Jennifer Lackey

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Jennifer Lackey
Jennifer Lackey.jpg
Lackey in 2010
Education Saint Mary's College
Institutions
Doctoral advisors Ernest Sosa
Main interests
Social epistemology

Jennifer Lackey is an American academic; she is the Wayne and Elizabeth Jones Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. [1] [2] Lackey is known for her research in epistemology, [3] especially on testimony, [4] [5] disagreement, [6] memory, [7] the norms of assertion, and virtue epistemology. [8] [9] She is the author of Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge [10] [11] [12] and of numerous articles and book chapters. She is also co-editor of The Epistemology of Testimony [13] and The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. [14]

Contents

Education

Lackey graduated from Saint Mary's College in 1994 with a B.A. in philosophy and from the University of Chicago in 1995 with an M.A. in philosophy. In 2000, she graduated from Brown University with a Ph.D. in philosophy under the supervision of Ernest Sosa.

Research areas

Lackey's primary research interests lie in social epistemology. [15] She is known for arguing against the traditional view of testimony, according to which testimony is a merely transmissive, rather than a generative, epistemic source. On this view, hearers can acquire knowledge on the basis of testimony only if the speakers themselves possess the knowledge in question and thus testimony transmits knowledge from one person to another without being able to generate knowledge in its own right. In Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, Lackey uses her widely discussed creationist teacher case [16] [17] to argue that the standard view is false and that testimony can in fact be generative. In this case, a creationist teacher rejects all of the evidence supporting evolutionary theory and thus fails to either believe or know that modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus, but nevertheless reliably conveys this fact about Homo sapiens to her students. This shows that the teacher imparts knowledge to her students that she fails to possess herself. Lackey then advances a theory of the epistemology of testimony that focuses on the linguistic or communicative items in testimonial exchanges, such as statements and other acts of communication, rather than the internal states of speakers, such as states of knowing and believing.

In other works, Lackey argues that reasonableness, rather than knowledge, is the norm of assertion, [18] that memory is a generative epistemic source, [19] [20] and that lying requires deception. [21]

Lackey is also known for arguing against the claim central to virtue epistemology that knowledge should be understood in terms of the knower's deserving credit for the truth of her belief. [22] Lackey argues that the virtue epistemologist faces a dilemma: either the standards for deserving credit for a true belief are relatively high, or they are relatively low. If they are relatively high, then the virtue epistemologist cannot account for instances of knowledge from testimony, where the credit for the hearer's true belief goes to the speaker. On the other hand, if the standards are relatively low, then the virtue epistemologist cannot distinguish between cases of genuine knowledge and Gettier cases where a person has a justified true belief by accident.

Awards and fellowships

Lackey has received a number of awards, including a Charles A. Ryskamp Research Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies, [23] the Young Epistemologist Prize, [24] and an Alice Kaplan Institute for the Humanities Fellowship. [25]

Selected works

Miscellaneous

Lackey is editor-in-chief of both Episteme: Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology [26] and Philosophical Studies [27] and an epistemology subject editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. [28]

Lackey was elected an at-large member of the board of officers for the American Philosophical Association in the first-ever association-wide vote for this position. Lackey began this three-year appointment July 1, 2014. [29]

Lackey has been a guest on Philosophy Talk on the topic of disagreement, [30] has discussed social epistemology with Alvin Goldman on Philosophy TV, [31] and has been interviewed for 3:AM Magazine . [32]

Related Research Articles

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. It studies the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge, epistemic justification, the rationality of belief, and various related issues. Debates in contemporary epistemology are generally clustered around four core areas:

Social epistemology refers to a broad set of approaches that can be taken in epistemology that construes human knowledge as a collective achievement. Another way of characterizing social epistemology is as the evaluation of the social dimensions of knowledge or information.

Justification is the property of belief that qualifies it as knowledge rather than mere opinion. Epistemology is the study of reasons that someone holds a rationally admissible belief. Epistemologists are concerned with various epistemic features of belief, which include the ideas of warrant, knowledge, rationality, and probability, among others.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Knowledge</span> Awareness of facts or being competent

Knowledge is an awareness of facts, a familiarity with individuals and situations, or a practical skill. Knowledge of facts, also called propositional knowledge, is often characterized as true belief that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of justification. While there is wide agreement among philosophers that propositional knowledge is a form of true belief, many controversies focus on justification. This includes questions like how to understand justification, whether it is needed at all, and whether something else besides it is needed. These controversies intensified in the latter half of the 20th century due to a series of thought experiments called Gettier cases that provoked alternative definitions.

The epistemic virtues, as identified by virtue epistemologists, reflect their contention that belief is an ethical process, and thus susceptible to intellectual virtue or vice. Some epistemic virtues have been identified by W. Jay Wood, based on research into the medieval tradition. Epistemic virtues are sometimes also called intellectual virtues.

Contextualism, also known as epistemic contextualism, is a family of views in philosophy which emphasize the context in which an action, utterance, or expression occurs. Proponents of contextualism argue that, in some important respect, the action, utterance, or expression can only be understood relative to that context. Contextualist views hold that philosophically controversial concepts, such as "meaning P", "knowing that P", "having a reason to A", and possibly even "being true" or "being right" only have meaning relative to a specified context. Other philosophers contend that context-dependence leads to complete relativism.

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski is an American philosopher. She is the Emerita George Lynn Cross Research Professor, as well as Emerita Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics, at the University of Oklahoma. She writes in the areas of epistemology, philosophy of religion, and virtue theory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Virtue epistemology</span> Philosophical approach

Virtue epistemology is a current philosophical approach to epistemology that stresses the importance of intellectual and specifically epistemic virtues. Virtue epistemology evaluates knowledge according to the properties of the persons who hold beliefs in addition to or instead of the properties of the propositions and beliefs. Some advocates of virtue epistemology also adhere to theories of virtue ethics, while others see only loose analogy between virtue in ethics and virtue in epistemology.

The philosophy of testimony considers the nature of language and knowledge's confluence, which occurs when beliefs are transferred between speakers and hearers through testimony. Testimony constitutes words, gestures, or utterances that convey beliefs. This definition may be distinguished from the legal notion of testimony in that the speaker does not have to make a declaration of the truth of the facts.

Computational epistemology is a subdiscipline of formal epistemology that studies the intrinsic complexity of inductive problems for ideal and computationally bounded agents. In short, computational epistemology is to induction what recursion theory is to deduction. It has been applied to problems in philosophy of science.

Metaepistemology is the branch of epistemology and metaphilosophy that studies the underlying assumptions made in debates in epistemology, including those concerning the existence and authority of epistemic facts and reasons, the nature and aim of epistemology, and the methodology of epistemology.

Formal epistemology uses formal methods from decision theory, logic, probability theory and computability theory to model and reason about issues of epistemological interest. Work in this area spans several academic fields, including philosophy, computer science, economics, and statistics. The focus of formal epistemology has tended to differ somewhat from that of traditional epistemology, with topics like uncertainty, induction, and belief revision garnering more attention than the analysis of knowledge, skepticism, and issues with justification.

Ernest Sosa is an American philosopher primarily interested in epistemology. Since 2007 he has been Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University, but he spent most of his career at Brown University.

Michael Williams is a British philosopher who is currently Krieger-Eisenhower Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, noted especially for his work in epistemology.

Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature and scope (limitations) of knowledge. It addresses the questions "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", "What do people know?", "How do we know what we know?", and "Why do we know what we know?". Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief, and justification. It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Miranda Fricker</span> English feminist philosopher

Miranda Fricker, FBA FAAS is a British philosopher who is Professor of Philosophy at New York University, Co-Director of the New York Institute of Philosophy, and Honorary Professor at the University of Sheffield. Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice, the concept of an injustice done against someone "specifically in their capacity as a knower", and explored the concept in her 2007 book Epistemic Injustice.

Religious epistemology broadly covers religious approaches to epistemological questions, or attempts to understand the epistemological issues that come from religious belief. The questions asked by epistemologists apply to religious beliefs and propositions whether they seem rational, justified, warranted, reasonable, based on evidence and so on. Religious views also influence epistemological theories, such as in the case of Reformed epistemology.

The issue of peer disagreement in epistemology discusses the question of how a person should respond when he learns that somebody else with the same body of knowledge disagrees with them.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mona Simion</span> British philosopher

Mona Simion is a philosopher. She is professor of philosophy at the University of Glasgow where she is also deputy director of the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre. Simion's work focuses on issues in epistemology, ethics, the philosophy of language, and feminist philosophy.

Definitions of knowledge try to determine the essential features of knowledge. Closely related terms are conception of knowledge, theory of knowledge, and analysis of knowledge. Some general features of knowledge are widely accepted among philosophers, for example, that it constitutes a cognitive success or an epistemic contact with reality and that propositional knowledge involves true belief. Most definitions of knowledge in analytic philosophy focus on propositional knowledge or knowledge-that, as in knowing that Dave is at home, in contrast to knowledge-how (know-how) expressing practical competence. However, despite the intense study of knowledge in epistemology, the disagreements about its precise nature are still both numerous and deep. Some of those disagreements arise from the fact that different theorists have different goals in mind: some try to provide a practically useful definition by delineating its most salient feature or features, while others aim at a theoretically precise definition of its necessary and sufficient conditions. Further disputes are caused by methodological differences: some theorists start from abstract and general intuitions or hypotheses, others from concrete and specific cases, and still others from linguistic usage. Additional disagreements arise concerning the standards of knowledge: whether knowledge is something rare that demands very high standards, like infallibility, or whether it is something common that requires only the possession of some evidence.

References

  1. "Jennifer Lackey : Department of Philosophy - Northwestern University". www.philosophy.northwestern.edu.
  2. "Jennifer Lackey". faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu.
  3. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  4. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Epistemological Problems of Testimony". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  5. "Epistemology of Testimony". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  6. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Religious Diversity". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  7. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Epistemological Problems of Memory". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  8. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Virtue Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  9. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "The Value of Knowledge". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  10. Zimmerman, Aaron Z. (July 31, 2008). "Review of Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge" via Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  11. Faulkner, Paul (April 1, 2009). "Review: Jennifer Lackey: Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge" (PDF). Mind. 118 (470): 479–485. doi:10.1093/mind/fzp036.
  12. Christoph Kelp, Learning from words: Testimony as a source of knowledge – Jennifer Lackey - PhilPapers at PhilPapers
  13. Faulkner, Paul (2007). "Review: The Epistemology of Testimony". Mind. 116 (464): 1136–1139. doi:10.1093/mind/fzm1136.
  14. Taylor and Francis Online - The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays by Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer (eds.)
  15. Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Social Epistemology". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  16. Carter, J. Adam; Nickel, Philip J. (January 26, 2014). "On Testimony and Transmission". Episteme. 11 (2): 145–155. doi:10.1017/epi.2014.4. hdl: 20.500.11820/f9015a77-0a44-4e32-93a1-88d8afc819aa . S2CID   53604818 via PhilPapers.
  17. "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2014-04-21. Retrieved 2014-04-20.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  18. Littlejohn, Clayton; Turri, John (April 17, 2014). Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. OUP Oxford. ISBN   9780191008894 via Google Books.
  19. Senor, Thomas D. (January 26, 2007). "Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 74 (1): 199–208. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00009.x.
  20. Andrew Naylor, Justification and Forgetting - PhilPapers at PhilPapers
  21. Broncano-Berrocal, Fernando (2013). "Lies and Deception: A Failed Reconciliation". Logos & Episteme. 4 (2): 227–230. doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20134229 via www.academia.edu.
  22. Riggs, Wayne (July 1, 2009). "Two problems of easy credit". Synthese. 169 (1): 201–216. doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9342-6. S2CID   30051909.
  23. "ACLS American Council of Learned Societies | www.acls.org - Results". www.acls.org.
  24. "Program 2005". philosophy.rutgers.edu.
  25. "Fellows: Alice Kaplan Institute for the Humanities - Northwestern University". www.humanities.northwestern.edu.
  26. "Episteme | Cambridge Core". Cambridge Core.
  27. "Philosophical Studies – incl. option to publish open access". springer.com.
  28. "Editorial Board (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". plato.stanford.edu.
  29. "New at-large board members elected - The American Philosophical Association". www.apaonline.org.
  30. Philosophy Talk
  31. "Alvin Goldman and Jennifer Lackey « Philosophy TV". www.philostv.com.
  32. "on testimony -". May 31, 2013.

Further reading

Reviews of Learning from Words

Papers that discuss Lackey's work