Wieman v. Updegraff | |
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Argued October 16, 1952 Decided December 15, 1952 | |
Full case name | Wieman et al. v. Updegraff et al. |
Citations | 344 U.S. 183 ( more ) 73 S.Ct. 215; 97 L. Ed. 216; 1952 U.S. LEXIS 1430 |
Case history | |
Prior | On appeal from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
Holding | |
Oklahoma loyalty oath legislation violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Clark, joined by Vinson, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Minton |
Concurrence | Black, joined by Douglas |
Concurrence | Frankfurter, joined by Douglas |
Concurrence | Burton |
Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. |
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), is a unanimous ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that Oklahoma loyalty oath legislation violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it did not give individuals the opportunity to abjure membership in subversive organizations. Due process requires that individuals have scienter (knowledge that their membership or support violates the loyalty oath), and the Oklahoma statute did not accommodate this requirement.
In 1950, the state of Oklahoma enacted legislation requiring all state officers and employees to take an oath pledging loyalty to the United States of America, affirming that they did not advocate the violent overthrow of the U.S. government, and denying direct or indirect involvement with or support of any "agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a communist front or subversive organization". [1]
Several faculty and staff at Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College refused to take the oath within the required 30 days after employment. Paul W. Updegraff, an Oklahoma citizen, sued in the District Court of Oklahoma County to prevent the state from paying these individuals their salaries. The faculty and staff members asked to intervene in the suit, and were permitted to do so. They argued that the Act was a bill of attainder; an ex post facto law; made it impossible for them to fulfill their contracts with the state; and violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The district court upheld the Act. The faculty and staff appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the Act. [2] The faculty and staff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.
Associate Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the opinion for the majority. [3]
Clark accepted the Oklahoma Supreme Court's interpretation that the Act proscribed membership in and support only for those organizations listed on the U.S. Attorney General's list as of the date of enactment. [1] Organizations not on that list, even if communist, were required to be abjured.
Clark argued that the present case must be adjudicated within the context of three recent Supreme Court decisions: Garner v. Board of Public Works , 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Adler v. Board of Education , 342 U.S. 485 (1952); and Gerende v. Board of Supervisors , 341 U.S. 56 (1951). [4] In Garner, the high court rejected the loyalty oath adopted by the city of Los Angeles, California, because it required that the individual have knowledge of all the organizations which might advocate the unlawful violent overthrow of the government. Since no individual could have such knowledge, the act was overturned as vague. The Garner court had remanded the case to the district court with the requirement that the individuals be permitted to take the oath, now that the oath had been interpreted. [5] In Adler, the Court upheld the New York legislation, because the New York courts had already interpreted the law to require that individuals have knowledge of the goals of the organization they belonged to. In Gerende, [6] the Court upheld a Maryland statute on grounds similar to those in Adler.
Justice Clark noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had refused to allow the applicants to take the loyalty oath even though it had interpreted the oath anew. [7] Additionally, the appellants had petitioned that court for a rehearing that would allow them to take the oath and again, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the request. [8] The act, as interpreted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court (Clark concluded) was asserting that "the fact of membership alone disqualifies. If the rule be expressed as a presumption of disloyalty, it is a conclusive one." [8]
The Oklahoma act could not withstand constitutional scrutiny in that case, Clark wrote: "But membership may be innocent. A state servant may have joined a proscribed organization unaware of its activities and purposes. In recent years, many completely loyal persons have severed organizational ties after learning for the first time of the character of groups to which they had belonged." [8] "Indiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power. The oath offends due process." [9]
Clark next dealt with the doctrine of privilege. (This legal doctrine concluded that public employment was a privilege, not a right, and subsequently significant restrictions could be placed on public employees that could not be constitutionally tolerated in the private sector.) [10] Both the Adler Court and the majority in United Public Workers v. Mitchell , 330 U.S. 75 (1947), had upheld statutes on the basis of the doctrine of privilege. Clark distinguished United Public Workers by noting that political corruption was practically a unique case. [11] Additionally, neither Adler nor United Public Workers permitted "patently arbitrary or discriminatory" application of the law (as occurred under the Oklahoma loyalty statute). [12]
Based on these grounds, the majority reversed the Oklahoma Supreme Court and remanded the case. Clark refused to decide the case on other grounds, such as whether the Attorney General had given fair notice to affected organizations or the differing standards employed in the preparation of the list. [12]
Associate Justice Hugo Black concurred, joined by Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter. He also provided a strong defense of free speech:
Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred, joined by Associate Justice William O. Douglas. Frankfurter's concurrence provided a ringing defense of the special role teachers play in a democracy:
Associate Justice Harold Hitz Burton concurred but did not provide a written statement of his concurrence.[ citation needed ]
In the 19th century, American courts had established the "doctrine of privilege."
By the middle of the 20th century, however, the doctrine of privilege had been markedly weakened. Abuse of the privilege had led to widespread corruption; the tolerance of sexual harassment, racism, religious discrimination, and gender discrimination; and workplace abuse (such as forcing employees to buy goods and services from a supervisor, or forcing employees to run errands for the supervisor). [15] The courts were becoming less and less tolerant of the doctrine of privilege. [15] [16]
United Public Workers v. Mitchell marked the end of the doctrine of privilege. The Supreme Court openly rejected the doctrine in Weiman v. Updegraff, and a number of high court decisions in areas such as nonpartisan speech, due process, search and seizure, the right to marry, the right to bear children, equal protection, education, and receipt of public benefits over the next two decades continued to undermine the doctrine. [17] Although the Supreme Court later reaffirmed United Public Workers in 1973 in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers , 413 U.S. 548 (1973), it did so on the very narrow grounds that permitting public employees to engage in political activity encouraged corruption. [18]
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the government from making laws that: regulate an establishment of religion; prohibit the free exercise of religion; abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. It was adopted on December 15, 1791, as one of the ten amendments that constitute the Bill of Rights.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), was a United States Supreme Court case deciding on the issue of silent school prayer.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), was a U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the State of California's refusal to grant to ACLU lawyer Lawrence Speiser, a veteran of World War II, a tax exemption because that person refused to sign a loyalty oath as required by a California law enacted in 1954. The court reversed a lower court ruling that the loyalty oath provision did not violate the appellants' First Amendment rights.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that groups could sue to challenge their inclusion on the Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations. The decision was fractured on its reasoning, with each of the Justices in the majority writing separate opinions.
Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), was a United States Supreme Court case that solidified the narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and determined that the right to practice a profession was not among these privileges. Brought by Myra Bradwell, the case is also notable for being an early 14th Amendment challenge to sex discrimination in the United States.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision that helped to establish an implied "right to privacy" in U.S. law in the form of mere possession of obscene materials.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), was a case of the U.S. Supreme Court. In this case, the Court established the Incorporation Doctrine by concluding that while certain rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights might apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination is not incorporated.
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), was a case decided by the US Supreme Court, which ruled that a state trespassing statute could not be used to prevent the distribution of religious materials on a town's sidewalk even though the sidewalk was part of a privately-owned company town. The Court based its ruling on the provisions of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.
Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state statute making it an offense to distribute literature in a federal government-owned town was an improper restriction on freedom of the press and religion.
Thomas Campbell Clark was an American lawyer who served as the 59th United States Attorney General from 1945 to 1949 and as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1949 to 1967.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on the right to travel and passport restrictions as they relate to Fifth Amendment due process rights and First Amendment free speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association rights. It is the first case in which the US Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of personal restrictions on the right to travel abroad.
The United Federal Workers of America (UFWA) was an American labor union representing federal government employees which existed from 1937 to 1946. It was the first union with this jurisdiction established by the Congress of Industrial Organizations. In 1946 it merged with other unions to form the influential United Public Workers of America. The union challenged the constitutionality of the Hatch Act of 1939, which led to the Supreme Court decision in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), is a ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that the Hatch Act of 1939 does not violate the First Amendment, and its implementing regulations are not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), is a ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that a municipal loyalty oath which required an oath and affidavit about one's beliefs and actions for the previous five years and which was enacted more than five years previous is not an ex post facto law nor a bill of attainder.
American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), is a 5-to-1 ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that the Taft–Hartley Act's imposition of an anti-communist oath on labor union leaders does not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, is not an ex post facto law or bill of attainder in violation of Article One, Section 10 of the United States Constitution, and is not a "test oath" in violation of Article Six of the Constitution.
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), is a 4-to-3 ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that the Hatch Act of 1939, as amended in 1940, does not violate the First, Fifth, Ninth, or Tenth amendments to U.S. Constitution.
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956) and 367 U.S. 1 (1961), was a federal court case in the United States involving the compelled registration of the Communist Party of the United States, under a statute requiring that all organizations determined to be directed or controlled by the "world Communist movement" publicly disclose detailed information as to their officers, funds, and membership.
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974), was a United States Supreme Court case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that invalidated Indiana's loyalty oath requirement.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), was a US Supreme Court decision that held the "silver platter doctrine", which allowed federal prosecutors to use evidence illegally gathered by state police, to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Vinson Court refers to the Supreme Court of the United States from 1946 to 1953, when Fred M. Vinson served as Chief Justice of the United States. Vinson succeeded Harlan F. Stone as Chief Justice after the latter's death, and Vinson served as Chief Justice until his death, at which point Earl Warren was nominated and confirmed to succeed Vinson.