Fast-and-frugal treeormatching heuristic [1] (in the study of decision-making) is a simple graphical structure that categorizes objects by asking one question at a time. These decision trees are used in a range of fields: psychology, artificial intelligence, and management science. Unlike other decision or classification trees, such as Leo Breiman's CART, [2] fast-and-frugal trees are intentionally simple, both in their construction as well as their execution, and operate speedily with little information. For this reason, fast-and-frugal-trees are potentially attractive when designing resource-constrained tasks. [3]
Laura Martignon, Vitouch, Takezawa and Forster first introduced both the concept and the term in 2003; [4] similar heuristics for other tasks had been used before, building on the formal models created by Gerd Gigerenzer and Herbert A. Simon.
In categorization tasks with two options and m cues—also known as features or attributes—available for making such a decision, an FFT is defined as follows:
A fast-and-frugal tree is a classification or a decision tree that has m+1 exits, with one exit for each of the first m −1 cues and two exits for the last cue.
Mathematically, fast-and-frugal trees can be viewed as lexicographic heuristics or as linear classification models with non-compensatory weights and a threshold. [MKW] Their formal properties and construction have also been analyzed using signal detection theory by Luan, Schooler and Gigerenzer in 2011. [5] [LSG]
The basic elements are the cues. The cues are ranked, with one cue at each level of the tree and an exit node at each level (except for two exit nodes for the last cue at the last level of the tree). Whenever a cue is used, a question is asked about the value of the cue. The answers to the questions might immediately lead to an exit, or they might lead to a further question (and eventually to an exit). A characteristic property of fast-and-frugal trees is that, for each question, there is at least one possible answer that leads to an exit.
In the literature on fast-and-frugal trees, many different algorithms have been proposed [4] [MKW] [LSG] [6] for (1) ordering cues and (2) deciding which possible answer to a question about a cue leads immediately to an exit. A fast-and-frugal tree is fully defined if both the following conditions are met. Often, in order to keep construction simple and intuitive, the algorithms use (1) simple measures of cue "goodness" (e.g., correlation between cue and category, considering each cue independently of the other cues) and (2) make simple choices about exits (e.g., decide on each exit independently of the other exits), but more complex algorithms have been proposed as well.
To use a fast-and-frugal tree, begin at the root and check one cue at a time. At each step, one of the possible outcomes is an exit node which allows for a decision (or action)—if an exit is reached, stop; otherwise, continue until an exit is reached. Take an exit, stop; otherwise, continue and ask more questions until an exit is reached.
Figure 1 illustrates a fast-and-frugal tree for classifying a patient as "high risk" of having a heart stroke and thus having to be sent to the "coronary care unit" or as "low risk" and thus having to be sent to a "regular nursing bed" (Green & Mehr, 1997). [GM]
Consider three patients, John, Mary, and Jack:
The accuracy and robustness of fast-and-frugal trees has been shown to be comparable to that of Bayesian benchmarks in studies by Laskey and Martignon (2014). [LM] Extensive studies comparing the performance of fast-and-frugal trees to that of classification algorithms used in statistics and machine learning, such as naive Bayes, CART, random forests, and logistic regression, have also been carried out by using dozens of real-world datasets. [WHM] [MKW] [6]
Fast-and-frugal trees are used to perform binary classifications or decisions. In psychology, medicine, and other fields, signal detection theory (or detection theory) has been the classic theory under which such tasks are analyzed.
The theory assumes that there are two categories of events or people (e.g., people with and without heart problems), of which the category more relevant to us is referred as "signal" while the other is referred to as "noise". The two differ in their distribution on an observation scale that we may call "evidence", with the signal distribution having a higher mean. One can make two possible classifications, namely "signal" or "noise", upon gathering the evidence. This leads to four possible outcomes: hit (classify as "signal" when it is indeed a signal), correct rejection (classify as "noise" when it is indeed a noise), miss (classify as "noise" when it is actually a signal), and false alarm (classify as "signal" when it is actually a noise). To maximize overall accuracy or the expected value of a classification, the theory posits that we need to carefully select the classification criterion on the evidence scale, above which we make a "signal" decision and below which "noise". Specially, when the cost of a miss is very high (i.e., classifying a patient with heart problem as normal), a lower, more "liberal" criterion (i.e., toward the left in the evidence scale) needs to be selected, whereas when the cost of a false alarm is very high (e.g., classifying an innocent person as guilty of a murder), a higher, more "conservative" criterion will be better. This implies that a good decision-maker needs to be properly biased in most real-world situations; this is the most critical and relevant insight from signal detection theory on classification and decision making.
In 2011, Luan, Schooler, and Gigerenzer analyzed characteristics of fast-and-frugal trees from the perspective of signal detection theory. There are several key findings from this analysis. First, the choice of the exit structure of a fast-and-frugal tree corresponds to the setting of the decision criterion in signal detection. In a nutshell, the earlier a "signal exit" appears in a fast-and-frugal tree, the more liberally biased is the tree. The relative biases of two fast-and-frugal trees are determined by the first exit in which the two differ, with the one having the "signal exit" – denoted by "s" – always being more liberal as the one having the "noise exit" – denoted by "n" (Figure 2). For example, an FFTsnnn (here again s = "Signal exit", n = "noise exit") is more liberally biased than an FFTnsss. This principle is referred to as the "lexicographic decision bias" of fast-and-frugal trees.
Second, a series of simulations show that fast-and-frugal trees with different exit structures will lead to different—sometimes drastically different—expected value of a decision when the consequences of a miss and a false alarm differ. Therefore, when constructing and applying a fast-and-frugal tree, one needs to choose an exit structure that matches well the decision payoff structure of a task.
Third, the overall sensitivity of a fast-and-frugal tree—that is, how well the tree can discriminate a signal from a noise and which can be measured by d' or A' from signal detection theory—is affected by properties of the cues that make up the tree, such as the mean and variance of the cues' sensitivities and the inter-cue correlations among the cues, but not much by the exit structure of the tree. And finally, the performance of fast-and-frugal trees is robust and comparable to much more sophisticated decision algorithms developed in signal detection theory, including the ideal observer analysis model and the optimal sequential sampling model. In the context of out-of-sample predictions, fast-and-frugal trees perform the best relative to other models when the learning sample size is relatively small (e.g., less than 80 trials).
In 2017, Phillips, Neth, Woike and Gaissmaier [PNWG] introduced the R package FFTrees, [7] hosted on CRAN (with an accompanying app [8] ), which constructs, depicts graphically, and evaluates quantitatively fast and frugal trees in user-friendly ways.
There have been many applications of fast-and-frugal trees in both prescribing how a decision should be made and describing how people actually make decisions. Beyond the medical field, an example of their prescriptive applications is instructing soldiers stationed in Afghanistan how to distinguish whether a car approaching a check-point is driven by civilians or potential suicide bombers; [9] [KK] the tree is illustrated in Figure 3. Two examples of fast-and-frugal trees' descriptive uses are shown in Figure 4. The trees on the left and right describe, respectively, how a person decides whether to forgive another person for an offense the latter committed during social interactions [TLK] and how British judges make a bail-or-jail decision. [D] In general, fast-and-frugal trees can be applied to help or model any binary decision-making processes that involve multiple cues.
GM. | Green and Mehr, 1997 Green, L., & Mehr, D. R. (1997). What alters physicians’ decisions to admit to the coronary care unit? The Journal of Family Practice, 45(3), 219–226. |
MH. | Martignon & Hoffrage 2002 Fast, Frugal and Fit: simple heuristics for paired comparison |
DA. | Dhami, M. K., & Ayton, P. 2001. Bailing and jailing the fast and frugal way. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14(2), 141–168. |
DH. | Dhami and Harries, 2001 Fast and frugal versus regression models of human judgement. Thinking & Reasoning, 7(1), 5–27. |
FZBM. | Fischer, Steiner, Zucol, Berger, Martignon Use of simple heuristics to target macrolide prescription in children with community-acquired pneumonia. Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine, 156(10), 1005–1008. |
MKW. | Martignon, Katsikopoulos & Woike 2008 Categorization with Limited Resources: A Family of Simple Heuristics |
D. | Dhami, M. K. (2003). Psychological models of professional decision- making. Psychological Science, 14, 175–180. |
LSG. | Luan, Schooler and Gigerenzer, 2011 A signal-detection analysis of fast-and-frugal trees. |
LM. | Laskey and Martignon, 2014 Comparing fast-and-frugal trees and bayesian networks for risk-assessment. |
KK. | Keller, N., & Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2016) – On the role of psychological heuristics in operational research; and a demonstration in military stability operations. European Journal of Operational Research, 249, 1063–1073. |
TLK. | Tan, J. H., Luan, S, & Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2017). A signal-detection approach to modeling forgiveness decisions. Evolution and Human Behavior, 38, 21–38. |
WHM. | Woike, Hoffrage & Martignon, 2017 – Integrating and testing Natural Frequencies, naive Bayes and Fast-and-Frugal Trees. |
PNWG. | Phillips, Neth, Woike, & Gaissmaier, 2017. FFTrees: A toolbox to create, visualize, and evaluate fast-and-frugal decision trees. Judgment and Decision Making, 12 (4), 344–368. |
A cognitive bias is a systematic pattern of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment. Individuals create their own "subjective reality" from their perception of the input. An individual's construction of reality, not the objective input, may dictate their behavior in the world. Thus, cognitive biases may sometimes lead to perceptual distortion, inaccurate judgment, illogical interpretation, and irrationality.
A heuristic or heuristic technique is any approach to problem solving that employs a pragmatic method that is not fully optimized, perfected, or rationalized, but is nevertheless "good enough" as an approximation or attribute substitution. Where finding an optimal solution is impossible or impractical, heuristic methods can be used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution. Heuristics can be mental shortcuts that ease the cognitive load of making a decision.
Heuristic reasoning is often based on induction, or on analogy[.] [...] Induction is the process of discovering general laws [...] Induction tries to find regularity and coherence [...] Its most conspicuous instruments are generalization, specialization, analogy. [...] Heuristic discusses human behavior in the face of problems [...that have been] preserved in the wisdom of proverbs.
Bounded rationality is the idea that rationality is limited when individuals make decisions, and under these limitations, rational individuals will select a decision that is satisfactory rather than optimal.
The recognition heuristic, originally termed the recognition principle, has been used as a model in the psychology of judgment and decision making and as a heuristic in artificial intelligence. The goal is to make inferences about a criterion that is not directly accessible to the decision maker, based on recognition retrieved from memory. This is possible if recognition of alternatives has relevance to the criterion. For two alternatives, the heuristic is defined as:
If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.
Gerd Gigerenzer is a German psychologist who has studied the use of bounded rationality and heuristics in decision making. Gigerenzer is director emeritus of the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, director of the Harding Center for Risk Literacy, University of Potsdam, and vice president of the European Research Council (ERC).
Daniel G. Goldstein is an American cognitive psychologist known for the specification and testing of heuristics and models of bounded rationality in the field of judgment and decision making. He is an honorary research fellow at London Business School and works with Microsoft Research as a principal researcher.
In psychology, the take-the-best heuristic is a heuristic which decides between two alternatives by choosing based on the first cue that discriminates them, where cues are ordered by cue validity. In the original formulation, the cues were assumed to have binary values or have an unknown value. The logic of the heuristic is that it bases its choice on the best cue (reason) only and ignores the rest.
The gaze heuristic falls under the category of tracking heuristics, and it is used in directing correct motion to achieve a goal using one main variable. McLeod & Dienes' (1996) example of the gaze heuristic is catching a ball.
Pruning is a data compression technique in machine learning and search algorithms that reduces the size of decision trees by removing sections of the tree that are non-critical and redundant to classify instances. Pruning reduces the complexity of the final classifier, and hence improves predictive accuracy by the reduction of overfitting.
In mathematical optimization and computer science, heuristic is a technique designed for problem solving more quickly when classic methods are too slow for finding an exact or approximate solution, or when classic methods fail to find any exact solution in a search space. This is achieved by trading optimality, completeness, accuracy, or precision for speed. In a way, it can be considered a shortcut.
Heuristics is the process by which humans use mental shortcuts to arrive at decisions. Heuristics are simple strategies that humans, animals, organizations, and even machines use to quickly form judgments, make decisions, and find solutions to complex problems. Often this involves focusing on the most relevant aspects of a problem or situation to formulate a solution. While heuristic processes are used to find the answers and solutions that are most likely to work or be correct, they are not always right or the most accurate. Judgments and decisions based on heuristics are simply good enough to satisfy a pressing need in situations of uncertainty, where information is incomplete. In that sense they can differ from answers given by logic and probability.
The heuristic-systematic model of information processing (HSM) is a widely recognized model by Shelly Chaiken that attempts to explain how people receive and process persuasive messages.
Cognitive bias mitigation is the prevention and reduction of the negative effects of cognitive biases – unconscious, automatic influences on human judgment and decision making that reliably produce reasoning errors.
Heuristics are simple strategies for decision making that are used to achieve a specific goal quickly and efficiently, and are commonly implemented in sports. Many sports require the ability to make fast decisions under time pressure, and the proper use of heuristics is essential for many of these decisions.
Social heuristics are simple decision making strategies that guide people's behavior and decisions in the social environment when time, information, or cognitive resources are scarce. Social environments tend to be characterised by complexity and uncertainty, and in order to simplify the decision-making process, people may use heuristics, which are decision making strategies that involve ignoring some information or relying on simple rules of thumb.
Ecological rationality is a particular account of practical rationality, which in turn specifies the norms of rational action – what one ought to do in order to act rationally. The presently dominant account of practical rationality in the social and behavioral sciences such as economics and psychology, rational choice theory, maintains that practical rationality consists in making decisions in accordance with some fixed rules, irrespective of context. Ecological rationality, in contrast, claims that the rationality of a decision depends on the circumstances in which it takes place, so as to achieve one's goals in this particular context. What is considered rational under the rational choice account thus might not always be considered rational under the ecological rationality account. Overall, rational choice theory puts a premium on internal logical consistency whereas ecological rationality targets external performance in the world. The term ecologically rational is only etymologically similar to the biological science of ecology.
In behavioural sciences, social rationality is a type of decision strategy used in social contexts, in which a set of simple rules is applied in complex and uncertain situations.
Laura Martignon is a Colombian and Italian professor and scientist. From 2003 until 2020 she served as a Professor of Mathematics and Mathematical Education at the Ludwigsburg University of Education. Until 2017 she was an Adjunct Scientist of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, where she previously worked as Senior Researcher. She also worked for ten years as a Mathematics Professor at the University of Brasília and spent a period of one and a half years, as visiting scholar, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Ralph Hertwig is a German psychologist whose work focuses on the psychology of human judgment and decision making. Hertwig is Director of the Center for Adaptive Rationality at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, Germany. He grew up with his brothers Steffen Hertwig and Michael Hertwig in Talheim, Heilbronn.
Vicarious mediation is the potential level of substitutability in the task itself, the different potential ways that exist for achieving an outcome or performing a task successfully. For example, what is the substitutability of potential cues for accurate judgments about the size of objects in a visual field, particularly when all the cues are not available or are not perfect predictors of size? Similarly, what is the substitutability of potential behaviors to accomplish one’s goals when all actions may not be available or equally effective? The focus is on the task, the various potentially substitutable pathways mediating success in the task itself.
[A] fast-and-frugal tree ('matching heuristic')[.]