Background
The case concerned the constitutionality of a Connecticut state statute, which provided, "[n]o person who states that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds for his dismissal."
Donald E. Thornton began working as a store department manager for Caldor, Inc., a chain of retail stores, in 1975. At that time, Connecticut's blue laws required retail stores to close on Sunday, but the law was changed in 1977. As a result, Caldor required Thornton to work one Sunday out of each four. Thornton complied for several months but in 1978, he advised Caldor that he observed Sunday as his Sabbath and would no longer work on Sundays. Caldor told Thornton that it could not accommodate his unwillingness to work Sundays in his current job. It offered either to transfer him to a comparable management job at a store in Massachusetts that was closed on Sunday, or to transfer him to a non-management position in his current store at a lower salary. Although Thornton did not accept either suggestion, in 1980 Caldor transferred Thornton to a clerical position that was not assigned to work Sundays.
Thornton resigned and filed a complaint with a Connecticut state agency, asserting that Caldor had illegally discharged him for refusing to work on his Sabbath. Caldor responded that Thornton had not been "discharged" for purposes of the statute, and also contended that the statute was unconstitutional under the religion clauses of the United States and Connecticut Constitutions.
The agency sided with Thornton, ordering Caldor to reinstate Thornton to his prior position with back pay and benefits, and the Connecticut Superior Court affirmed the agency's determination. On appeal, however, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the statute lacked a "clear secular purpose" and its "primary effect" was to confer a religious benefit, it was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Thornton sought review by the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. While the case was pending, Thornton died, and his estate was substituted as a party. At argument, Thornton's estate was represented by Nathan Lewin, and Caldor by Paul Gewirtz.
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
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