The term market participant is another term for economic agent, an actor and more specifically a decision maker in a model of some aspect of the economy. For example, buyers and sellers are two common types of agents in partial equilibrium models of a single market. The term market participant is also used in United States constitutional law to describe a U.S. State which is acting as a producer or supplier of a marketable good or service.
In economics, a model is a theoretical construct representing economic processes by a set of variables and a set of logical and/or quantitative relationships between them. The economic model is a simplified, often mathematical, framework designed to illustrate complex processes. Frequently, economic models posit structural parameters. A model may have various exogenous variables, and those variables may change to create various responses by economic variables. Methodological uses of models include investigation, theorizing, and fitting theories to the world.
Partial equilibrium is a condition of economic equilibrium which takes into consideration only a part of the market, ceteris paribus, to attain equilibrium.
A market is one of the many varieties of systems, institutions, procedures, social relations and infrastructures whereby parties engage in exchange. While parties may exchange goods and services by barter, most markets rely on sellers offering their goods or services in exchange for money from buyers. It can be said that a market is the process by which the prices of goods and services are established. Markets facilitate trade and enable the distribution and resource allocation in a society. Markets allow any trade-able item to be evaluated and priced. A market emerges more or less spontaneously or may be constructed deliberately by human interaction in order to enable the exchange of rights of services and goods. Markets generally supplant gift economies and are often held in place through rules and customs, such as a booth fee, competitive pricing, and source of goods for sale.
When a state is acting in such a role, it may permissibly discriminate against non-residents. This principle was established by the United States Supreme Court in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), in which the Court upheld South Dakota's right to give South Dakota residents preferential treatment in the purchase of cement produced at a cement plant owned and operated by the state.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that individual states, when acting as producers or suppliers rather than as market regulators, may discriminate preferentially against out-of-state residents. This "market participant" doctrine is an exception to the so-called negative commerce clause, which ordinarily deems state regulations invalid where they discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce for the purpose of economic protectionism.
Case citation is a system used by legal professionals to identify past court case decisions, either in series of books called reporters or law reports, or in a neutral style that identifies a decision regardless of where it is reported. Case citations are formatted differently in different jurisdictions, but generally contain the same key information.
South Dakota is a U.S. state in the Midwestern region of the United States. It is named after the Lakota and Dakota Sioux Native American tribes, who compose a large portion of the population and historically dominated the territory. South Dakota is the seventeenth largest by area, but the fifth smallest by population and the 5th least densely populated of the 50 United States. As the southern part of the former Dakota Territory, South Dakota became a state on November 2, 1889, simultaneously with North Dakota. Pierre is the state capital and Sioux Falls, with a population of about 187,200, is South Dakota's largest city.
"Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others." Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
The Commerce Clause describes an enumerated power listed in the United States Constitution. The clause states that the United States Congress shall have power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." Courts and commentators have tended to discuss each of these three areas of commerce as a separate power granted to Congress. It is common to see the individual components of the Commerce Clause referred to under specific terms: the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. Maryland created a program that, 1) purchased junked cars, 2) paid a bounty for those with Maryland license plates and, 3) imposed more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state processors, in an effort to reduce the number of abandoned cars in Maryland.
In Reeves, 447 U.S. 429 (1980), the Court relied upon "the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."
"There are some limits on a state or local government's ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts business." White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
"The limit on the Market Participant Exception is that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant but allows it to go no further. The State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market." South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984). "Downstream restrictions have a greater regulatory effect than do limitations on the immediate transaction. The State may not avail itself of the market-participant doctrine to immunize its downstream regulation of a market it is not actually a participant." Id.
South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held unconstitutional Alaska's inclusion of a requirement that purchasers of state-owned timber process it within state before it was shipped out of state. According to a plurality opinion by Justice White, Alaska could not impose "downstream" conditions in the timber-processing market as a result of its ownership of the timber itself. The opinion summarized "[the] limit of the market-participant doctrine" as "allowing a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but [to] go no further. The State may not impose conditions [that] have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market."
The most ubiquitous example of a service offered by the individual states is the operation of public universities. Because the provision of higher education is deemed not to be a fundamental right, the individual states that have universities may charge higher tuition to out-of-state students.[citation needed]
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The Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution repealed the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which had mandated nationwide Prohibition on alcohol. The Twenty-first Amendment was proposed by Congress on February 20, 1933, and was ratified by the requisite number of states on December 5, 1933. It is unique among the 27 amendments of the U.S. Constitution for being the only one to repeal a prior amendment, as well as being the only amendment to have been ratified by state ratifying conventions.
The Dormant Commerce Clause, or Negative Commerce Clause, in American constitutional law, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause in Article I of the US Constitution. The Dormant Commerce Clause is used to prohibit state legislation that discriminates against interstate or international commerce.
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), was a 1963 decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court declined to invalidate a California law that imposed minimum fat content standards on avocados sold in the state, including those imported from other states. The law prohibited the sale of avocados that did not contain at least 8% oil by weight. Florida, a major avocado producer, employed, for wholesale marketing purposes, a federal standard unrelated to oil content. Most Florida avocados that were marketable at home failed to meet the California standard, because they were a different variety from those sold in California, with a lower fat content. Accordingly, Florida avocado growers brought this suit, arguing (unsuccessfully) that the California law (1) was preempted by federal law, (2) violated equal protection, and (3) unduly burdened and interfered with their right to engage in interstate commerce. The case is widely used in law school casebooks on constitutional law and federal jurisdiction as illustrative of preemption issues.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents a state from treating citizens of other states in a discriminatory manner. Additionally, a right of interstate travel may plausibly be inferred from the clause.
The Taxing and Spending Clause and the Uniformity Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, grants the federal government of the United States its power of taxation. While authorizing Congress to levy taxes, this clause permits the levying of taxes for two purposes only: to pay the debts of the United States, and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. Taken together, these purposes have traditionally been held to imply and to constitute the federal government's taxing and spending power.
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a city can pressure private employers to hire city residents, but the same exercise of power to bias private contractors against out-of-state residents may be called into account under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that states cannot impose qualifications for prospective members of the U.S. Congress stricter than those specified in the Constitution. The decision invalidated the Congressional term limit provisions of 23 states. The parties to the case were U.S. Term Limits, a non-profit advocacy group, and Arkansas politician Ray Thornton, among others.
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), was a case before the United States Supreme Court in which the plaintiff, a private recycler with business in Clarkstown, New York, sought to ship its non-recyclable waste to cheaper waste processors out-of-state. Clarkstown opposed the move, and the company then brought suit, raising the unconstitutionality of Clarkstown's "flow control ordinance," which required solid wastes that were not recyclable or hazardous to be deposited at a particular private company's transfer facility. The ordinance involved fees that were above market rates. The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiff, concluding that Clarkstown's ordinance violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court ruling, since overturned, concerning use tax. The decision effectively prevented states from collecting any sales tax from retail purchases made over the Internet or other e-Commerce route unless the seller had a physical presence in the state. The ruling was based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, preventing states from interfering with interstate commerce unless authorized by the United States Congress. The case resulted from an attempt by North Dakota seeking to collect sales tax on licensed computer software offered by the Quill Corporation, an office supply retailer with no North Dakota presence, that allowed users to place orders directly with Quill.
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that Congress acted within its power under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in forbidding racial discrimination in restaurants as this was a burden to interstate commerce.
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994), is a United States Supreme Court decision focused on the aspect of state power and the interpretation of the Commerce Clause as a limitation on states' regulatory power. In this particular case, the Supreme Court considered whether the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality's alleged cost-based surcharge on the disposal of out-of-state waste violated the dormant commerce clause.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that an Alabama law imposing a fee on out-of-state hazardous waste being disposed of in-state violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
In the law of the United States, federal preemption is the invalidation of a U.S. state law that conflicts with federal law.
Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a New Mexico tax on the generation of electricity was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Snead was the director of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department.
Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed unanimously the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that the provisions of the Lanham Act's prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may "disparage" persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols with the United States Patent and Trademark Office violated the First Amendment.
