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References
- 1 2 3 "David Enoch CV" (PDF). The Hebrew University Philosophy Department and Faculty of Law. Hebrew University of Jerusalem. August 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 18 September 2021.
- ↑ "Prof David Enoch". Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Archived from the original on 13 February 2017.
- ↑ https://www.lawprofsforum.org/en
- ↑ Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (Oxford University Press, 2011)
- ↑ Against Public Reason”, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy 1 (2015), 112-142
- ↑ “Against Utopianism: Noncompliance and Multiple Agents”, Philosopher’s Imprint 18 (2018)
- ↑ “False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences”, The Philosophical Review 129 (2020), 159-210
- ↑ “Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?” in Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (edited by David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro, and Kevin Toh) (Oxford University Press, 2019).
- ↑ “Luck between Morality, Law and Justice”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (2008), 23-59; “Moral Luck and the Law”, Philosophy Compass 5 (2010), 42-54.
- ↑ “Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge” (with Levi Spectre and Talia Fisher), Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2012), 197-224
- ↑ David Enoch, “Sense and Sensitivity” (with Talia Fisher), Stanford Law Review 67 (2015), 557-611
- ↑ “A Defense of Moral Deference”, The Journal of Philosophy 111 (2014), 1-30.
- ↑ “Contrastive Consent and Third-Party Coercion”. Forthcoming in Philosopher’s Imprint.
- ↑ “Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy”, Ethics 128 (2017), 6-36.
- ↑ “Intending, Foreseeing, and the State”, Legal Theory 13 (2007), 69-99.
- ↑ Reviews of Taking Morality Seriously:
- Björnsson, Gunnar; Olinder, Ragnar Francén (11 January 2016). "Enoch's Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism" (PDF). Journal of Moral Philosophy . 13 (1): 101–112. doi:10.1163/17455243-01301001. ISSN 1740-4681.
- Cuneo, Terence (October 2012). "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, by David Enoch". Mind (Review). 121 (484): 1059–1064. doi:10.1093/mind/fzs093. ISSN 0026-4423.
- Faraci, David (June 2012). "David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism" (PDF). The Journal of Value Inquiry (Review). 46 (2): 259–267. doi:10.1007/s10790-012-9329-x. S2CID 140758018.
- Joyce, Richard (April 2014). "Taking moral skepticism seriously". Philosophical Studies . 168 (3): 843–851. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0213-8. JSTOR 42920393. S2CID 171052378. Freely accessible version (PDF).
- Sepielli, Andrew (2012). "David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Review). Archived from the original on 7 March 2021.
- Skarsaune, Knut Olav (December 2015). "David Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism". Utilitas (Review). 27 (4): 487–490. doi:10.1017/S0953820815000205. S2CID 143316314.
- Wedgwood, Ralph (April 2013). "Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. By David Enoch". The Philosophical Quarterly (Review). 63 (251): 389–393. doi:10.1111/1467-9213.2007.
