas light ship in the mouth of the river Rhine. On March 18, the Germans boarded two Dutch steamers transporting foodstoff to Britain. Prize crews took both to Zeebrugge in occupied Belgium, where also the submarine anchored. One of the steamers, the Batavier V was let free, while some of the cargo of the Zaanstrom was given back. The ship itself was seized by the German authorities. [26] [27]

U-28 left harbour to continue her mission on March 24. Passing the Strait of Dover, water leaked into her main periscope, making it unoperable. With the minor periscope underwater attacks were only possible under very calm conditions, but Forstner decided to continue and operate according to the prize law. Next day U-28 halted the Dutch steamer Medea. Since she was transporting food to London and her papers could not ascertain, that not for military reasons, she was sunk with gunfire. [26] Afterwards the submarine towed the life boats into the vicinity of the nearby patrolling British patrol boats. After dusk Forstner launched a torpedo on a darkened steamer, but missed her. [28]

On March 26 sailing west in heavy waves Forstner launched a torpedo aiming at a steamer without any signs, but missed again. At the Lizard Peninsula Forstner sighted many British steamers, but heavy seas made torpedo launching unaccomplishable. [28]

On March 27 U-28 sighted a steamer without any markings in the Bristol Channel and tried to stop her, but she began to flee. The submarine opened fire, but due to the frontal waves had only a slight speed adventage. U-28 achieved four hits on the steamer but abandoned the chase after one and a half hour in order to spare munition. During the chase the steamer hoisted the British flag. Forstner remarked to the occasion:

"The captain of the steamer behaved in an extremely undaunted manner anyway and, if he got through with her ship, earned well a recognition of his government." [29]

This steamer was the Vosges, which indeed sank before reaching a harbour. One crew member was killed. [28] [30]

Later that day the steamer South Point was halted, and torpedoed after her crew left. The sinking was accelerated with gunshots on the waterline. In the meantime a steamer neared to the scene, and tried to run away after the submarine signalled her to heave to. What thereafter happened to the Aguila is controversial. British sources claim that after a warning shot before the bow she stopped, and started to evacuate. One of her life boats capsized, and two women drowned. The Germans should open fire afterwards, causing farther death casualties. [28] U-28 fired 20 rounds in total before torpedoing her. Forstner ordered the nearby fishing vessel Ottilie to take the survivors on board. She has found three of the life boats, the fourth was found by another vessel next day. In contrary to the British version, Forstner claimed that he was firing on the Aguila only while she was fleeing, and only after she was hit, decided to stop. [31]

The submarine spent the night to March 28 on the bottom of the sea in a depth of 25 metres, south of St George's Channel. In the morning a ship under Spanish flag was halted, inspected and let free. Next a bigger one was sighted. This was the Falaba. [28]

According to the submarine's log book there was a North-Eastern wind with heavy seas, but the weather was clear at that time. Forstner went under to take an attacking position undetected. Cause of the bigger waves with the smaller periscope the ship was again to be detected when she was in a distance of about 5 miles. Underwater attack impossible, Forstner ordered to surface and take up the chase with full speed (16 knots) at 11:10 (12:10 GMT).

The journey of the Eileen Emma

In the vicinity the Germans have sighted many fishing vessels, and their fear was, that anyone of them could have been armed. [32] Out of the many the drifter Eileen Emma departed from Milford Haven three days before, on March 25 to the fishing grounds. [33] After detecting the submarine, her Captain, Horatio Wright decided to separate from the other vessels and gave an hour long "chase" to the submarine. Then he sighted the Falaba, and realized that "it was no good chasing", cause the submarine went after that steamer and proved much faster. He followed the Germans with the new aim of save the people from the ship. [34]

Sinking of the Falaba

The chase

U 28 with four or five sailors in her conning tower as she overhauled Falaba, photographed by Lieutenant Lacon. Published in the Daily Mirror on March 31 SM U-28, photo taken from sinking SS Falaba (1915).jpg
U 28 with four or five sailors in her conning tower as she overhauled Falaba, photographed by Lieutenant Lacon. Published in the Daily Mirror on March 31

At this point the Falaba was about 50–60 miles to the west from St. Anne's Head [35] steering 216° (south-southwest) [36] with a speed of about 12.5–12.75 knots. [37] The surfacing submarine was quickly sighted by passengers on board the Falaba. [38] One of the passengers thought that the submarine was flying the British White Ensign, and a debate aroused among the spectators on that matter. [39] After a few minutes, third officer Harry Pengilly became aware of the commotion, and was informed by the passengers of their observation. He at once went to the bridge and at 11:40 deck time [40] (GMT 12:15, just 5 minutes after U-28 surfaced to begin the chase) reported the sighting to first officer Walter Baxter, describing it as a submarine at a distance of 3 miles, 3 points to the right, and adding that the submarine might fly the British flag. [41] Behind the submarine "at some distance" a small fishing vessel, the drifter [42] Eileen Emma was also observed. [43] Some said, the drifter was just behind the submarine, another estimation located the submarine just between Falaba and the drifter, hence 6 miles would have been between Falaba and the drifter. [44]

Baxter informed Captain Frederick Davies, who was in the chart room, and he came out immediately to see the submarine. Observing the submarine with glasses, he soon made out that she was indeed flying a German flag, and gave an order to accelerate to full speed, and alter the course by 2 points to make the submarine right astern. [45] More speed could not be obtained since the ship was sailing with her maximal available speed, about 12.5 knots at that time, due to not all possible fires being then lit under each boiler. [46] According to fourth engineer Hugh Brown the clock in the engine room was at 11:56 when the "full speed" telegraph order was received, and thinking it was the signal to midday, the clock hand was set forward at 12:00. [47]

After giving these orders, Captain Davies sent first officer Baxter to the radio room to send this message to Land's End station:

"Submarine overhauling us. Flying British flag. 51° 32', 6° 36'." [48]

According to Edwin Taylor, this message was sent at 12:25 GMT (11:50 deck time), 10 minutes after the submarine was reported. [49] He attached a request to the message, that it is to be relayed to a "battleship". He received an answer to his message, and also that it was relayed. [50] Coming back from the radio room, Baxter received a telescope from a passenger, and with that he realized, that the submarine was actually flying a German flag. [51]

While Falaba sailed with about 12.5 knots, the U-28 was coming with her maximum 16 knots. With that speed difference, the chase was about to last nearly a whole hour. But 12 minutes after the submarine was reported to the chief officer, at 11:52 (12:27 GMT), the submarine signalled "stop immediately" with flags, and about half a minute later "stop or I will fire". [52] In order to threaten the vessel, Captain Forstner had sent two gunners to the deck gun, who had to tie themselves to their weapon for not to be washed away from board.

According to quartermaster Harrison, seeing both these signals the chief officer and the Captain discussed the matter, and Baxter advised the Captain not to risk a hit on the deck now already full of spectators, and they better stop before the Germans open fire. The Captain agreed, and the engines were stopped even before the third German message "abandon ship immediately" was signalled. [53] The fourth engineer stated, that in the engine room the order "stop" was received at 12:12 on the telegraph, 12 minutes after "full speed". [54]

Forstner also fired a red lighted signal rocket to warn the steamer not to flee, and the steamer should have replied with signaling that she is obeying to the order. According to Forstner he signalled next "abandon ship immediately". According to the estimate of the Admiralty, the Falaba needed 5 to 6 minutes to stop completely, that means, she must have stopped already at around 11:57–11:58 deck time (12:32–12:33 GMT). [55] Some survivors also mentioned, that at the late stage of the chase the submarine was approaching very fast. Captain Forstner, who was in the hull of the submarine watching the events through the periscope observed "wild disorder" ("wilde Unordnung") ensuing just after the flag sign "abandon ship immediately" was hoisted.

Some minutes after this signal the submarine arrived next to the steamer, and out of precaution held itself out of range of hand weapons, and observed, whether there were board weapons on the steamer, and after finding there were none, at 11:30 on his clock (11:55 Falaba deck time, 12:30 GMT) he hailed through a megaphone, that he is granting 10 minutes to evacuate. [56] Captain Davies replied "Alright, we are taking to the boats now." [57]

The U 28 to the south of Falaba heading east (north-east) U 28 um das Heck der FALABA herumholend.jpg
The U 28 to the south of Falaba heading east (north-east)

Hearing this short conversation Edwin Taylor sent another wireless message on his own initiative at 12:35 GMT with this content: [58]

"Position 51° 32' N. 6° 36' W. torpedo, going boats." [59]

The radio operator later explained this message with his expectation of being torpedoed in a short time. This second wireless message was sent 10 minutes after the first one, and evidently 5 minutes after the megaphoned time limit. [60] [61] According to Taylor himself, he remained 6–7 minutes in the radio room after sending that message, when coming along first officer Baxter informed him that they are overhauled by the submarine, and he has nothing to do anymore in the radio room. So Taylor left for the boats. [62]

About that time some passengers estimated the distance to be around 100 yards to the submarine, and someone even suggested to fetch the rifles from beneath, and open fire on the German sailors, who seemed to represent easy targets. [63] Having the submarine already that near was the decision on the bridge made to swing out the boats No. 5 and 6 on the main deck. Earlier only No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and the gig were swung out. Even this time the surf boat on the poop was not involved. The chief steward, the second steward and a further steward was ordered by the first officer to bring all the passengers on deck and provide them with life belts. [64] Chief bedroom steward John Ellams stated, that they had to tell the passengers, that they were given 10 minutes to evacuate. [65] Learning from the lessons of the Titanic and avoid panic instead of the order "into the boats" the order "to the boats" was given. [66] [67] Passengers who came up without their own life belts were provided out of the two big boxes on the upper deck. [68]

Torpedoing of the Falaba

According to some passengers some kind of excitement was arising after the megaphoned order, but there was no real panic. [69] Some reported that there was a big rush for boat No. 3 and a commotion ensued. Others stated, that every passenger waited patiently for lowering the boats, some were even singing the song "It's a Long Way to Tipperary". [70]

Forstner witnessed as the crew of Falaba struggled hard with preparing and lowering the boats, and more of them were hastily dropped on the water. He decided therefore to wait longer, so that all of them could be lowered and they can draw off to a safe distance from the ship. In the meantime he slowly got around the ship, and positioned himself on her starboard side, and elapsing already 20 minutes after megaphoning the evacuation time, he ordered one of the torpedos in the bow to be prepared for launching.

ForstnerBaxterTaylor
surfacing/sighting12:1012:15-
radio message I--12:25
10 minutes given12:3012:3512:25+x
radio message II--12:35
torpedo fired12:5312:40–12:46~ 12.45

By this time the British lowered their boats, some of them capsized, or began to sink because of missing plugs. The survivors unanimously reported, that the Falaba was stationary at the time when the boats were lowered. One survivor even stated that the ship was already motionless at the time the megaphoned message was given. [71] The first lowered (and dropped) boats were drifting slowly towards the stern, while the tide, the stream and the wind turned the ship. [72]

U-28 took up a position on the starboard of Falaba with her stern to the ship. According Forstner he thought that after 20 minutes all the boats were lowered, but decided to wait a bit, cause he saw some people still moving around. Farther 3 minutes elapsed, when fast nearing smokes were reported from the conning tower. Forstner now – at 11:53 (12:53 GMT, Falaba deck time 12:18) – gave the order to fire. The torpedo shot launched out of a distance of 240 metres hit the ship under the davits of boat No. 1. In his log book Forstner explained, that he has noticed only after the order that there was one last boat on the poop being prepared for lowering. The explosion caused this surf boat to fell in the water. (On the German photograph there is a bigger white spot under the poop, maybe the splash or perhaps the retouched impact). The detonation could be heared even 16 miles away on board the fishing vessel George Baker, which was one of the drifters coming to rescue the survivors. [73] The Falaba suddenly leaned to starboard, but stopped for a while, than started to sink slowly by the stern. She completely sank within 10 minutes. According to chief officer Baxter it happend in 8 minutes. [74] [75] [76]

Times given for torpedo hit
Time (GMT)Source
12:40Taylor (I) [77]
12:40Baxter (I) [78]
12:45Taylor (II) [79]
12:45-46Baxter (II) [80]
12:53Forstner [81]
~ 13:00Wright [82]

There were still 16-18 people on board as Baxter stated. The first officer ordered them to stay until he gives order to jump. That happened after a few minutes, and those people tried to reach one of the boats or catch something floatable.

After the torpedo hit captain Davies went to the bridge, and gave signals with the steam pipe, obviously to call for immediate help from the drifter Eileen Emma, just arriving at the scene. This action of the British captain mentions praising even Kapitänleutnant Forstner in his log book. The Germans did not participate in the rescuing, since Forstner has observed the radio station installed on the ship and feared, that the reported "fast approaching" smokes on the horizon came from alarmed warships. Upon this he decided to leave the scene quickly. Radio operator Edwin Lough Taylor – who was lowered with boat No. 1, and after its capsizing swam for No. 2 – remembered the fate of the passengers of a third boat (No. 6) as follows:

We saw about this time one of the boats containing about 30 of our companions capsized by the heavy seas without a chance of our doing anything to save them. So trying were the circumstances under which we were placed that one of the black firemen with us jumped overboard to end his agonies, whilst we found ourselves obliged to restrain another from cutting his throat… We ourselves were continually passing fellow creatures in the last throes of drowning, and I shall never forget the agony of listening to their final and awful cries, and watching the heartrending look of horror as they sank from sight... [83]

104 were lost of the 242 on board. Thrasher was among the people killed in the incident. He was the first US citizen to be killed by the action of a German submarine. [84]

Reactions on the call of Falaba

Same time as the Falaba started the liner her journey from Liverpool to America, and she was one of the ships receiving the distress signal. She was only 15 miles from Falaba, but according tot he orders of the Admiralty it was forbidden to her to risk her own safety by helping other ships under attack of submarines. According to the Cymric the first wireless message of the Falaba was "Submarine alongside. Am putting off passengers in boats." [85] [86] A few minutes later the radio operator of Cymric heared British warships answering the distress call. [87]

The Falaba was just between Queenstown (Ireland) and Pembroke (Wales), and both towns naval base received the distress call. There was no naval ship, but Pembroke has sent out the destroyer Liffey, which dropped her anchor there the day before. [88]

Aftermath

Falaba was the second British passenger ship that U-28 had sunk in as many days. On 27 March it had sunk Yeoward Brothers' steamship Aguila, also with considerable loss of life. U-28 was reported to have fired its deck gun at Aguila, inflicting casualties, including as her passengers and crew were abandoning ship. [89]

Wilson thought U-28 had violated international law, the key point being the short amount of time given to evacuate the ship, but Bryan questioned "whether an American citizen can, by putting his business above his regard for his country, assume for his own advantage unnecessary risks and thus involve his country in international complications." [90]

Wilson had Counselor Robert Lansing draft a diplomatic complaint to the Germans:

The Government of the United States has received a report, confirmed by substantial evidence, that Leon C. Thrasher, a native born American citizen, came to his death by reason of the act of the German naval authorities in sinking the British passenger steamer Falaba on the high seas on the 28th of March, 1915, outward bound from Liverpool, and the failure of the commander of the German submarine U–28 to give ample time for the crew and passengers of the Falaba to leave the vessel before sinking her by means of torpedoes. It is further reported that, at the time when the Falaba was torpedoed and sunk, she was lying to, making no attempt to escape and offering no resistance.

[...]

It sincerely hopes that the Imperial Government, recognizing the justice of these representations, will promptly disavow the act complained of and take the steps necessary to prevent its repetition.

— Robert Lansing, April 5 1915 [91]

Bryan advised Wilson to not send a note in such bellicose terms, and had Lansing redraft the note. It was noted that only one American was killed, thus grounds for a legal protest was weak. The decision was made to leave off a formal protest for the time being, as Thrasher may be simply an isolated incident. [92]

Two attacks followed: one, an air attack on the Cushing, and then a submarine attack on an American tanker, the Gulflight. On 7 May a U-boat sank RMS Lusitania. The incident was a great deal more severe, as the U-boat had this time attacked with no warning at all. Many people, including over a hundred US citizens, died in the shipwreck. The US sent a diplomatic note to Germany asking for an apology and reparations for both ships. The note included a warning that the US would take "any necessary act in sustaining the rights of its citizens or in safeguarding the sacred duties of international law." [90]

The Lusitania sinking brought up the Thrasher case again. The Germans claimed that they had given the ship ample time to evacuate (10 minutes, extended to 23), and that they had been forced to sink the ship due to the approach of "suspicious vessels". This point was brought up by Bryan in his discussions with Wilson. [93] The German government also contended that if a merchant ship tries to escape capture and seek assistance, that alters the duty of the commander of the attacking vessel to try to ensure the safety of non-combatants aboard the merchant ship, even after the ship subsequently stops and ceased resistance. The US government rejected this contention. [94]

Thrasher's body washed ashore on the coast of Ireland on 11 July 1915, after it had been in the sea for 106 days. At first, authorities mistook him for a Lusitania victim and designated him Body No. 248. [95]

During the subsequent British inquiry led by Lord Mersey, which ended in July, one of the passengers was angry at the "bungled" evacuation, alleging that had the crew been well organized and the passengers well led, all of those on the ship could have been safely evacuated before the torpedo was fired. The passenger thus blamed Elder, Dempster, their Marine Superintendent and his brother-in-law Fred Davies for the loss of life. Mersey ultimately found that the ship only had five minutes to evacuate, thus placing all of the blame on the U-boat captain. Many later authors suspect the true amount of time given to evacuate was likely around 10 minutes, in between the British and German claims. [96] [97] Journalist and Lusitania conspiracy theorist Colin Simpson claims the torpedo may have detonated the Falaba's cargo, [98] but the inquiry at the time did not believe this was an issue.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Cooper 2009, pp. 275–277.
  2. ↑ "U.S. steamer mined off Borkum". The Times. No. 40784. London. 22 February 1915. col. F, p. 9.
  3. ↑ "U.S. Merchant Ships, Sailing Vessels, and Fishing Craft Lost from all Causes during World War I". USMM. Retrieved 23 September 2020.
  4. ↑ "Copy of instructions to merchant captains as issued by the Admiralty".
  5. ↑ Bailey, Thomas A.; Ryan, Paul B. (1975). The Lusitania Disaster: An Episode in Modern Warfare and Diplomacy. New York/London: Free Press/Collier Macmillan. pp. 53, 330.
  6. ↑ "Thrasher born in Bay State" . The New York Times . 1 April 1915. p. 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  7. 1 2 "Recalls warning to Berlin" . The New York Times. 1 April 1915. p. 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  8. ↑ "No Report to Washington Yet" . The New York Times. 31 March 1915. p. 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  9. ↑ "Submarine raid killed American" . The New York Times. 31 March 1915. pp. 1, 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  10. ↑ "Death of Thrasher stirs our Embassy" . The New York Times. 1 April 1915. p. 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  11. ↑ "Germany defends sinking of Falaba" . The New York Times . 14 April 1915. p. 3. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  12. ↑ "U.S. Citizen is Lost on Torpedoed Ship". The Evening Star . Washington, D.C. 31 March 1915. p. 1 – via Library of Congress.
  13. ↑ "American lost when submarine torpedoed ship". New-York Tribune . 31 March 1915. p. 1 – via Library of Congress.
  14. ↑ Walker 2012, pp. 78–79.
  15. ↑ Proceedings p. 88. ( "…we also had the Captain's gig, an extra boat, which was capable of carrying 25 (sic!) people…")
  16. ↑ Proceedings p. 5. (24–30.)
  17. ↑ Proceedings p. 5. (95.)
  18. ↑ Proceedings p. 80. (3429–3441.)
  19. ↑ Naval Staff Monographs Vol. VIIII, p. 151.
  20. ↑ Proceedings p. 6. (105–106.)
  21. ↑ Proceedings p. 38. (1613–1614.)
  22. ↑ Proceedings p. 71. (3097.)
  23. ↑ Proceedings p. 64. (2698-2703.)
  24. ↑ Proceedings p. 71–72. (3198–3201.)
  25. ↑ Proceedings p. 71–72. (3095–3097.)
  26. 1 2 Mantey 1933, p. 46.
  27. ↑ "18. [März] Die beiden holländischen Dampfer „Batavier V”, 1569 T, und „Zaanstrom”, 1657 T, angehalten, nach Feststellen der Ladung aus den Papieren – Lebensmittel nach England – mit Prisenkomando des U-Bootes besetzt und nach Zeebrügge aufgebracht. 18. Zeebrügge eingelaufen. Durch Urteil des deutschen Prisengerichts wurde „Batavier V” freigegeben, von „Zaanstrom” ein Teil der Ladung freigegeben, Schiff eingezogen." – Handelskrieg mit U-Booten, p. 46
  28. 1 2 3 4 5 Mantey 1933, p. 47.
  29. ↑ "Der Kapitän des Dampfers hat sich jedenfalls äußerst unerschrocken benommen und, falls er mit seinem Schiff durchgekommen sein sollte, wohl eine Anerkennung seiner Regierung verdient." – von Forstner p. 161., von Mantey p. 47.
  30. ↑ NSM p. 150.
  31. ↑ von Forstner p. 167-170.
  32. ↑ Mantey 1933, p. 48.
  33. ↑ Proceedings p. 76. (3280.)
  34. ↑ Proceedings p. 76. (3308.)
  35. ↑ Proceedings p. 96.
  36. ↑ Proceedings p. 6. (101–102.)
  37. ↑ Proceedings p. 11. (367.)
  38. ↑ Proceedings p. 20. (804.)
  39. ↑ Proceedings p. 19. (745.)
  40. ↑ Proceedings p. 63. (2654.)
  41. ↑ Proceedings p. 60. (2485–2487.) – Baxter mentions 2 points: Proceedings p. 6. (108–110.)
  42. ↑ Proceedings p. 76. (3275.)
  43. ↑ Shipping casualties p. 5.
  44. ↑ Proceedings p. 96.
  45. ↑ Proceedings p. 74. (3184–3188.)
  46. ↑ Proceedings p. 80. (3429–3437.)
  47. ↑ Proceedings p. 64. (2696.)
  48. ↑ Shipping casualties p. 5.; Proceedings p. 71. (3085.)
  49. ↑ Proceedings p. 71. (3088.)
  50. ↑ Proceedings p. 71. (3093.)
  51. ↑ Proceedings p. 7. (133.)
  52. ↑ Proceedings p. 75. (3227–3228.)
  53. ↑ Proceedings p. 74. (3189–3192.), and the discussion between Baxter and Davies: Proceedings p. 7. (163.) – Baxter stated, they only stopped, when the submarine was only 300 yards away. This contradicts not only quartermaster Harrison's and fourth engineer Brown's testaments, but the laws of physics as well. Baxter guessed, that the submarine had a speed of 18–19 knots, in realty she was able to achieve 16 knots maximum.
  54. ↑ Proceedings p. 64. (2698–2703.)
  55. ↑ Proceedings p. 99.
  56. ↑ Lansing Papers p. 363.
  57. ↑ Proceedings p. 10. (324.)
  58. ↑ Proceedings p. 72. (3131.)
  59. ↑ Shipping casualties p. 5.
  60. ↑ "Submarines Sink Passenger Ships". New York Tribune . 1915-03-30.
  61. ↑ Proceedings p. 71. (3118–3122.)
  62. ↑ "Two passenger ships sunk by submarines; 138 men and women die". New-York Tribune . 30 March 1915. p. 1 – via Library of Congress.
  63. ↑ Proceedings p. 19. (743.)
  64. ↑ Henry Spray fourth officer stated, that he was (also?) entrusted with informing the stewards about this. – Proceedings p. 9 (307–310.)
  65. ↑ Proceedings p. 12. (468.); The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State April 9, 1915.
  66. ↑ Proceedings p. 11. (375.)
  67. ↑ Langensiepen & Nottelmann / Einige Darstellungen des Brückenpersonals
  68. ↑ Proceedings p. 66. (2806-2807.)
  69. ↑ For example: Proceedings p. 49. (1968-1969.) and p. 18. (726–730.)
  70. ↑ Proceedings p. 12. (502–503.)
  71. ↑ Proceedings p. 23. (864–867.)
  72. ↑ Proceedings p. 21. (817.)
  73. ↑ Proceedings p. 7. (199.); Proceedings p. 8. (214.)
  74. ↑ Proceedings p. 8. (216.); NSM p. 151.
  75. ↑ Walker 2012, p. 152.
  76. ↑ Lord Mersey (8 July 1915). Shipping casualties. (Loss of the steamship "Falaba"). Report of a formal investigation into the circumstances attending the foundering on 28th March of the British steamship "Falaba" (Report).
  77. ↑ Proceedings p. 71. (3088., 3094.)
  78. ↑ Proceedings p. 7. (201–202.)
  79. ↑ Proceedings p. 72. (3124.)
  80. ↑ Proceedings p. 7. (201–202.)
  81. ↑ Proceedings p. 75. (3227.)
  82. ↑ The Western Telegraph, March 31. 1915
  83. ↑ "Ship's cook and butcher Albert J Gough". cwgc.org. 2025-05-30. Retrieved 2025-07-09.
  84. ↑ Walker 2012, p. 80.
  85. ↑ "Danger of Falaba Shared by Cymric". The New York Times. April 8, 1915. p. 2.
  86. ↑ "White Star liner barely escaped fate of Falaba". The Evening World . 7 April 1915. p. 1 – via Library of Congress.
  87. ↑ "Danger of Falaba shared by Cymric" . The New York Times. 8 April 1915. p. 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  88. ↑ NSM p. 151.
  89. ↑ "140 lives lost as submarines sink two ships" . The New York Times. 30 March 1915. pp. 1, 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  90. 1 2 Cooper 2009, pp. 277–278.
  91. ↑ Lansing, Robert. "The Counselor for the Department of State (Lansing) to the Secretary of State".
  92. ↑ Link, Arthur S. (1960). Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality 1914-1915. pp. 363–366.
  93. ↑ "The Secretary of State to President Wilson".
  94. ↑ "Washington awaits facts" . The New York Times. 2 July 1915. p. 2. Retrieved 22 March 2024– via Times Machine.
  95. ↑ Larson 2015, p. 6.
  96. ↑ Walker 2012, p. 172.
  97. ↑ Link 1960, p. 369.
  98. ↑ Simpson 1973, p. 82.

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