Everson v. Board of Education | |
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Argued November 20, 1946 Decided February 10, 1947 | |
Full case name | Arch R. Everson v Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, et al. |
Citations | 330 U.S. 1 ( more ) |
Case history | |
Prior | Everson sued as a school district taxpayer, judgment for plaintiff, 132 N.J.L. 98, 39 A.2d 75; New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed, 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333, cert. granted. |
Subsequent | Rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 855(1947). |
Holding | |
(1) The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (2) New Jersey law providing public payment of the costs of transportation to and from parochial Catholic schools is not in violation of the Establishment Clause. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Black, joined by Vinson, Reed, Douglas, Murphy |
Dissent | Jackson, joined by Frankfurter |
Dissent | Rutledge, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV |
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that applied the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to state law. [1] Before this decision, the clause, which states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion", [2] restricted only the federal government, while many states continued to grant certain religious denominations legislative or effective privileges. [3]
It was the first Supreme Court case incorporating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as binding upon the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A New Jersey taxpayer brought the case against a tax-funded school district that provided reimbursement to parents of both public and private school students who took public transportation to school. The taxpayer contended that reimbursement for children attending private religious schools violated the constitutional prohibition against state support of religion, and the use of taxpayer funds to do so violated the Due Process Clause. The Justices were split over the question whether the New Jersey policy constituted support of religion, with the majority concluding that the reimbursements were "separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function" that they did not violate the constitution. Both affirming and dissenting Justices, however, agreed that the Constitution required a sharp separation between government and religion, and their strongly-worded opinions paved the way to a series of later court decisions that collectively brought about profound changes in legislation, public education, and other policies involving matters of religion. [3] Both Justice Hugo Black's majority opinion and Justice Wiley Rutledge's dissenting opinion defined the First Amendment religious clause in terms of a "wall of separation between church and state."
After repealing a former ban, a 1941 New Jersey law authorized payment by local school boards of the costs of transportation to and from schools, including private schools, most of which were parochial Catholic schools. [4]
Arch R. Everson, a taxpayer in Ewing Township, filed a lawsuit on state constitutional grounds. [5] The Establishment Clause was not yet incorporated when the lawsuit was filed.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the provision violated the state constitution's purpose restriction on the legislative power to authorize spending for private and parochial schools. [6] [a] After this decision was reversed by the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals, then the state's highest court, Everson appealed to the US Supreme Court which decided the case on federal grounds only. [7] [b]
The Supreme Court handed down its 5–4 decision upholding the state law on February 10, 1947. The decision was the first to hold that the Establishment Clause was applicable against the states. It is also remembered as the first Supreme Court case to attempt an explanation of the Establishment Clause. [4] They held that the New Jersey law providing reimbursement to transportation to all students was not a violation of the establishment clause. [8]
In a majority opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the Supreme Court ruled that the state bill was constitutionally permissible because the law had a "public purpose" to provide safe transportation to parochial school students. [9]
The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause was broad and would guide the Court's jurisprudence for decades to come. Arthur E. Sutherland Jr. called it "the most influential single announcement of the American law of church and state". [10] Black's language was sweeping:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "'a wall of separation between Church and State."
This highly influential dictum was supported only by a historical analysis based on James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments and Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. [11]
Justice Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion which Justice Frankfurter joined. Justice Rutledge wrote another dissenting opinion which Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton joined. The four dissenters agreed with Justice Black's definition of the Establishment Clause but protested that the principles that he laid down would logically lead to the invalidation of the challenged law: [12]
The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the state. For when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting.
Everson confirmed that the Supreme Court would interpret the Establishment Clause to protect against more than the establishment of a state church. The "wall of separation" was a principle of the founding age that prohibited any government aid to religion. The Establishment Clause would not allow any public spending "to support any religious activities, or institutions whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion". [13]
Everson upheld the constitutionality of reimbursing the students transportation costs because the program had a public welfare purpose. The Court said that public funds could not be used "to teach or practice religion." [14] Citing Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education , Justice Black wrote that it was "too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public purpose". [8]
An "indirect benefit" to parochial schools did not make a statute with a legitimate secular purpose unconstitutional. [11] [15] The divided opinion laid the groundwork for the Lemon test which would add the primary effect and excessive entanglement criteria. [16]
Everson's holding incorporating the Establishment Clause was controversial and more cases followed. [17] A few months later the Court reaffirmed this holding in the first released time case McCollum v. Board of Education . [11] [18] The court continued to hear cases about religion in public schools in cases like Abington v. Schempp which banned daily bible readings in public school. The American public was divided and some viewed the cases as heralding the secularization of public life in the United States. [19]
Having invoked Jefferson's metaphor of the wall of separation in the Everson decision, lawmakers and courts have struggled how to balance governments' dual duty to satisfy the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. The majority and dissenting Justices in Everson split over the question, with Rutledge in the minority by insisting that the Constitution forbids "every form of public aid or support for religion." [20]
Writing for the majority in McCollum, Justice Black defended the Everson holding and the "wall of separation" dictum. The four Justices who dissented in Everson—Justices Harold H. Burton, Felix Frankfurter, Robert H. Jackson, Wiley Rutledge— were reluctant to endorse the McCollum ruling. The Court's historical argument was reaffirmed in subsequent cases including Abington School District v. Schempp , Engel v. Vitale and McGowan v. Maryland . [11]
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. The court ruled in an 8–0 decision that Pennsylvania's Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act from 1968 was unconstitutional and in an 8–1 decision that Rhode Island's 1969 Salary Supplement Act was unconstitutional, violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The act allowed the Superintendent of Public Schools to reimburse private schools for the salaries of teachers who taught in these private elementary schools from public textbooks and with public instructional materials.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), was a United States Supreme Court case deciding on the issue of silent school prayer.
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court decided 8–1 in favor of the respondent, Edward Schempp, on behalf of his son Ellery Schempp, and declared that school-sponsored Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools in the United States was unconstitutional.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that it is unconstitutional for state officials to compose an official school prayer and encourage its recitation in public schools, due to violation of the First Amendment. The ruling has been the subject of intense debate.
"Separation of church and state" is a metaphor paraphrased from Thomas Jefferson and used by others in discussions of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof".
In United States law, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, together with that Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, form the constitutional right of freedom of religion. The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause together read:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...
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Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), was an opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding whether a state university might, consistent with the First Amendment, withhold from student religious publications funding provided to similar secular student publications. The University of Virginia provided funding to every student organization that met funding-eligibility criteria, which Wide Awake, the student religious publication, fulfilled. The University's defense claimed that denying student activity funding to the religious magazine was necessary to avoid the University's violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. In this case, the Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton (1985), now finding that it was not a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for a state-sponsored education initiative to allow public school teachers to instruct at religious schools, so long as the material was secular and neutral in nature and no "excessive entanglement" between government and religion was apparent. This case is noteworthy in a broader sense as a sign of evolving judicial standards surrounding the First Amendment, and the changes that have occurred in modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989), was a case brought before the US Supreme Court in November 1988. The case was to test the legality of a Texas statute that exempted religious publications from paying state sales tax.
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that a school must continue to provide an interpreter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act even if the child elects to attend a religious school; to do so does not violate the Establishment Clause.
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