The Battle of the Bzura (or the Battle of Kutno) was both the largest battle[3] and Polish counter-attack[4] of the German invasion of Poland and was fought from 9 to 19 September.[5][6] The battle took place west of Warsaw, near the Bzura River. It began as a Polish counter-offensive, which gained initial success, but the Germans outflanked the Polish forces with a concentrated counter-attack. That weakened Polish forces and the Poznań and Pomorze Armies were destroyed. Western Poland was now under German occupation.[7]:65–70 The battle has been described as "the bloodiest and most bitter battle of the entire Polish campaign".[8]Winston Churchill called the battle an "ever-glorious struggle".[9]
Background
Dispositions of opposing forces, 31 August 1939, and the German plan.Map showing the Polish assault southwards
The Polish plan to defend from the German invasion, Plan West, called to defend the borders.[10] That was dictated more by political than military concerns, as Poles feared that the Germans, after they had taken over the territories that they had lost by the Treaty of Versailles, would try to end the war by keeping those territories.[1] Defending the borders was risky, but the Poles were counting on a British and French counteroffensive, which never came.[1] That made Army Pomorze, under General Władysław Bortnowski, find itself in the Polish Corridor while it was surrounded by German forces on two fronts. Army Poznań, under General Tadeusz Kutrzeba, was pushed to the westernmost fringes of Poland and was separated from its primary defensive positions and from other Polish Armies.[1]
The German offensive proved the folly of the Polish border defence plan during the first days of the war.[11] Army Pomorze was defeated at the Battle of Bory Tucholskie and was forced to retreat to the south-east.[11] Army Poznań, meanwhile, did not face heavy German assaults but was forced to retreat to the east by defeats of its neighbours (Army Pomorze in the north and Army Łódź in the south). Both of them were retreating and so Army Poznań was in danger of being flanked and surrounded by the German forces.[11] On 4 September, Army Poznań moved through Poznań and abandoned it to the enemy although at that point, it was not in contact with any significant German forces.[11] By 6 September, Armies Pomorze and Poznań had linked and formed the strongest Polish operational unit in the campaign, and General Bortnowski accepted the command of General Kutrzeba.[11]
On 7 September, the Polish forces became aware of the German push towards Łęczyca, which, if successful, could cut off the retreat route of Polish forces.[11] By 8 September, advanced German troops reached Warsaw, which marked the beginning of the Siege of Warsaw.[11] At the same time, German forces had lost contact with Army Poznań, and the German command assumed that the army must have been transported by rail to aid Warsaw's defence. They were unaware that in fact Army Poznań had merged forces with Army Pomorze, which they considered, since its defeat at Bory Tucholskie, to be no longer a significant threat.[11] On 8 September, the Germans were certain that they had eliminated major Polish resistance west of Vistula and so prepared to cross it and to engage the Polish forces on the other side.[2]
Meanwhile, General Kutrzeba and his staff officers had suspected, even before the German invasion, that it would be the neighbouring armies that would bear the German attack and so they had developed plans at an offensive to the south to relieve Army Łódź.[12] During the first week of the campaign, however, those plans were rejected by the Polish commander-in-chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły.[12] By 8 September, Kutrzeba had lost contact with Rydz-Śmigły, who had relocated his command center from Warsaw to Brest. Those factors made Kutrzeba decide to go forward with his plan.[12] His situation was dire, as German forces were close to surrounding his units: the German 8th Army had secured the southern bank of the Bzura river, and the German 4th Army had secured the northern bank of Vistula, from Włocławek to Wyszogród, and its elements were attacking the rear of the Armies Pomorze and Poznań from the direction of Inowrocław and crossing the Vistula near Płock.[12]
On the night of 9 September, the Polish Poznań Army commenced a counterattack from the south of the Bzura river, its target being the German forces from the 8th Army advancing between Łęczyca and Łowicz towards Stryków.[13][14] The commander of Poznań Army, Tadeusz Kutrzeba noticed that the German 8th Army, which was commanded by General Johannes Blaskowitz, was weakly secured from the north by only the 30th Infantry Division, which stretched over a 30 km defensive line while the rest of the army was advancing towards Warsaw. The main thrust of the Polish offensive were the units under General Edmund Knoll-Kownacki, which were known as the Knoll-Kownacki Operational Group (Polish 14th, 17th, 25th and 26th Infantry Divisions).[13][14][15] The right wing of the offensive, in the area Łęczyce, included the Podolska Cavalry Brigade under Col. L. Strzelecki, and on the left, advancing from Łowicz to the area of Głowno, the Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade under General Roman Abraham.[13][14][16] These groups inflicted considerable losses on the German defenders from the 30th Infantry Division and the 24th Infantry Division, with some 1,500 German soldiers killed or wounded and an additional 3,000 lost as prisoners during the initial push.[13][14][17] The cavalry brigades, supplemented with TKS and TK-3 reconnaissance tanks, moved to threaten the flanks and the rear of the advancing German units.[18]
On the morning of 14 September, General Władysław Bortnowski's 26th and 16th Infantry Divisions crossed the Bzura near Łowicz. The Polish 4th Infantry Division reached the road linking Łowicz with Głowno. At that point, however, Bortnowski ordered the 26th Infantry Division to retreat. He had learned of the withdrawal of the German 4th Panzer Division from the outskirts of Warsaw and was concerned that the Panzer division posed a threat to his men.[19]
Map of the third and final phase by Lonio17Polish Horse artillery in Battle of the Bzura 1939, near Sochaczew.
On 15 and 16 September, Army Pomorze took up defensive positions on the north bank of the Bzura. General Stanisław Grzmot-Skotnicki's group between Kutno and Żychlin, General Michał Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski's units near Gąbin and parts of Army Poznań by the Bzura near Sochaczew were ready to begin their drive towards Warsaw. To encircle and to destroy the Polish forces, the Germans used most of their 10th Army, including two armoured, one motorized and three light divisions, which was equipped with some 800 tanks altogether. The attack from all sides on Polish positions started on 16 September with the support of the Luftwaffe. On 15 September, the Poles were forced out of Sochaczew, a town on the Bzura river, and were trapped in a triangle of Bzura, Vistula and German forces.[14][20] The German 1st Panzer Division, after crossing the Bzura between Sochaczew and Brochów and engaging the Polish 25th Infantry Division, managed to capture Ruszki, but its advance was then halted. Poles began to cross the Bzura near the Vistula, north of Sochaczew, and retreat towards Warsaw.[14][20][21]
The Polish forces were forced to abandon most of their heavy equipment while they crossed the river.[20] On 17 September, German heavy artillery was shelling the crossing north of Brochów, and the largest air operation of the campaign began, with the Luftwaffe attacking the retreating Polish forces.[14][20]
During the night of 17 September, the main forces of Army Poznań attacked the German forces to break out of the German encirclement between Witkowice and Sochaczew. The 15th Infantry Division and Podolska Cavalry Brigade again crossed the Bzura in Witkowice. In Brochow, the 25th and the 17th Infantry Divisions crossed the Bzura. The 14th Infantry Division was concentrated in Łaziska. At the same time, Army Pomorze marched towards the villages of Osmolin, Kierozia and Osiek.
In the morning, the Germans started their drive towards the south along both banks of the Bzura and were supported by more than 300 aircraft and heavy artillery.[20] German howitzers, taking advantage of their position on the high ground of the Vistula's right bank, shelled Polish positions for the entire day.[20] After two days of heavy fighting, with no ammunition or food rations remaining, further attempts at a breakout for the Poles became impossible.[10]
Aftermath
The aftermath of a bombing of a Polish column, with a Bofors 40 mm gun in the foreground
"[My soldiers fought] in one of the biggest and most destructive battles of all times."
Only a few Polish units managed to break out of the encirclement.[20] The groups crossed the Kampinos Forest and fought German units in the area (such as at the Battle of Wólka Węglowa), then entered Warsaw and Modlin, mostly around 19 and 20 September. [14][22] Among them were Generals Kutrzeba, Knoll-Kowacki and Tokarzewski, two cavalry brigades (Wielkopolska and Podolska) of General Abraham and the 15th and 25th Infantry Divisions. The remainder (4th, 14th, 17th, 26th and 27th Infantry Divisions), which did not manage to cross the river, surrendered with General Bortnowski between 18 and 22 September.[2][14] Polish casualties were estimated at 20,000 dead, including three generals: Franciszek Wład, Stanisław Grzmot-Skotnicki and Mikołaj Bołtuć.[1] German casualties are estimated at 8,000 dead.[2]
After the battle, the remaining German divisions rushed towards Warsaw and Modlin and soon encircled both. The Bzura campaign ended in defeat for the Poles, but because of the initial Polish local successes, the German advance on Warsaw was halted for several days. The Wehrmacht was required to divert units from its push towards Warsaw.[23] That helped the Polish units defending Warsaw and its environs to organise their own long-term but ultimately failed defence of the capital.[24]
The campaign also showed the importance of taking initiative, proved that horse cavalry units were still an important factor on the battlefield, proved the importance of air superiority and confirmed that simple numerical superiority still mattered.[1][25]
↑ Sources vary regarding the end date, with some giving 18 September and others 19 September. Brockhaus Multimedial Lexikon gives 19 September 1939 as to the battle's end date.
↑ Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, vol. 1 of The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 445. Churchill gives "the battle of the river Bzura" as its name.
1 2 Seidner, Stanley S. Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz....,34-128.
↑ Seidner, Stanley S. Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz....,128.
↑ Seidner, Stanley S. Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz....,128-129.
↑ Andrzej Kunert in "Wrzesień 1939 9/19 - Bzura" claims that at least one pivotal attack was cancelled because while they were marching, the soldiers were asleep for the first time in a few days, which led to the loss of momentum.
Related Research Articles
The Battle of Kock was the final battle in the invasion of Poland at the beginning of World War II in Europe. It took place between 2–5 October 1939, near the town of Kock, in Poland.
This article discusses the Polish order of battle during the invasion of Poland. In the late 1930s Polish headquarters prepared "Plan Zachód", a plan of mobilization of Polish Army in case of war with Germany. Earlier, the Poles did not regard the Germans as their main threat, priority was given to threat from the Soviets.
The Siege of Warsaw in 1939 was fought between the Polish Warsaw Army garrisoned and entrenched in Warsaw and the invading German Army.
Independent Operational Group Polesie was one of the Polish Army Corps that defended Poland during the Invasion of Poland in 1939. It was created on 11 September 1939 and was commanded by general Franciszek Kleeberg. The SGO is most notable for fighting in the battle of Kock, the last battle of the Invasion of Poland.
Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz also called Edward Rydz-Śmigły, was a Polish politician, statesman, Marshal of Poland and Commander-in-Chief of Poland's armed forces, as well as a painter and poet.
The Battle of Mława, otherwise known as the Defence of the Mława position, took place to the north of the town of Mława in northern Poland between 1 and 3 September 1939. It was one of the opening battles of the Invasion of Poland and World War II in general. It was fought between the forces of the Polish Modlin Army under General Krukowicz-Przedrzymirski and the German 3rd Army under General Georg von Küchler.
The Battle of Tomaszów Lubelski took place from 18 September to 20 September 1939 near the town of Tomaszów Lubelski. It was the second largest battle of the Invasion of Poland and also the largest tank battle of the campaign. It resulted in the surrender of Army Krakow on 20 September 1939.
The Prusy Army was one of the Polish armies to fight during the Invasion of Poland in 1939. Created in the summer of 1939 as the main reserve of the Commander in Chief, it was commanded by Gen. Stefan Dąb-Biernacki. The word Prusy in the Polish language means Prussia, but this name only served as a codename and the region of operations of this army was far from East Prussia. This is in contrast to other Polish armies in 1939 which were named after the geographical regions where they formed. The Prusy Army, whose original name was Warszawa Army, was named so after a folwark in central Poland called Prusy, which served as the headquarters of General Dąb-Biernacki.
Władysław Bortnowski was a Polish historian, military commander and one of the highest ranking generals of the Polish Army. He is most famous for commanding the Pomorze Army in the Battle of the Bzura during the invasion of Poland in 1939. He is also notable for serving as president of the Józef Piłsudski Institute of America between 1961 and 1962.
The Pomeranian Army was one of the Polish armies defending against the 1939 Invasion of Poland. It was officially created on 23 March 1939. Led by General dywizji Władysław Bortnowski, it consisted of 5 infantry divisions, 2 National Defence brigades and 1 cavalry brigade.
The Battle of Kampinos Forest was in fact a series of skirmishes and battles fought in the forests around Kampinos during the Invasion of Poland of 1939, between the Polish Army and the German Wehrmacht.
The Battle of the Border refers to the battles that occurred in the first days of the German invasion of Poland in September, 1939. The series of battles ended in a German victory, as Polish forces were either destroyed or forced to retreat.
The Warsaw Army was one of the Polish armies to take part in the Polish Defensive War of 1939. Created on 8 September, eight days after the invasion begun, it was an improvised formation charged with the defence of the Polish capital of Warsaw (Warszawa).
The Polish 4th Infantry Division was created following Polish independence after the end of World War I. The division participated in the Polish–Ukrainian War in 1919. During World War II, the division existed as three wholly separate organizations, the original incarnation of the division as part of the pre-war Polish Army, the second incarnation armed and equipped by the western Allies, and another division armed and equipped and controlled by the Soviet Union. The second and third incarnations of this division existed simultaneously from 1944 until 1947.
Army Poznań, led by Major General Tadeusz Kutrzeba, was one of the Polish Armies during the Invasion of Poland in 1939.
Plan West was a military plan of the Polish Army of the Second Polish Republic, for defence against invasion from Nazi Germany. It was designed in the late 1930s.
Plan East was a Polish defensive military plan that was created in the 1920s and the 1930s in case of war against the Soviet Union. Unlike Plan West, it was being prepared during the whole interwar period, as the government of the Second Polish Republic treated the Soviet Union as the greatest potential military threat that was capable of initiating a full-scale war. However, only a few loose historical documents remain of the original plan today.
The Intervention Corps was a tactical unit of the Polish Armed Forces of the Second Polish Republic. It did not exist in the peacetime organization of the Polish Army, and was created for specific purposes only. Its task was to intervene in special circumstances, both inside Poland and outside of the country.
Kutno Operational Group, named after the town and major rail junction of Kutno,, was an Operational Group of the Polish Army, created in March 1939, a few months before the Invasion of Poland. Its official name was Kutno Reserve Group of Commander-in-Chief, and it remained under direct control of Commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz.
19th Relief of Lwów Infantry Regiment was an infantry regiment of the Polish Army. It existed from April 1919 until September 1939. Garrisoned in Lwów, the unit belonged to the 5th Lwów Infantry Division from Lwów. Its reserve battalion was stationed in Brzeżany. During the 1939 Invasion of Poland, the regiment, together with its division, belonged to Pomorze Army.
References
(in Polish) Sławomir Cisowski, Wojciech Zalewski, Bitwa nad Bzurą, Chwała Oręża Polskiego 26 (47), Rzeczpospolita, 20 January 2007 (publication contains a map of the battle).
Stanley S.Seidner, Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz Rydz and the Defense of Poland, New York, 1978.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
Germany 
Poland 
