Day of Deceit

Last updated
Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor
Day of Deceit.jpg
First edition
Author Robert Stinnett
Subject Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory
PublisherFree Press, Edition: Touchstone ed
Publication date
1999
Pages416
ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
940.5426
LC Class D767.92.S837

Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor is a book by Robert Stinnett. It alleges that Franklin Roosevelt and his administration deliberately provoked and allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to bring the United States into World War II. Stinnett argues that the attacking fleet was detected by radio and intelligence intercepts, but the information was deliberately withheld from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the Pacific Fleet at that time.

Contents

First released in December 1999, it received a nuanced review in The New York Times [1] and is frequently referenced by proponents of advance knowledge theories. [2]

Historians of the period, however, generally reject its thesis, pointing to several key errors and reliance on doubtful sources. [2]

Summary

Stinnett's starting point is a memorandum written by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum in October 1940, which was obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. McCollum, then head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence, [3] discussed the strategic situation in the Pacific and ended with a list of eight actions directed at the Japanese threat. Stinnett characterizes the actions as "provocations" and states his belief in McCollum's point F ("Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands") was intended to lure the Japanese into attacking it. Stinnett asserts that the overall intent was to provoke an act of war that would allow Roosevelt to enter into active conflict with Germany in support of the United Kingdom.

Walter Short and Kimmel were ordered to remain in a defensive posture with respect to the Japanese. Stinnett claims that intelligence intercepts were deliberately withheld from them to prevent them from mounting an adequate defense. He also claims that radio traffic was intercepted from the fleet as it approached Hawaii, allowing it to be tracked, but again, the information was withheld so that the defenders would be unprepared. All, says Stinnett, was directed from the White House itself with Roosevelt's knowledge and at his behest.

Reception

Reviewers were generally dismissive of Stinnett's claims, as many of his claims appear to be baseless. [4] An article in Salon quotes CIA historian Donald Steury:

[Stinnett] concocted this theory pretty much from whole cloth. Those who have been able to check his alleged sources also are unanimous in their condemnation of his methodology. Basically, the author has made up his sources; when he does not make up the source, he lies about what the source says. [2]

Critical points in Stinnett's argument were disputed by military historians. His characterization of the McCollum memorandum was not accepted by Conrad Crane, Chief of Historical Services and Support at the United States Army Heritage and Education Center, who wrote: "A close reading shows that its recommendations were supposed to deter and contain Japan, while better preparing the United States for a future conflict in the Pacific. There is an offhand remark that an overt Japanese act of war would make it easier to garner public support for actions against Japan, but the document's intent was not to ensure that event happened." [3] This means that Stinnett attributes to McCollum a position McCollum expressly refuted. [5] Furthermore, McCollum's own sworn testimony also refutes it. [6]

Philip Zelikow, writing in Foreign Affairs , objected to Stinnett's claim that the Japanese naval code was being read at the time (the JN-25 code was changed shortly before the attack and was not decrypted again until May 1942), [7] an objection also raised by Crane. [3] A review posted on the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association website addresses the intelligence issues in greater detail and disputes claims that the fleet was detected through direction finding; the author also criticizes Stinnett's use of testimony from Robert Ogg, [8] originally identified as "Seaman Z" by John Toland in his 1986 book. [9] Indeed, Ogg expressly denies saying what Toland quotes him as saying. [10] In their annotations on the 1995 Pentagon study of the attack, Frederic Borch and Daniel Martinez, chief historian at the USS Arizona Memorial, also dispute these claims and call his claims "totally false". [11]

Stinnett's claims of "intercepts" are contradicted by Japanese testimony, which unequivocally state there were none, and even transmitter keys were removed from radios of ships in the task force. [12] (The claim of a need for "low-power radio" made by Stinnett[ page needed ] ignores standard fleet practise under radio silence, use of flag or blinker.) Moreover, his "intercepts" do not amount to direction finding bearings, contrary to his claims, [13] while his document allegedly [14] showing the plot of these nonexistent bearings contains nothing of the kind. [15]

"If there was this vast and humongous conspiracy", [16] its members had to number in the hundreds. [17] Among them would have to be Lt. Kermit Tyler who, on the morning of 7 December, was contacted about a radar contact on an inbound flight, and told the operators to forget about it. [16] One would also have to include the Navy duty officer, who was asleep when the destroyer USS Ward first tried to report a minisub contact, [18] thereby losing over three hours' warning. [17] It would also include the officer who ordered USAAC fighters be parked in close proximity to avoid sabotage. [17] Also included would be the senior antiaircraft officers, who ordered ammunition to be locked up far from the guns. [17]

Furthermore, Stinnett makes numerous and contradictory claims of the number of messages originated by the Kido Butai , attributing to it messages from shore stations, Yamamoto's flagship (which was not accompanying the task force), deception measures, and traffic from before the task force even sailed. [19] Moreover, he finds "not a single one" originating from the Kido Butai after it sortied 26 November. [20]

David Kahn commented on the book, stating that it had "basic errors of fact" and "tendentious interpretations" and was "an extraordinarily sloppy book". Examples include Stinett commenting on Japanese code wheels which did not exist, and misreading a date that said 15-5-41 as December 5, 1941. Stinnett also mistakenly believed that provoking Japan into an act of war against another nation would trigger the mutual assistance provision of the Axis Tripartite Pact. [21]

Historian Gordon Prange, in an earlier work, noted that a war between the U.S. and Japan was contrary to Roosevelt's desire to aid Britain in her fight against Germany, and Prime Minister Churchill's desire to avoid "another war". Prange, the foremost authority on the Pearl Harbor attack, characterizes the conspiracy theory as "an absurdity." [22] British historian John Keegan writes that Stinnett's charges of conspiracy "defy logic", and fail to show how Roosevelt could have succeeded in bringing US Army Chief George Marshall and US Navy Chief Harold Stark into the conspiracy. [23] Another British historian, Ronald Lewin, calls Stinnett's theory "moonshine." [23] Military intelligence historian Roberta Wohlstetter wrote that Stinnett conflated FDR's desire for an incident which might serve as a catalyst for war against Germany, with FDR's supposed foreknowledge of such an incident provoking war with Japan. [23] Presidential historian Joseph E. Persico found that FDR drafted an appeal to peace to the Emperor of Japan the night before the Pearl Harbor attack, which historian Hervie Haughler said could not be the action of someone who wished for war with Japan. [23]

Reviews

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Attack on Pearl Harbor</span> 1941 surprise attack by Japan on the US military base in Hawaii

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise military strike by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service upon the United States against the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, just before 8:00 a.m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941. The United States was a neutral country at the time; the attack led the U.S. to formally enter World War II on the side of the Allies the following day. The Japanese military leadership referred to the attack as the Hawaii Operation and Operation AI, and as Operation Z during its planning.

<i>Pearl Harbor</i> (film) 2001 film by Michael Bay

Pearl Harbor is a 2001 American romantic war drama film directed by Michael Bay, produced by Bay and Jerry Bruckheimer and written by Randall Wallace. It stars Ben Affleck, Kate Beckinsale, Josh Hartnett, Cuba Gooding Jr., Tom Sizemore, Jon Voight, Colm Feore, and Alec Baldwin. The film features a heavily fictionalized version of the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces on December 7, 1941, focusing on a love story set amidst the lead up to the attack, its aftermath, and the Doolittle Raid.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Husband E. Kimmel</span> US Navy admiral (1882–1968)

Husband Edward Kimmel was a United States Navy four-star admiral who was the commander in chief of the United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He was removed from that command after the attack, in December 1941, and was reverted to his permanent two-star rank of rear admiral due to no longer holding a four-star assignment. He retired from the Navy in early 1942. The United States Senate voted to restore Kimmel's permanent rank to four stars in 1999, but President Clinton did not act on the resolution, and neither have any of his successors.

The Hull note, officially the Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan, was the final proposal delivered to the Empire of Japan by the United States of America before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Japanese declaration of war. The note, delivered on November 26, 1941, is named for Secretary of State Cordell Hull. It was the diplomatic culmination of a series of events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Notably, its text repeats previous American demands for Japan to withdraw from China and from French Indochina. No further American proposals were made before the attack on Pearl Harbor, as the US government had received intelligence that Japan was preparing an invasion of Thailand.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mitsuo Fuchida</span> Japanese Naval officer

Mitsuo Fuchida was a Japanese captain in the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service and a bomber observer in the Imperial Japanese Navy before and during World War II. He is perhaps best known for leading the first wave of air attacks on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Working under the overall fleet commander, Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, Fuchida was responsible for the coordination of the entire aerial attack.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Joseph Rochefort</span> American naval officer and cryptanalyst (1900–1976)

Joseph John Rochefort was an American naval officer and cryptanalyst. He was a major figure in the United States Navy's cryptographic and intelligence operations from 1925 to 1946, particularly in the Battle of Midway. His contributions and those of his team were pivotal to victory in the Pacific War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Harold Raynsford Stark</span> American admiral, 8th US Chief of Naval Operations (1880–1972)

Harold Raynsford Stark was an officer in the United States Navy during World War I and World War II, who served as the 8th Chief of Naval Operations from August 1, 1939, to March 26, 1942.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kichisaburō Nomura</span> Japanese admiral and politician (1877–1964)

Kichisaburō Nomura was an admiral in the Imperial Japanese Navy and was the ambassador to the United States at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The "Winds Code" is a confused military intelligence episode relating to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, especially the advance-knowledge debate claiming that the attack was expected.

Various conspiracy theories allege that U.S. government officials had advance knowledge of Japan's December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor. Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to why and how the United States was caught off guard, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans for an attack. In September 1944, John T. Flynn, a co-founder of the non-interventionist America First Committee, launched a Pearl Harbor counter-narrative when he published a 46-page booklet entitled The Truth about Pearl Harbor, arguing that Roosevelt and his inner circle had been plotting to provoke the Japanese into an attack on the U.S. and thus provide a reason to enter the war since January 1941.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Richmond K. Turner</span> Admiral in the United States Navy

Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commonly known as Admiral Kelly Turner, served in the United States Navy during World War II, and is best known for commanding the Amphibious Force during the campaign across the Pacific. Admiral Turner was responsible for the creation of the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) that were an early precursor to the United States Navy SEALs.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">John T. Flynn</span> American journalist (1882-1964)

John Thomas Flynn was an American journalist best known for his opposition to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to American entry into World War II. In September 1940, Flynn helped establish the America First Committee (AFC), which he abandoned when Pearl Harbor was attacked a year later, switching to support of the war effort. In his rabid opposition to Roosevelt, Flynn later went on to advance the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory.

Robert B. Stinnett was an American sailor, photographer and author. He earned ten battle stars and a Presidential Unit Citation. He was the author of Day of Deceit, regarding alleged U.S. government advance knowledge of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, plunging the United States into World War II.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">McCollum memo</span> 1940 U.S. naval memo on provoking Japan into attacking the United States

The McCollum memo, also known as the Eight Action Memo, was a memorandum, dated October 7, 1940, sent by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum in his capacity as director of the Office of Naval Intelligence's Far East Asia section. It was sent to Navy Captains Dudley Knox, who agreed with the actions described within the memo, and Walter Stratton Anderson.

Station HYPO, also known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPAC), was the United States Navy signals monitoring and cryptographic intelligence unit in Hawaii during World War II. It was one of two major Allied signals intelligence units, called Fleet Radio Units in the Pacific theaters, along with FRUMEL in Melbourne, Australia. The station took its initial name from the phonetic code at the time for "H" for Heʻeia, Hawaii radio tower. The precise importance and role of HYPO in penetrating the Japanese naval codes has been the subject of considerable controversy, reflecting internal tensions amongst US Navy cryptographic stations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Edwin T. Layton</span> U.S. Navy Rear Admiral, noted for intelligence work during the Second World War

Edwin Thomas Layton was a rear admiral in the United States Navy. Layton is most noted for his work as an intelligence officer before and during World War II.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Prelude to the attack on Pearl Harbor</span>

A series of events led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. War between the Empire of Japan and the United States was a possibility each nation's military forces had planned for after World War I. The expansion of American territories in the Pacific had been a threat to Japan since the 1890s, but real tensions did not begin until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor</span>

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor took place on December 7, 1941. The United States military suffered 19 ships damaged or sunk, and 2,403 people were killed. Its most significant consequence was the entrance of the United States into World War II. The US had previously been officially neutral but subsequently entered the Pacific War, and after Italy's declaration of war and Germany's declaration of war shortly after the attack, the Battle of the Atlantic and the European theatre of war. Following the attack, the US interned 120,000 Japanese Americans, 11,000 German Americans, and 3,000 Italian Americans.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack</span>

The Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, also known as The Pearl Harbor Committee, was a committee of members of the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives formed during the 79th United States Congress after World War II to investigate the causes of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, and possible preventive measures against future attacks. The resolution for the formation of this committee passed in the Senate on September 6, 1945, and in the House on September 11, 1945. The final report of the committee issued on June 20, 1946.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Attack on Pearl Harbor in popular culture</span>

The attack on Pearl Harbor has received substantial attention in popular culture in multiple media and cultural formats including film, architecture, memorial statues, non-fiction writing, historical writing, and historical fiction. Today, the USS Arizona Memorial on the island of Oahu honors the dead. Visitors to the memorial reach it via boats from the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The memorial was designed by Alfred Preis, and has a sagging center but strong and vigorous ends, expressing "initial defeat and ultimate victory". It commemorates all lives lost on December 7, 1941.

References

  1. ↑ Bernstein, Richard (December 15, 1999). "Books of the Times: On Dec. 7, Did We Know We Knew?". New York Times. Retrieved 2010-12-09.
  2. 1 2 3 Greer, Judith (June 14, 2001). "Dive-bombing FDR". Salon. Retrieved 2010-12-09.
  3. 1 2 3 Crane, Conrad (Spring 2001). "Book Reviews: Day of Deceit". Parameters.
  4. ↑ Young, Richard E., Admiral. "A Deceitful Book", review of Day of Deceit. Archived 2012-03-21 at the Wayback Machine (retrieved 4 July 2014)
  5. ↑ Young, p.4; McCollum, Arthur H., Rear Admiral. "The Calamitous 7th", The Saturday Review of Literature, 29 May 1954.
  6. ↑ Pearl Harbor Investigations, Part 8, pp.2447-3443.
  7. ↑ Zelikow, Philip (March–April 2000). "Capsule Reviews: Day of Deceit: The Truth About F.D.R. and Pearl Harbor". Foreign Affairs (March/April 2000).
  8. ↑ UPI, Dec 1, 1983. "'Seaman Z,' the anonymous sailor . ."
  9. ↑ Jacobsen, Philip H. "A Cryptologic Veteran's Analysis of "Day of Deceit"". USNCVA. Archived from the original on 2011-07-22.
  10. ↑ Young, p.8.
  11. ↑ Borch, Frederic; Daniel Martinez (2005). Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: the final report revealed. Naval Institute Press. pp. 78–79.
  12. ↑ Prange, Gordon W., Goldstein, Donald, and Dillon, Katherine. Pearl Harbor Papers, pp.17ff; Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981, pp.166-167, 227, 441, 548, & 573; Gannon, Michael. Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt & Co., 2001), pp.182-183, 185, 204, & 208; Kahn, David. The Codebreakers (Macmillan, 1967); Young, p.7.
  13. ↑ Young, pp.8-9.
  14. ↑ Stinnett, pp.52 & 305.
  15. ↑ Young, p.9.
  16. 1 2 Young, p.14.
  17. 1 2 3 4 Young, p.15.
  18. ↑ Prange et al.At Dawn We Slept? December 7th, 1941?
  19. ↑ Young, pp.10-11; Stinnett, passim.
  20. ↑ Young, p.11.
  21. ↑ Kahn, David (2014). How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code. CRC Press. pp. 23–25. ISBN   9781466561991 . Retrieved 14 August 2016.
  22. ↑ Prange et al., At Dawn We Slept, p.861.
  23. 1 2 3 4 Haughler, Hervie. Codebreaker's Victory, p. 156. New American Library, 2003
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.