Burgess v. United States

Last updated
Keith Lavon Burges v United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 24, 2008
Decided April 16, 2008
Full case nameBurgess v United States
Citations553 U.S. 124 ( more )
128 S.Ct. 1572; 170 L. Ed. 2d 478; 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3475
Case history
PriorAppeals court affirmed conviction, 478 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2007).
Holding
States classification of a drug offense as misdemeanor, that was punishable by more than 1 year in jail was classified as a felony drug offense under federal law.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy  · David Souter
Clarence Thomas  · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer  · Samuel Alito
Case opinion
MajorityGinsburg, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
21 U.S.C. 841

Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the interpretation of the words "federal drug offense" in the Controlled Substances Act. [1]

Contents

Background

Keith Lavon Burgess was convicted in a South Carolina state court for cocaine possession. [2] Although the maximum sentence under state law was two years, South Carolina classified the offense as a misdemeanor, rather than a felony. [3] At a later proceeding, Burgess pleaded guilty for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine in Federal Court. [4] At his sentencing, the judge applied to Burgess the "prior conviction" statute, which required a minimum twenty-year sentence for anyone with a prior "felony drug conviction." [5] In Burgess' appeal to the Court he maintained that since South Carolina considered his first offense a misdemeanor, the "prior felony drug conviction" did not apply. [6]

Opinion of the Court

In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court rejected Burgess' appeal, holding that "felony" refers to any offense that is punishable for more than a year even if another jurisdiction classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. [7]

See also

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References

  1. Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2008).
  2. Burgess, 553 U.S. at 127 (citing S. C. Code Ann. § 44–53–370(c) and (d)(1) (2002 and Supp. 2007)).
  3. Burgess, 553 U.S. at 127 (citing § 44–53–370(d)(1)).
  4. Burgess, 553 U.S. at 127.
  5. Burgess, 553 U.S. at 128 ("The court granted the motion and sentenced Burgess to 156 months' imprisonment followed by ten years' supervised release.").
  6. Burgess, 553 U.S. at 128.
  7. Burgess, 553 U.S. at 134, 136.