1970s South Bronx building fires | |
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Location | Bronx, New York City, U.S. |
Date | ~1972-1984 |
Target | Unprofitable leased residential buildings |
Attack type | Neglect of crucial infrastructure by city planners, and intentional arson by landlords on unprofitable buildings (typically carried out by paid-off Bronx residents) |
Weapons | Fire |
Victims |
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Perpetrators |
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Litigation | None |
The 1970s South Bronx building fires, sometimes referred to as simply the Bronx fires, were a series of fires that severely damaged the South Bronx, destroying more than 80 percent of the existing buildings in the area. [1] [2] [3] [4] Nearly ten years of continuous fires burned throughout the South Bronx. While unparalleled in their scope, these fires were part of the high rates of fire and arson afflicting cities nationwide during the 1970s. [5]
While most of the fires were the result of arson by landlords recruiting Bronx residents to start fires, [6] [7] [8] the South Bronx fires were not a singular, coordinated event. Rather, the fires were the product of dozens of social and economic factors: redlining and disinvestment, the economic crises of the 1970s, a newly available property insurance program, poor fiscal management by the city of New York, decades of housing segregation, budget cuts targeted towards poor communities, and the overcrowding of under-funded areas due to gentrification and displacement all set up the conditions that fueled fires and the feeble state response.
By the end of World War II, many middle-class black and stateside Puerto Rican families had moved into the South Bronx from Harlem, due to the area being integrated during the era of Jim Crow. However, white flight caused many white Bronx residents to leave, fearing a loss of property values, and the South Bronx went from being two-thirds non-Hispanic white in 1950, to being two-thirds black or Puerto Rican ten years later. [9] The construction of Co-op City motivated further flight by housing middle-class black and Puerto Rican residents in family-sized apartments. The 1938 maps published by the FHA solidified this concept by designating the buildings as deteriorating. [10] [4]
As a result of these demographic changes, the South Bronx began to see reduced economic activity, coupled with a decrease in municipal services such as hospitals and public utilities. By the 1960's, many landlords had begun to neglect their buildings, and the area had been substantially redlined. The completion of the Cross Bronx Expressway in 1963 caused further inconvenience for the area, in some cases displacing entire neighborhoods. Combined with Robert Moses's urban renewal projects, the value of buildings in the Bronx dropped dramatically, businesses left, income levels dropped, and crime began to rise. [4] [11] [12] [13]
During the 1960s, South Bronx's population grew rapidly, caused in large part by the "urban renewal" project. Contributing massively to this change was Columbia University's rapid buy-up of low-income housing in Harlem, from which they kicked residents in order to create university dorms and housing. [14] Alongside the refugees who were kicked out of other New York City buildings by urban renewal, the South Bronx's population surged by over 100,000 in just a few years, putting a massive strain on the area's resources, which had already been defunded by city planning.[ citation needed ]
After the production boom of World War II began to wane, New York City faced financial trouble. The city was described as "so broke" by the 1970s, with neighborhoods that had become "so desperate and depleted," that municipal authorities had to scramble for a solution. [15] Some authorities believed the process of population decline was inevitable and, instead of trying to fight it, searched for alternatives; in many cases, this resulted in attempts to have the greatest population loss in the areas with the poorest and non-white populations. [16] [17]
Roger Starr, former head of New York City's Housing and Development Administration, proposed a policy for addressing the economic crisis, which he termed planned shrinkage. [18] The plan's goal was to reduce the poor population in New York City and better preserve the tax base; according to the proposal, the city would stop investing in troubled neighborhoods, and divert funds to communities "that could still be saved." [18] [19] Starr suggested that the city "accelerate the drainage" in what he called the "worst parts" of the South Bronx, and encouraged the city to do so by closing subway stations, firehouses, and schools. [20] According to its advocates, the planned shrinkage approach would encourage so-called "monolithic development," resulting in new urban growth at much lower population densities than the neighborhoods which had existed previously. [16] However, the policy was seen by many as ultimately failing to address the underlying systemic causes that were responsible. [21]
The ethics of this approach also came into question, [3] with former mayor Abraham Beame disavowing the idea, and City Council members calling it "inhuman," "racist," and "genocidal." [22] Abraham Beame soon dismissed Starr from his role in the HDA. [18] While the implementation of “planned shrinkage” policy was relatively short-lived, [23] the impact of the policy changes would last for the next two decades.[ citation needed ] On top of depriving the South Bronx of adequate fire service and protection, planned shrinkage heavily hurt public health as well. [17] [12] [13]
In the early 1970s, a RAND study examining the relation between city services and large city populations concluded that when services such as police and fire protection were withdrawn, the numbers of people in the neglected areas would decrease. [3] [17] This report built on existing prejudices established by reports such as the Moynihan Report, which argued that social issues facing black Americans were not systemic, but rather the result of black social and family organization in America. [24]
The reports further shifted the blame onto individuals affected by policy, with the RAND report in particular suggesting that neighborhood fires were predominantly caused by arson, despite substantial evidence that arson was not a major cause. [25] If arson was a primary cause, according to the RAND viewpoint, it did not make sense financially for the city to try to invest further funds to improve fire protection. The RAND report allegedly influenced then-Senator Daniel Moynihan, author of the aforementioned report blaming minority groups for their financial circumstances. Moynihan used the report's findings to make recommendations for urban policy, arguing that arson was one of many social pathologies caused by large cities, and suggesting that a policy of "benign neglect" was the most appropriate response. [16]
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (April 2025) |
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (April 2025) |
Burning for insurance money was primarily driven by property owners who found that almost all of the property in the South Bronx had been redlined by the banks and insurance companies. Unable to sell their property at a good price and facing default on back property taxes and mortgages, some landlords began to burn their buildings for their insurance value. A type of sophisticated white collar criminal known as a "fixer" sprung up during this period, specializing in a form of insurance fraud that began with buying out the property of redlined landlords at or below cost, then selling and reselling the buildings multiple times on paper between several different fictitious shell companies under the fixer's control, artificially driving up the value incrementally each time. [25]
Fraudulent "no questions asked" fire insurance policies, including from the New York FAIR Plan, would then be taken out on the overvalued buildings and the property stripped and burnt for the payoff. [30] [4] [6] [1] [7] especially from Lloyd's of London, [31] This scheme became so common that local gangs were hired by fixers for their expertise at the process of stripping buildings of wiring, plumbing, metal fixtures, and anything else of value and then effectively burning it down with gasoline. Many finishers became extremely rich buying properties from struggling landlords, artificially driving up the value, insuring them and then burning them. [25] Often, the properties were still occupied by subsidized tenants or squatters at the time, who were given short or no warning before the building was burnt down. They were forced to move to another slum building, where the process would usually repeat itself. The rate of unsolved fatalities due to fire multiplied sevenfold in the South Bronx during the 1970s, with many residents reporting being burnt out of numerous apartment blocks one after the other. [25]
Other landlords profited simply by letting their buildings get damaged and start decaying, while still collecting rent. [10] As an added benefit to the landlord, burning older buildings and allowing erosion of decaying properties also helped other, better-maintained properties increase in value. [10]
While most arsons were driven by landlords, many of whom did not live in the area, HUD and city policies did encourage some local South Bronx residents to burn down their own buildings. Under the regulations, Section 8 tenants who were burned out of their current housing were granted immediate priority status for another apartment, potentially in a better part of the city. After the establishment of Co-op City, several tenants burnt down their Section 8 housing in an attempt to jump to the front of the 2-3 year long waiting list for the new units. [32] However, this housing was often in poor condition to begin with, and in many cases barely inhabitable. [6] [10]
Due to the poor quality of housing and heavily-neglected buildings, many tenants began refusing to pay rent altogether. [33] [34] Although rent strikes in the Bronx initially started due to the exorbitant rises in rent from absentee landlords, the practice of rent strikes soon spread to tenants of all neglected buildings, and led to periods where buildings remained untouched and rents unpaid for years on end.
By the end of the 1970's, Bronxites had begun to rebuild, and led recovery programs. At first, many residents applied to the city for funds, but this was often ignored; what's more, many of the buildings had been long abandoned by landlords, and changed hands so many times that the true owner was no longer known. [34] As such, Bronx residents felt that repairing a building would ultimately make it theirs, as a product of the "sweat equity" put in. One such group was known as the People's Development Corporation, formed in 1975 by Ramon Rueda, and led by George Rodriguez. The group worked to "train residents to rebuild their own neighborhood... harnessing government work programs, available grants, and abandoned buildings, the PDC formalized a structure and plan to rehabilitate housing stock through sweat equity and urban homesteading." [35] The PDC was one of many groups that formed during the time. [34] Other rehabilitation groups of the 1970s and early 1980s included BronxWorks (1972), the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (1974), the Fordham Bedford Housing Cooperation (1980), the Banana Kelly Community Improvement Association (1982), and ¡Nos Quedamos! (1982). [35]
During this same period, gangs formed, and were looked to for protection by Bronx residents. [36] Some argue that gang activity also helped worsened the crisis, encouraging white flight. [34] [36]
By the 1980's, in line with president Reagan's goal of privatization, many New Yorkers felt that the best approach to solving the housing crisis was to privatize housing in the Bronx. This movement was spearheaded by Mayor Ed Koch. [37] Ultimately, arson rates did decline, but the era of modern gentrification was kicked off. [37]
In 1982, a Bronx arson unit was finally developed. [6]
On a national level, politicians were seen by Bronxites as dragging their feet. However, the city of New York was already seen by the rest of the country of a massive drain. These mentalities were encapsulated by the infamous but slightly misleading "Ford to City: Drop Dead" headline ran by the Daily News in 1976. [38] Just a year earlier, president Ford exacerbated the NYC budget cuts by refusing to send aid to the city. [38] [6] The fires in the Bronx soon became a national discussion in 1977, however, when ABC’s aerial camera panned out over the stadium into the Bronx during the World Series, showing 60 million viewers a burning apartment building. [6]
In the aftermath, President Carter went to the Bronx [39] and made promises for recovery. Many other politicians visited Charlotte Street to make political points, but this was largely seen as being for show. [6]
The phrase "The Bronx is burning," attributed to Howard Cosell during Game 2 of the 1977 World Series featuring the New York Yankees and Los Angeles Dodgers, refers to the arson epidemic caused by the total economic collapse of the South Bronx during the 1970s. During the game, as ABC switched to a generic helicopter shot of the exterior of Yankee Stadium, an uncontrolled fire could clearly be seen burning in the ravaged South Bronx surrounding the park. [6] Many believe Cosell intoned, "There it is, ladies and gentlemen, the Bronx is burning." [40] Review of the game footage shows that he did not say this. According to the New York Post , the words used by the two broadcasters during the game were later "spun by credulous journalists" into the now ubiquitous phrase "Ladies and gentlemen, the Bronx is burning" without either of the two announcers actually having phrased it that way. [25]
This section needs expansionwith: impact of co-ops [41] [42] and music on building community recovery efforts, and how the impact of crack, mass policing, and gentrification compiled on top of the impact of the fires. You can help by adding to it. (April 2025) |