Duty of confidentiality

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In common law jurisdictions, the duty of confidentiality obliges solicitors (or attorneys) to respect the confidentiality of their clients' affairs. Information that solicitors obtain about their clients' affairs may be confidential, and must not be used for the benefit of persons not authorized by the client. Confidentiality is a prerequisite for legal professional privilege to hold.

Contents

The duty and its source

The lawyer-client relationship has historically been characterised as one of confidence. This duty also constitutes part of the broader foundation for lawyer's fiduciary duties to their clients.

Rationales for the duty

The maintenance of full and frank disclosure between lawyers and their clients is the main justification for the duty of confidentiality. The basis for this rationale is utilitarianism, in that it works to promote the work of solicitors, who are officers of the court. It allows clients to freely discuss intimate details without fear that such information could be subsequently disclosed to the general public. In turn, public confidence in lawyers and the legal system is maintained and promoted. Further, the duty of confidentiality is a constant reminder to lawyers of the loyalty they owe to their clients.

Another rationale is to protect the human dignity of the client.

In criminal cases, confidentiality is also justified to prevent the use of tricked confessions or admissions.

Source of the duty

The duty is sourced from a combination of contract law and equity arising from the distinctive relationship between lawyer and client. The solicitor or attorney is an agent of the client under the law of agency. In contract, the duty arises from terms contained in the retainer agreement. Complementarily, equity prohibits unauthorised use or disclosure of confidential information. In most jurisdictions, the duty is codified in the terms of legal professional rules, such as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.

Although the duty of confidentiality and fiduciary duties have common origins, they cannot be equated as not all fiduciary duties attract duties of confidentiality and vice versa.

Scope of the duty

In contract

As the lawyer-client duty of confidentiality is primarily sourced in contract law, the wording of implied terms in the retainer agreement determines its scope of operation. Despite its importance, there have been few judicial attempts to resolve the extent of the implied term.

In equity

In equity, protection is attached to information that is capable of meeting the test of confidentiality - whether the information was already public knowledge and whether its communication was for a limited purpose. While this test may indicate a more limited scope of confidentiality under equity, by requiring information to be deemed confidential before falling under the scope, on another level equity may secure a broader temporal protection for confidential information. The duty under contract expires on termination of the legal retainer, whereas the duty under equity remains intact until the information is no longer confidential, which may occur long after the expiration of the contractual retainer.

In professional rules

Legal professional rules have tended to adopt the broad view of the scope of duty recognised in contract law. The obligation to retain information in confidence, according to the professional rules in Australian jurisdictions is premised on its connection with the legal retainer rather than the source of the information. Hence, the professional rules seem to imply that information gained in connection with the legal retainer is deemed confidential. However, though the rules emphasise the importance of the duty of confidentiality, this is not a hard rule. Not all information connected with the retainer meets the legal test of confidentiality. The duty of confidence applies to "any information, which is confidential to a client and acquired by [a] practitioner or [a] practitioner's firm during the client's engagement." For barristers, it is "confidential information obtained by [a] barrister concerning any person."

Though the duty of confidentiality shares a common origin, goals, and similarities with legal professional privilege, they are distinct in at least three ways. Firstly, privilege is not dependent on a contractual, equitable or professional duty to clients. Rather, it is based upon arguments of public policy. Secondly, communications protected by confidentiality are more numerous than those protected by privilege. Privileged communications are a subset of confidential communication. Nonetheless, loss of privilege does not necessarily automatically destroy the duty to confidentiality if it has arisen independently of the privilege. Finally, privileged information is protected from compulsory disclosure, unless abrogated by statute or waived. Non-privileged confidential information on the other hand must be disclosed to judicial, statutory, or other legal compulsion. In particular, the public interest in discovering the truth trumps private duties to respect confidence.

Limits and exceptions to the duty

Though the duty to confidentiality is often expressed in absolute terms in professional rules, there are circumstances where the duty can be breached. The breach of the duty in certain contexts is justified through the balancing of the often competing interests of the client and proper administration of justice

Client authorization

As lawyer-client confidentiality exists for the benefit of the client, the confidence is the client's to waive or modify. Hence, the lawyer can reveal confidential information to third parties where the client allows such an action. However, consent to allow the disclosure of confidential information does not entitle the lawyer to disclose or use the information for other purposes than those specified by the client.

The authorization does not necessarily have to be explicit. It can be inferred from the terms or nature of the retainer agreement. The idea that all information imparted within a retainer is confidential is impracticable. Often, much of that information is communicated so that it can be disclosed to dispose of a matter, claim, or legal issue. Hence, where information is incidental to the conduct of a retainer, client authorisation can be generally taken as given. Nonetheless, where there is uncertainty, express authority should be sought from the client.

Disclosure compelled by law

Where expressly provided for in statute, lawyers must comply with any parliamentary requirement necessitating breach of the duty to confidentiality. Lord Denning in Parry-Jones v Law Society [1] said at 6-7:

"the solicitor must obey the law, and, in particular, he must comply with the rules made under the authority of statute for the conduct of the profession. If the rules require him to disclose his client's affairs, then he must do so."

Statutory abrogation of the duty is limited in scope and purpose however. Requirements are never blanket decrees for the revelation of confidential information. Rather they are based on upholding the public interest, where such interests override client interests in maintaining confidentiality.

Disclosure ostensibly to support lawyer's own interests

Lawyers may disclose confidential information relating to the retainer where they are reasonably seeking to collect payment for services rendered. This is justified on policy grounds. If lawyers were unable to disclose such information, many would undertake legal work only where payment is made in advance. This would arguably adversely affect the public's access to justice.

Lawyers may also breach the duty where they are defending themselves against disciplinary or legal proceedings. A client who initiates proceedings against a lawyer effectively waives rights to confidentiality. This is justified on grounds of procedural fairness - a lawyer unable to reveal information relating to the retainer would be unable to defend themselves against such actions.

Disclosure of information that is not confidential

Clearly, information that is not confidential does not fall under the duty of confidentiality. Disclosure of information that is already in the public domain does not breach the duty. Further, information that was not in the public knowledge at the time of the retainer agreement, is not subject to the duty if it subsequently enters the public domain. The purpose served by maintaining the confidence - the protection of the client - is arguably extinguished.

Nonetheless, the lawyer still owes a duty of loyalty, and clients may feel betrayed if such information is disclosed, even if it becomes public knowledge. Though there are no legal ramifications for disclosure, discretion on part of the lawyer may be in the long term interests of maintaining the propriety of the legal profession.

Disclosure for the purpose of probate

Another case is for the probate of a last will and testament. Previously confidential communications between the lawyer and testator are no longer secret for the purpose of proving the Will is the intent of the now deceased decedent. In many instances, the will, codicil, or other parts of the estate plan require explanation or interpretation through other proof (extrinsic evidence), such as the attorney's file notes or correspondence from the client.

In certain cases, the client may desire or consent to revelation of personal or family secrets only after his or her death; for example, the Will may leave a legacy to a paramour or a natural child.

Related Research Articles

Non-disclosure agreement Contractual agreement not to disclose specified information

A non-disclosure agreement (NDA), also known as a confidentiality agreement (CA), confidential disclosure agreement (CDA), proprietary information agreement (PIA) or secrecy agreement (SA), is a legal contract or part of a contract between at least two parties that outlines confidential material, knowledge, or information that the parties wish to share with one another for certain purposes, but wish to restrict access to. Doctor–patient confidentiality, attorney–client privilege, priest–penitent privilege, bank–client confidentiality, and kickback agreements are examples of NDAs, which are often not enshrined in a written contract between the parties.

A conflict of interest (COI) is a situation in which a person or organization is involved in multiple interests, financial or otherwise, and serving one interest could involve working against another. Typically, this relates to situations in which the personal interest of an individual or organization might adversely affect a duty owed to make decisions for the benefit of a third party.

Attorney–client privilege or lawyer–client privilege is the name given to the common law concept of legal professional privilege in the United States. Attorney-client privilege is "[a] client's right to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications between the client and the attorney."

Confidentiality involves a set of rules or a promise usually executed through confidentiality agreements that limits access or places restrictions on certain types of information.

In law, a settlement is a resolution between disputing parties about a legal case, reached either before or after court action begins. The term "settlement" also has other meanings in the context of law. Structured settlements provide for future periodic payments, instead of a one time cash payment.

Fiduciary

A fiduciary is a person who holds a legal or ethical relationship of trust with one or more other parties. Typically, a fiduciary prudently takes care of money or other assets for another person. One party, for example, a corporate trust company or the trust department of a bank, acts in a fiduciary capacity to another party, who, for example, has entrusted funds to the fiduciary for safekeeping or investment. Likewise, financial advisers, financial planners, and asset managers, including managers of pension plans, endowments, and other tax-exempt assets, are considered fiduciaries under applicable statutes and laws. In a fiduciary relationship, one person, in a position of vulnerability, justifiably vests confidence, good faith, reliance, and trust in another whose aid, advice, or protection is sought in some matter. In such a relation good conscience requires the fiduciary to act at all times for the sole benefit and interest of the one who trusts.

A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.

Accountant–client privilege is a confidentiality privilege, or more precisely, a group of privileges, available in American federal and state law. Accountant–client privileges may be classified in two categories: evidentiary privileges and non-evidentiary privileges.

The clergy–penitent privilege, clergy privilege, confessional privilege, priest–penitent privilege, clergyman–communicant privilege, or ecclesiastical privilege is a rule of evidence that forbids judicial inquiry into certain communications between clergy and members of their congregation. The law recognises certain communication as privileged and not subject to otherwise obligatory disclosure; for example, this often applies to communications between lawyers and clients. In many jurisdictions certain communications between a member of the clergy of some or all religious faiths and a person consulting them in confidence are privileged in law. In particular, Catholics are required to confess sins to priests, who are unconditionally forbidden by Church canon law from making any disclosure, a position supported by the law of many countries, although in conflict with civil (secular) law in some jurisdictions. It is a distinct concept from that of confidentiality.

In common law jurisdictions, legal professional privilege protects all communications between a professional legal adviser and his or her clients from being disclosed without the permission of the client. The privilege is that of the client and not that of the lawyer.

The doctrine of priest–penitent privilege does not appear to apply in English law. The orthodox view is that under the law of England and Wales privileged communication exists only in the context of legal advice obtained from a professional adviser. A statement of the law on priest–penitent privilege is contained in the nineteenth century case of Wheeler v. Le Marchant:

In the first place, the principle protecting confidential communications is of a very limited character. ... There are many communications, which, though absolutely necessary because without them the ordinary business of life cannot be carried on, still are not privileged. ... Communications made to a priest in the confessional on matters perhaps considered by the penitent to be more important than his life or his fortune, are not protected.

In Australia, legal professional privilege is a rule of law protecting communications between legal practitioners and their clients from disclosure under compulsion of court or statute. While the rule of legal professional privilege in Australia largely mirrors that of other Commonwealth jurisdictions, there are a number of notable qualifications and modifications to the privilege specific to Australia and its states, and contentious issues about the direction of the privilege.

Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1996] EWCA Civ 533 is a leading English fiduciary law and professional negligence case, concerning a solicitor's duty of care and skill, and the nature of fiduciary duties. The case is globally cited for its definition of a fiduciary and the circumstances in which a fiduciary relationship arises.

In England and Wales, the principle of legal professional privilege has long been recognised by the common law. It is seen as a fundamental principle of justice, and grants a protection from disclosing evidence. It is a right that attaches to the client and so may only be waived by the client.

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Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd is a leading Supreme Court of Canada decision on the nature of fiduciary and confidential relationships that can be created in the course of business, together with appropriate remedies for restitution when such relationships are breached.

<i>Attorney General v Blake</i> English contract law case on damages for breach of contract

Attorney General v Blake[2000] UKHL 45, [2001] 1 AC 268 is a leading English contract law case on damages for breach of contract. It established that in some circumstances, where ordinary remedies are inadequate, restitutionary damages may be awarded.

The Buried Bodies Case, also known as the Lake Pleasant Bodies Case, is a mid-1970s upstate New York court case where defense attorneys Frank H. Armani and Francis Belge kept secret the location of the bodies of two women murdered by their client, Robert Garrow, Sr.

<i>Peskin v Anderson</i>

Peskin v Anderson [2000] EWCA Civ 326 is a UK company law case concerning directors' duties under English law.

The joint defense privilege, or common-interest rule, is an extension of the attorney–client privilege. Under “common interest” or “joint defense” doctrine, parties with shared interest in actual or potential litigation against a common adversary may share privileged information without waiving their right to assert attorney–client privilege. Because the joint defense "privilege sometimes may apply outside the context of actual litigation, what the parties call a ‘joint defense’ privilege is more aptly termed the ‘common interest’ rule.”

<i>Canadian National Railway Co v McKercher LLP</i>

Canadian National Railway Co v McKercher LLP is a significant case of the Supreme Court of Canada that consolidated Canadian jurisprudence on conflicts of interest in the legal profession.

Evidence Act 2006

The Evidence Act 2006 is an Act of the Parliament of New Zealand that codifies the laws of evidence. When enacted, the Act drew together the common law and statutory provisions relating to evidence into one comprehensive scheme, replacing most of the previous evidence law on the admissibility and use of evidence in court proceedings.

References

Footnotes

  1. Parry-Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1

See also