Dying to Win

Last updated
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism
Dying to Win cover.jpg
Author Robert Pape
Publisher Random House
Publication date
2005
Pages352
ISBN 1-4000-6317-5

Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism is Robert Pape's analysis of suicide terrorism from a strategic, social, and psychological point of view. It is based on a database he has compiled at the University of Chicago, where he directs the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST). The book's conclusions are based on data from 315 suicide terrorism attacks around the world from 1980 through 2003. Of these, 301 were classified into 18 different campaigns by 11 different militant groups; the remaining 14 appear to have been isolated. Published in May 2005, Pape's volume has been widely noticed by the press, the public, and policymakers alike, and has earned praise from the likes of Peter Bergen, Congressman Ron Paul (R-Texas), [1] and Michael Scheuer. [2]

Contents

Dying to Win is divided into three parts, analyzing the strategic, social, and psychological dimension of suicide terrorism.

Detailed synopsis

Introduction

Chapter 1: The Growing Threat

Pape claims to have compiled the world's first "database of every suicide bombing and attack around the globe from 1980 through 2003—315 attacks in all" (3). "The data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world's religions. ... Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland" (4). It is important that Americans understand this growing phenomenon (4–7).

Chapter 2: Explaining Suicide Terrorism

Caveat: the book's conclusions do not hold for terrorism in general (8–9). Pape distinguishes among demonstrative terrorism, which seeks publicity, destructive terrorism, which seeks to exert coercion through the threat of injury and death as well as to mobilize support, and suicide terrorism, which involves an attacker's actually killing himself or herself along with others, generally as part of a campaign (9–11). Three historical episodes are introduced for purposes of comparison: the ancient Jewish Zealots (11–12; see also 33–34), the 11th-12th-century Ismaili Assassins (12–13; see also 34–35), and the Japanese kamikazes (13; see also 35–37).

Pape had graduate students fluent in many languages scour the international press for incidents of suicide terrorism. There was no suicide terrorism from 1945 to 1980 (13–14). They found 315 incidents, beginning with the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing (14). They were able to classify all but 14 of the incidents into 18 different campaigns by 10 different organizations of predominantly Muslim, Hindu or Sikh religious persuasion. These included the Tamil Tigers (July 1990), the Israeli occupation of Palestine (1994), Persian Gulf (1995), Turkey (1996), Chechnya (2000), Kashmir (2000), and the U.S. (2001) (14–15). Five campaigns were still ongoing in early 2004, when Dying to Win was being written (15–16).

Traditional explanations for suicide terrorism focus on individual motives, but fail to explain the specificity of suicide terrorism (16–17). Economic explanation of this phenomenon yields "poor" results (17–19). Explanation of suicide terrorism as a form of competition between radical groups is dubious (19–20).

Pape proposes an alternative explanation of the "causal logic of suicide terrorism": at the strategic level, suicide terrorism exerts coercive power against democratic states to cease occupation of territory terrorists consider homeland, while at the social level it depends on mass support and at the individual level it is motivated by altruism (20–23). All 18 campaigns shared two elements: (1) a foreign occupation (2) by a democracy. Only one of the 10 groups shared a religion with the occupiers: the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey. "The bottom line, then, is that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation" (23).

Part I: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism

Chapter 3: A Strategy for Weak Actors

The willingness of an attacker to die has strategic value (27–29). As a weapon of weak groups incapable of "denial" as a "coercive strategy," suicide terrorism relies on punishment and, especially, "the expectation of future damage," which provides coercive leverage (29–33).

Chapter 4: Targeting Democracies

Pape claims that his research reveals that the key to understanding the phenomenon of suicide attacks is not religion, but that they "compel democracies to withdraw military forces from the terrorists' national homeland" (38). Patterns of timing (39–41), nationalist goals (42–44), and the targeting of democracies (44–45) reveal its logical, not irrational, nature. "At bottom, suicide terrorism is a strategy for national liberation from foreign military occupation by a democratic state" (45). Foreign occupation is defined in terms of control of territory (not military occupation alone) (46). The targets selected by suicide terrorists suggests nationalist, not religious, aims (46–47). Hamas (47–51) and Al-Qaeda (51–58) are analyzed in some detail. In general, the harshness of occupation does not strongly correlate with suicide terrorism (58–60).

Chapter 5: Learning Terrorism Pays

Terrorists are predisposed to attribute success to their technique whenever plausible (62–64). Pape claims that "recent suicide terrorist campaigns ... are associated with gains for the terrorists' political causes about half the time" (64–65). Hamas's success is difficult to evaluate, but Hamas spokespersons express belief in their own success (65–73). Terrorists learn from each other; the spread of the method is therefore neither irrational nor surprising (73–75). But suicide terrorism has failed "to compel target democracies to abandon goals central to national wealth or security" (75–76).

Part II: The Social Logic of Suicide Terrorism

Chapter 6: Occupation and Religious Difference

"[T]he taproot of suicide terrorism is nationalism" not religion (79). It is "an extreme strategy for national liberation" (80). This explains how the local community can be persuaded to re-define acts of suicide and murder as acts of martyrdom on behalf of the community (81–83). Pape proposes a nationalist theory of suicide terrorism, seen from the point of view of terrorists. He analyzes the notions of occupation (83–84), homeland (84–85), identity (85–87), religious difference as a contributor to a sense of "alien" occupation (87–88), foreign occupation reverses the relative importance of religion and language (88–92), and the widespread perception of the method as a "last resort" (92–94). A statistical demonstration leads to the conclusion that a "linear" rather than "self-reinforcing spiral" explanation of suicide terrorism is best (94–100). However, different future developments of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism are very possible, and more study of the role of religion is needed (101).

Chapter 7: Demystifying al-Qaeda

With increasing knowledge of al-Qaeda, we see that "the presence of American military forces for combat operations on the homeland territory of the suicide terrorists is stronger than Islamic fundamentalism in predicting whether individuals from that country will become al-Qaeda suicide terrorists" (103). "Al-Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues ... than a cross-national military alliance of national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat" (104). The nature of Salafism, a Sunni form of Islamic fundamentalism, is complex (105–07). Statistical analysis fails to corroborate Salafism-terrorism connection, but it does corroborate a connection to U.S. military policies in the Persian Gulf (107–17). Al-Qaeda propaganda emphasizes the "Crusader" theme, which is inherently related to occupation (117–24). Pape concludes that "the core features of al-Qaeda" are captured by his theory (125).

Chapter 8: Suicide Terrorist Organizations around the Globe

Robert Pape examines other campaigns to see if the "dynamics that make religious difference important" are present in other terrorist campaigns, acknowledging the difficulty of the inquiry (126–29). He offers detailed analyses of Lebanon (129–39), Sri Lanka (139–54), the Sikhs in Punjab (154–62), and the Kurdish PKK in Turkey (162–66). His conclusion: "Religion plays a role in suicide terrorism, but mainly in the context of national resistance" and not Islam per se but "the dynamics of religious difference" are what matter (166–67).

Part III: The Individual Logic of Suicide Terrorism

Chapter 9: Altruism and Terrorism

Pape presents a Durkheimian analysis of suicide (173–79). "Many acts of suicide terrorism are a murderous form of what Durkheim calls altruistic suicide" (179). Analytical difficulties are acknowledged (180–81). Pape uses suicide rates in general as points of comparison (181–84). Team suicide, which is frequent in suicide terrorism, is an indicator of altruistic suicide, he argues (185–87). Altruistic suicide is a socially constructed phenomenon (187–88): e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon (188–91), Hamas (191–93), Tamil Tigers (193–95); al-Qaeda (195–96). The altruistic nature of suicide terrorism suggests the number of potential terrorists is large, that suicide terrorism is capable of growing in attractiveness and appeal, and that any attempt at profiling will miss a substantial number of potential suicide terrorists (197–98).

Chapter 10: The Demographic Profile of Suicide Terrorists

"In general, suicide attackers are rarely socially isolated, clinically insane, or economically destitute individuals, but are most often educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people who could be expected to have a good future" (200). Pape discusses problems of data-gathering (201–02). He establishes 462 individuals in his "universe" of suicide terrorists available for analytical purposes (203). Hezbollah suicide bombers in the period 1982–1986 were 71% Communist/Socialist, 21% Islamist, 8% Christian (204–07). In general, suicide terrorists are in their early 20s (207–08). Females are fewer in Islamist groups: "Islamist fundamentalism may actually reduce the number of suicide terrorists by discouraging certain categories of individuals" (208–09). Female suicide terrorists tend to be older than male (209–10). There is no documented mental illness in any case of suicide terrorism, though there are 16 cases of personal trauma (e.g., the loss of a loved one) (210–11). Arab suicide terrorists are in general better educated than average and are from the working or middle classes (211–16). "[T]hey resemble the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots movement more than they do wayward adolescents or religious fanatics" (216).

Chapter 11: Portraits of Three Suicide Terrorists

Earlier work has tended to emphasize suicide terrorists' irrationality, but this generalization fit 1980s data better than more recent data (217–20). Pape looks at three individual cases: Mohamed Atta (220–26); Dhanu, a young woman from Jaffna, "the most famous Tamil Tiger suicide bomber" (226–30); and Saeed Hotari, of Hamas (231–34).

Conclusion

Chapter 12: A New Strategy for Victory

Though "we" cannot leave the Middle East altogether, Pape asserts, a "strategy for victory" is available (237–38). U.S. should define victory as the separate objectives of "defeating the current pool of terrorists" and preventing a new generation from arising (238–39). He rejects Frum-Perle view that the root of the problem is in Islam (241–44). "Rather, the taproot is American military policy" (244). The notion that Islamic fundamentalism is bent on world domination is "pure fantasy" (244–45). An attempt by the West to force Muslim societies to transform "is likely to dramatically increase the threat we face" (245). He calls for a policy of "'off-shore' balancing": establishing local alliances while maintaining the capacity for rapid deployment of military forces (247–50).

Appendices

Appendix I: Suicide Terrorist Campaigns, 1980–2003

Analysis of 18 campaigns.

Appendix II: Occupations by Democratic States, 1980–2003

Fifty-eight occupations by democratic states are listed (265–67).

Appendix III: Salafism in Major Sunni Muslim Majority Countries

Thirty-four countries with Sunni majority populations of 1 m or more and the importance of Salafism in these countries are the subjects of brief commentaries. Salafism is defined as "the belief that society should be organized according to the Quran and Sunna only" (269). Sunni Countries with Salafi-Influenced Populations: Afghanistan (10 m Pashtuns); Algeria (19 m/31m Sunni Muslims); Bangladesh (14 m/114m); Egypt (23 m/62m); Indonesia (26 m/185m); Jordan (2 m/6m); Nigeria (37 m/68m); Oman (2 m/2m); Pakistan (43 m/149m); Saudi Arabia (18 m/18m); Somalia (5 m/10m); Sudan (21 m/21m); Tunisia (5 m/10m); Yemen (8 m/11m) (270–74). Non-Salafi Sunni Countries: Albania, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (274–77).

Critiques

In a criticism of Pape's link between occupation and suicide terrorism, an article titled "Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" (published in The American Political Science Review), authors Scott Ashworth, Joshua D. Clinton, Adam Meirowitz, and Kristopher W. Ramsay from Princeton charge Pape with "sampling on the dependent variable" by limiting research only to cases in which suicide terror was used: [3] Pape's analysis has no control group. Appendix II lists 58 occupations by democracies, only 9 of which generated suicide terrorism. An analysis explaining the difference between the 9 with suicide terrorism and the 49 without is lacking.

In response, Pape argues that his research design is sufficient because it collected the universe of known cases of suicide terrorism. [4] In a rejoinder, Ashworth et al. discuss how even large samples of the dependent variable cannot be used to explain variation in outcomes, why suicide terrorism in some places but not others, if the sample does not vary. [5]

In a debate hosted by the Washington Institute, Martin Kramer argued that Pape's thesis was less relevant to Al Qaeda than to Lebanon and Palestine and that there were only 12,000 American troops in Saudi Arabia in 2001 and they had not caused any deaths. [6] In response Pape argued that "The U.S.-led war on terrorism is going badly because it is being waged on a faulty premise. That premise is that suicide terrorism is mainly a product of Islamic fundamentalism." [7]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Al-Qaeda</span> Pan-Islamic Sunni Jihadist terrorist organization (established 1988)

Al-Qaeda is a pan-Islamist militant organization led by Sunni Jihadists who self-identify as a vanguard spearheading a global Islamist revolution to unite the Muslim world under a supra-national Islamic caliphate. Its membership is mostly composed of Arabs, but also includes people from other ethnic groups. Al-Qaeda has mounted attacks on civilian, economic and military targets of the US and its allies; such as the 1998 US embassy bombings, the USS Cole bombing and the September 11 attacks. The organization is designated as a terrorist group by NATO, the UN Security Council, the European Union, and various countries around the world.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Terrorism</span> Use of violence against non-combatants to achieve aims.

Terrorism, in its broadest sense, is the use of violence against non-combatants to achieve political or ideological aims. The term is used in this regard primarily to refer to intentional violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants. There are various different definitions of terrorism, with no universal agreement about it. Different definitions of terrorism emphasize its randomness, its aim to instill fear, and its broader impact beyond its immediate victims.

Islamic fundamentalism has been defined as a revivalist and reform movement of Muslims who aim to return to the founding scriptures of Islam. The term has been used interchangeably with similar terms such as Islamism, Islamic revivalism, Qutbism, Islamic activism, but also criticized as pejorative, a term used by outsiders who instead ought to be using more positive terms such as Islamic activism or Islamic revivalism.

Religious terrorism is a type of religious violence where terrorism is used as a strategy to achieve certain religious goals or which are influenced by religious beliefs and/or identity.

Islamic terrorism refers to terrorist acts with religious motivations carried out by fundamentalist militant Islamists and Islamic extremists.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Robert Pape</span> American political scientist

Robert Anthony Pape Jr. is an American political scientist who studies national and international security affairs, with a focus on air power, American and international political violence, social media propaganda, and terrorism. He is currently a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and founder and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST).

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sociology of terrorism</span> Academic field that seeks to understand terrorism

Sociology of terrorism is a field of sociology that seeks to understand terrorism as a social phenomenon. The field defines terrorism, studies why it occurs and evaluates its impacts on society. The sociology of terrorism draws from the fields of political science, history, economics and psychology. The sociology of terrorism differs from critical terrorism studies, emphasizing the social conditions that enable terrorism. It also studies how individuals as well as states respond to such events.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Jihadism</span> Islamist movements for jihad

Jihadism is a neologism for militant Islamic movements that are perceived as existentially threatening to the West. It is a form of religious violence and has been applied to various insurgent Islamic extremist, militant Islamist, and terrorist individuals and organizations whose ideologies are based on the Islamic notion of lesser jihad from the classical interpretation of Islam. It has also been applied to various Islamic empires in history, such as the Rashidun and Umayyad caliphates of the early Muslim conquests, and the Ottoman Empire, who extensively campaigned against non-Muslim nations in the name of jihad.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islamic extremism</span> Extreme or radical form of Islam

Islamic extremism, Islamist extremism or radical Islam refers a set of extremist beliefs, behaviors and ideology within Islam. These terms remain contentious, encompassing a spectrum of definitions, ranging from academic interpretations to the notion that all ideologies other than Islam have failed and are inferior. Furthermore, these terms may extend to encompass other sects of Islam that do not share such extremist views.

Istishhad is the Arabic word for "martyrdom", "death of a martyr", or "heroic death". Martyrs are given the honorific shaheed. The word derives from the root shahida, meaning "to witness". Traditionally martyrdom has an exalted place in Islam. It is widely believed among Muslims that the sins of believers who "die in the way of God" will be forgiven by Allah. Shia views on martyrdom have been profoundly influenced by internal Muslim conflicts, notably Husayn ibn Ali's martyrdom at Karbala in 680, shaping it as a central belief and practice.

Globalization has been internalized in Arabic as awlaama (العولمة) and refers to the spread throughout the globe of ideas, customs, institutions, and attitudes originated in one part of the world which are usually Western in origin. For this reason it has often been perceived as largely equivalent to Westernization and is still widely regarded as an external threat rather than as an opportunity. In the Middle East the decade of globalization was marked by endless wars, intrusive US hegemony, renewed economic dependency and continuing insecurity. Globalization was ushered into the Middle East by a war which gave the Western victors excessive power over the region and created a violent anti-globalization struggle. As some authors argue, it has strengthened Islamic fundamentalism and, due to its ambiguity created a contradictory and tension filled situation. Globalization thus often acted as an obstacle rather than an impetus to democratization.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Suicide attack</span> Violent attack in which the attacker accepts their own death

A suicide attack is a deliberate attack in which the perpetrators knowingly sacrifice their own lives as part of the attack. These attacks are often associated with terrorism or military conflicts and are considered a form of murder–suicide. Suicide attacks involving explosives are commonly referred to as suicide bombings. In the context of terrorism, they are also commonly referred to as suicide terrorism. While generally not inherently regulated under international law, suicide attacks in their execution often violate international laws of war, such as prohibitions against perfidy and targeting civilians.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Salafi jihadism</span> Transnational Sunni Islamist religious-political ideology

Salafi jihadism, also known as revolutionary Salafism or jihadist Salafism, is a religious-political Sunni Islamist ideology that seeks to establish a global caliphate, characterized by the advocacy of "physical" (military) jihadist attacks on non-Muslim targets. The Salafist interpretation of sacred Islamic texts is "in their most literal, traditional sense", which adherents claim will bring about the return to "true Islam".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Motives for the September 11 attacks</span> Motivations for terror attacks

The September 11 attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers of the Islamist militant organization al-Qaeda. In the 1990s, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden declared a holy war against the United States of America, and issued two fatāwā in 1996 and 1998. In the 1996 fatwā, he quoted the Sword Verse. In both of these fatāwā, bin Laden sharply criticized the financial contributions of the American government to the Saudi royal family as well as American military intervention in the Arab world.

Eli Berman is the Research Director for International Security Studies at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and since 2010 a Professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego. He is known for his work applying rational choice analysis to the behavior of radical religious groups.

Islamic extremism in the United States comprises all forms of Islamic extremism occurring within the United States. Islamic extremism is an adherence to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, potentially including the promotion of violence to achieve political goals. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, Islamic extremism became a prioritized national security concern of the U.S. government and a focus of many subsidiary security and law enforcement entities. Initially, the focus of concern was on foreign Islamic terrorist organizations, particularly al-Qaeda, but in the course of the years since the September 11 terror attacks, the focus has shifted more towards Islamic extremist radicalized individuals and jihadist networks within the United States.

The fight against terrorisminAzerbaijan is one of Azerbaijan's declared priorities. International organizations banned as terrorist include Al Qaeda, Al-Nusra Front, Jamaat, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Islamic International Brigade, ISIS, Jeyshullah, and PKK. According to the Global Terrorism Database, seven people have been killed and over 20 injured in terrorist attacks from 2000 to 2015.

The ideology of the Islamic State, sometimes called Islamic Statism, has been described as being a hybrid of Salafism, Salafi jihadism, Sunni Islamist fundamentalism, Wahhabism, and Qutbism. Through its official statement of beliefs originally released by its first leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2007 and subsequently updated since June 2014, the Islamic State defined its creed as "a middle way between the extremist Kharijites and the lax Murji'ites".

The 2005 Erbil bombing was a suicide attack on the offices of Kurdish political parties in Erbil, Kurdistan Region, on May 4, 2005. The attacker detonated explosives strapped to his body as people lined up outside a police recruiting center in Erbil. Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility. This attack is an example of religious terrorism, groups who commit terrorist acts because of religion believe that their deity or deities are on their side and that their violence is divinely inspired and approved. This attack is also an example of Strategic terrorism. Which is a form of terrorism where the terrorist plans to inflict mass casualties. The goals of Strategic terrorism are normally not local objectives but global objectives or regional objectives. Ansar al-Sunna's goal is to transform the country of Iraq into an Islamic state so their goals are regional.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">International propagation of Salafism</span>

Starting in the mid-1970s and 1980s, Salafism and Wahhabism — along with other Sunni interpretations of Islam favored by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies — achieved a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."

References

  1. Paul, Ron (2005-07-14) Suicide Terrorism, LewRockwell.com
  2. Scheuer, Michael (2005-06-10) Throwing America a Life Preserver, AntiWar.com
  3. American Political Science Review , Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 269-273.
  4. American Political Science Review , Volume 102, Issue 02, May 2008, pp 275-277.
  5. Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism: A Rejoinder, https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/rejoinder3.pdf
  6. Kramer, Martin (November 8, 2005). "Suicide Terrorism in the Middle East: Origins and Response (Prepared Remarks)". Washington Institute. Retrieved Jun 10, 2016.
  7. Pape, Robert (November 16, 2005). "Suicide Terrorism in the Middle East: Origins and Response". Washington Institute. Retrieved Jun 10, 2016.