Erskine Agreement

The Erskine Agreement was a brief and ultimately unsuccessful diplomatic arrangement reached in April 1809 between David Erskine, the British ambassador to the United States, and James Madison, the United States Secretary of State, during a period of increasing Anglo-American tensions that preceded the War of 1812. ^[1]

Background

The agreement arose from disputes over British naval practices, particularly the impressment of sailors from American ships and trade restrictions imposed under Britain's 1807 Orders in Council during the Napoleonic Wars. ^[2] These measures, combined with the 1807 Chesapeake–Leopard affair, had led the United States to adopt the Embargo Act of 1807, which severely damaged American commerce, while failing to coerce Britain. ^[3]

Erskine Agreement

Seeking to restore trade and defuse tensions, Erskine negotiated terms under which Britain would suspend the application of the Orders in Council against the United States, while the U.S. would reopen trade with Britain and lift its non-intercourse restrictions. ^[4] Madison accepted the agreement and publicly proclaimed renewed trade, briefly improving relations. ^[5] However, the Portland ministry soon repudiated the arrangement, asserting that Erskine had exceeded his authority and that the concessions were unauthorized. ^[6] The ministry reinstated the Orders in Council, recalled Erskine and effectively reversed the diplomatic progress. ^[7] The collapse of the Erskine Agreement deeply embarrassed the Madison administration and reinforced American perceptions that Britain was negotiating in bad faith. ^[8] Although the agreement itself did not cause the War of 1812, its failure was a significant step in the diplomatic breakdown between Britain and the United States, strengthening the arguments of American "war hawks" and contributing to the growing conviction that peaceful negotiation could not secure U.S. neutral rights, thereby helping to set the stage for war in 1812. ^[9]

See also

• Origins of the War of 1812

References

1. (Perkins 1961, pp. 262–265; Hickey 1989, pp. 47–48)
2. (Bemis 1965, pp. 204–206)
3. (Hickey 1989, pp. 35–38; Perkins 1961, pp. 228–233)
4. (Perkins 1961, pp. 265–267)
5. (Bemis 1965, p. 206)
6. (Perkins 1961, pp. 267–269)
7. (Hickey 1989, p. 48)
8. (Taylor 2010, pp. 121–123)
9. (Hickey 1989, pp. 49–50; Perkins 1961, p. 270)

Bibliography

• Bemis, Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United States. 5th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.
• Hickey, Donald R. The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989.
• Perkins, Bradford. Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805–1812. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.
• Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010.