Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust | |
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Argued January 20, 1988 Decided June 29, 1988 | |
Full case name | Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust |
Citations | 487 U.S. 977 ( more ) |
Case history | |
Prior | 798 F.2d 791 (vacated and remanded) |
Holding | |
The reasons supporting the use of disparate impact analysis under Title VII apply to subjective employment practices. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | O'Connor (Parts I, II-A, II-B, III), joined by Rehnquist, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia |
Plurality | O'Connor (Parts II-C, II-D), joined by Rehnquist, White, Scalia |
Concurrence | Blackmun (in part and in judgment), joined by Brennan, Marshall |
Concurrence | Stevens (in judgment) |
Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. | |
Laws applied | |
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. |
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), is a United States Supreme Court case on United States labor law, concerning proof of disparate treatment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Plaintiff Watson, an African-American bank teller, applied (on four separate occasions) for a promotion to a supervisory position at the bank.
The bank had not developed precise and formal selection criteria for the positions in question, but instead relied upon the subjective judgment of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and the nature of the jobs to be filled.
In all four instances, the supervisors involved in the promotion process were white, and all four times Watson was not selected.
After exhausting her administrative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Watson filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She included allegations that the bank's promotion policies discriminated both against blacks as a class and against her individually, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USCS 2000e et seq.).
After trial, the District Court, dismissing the teller's individual claims, found that she had failed to make a sufficient showing under applicable evidentiary standards. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, and expressed the view that the proper framework to apply to a Title VII challenge to an allegedly discretionary promotion system would be disparate treatment analysis (which involves the question whether an employer has, with a discriminatory intent or motive, treated a particular person less favorably than others because of that person's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) rather than disparate impact analysis (which involves the question whether an employer has engaged in facially neutral employment practices that have significant adverse effects on protected groups, and which usually, in the absence of proof that the employer adopted such practices with a discriminatory intent, focuses on statistical disparities)
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Seven members of the Court (1) agreed that disparate impact analysis may be applied to allegedly discriminatory subjective or discretionary employment practices, and (2) agreed regarding certain aspects of the evidentiary standards applicable in such cases. In that portion (Parts I, II-A, II-B, and III) of the opinion by Justice O'Connor, it was held that, in a Title VII action, disparate impact analysis may properly be applied to subjective or discretionary employment practices.
The remainder (Parts II-C and II-D) of Justice O'Connor's opinion, joined by three other Justices, expressed the view that
Justice Blackmun agreed that disparate impact analysis may be applied to claims of discrimination caused by subjective or discretionary selection practices and that the plurality properly characterized the plaintiff's burden of showing that any numerical disparity is significant. He added that
Justice Stevens argued that
A portion of the holding in Watson was superseded by the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act. See Phillips v. Cohen, 400 F.3d 388, 397–98 (6th Cir. 2005); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2008).