Mental time travel

Last updated

In psychology, mental time travel is the capacity to mentally reconstruct personal events from the past (episodic memory) as well as to imagine possible scenarios in the future (episodic foresight/episodic future thinking). The term was coined by Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Corballis, [1] building on Endel Tulving's work on episodic memory [2] (Tulving proposed the alternative term chronesthesia. [3] ).

Contents

Mental time travel has been studied by psychologists, cognitive neuroscientists, philosophers and in a variety of other academic disciplines. [4] [5] Major areas of interest include the nature of the relationship between memory and foresight, [6] [7] the evolution of the ability (including whether it is uniquely human or shared with other animals), [8] [9] its development in young children, [10] [11] its underlying brain mechanisms, [12] [13] as well as its potential links to consciousness, [14] the self, [15] and free will. [16]

Overview, terminology, and relationship to other cognitive capacities

Declarative memory refers to the capacity to store and retrieve information that can be explicitly expressed, and consists of both facts or knowledge about the world (semantic memory) and autobiographical details about one's own experiences (episodic memory). [17] Tulving (1985) originally suggested that episodic memory involved a kind of ‘autonoetic’ (‘self-knowing’) consciousness that required the first-person subjective experience of previously lived events, whereas semantic memory is associated with ‘noetic’ (knowing) consciousness but does not require such mental simulation. [18]

It has become increasingly clear that both semantic and episodic memory are integral for thinking about the future. [19] [20] Mental time travel, however, specifically refers to the ‘autonoetic’ systems, and thus selectively comprises episodic memory and episodic foresight.

The close link between episodic memory and episodic foresight has been established with evidence of their shared developmental trajectory, [21] similar impairment profiles in neuropsychiatric disease and in brain damage, [22] [23] [24] phenomenological analyses, [25] and with neuroimaging. [26] Mental time travel may be one of several processes enabled by a general scenario building or construction system in the brain. [22] [27] [28] This general capacity to generate and reflect on mental scenarios has been compared to a theatre in the mind that depends on the working together of a host of components. [13]

Investigations have been conducted into diverse aspects of mental time travel, including individual differences relating to personality, [29] its instantiation in artificial intelligence systems, [30] and its relationship with theory of mind [31] and mind-wandering. [32] The study of mental time travel in general terms is also related to – but distinct from – the study of the way individuals differ in terms of their future orientation, [33] time perspective, [34] and temporal self-continuity. [35]

Brain regions involved

Various neuroimaging studies have elucidated the brain systems underlying the capacity for mental time travel in adults. Early fMRI studies on the topic revealed a number of close correspondences between remembering past experiences and imagining future experiences in brain activity. [26]

fMRI mapping of brain regions

Addis et al. conducted an fMRI study to examine neural regions mediating construction and elaboration of past and future events. [36]

The elaboration phase, unlike the construction phase, has overlap in the cortical areas comprising the autobiographical memory retrieval network. In this study, it was also found that the left hippocampus and the right middle occipital gyrus were significantly activated during past and future event construction, while the right hippocampus was significantly deactivated during past event construction. It was only activated during the creation of future events.[ citation needed ]

Episodic future thinking involves multiple component processes: retrieval and integration of relevant information from memory, processing of subjective time, and self-referential processing. [37] D'Argembeau et al.'s study found that the ventral medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex are the most activated areas when imagining future events that are relevant to one's personal goals than to unrelated ones. This shows that these brain regions play a role in personal goal processing, which is a critical feature of episodic future thinking.[ citation needed ]

Brain regions involved in the 'what' and 'where' of an event

Cabeza et al. conducted a positron emission tomography (PET) scan study on a group of human test subjects to identify the brain regions involved in temporal memory, which is based on a linear progression of events. Since 'recollecting a past episode involves remembering not only what happened but also when it happened', PET scans were used to find the areas of the brain that were activated when trying to remember a certain word in a sequence. [38] The results show that temporal-order memory of past events involves the frontal and posterior brain regions and item retrieval shows neural activity in the medial temporal and basal fore brain regions. [39]

Evolution and human uniqueness

The ability to travel mentally in time – especially into the future – has been highlighted as a potential prime mover in human evolution, enabling humans to prepare, plan and shape the future to their advantage. [8] However, the question of whether or to what extent animals other than human beings can engage in mental time travel has remained controversial. [40] [41]

One proposal, the Bischof-Köhler hypothesis, [1] [42] [43] [44] posits that non-human animals cannot act upon drive states they do not currently possess, for example seeking out water while currently fully quenched. Other proposals suggest that different species may have some capacities, but are limited because of shortcomings in a range of component capacities of mental scenario building and imagination. [19] A number of studies have claimed to have demonstrated mental time travel in animals including, most notably, various great apes, crows, ravens, and western scrub jays, [45] [46] [47] [48] but these have been subjected to a number of criticisms and simpler alternative explanations have been proposed for the results. [49] [50] [51] This debate is ongoing. [8]

If mental time travel is unique to humans, then it must have emerged over the last 6 million years since the line leading to modern humans split from the line leading to modern chimpanzees. Perhaps the first hard evidence for the evolution of mental time travel in humans comes in the form of Acheulean bifacial handaxes associated with Homo erectus. Acheulean tools are complex and appear to have required advanced planning to create. [52] [53] There is also evidence that they were often crafted in one location and then taken elsewhere for repeated use. [54]

A number of important adaptive functions have been identified that rely to some degree on the capacity to remember the past and imagine the future. [55] [56] These functions include predicting future emotional reactions (affective forecasting), [57] deliberate practice, [58] intertemporal choice, [59] navigation, [60] prospective memory, [61] counterfactual thinking, [62] [63] and planning. [64]

Episodic-like memory and planning for the future in great apes

Osvath et al. conducted a study on apes to show that they have the ability of foresight. The study consisted of testing for self-control, associative learning, and envisioning in chimpanzees and orangutans through a series of experiments. [65] Critics questioned whether these animals truly exhibited mental time travel, or whether it was associative learning that caused them to behave as they did. The Bischof-Kohler hypothesis says that animals cannot anticipate future needs, and this study by Osvath tried to disprove the hypothesis.[ citation needed ]

The scientists showed that when the apes were presented with a food item in conjunction with a utensil that could be used to actually eat that particular food, these animals chose the utensil instead of food. They anticipated a future need for the utensil that overcame the current want for just a food reward. This is an example of mental time travel in animals. It was not a result of associative learning, that they actually chose the utensil instead of the food reward, since the scientists ran another experiment to account for that. Other examples, such as food caching by birds, may be examples of mental time travel in non-humans. Even survival instinct by certain animals such as elephants, in response to imminent danger, could involve mental time travel mechanisms.[ citation needed ]

Another study to show that great apes have the ability of foresight was conducted by Martin-Ordas G. et al. These scientists were able to show that "apes remember in an integrated fashion what, where and when" a particular event had happened. [66] Two experiments were conducted in this study, the first being an investigation of the content of the memories of apes i.e. could these animals remember when and where two types of food they were shown before are hidden. The second experiment explored the structure of the memories. It was found that the apes' memories were formed in an integrated what–where–when structure. All these findings suggest that it is not instinctive or learning predispositions that made the animals behave the way they did, but rather that they have the ability to mentally time travel. However, comparative psychologists are divided about this conclusion. [8]

Episodic-like memory in western scrub-jays

In their study to show that birds exhibit episodic-like memory, Clayton et al. used 3 behavioral criteria: content, structure, and flexibility, to decide whether the food caching habits of these birds were evidence of their ability to recall the past and plan for the future. [67] Content involved remembering what happened based on a specific past experience. Structure required the formation of a 'what-where-when' representation of the event. Finally, flexibility was used to see how well the information could be organized and re-organized, based on facts and experiences. Mental time travel involves the use of both episodic future thinking and semantic knowledge. This study also contradicts the Bischof-Kohler hypothesis by showing that some animals may mentally time travel into the future or back to the past. However this interpretation has remained controversial. [8]

Development in children

Studies into the development of mental time travel in infancy suggest that the involved component processes come online piece by piece. Most of the required psychological subcomponents appear to be available by approximately age four. [10] This includes the fundamental capacity to prepare for two mutually exclusive possible future events, which appears to develop between the ages of 3 and 5. [68]

Two and three-year-old children can report some information about upcoming events, and by ages four and five, children can talk more clearly about future situations. [69] However, there is concern that children may understand more than they can articulate, and that they may say things without fully understanding. Thus, researchers have tried to examine future-oriented action. [70] A carefully controlled study found that four-year-olds could already remember a specific problem they saw in a different room sufficiently enough to prepare for its future solution. [71] These results suggest that children by the end of the preschool years have developed some fundamental capacity for foresight, capacities that continue to develop throughout childhood and adolescence. [72]

Measurement

Studies of mental time travel require the measurement of both episodic memory and episodic foresight.

Episodic memory

Episodic memory is typically measured in human adults by asking people to report or describe past events that they had experienced. Many studies provide participants with information at one point in the study and then assess their memory for this information at a later point in the study. The advantage of these studies is that they allow the accuracy of recall to be assessed. However, Cheke and Clayton found that such different measurements of memory do not mutually correspond enough and may therefore capture different facets of memory. [73] A more general limitation with studies in this field is that they fail to capture people's actual memories for real-life events, just like in other studied animals.

Many studies focus on asking people to recall episodes from their own lives. Some of them attempt to verify the accuracy of recall by comparing participants’ memories to those of family, friends or relatives who experienced the same event, [74] or in some cases by comparing peoples’ memories of an event to public information about the event. [75] However it is not always easy to verify the accuracy of recall, so many measures of episodic memory do not do this, focusing instead on aspects of people's verbal descriptions of their memories.

Three commonly used measures that do not verify the accuracy of people's memories are as follows:

1) Dritschel et al. adapted the Controlled Oral Word Association Test to assess the fluency with which people recall personal autobiographical episodes in specific given time periods (e.g., last week, last year, last 5 years, etc.) in a specific time limit (e.g., 1 min). [76]

2) Baddeley and Wilson used a 4-point scale with which to rate participants’ memories as (3) specific, (2) intermediate, (1) general, and (0) nil, based on the level of the detail provided in their description. [77]

3) Levine and colleagues designed the Autobiographical Interview to distinguish between episodic and semantic components of episodic memories based on participants’ verbal descriptions. [78]

Episodic foresight

Miloyan and McFarlane performed a systematic review of episodic foresight measurement instruments used in human adults and found that most of these measures were adapted from measures of episodic memory. [79]

1) The measure by Dritschel et al. [76] based on the Controlled Oral Word Association Test was adapted by MacLeod and colleagues to assess episodic foresight. [80]

2) Williams et al. adapted the 4-point scale from Baddeley and Wilson to assess episodic foresight. [81]

3) The Autobiographical Interview by Levine and colleagues which was designed to distinguish the episodic and semantic components of episodic memories was adapted by Addis and colleagues to measure episodic foresight. [82]

The authors of the systematic review noted that a limitation of all such episodic foresight measures is that they do not compare people's simulation of future events to objective preparatory behaviors or to the actual occurrence of future events. [79] Thus, none of the available measures verify the accuracy or relevance of people's imaginings. This is in contrast to studies of episodic foresight in children and animals that require participants to demonstrate episodic foresight with behaviors to compensate for their lack of verbal ability.

See also

Related Research Articles

Recall in memory refers to the mental process of retrieval of information from the past. Along with encoding and storage, it is one of the three core processes of memory. There are three main types of recall: free recall, cued recall and serial recall. Psychologists test these forms of recall as a way to study the memory processes of humans and animals. Two main theories of the process of recall are the two-stage theory and the theory of encoding specificity.

Source amnesia is the inability to remember where, when or how previously learned information has been acquired, while retaining the factual knowledge. This branch of amnesia is associated with the malfunctioning of one's explicit memory. It is likely that the disconnect between having the knowledge and remembering the context in which the knowledge was acquired is due to a dissociation between semantic and episodic memory – an individual retains the semantic knowledge, but lacks the episodic knowledge to indicate the context in which the knowledge was gained.

Hindsight bias, also known as the knew-it-all-along phenomenon or creeping determinism, is the common tendency for people to perceive past events as having been more predictable than they were.

Semantic memory refers to general world knowledge that humans have accumulated throughout their lives. This general knowledge is intertwined in experience and dependent on culture. New concepts are learned by applying knowledge learned from things in the past.

Episodic memory is the memory of everyday events that can be explicitly stated or conjured. It is the collection of past personal experiences that occurred at particular times and places; for example, the party on one's 7th birthday. Along with semantic memory, it comprises the category of explicit memory, one of the two major divisions of long-term memory.

Endel Tulving was an Estonian-born Canadian experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist. In his research on human memory he proposed the distinction between semantic and episodic memory. Tulving was a professor at the University of Toronto. He joined the Rotman Research Institute at Baycrest Health Sciences in 1992 as the first Anne and Max Tanenbaum Chair in Cognitive Neuroscience and remained there until his retirement in 2010. In 2006, he was named an Officer of the Order of Canada (OC), Canada's highest civilian honour.

Explicit memory is one of the two main types of long-term human memory, the other of which is implicit memory. Explicit memory is the conscious, intentional recollection of factual information, previous experiences, and concepts. This type of memory is dependent upon three processes: acquisition, consolidation, and retrieval.

The Levels of Processing model, created by Fergus I. M. Craik and Robert S. Lockhart in 1972, describes memory recall of stimuli as a function of the depth of mental processing. Deeper levels of analysis produce more elaborate, longer-lasting, and stronger memory traces than shallow levels of analysis. Depth of processing falls on a shallow to deep continuum. Shallow processing leads to a fragile memory trace that is susceptible to rapid decay. Conversely, deep processing results in a more durable memory trace. There are three levels of processing in this model. Structural processing, or visual, is when we remember only the physical quality of the word E.g how the word is spelled and how letters look. Phonemic processing includes remembering the word by the way it sounds. E.G the word tall rhymes with fall. Lastly, we have semantic processing in which we encode the meaning of the word with another word that is similar of has similar meaning. Once the word is perceived, the brain allows for a deeper processing.

Memory has the ability to encode, store and recall information. Memories give an organism the capability to learn and adapt from previous experiences as well as build relationships. Encoding allows a perceived item of use or interest to be converted into a construct that can be stored within the brain and recalled later from long-term memory. Working memory stores information for immediate use or manipulation, which is aided through hooking onto previously archived items already present in the long-term memory of an individual.

Retrospective memory is the memory of people, words, and events encountered or experienced in the past. It includes all other types of memory including episodic, semantic and procedural. It can be either implicit or explicit. In contrast, prospective memory involves remembering something or remembering to do something after a delay, such as buying groceries on the way home from work. However, it is very closely linked to retrospective memory, since certain aspects of retrospective memory are required for prospective memory.

Priming is the idea that exposure to one stimulus may influence a response to a subsequent stimulus, without conscious guidance or intention. The priming effect refers to the positive or negative effect of a rapidly presented stimulus on the processing of a second stimulus that appears shortly after. Generally speaking, the generation of priming effect depends on the existence of some positive or negative relationship between priming and target stimuli. For example, the word nurse might be recognized more quickly following the word doctor than following the word bread. Priming can be perceptual, associative, repetitive, positive, negative, affective, semantic, or conceptual. Priming effects involve word recognition, semantic processing, attention, unconscious processing, and many other issues, and are related to differences in various writing systems. Research, however, has yet to firmly establish the duration of priming effects, yet their onset can be almost instantaneous.

Foresight is the ability to predict, or the action of predicting, what will happen or what is needed in the future. Studies suggest that much of human thought is directed towards potential future events. Because of this, the nature and evolution of foresight is an important topic in psychology. Thinking about the future is studied under the label prospection.

Autonoetic consciousness is the human ability to mentally place oneself in the past and future or in counterfactual situations, and to thus be able to examine one's own thoughts.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Memory</span> Faculty of mind to store and retrieve data

Memory is the faculty of the mind by which data or information is encoded, stored, and retrieved when needed. It is the retention of information over time for the purpose of influencing future action. If past events could not be remembered, it would be impossible for language, relationships, or personal identity to develop. Memory loss is usually described as forgetfulness or amnesia.

The encoding specificity principle is the general principle that matching the encoding contexts of information at recall assists in the retrieval of episodic memories. It provides a framework for understanding how the conditions present while encoding information relate to memory and recall of that information.

In psychology, prospection is the generation and evaluation of mental representations of possible futures. The term therefore captures a wide array of future-oriented psychological phenomena, including the prediction of future emotion, the imagination of future scenarios, and planning. Prospection is central to various aspects of human cognition and motivation. Daniel Gilbert (psychologist) and Timothy Wilson coined the term in 2007. It has since become a central area of enquiry in the cognitive sciences.

Episodic-like memory is the memory system in animals that is comparable to human episodic memory. The term was first described by Clayton & Dickinson referring to an animal's ability to encode and retrieve information about 'what' occurred during an episode, 'where' the episode took place, and 'when' the episode happened. This ability in animals is considered 'episodic-like' because there is currently no way of knowing whether or not this form of remembering is accompanied by conscious recollection—a key component of Endel Tulving's original definition of episodic memory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Bilingual memory</span>

Bilingualism is the regular use of two fluent languages, and bilinguals are those individuals who need and use two languages in their everyday lives. A person's bilingual memories are heavily dependent on the person's fluency, the age the second language was acquired, and high language proficiency to both languages. High proficiency provides mental flexibility across all domains of thought and forces them to adopt strategies that accelerate cognitive development. People who are bilingual integrate and organize the information of two languages, which creates advantages in terms of many cognitive abilities, such as intelligence, creativity, analogical reasoning, classification skills, problem solving, learning strategies, and thinking flexibility.

Sex differences in cognition are widely studied in the current scientific literature. Biological and genetic differences in combination with environment and culture have resulted in the cognitive differences among males and females. Among biological factors, hormones such as testosterone and estrogen may play some role mediating these differences. Among differences of diverse mental and cognitive abilities, the largest or most well known are those relating to spatial abilities, social cognition and verbal skills and abilities.

Social cognitive neuroscience is the scientific study of the biological processes underpinning social cognition. Specifically, it uses the tools of neuroscience to study "the mental mechanisms that create, frame, regulate, and respond to our experience of the social world". Social cognitive neuroscience uses the epistemological foundations of cognitive neuroscience, and is closely related to social neuroscience. Social cognitive neuroscience employs human neuroimaging, typically using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Human brain stimulation techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct-current stimulation are also used. In nonhuman animals, direct electrophysiological recordings and electrical stimulation of single cells and neuronal populations are utilized for investigating lower-level social cognitive processes.

References

  1. 1 2 Suddendorf T, Corballis MC (May 1997). "Mental time travel and the evolution of the human mind". Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs. 123 (2): 133–67. PMID   9204544.
  2. Tulving E (1985). "Memory and Consciousness". Canadian Psychology. 26: 1–12. doi:10.1037/h0080017.
  3. Tulving E (2002). "Chronesthesia: Conscious Awareness of Subjective Time". Principles of Frontal Lobe Function. pp. 311–325. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195134971.003.0020. ISBN   978-0-19-513497-1.
  4. Bulley A (2018). "The History and Future of Human Prospection". Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture. 2: 75. doi:10.26613/esic.2.1.75. S2CID   134294187.
  5. Klein SB (January 2013). "The complex act of projecting oneself into the future". Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science. 4 (1): 63–79. doi:10.1002/wcs.1210. PMID   26304175.
  6. Suddendorf T (January 2010). "Episodic memory versus episodic foresight: Similarities and differences". Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science. 1 (1): 99–107. doi:10.1002/wcs.23. PMID   26272843.
  7. Klein SB (2018). "Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection". Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 69 (2): 381–401. doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1007150. PMID   25606713. S2CID   14444260.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 Suddendorf T (2013). The gap: the science of what separates us from other animals. Basic Books. ISBN   978-0-465-03014-9.[ page needed ]
  9. Cheke LG, Clayton NS (November 2010). "Mental time travel in animals". Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science. 1 (6): 915–930. doi:10.1002/wcs.59. PMID   26271786.
  10. 1 2 Suddendorf T, Redshaw J (August 2013). "The development of mental scenario building and episodic foresight". Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 1296 (1): 135–53. Bibcode:2013NYASA1296..135S. doi:10.1111/nyas.12189. PMID   23855564. S2CID   33641357.
  11. Atance CM, o'Neill DK (2005). "The emergence of episodic future thinking in humans". Learning and Motivation. 36 (2): 126–144. doi:10.1016/j.lmot.2005.02.003.
  12. Schacter DL, Addis DR, Hassabis D, Martin VC, Spreng RN, Szpunar KK (November 2012). "The future of memory: remembering, imagining, and the brain". Neuron. 76 (4): 677–94. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.11.001. PMC   3815616 . PMID   23177955.
  13. 1 2 Irish M (2016). "Semantic Memory as the Essential Scaffold for Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel". In Michaelian K, Klein SB, Szpunar KK (eds.). Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-oriented Mental Time Travel. Oxford University Press. pp. 389–408. ISBN   978-0-19-024153-7.
  14. D'Argembeau A, Van der Linden M (September 2012). "Predicting the phenomenology of episodic future thoughts". Consciousness and Cognition. 21 (3): 1198–206. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.05.004. hdl:2268/130764. PMID   22742997. S2CID   14972501.
  15. D'Argembeau A, Lardi C, Van der Linden M (2012). "Self-defining future projections: exploring the identity function of thinking about the future". Memory. 20 (2): 110–20. doi:10.1080/09658211.2011.647697. hdl: 2268/107158 . PMID   22292616. S2CID   9399136.
  16. Seligman ME, Railton P, Baumeister RF, Sripada C (March 2013). "Navigating Into the Future or Driven by the Past". Perspectives on Psychological Science. 8 (2): 119–41. doi:10.1177/1745691612474317. PMID   26172493. S2CID   17506436.
  17. Squire LR (1992). "Declarative and nondeclarative memory: multiple brain systems supporting learning and memory". Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 4 (3): 232–43. doi:10.1162/jocn.1992.4.3.232. PMID   23964880. S2CID   15095727.
  18. Tulving E (1985). Elements of Episodic Memory. Oxford University. ISBN   978-0-19-852125-9.[ page needed ]
  19. 1 2 Suddendorf T, Corballis MC (June 2007). "The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans?" (PDF). The Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 30 (3): 299–313, discussion 313–51. doi:10.1017/S0140525X07001975. PMID   17963565.
  20. Irish M, Addis DR, Hodges JR, Piguet O (July 2012). "Considering the role of semantic memory in episodic future thinking: evidence from semantic dementia". Brain. 135 (Pt 7): 2178–91. doi: 10.1093/brain/aws119 . PMID   22614246.
  21. Suddendorf T, Busby J (2005). "Making decisions with the future in mind: Developmental and comparative identification of mental time travel". Learning and Motivation. 36 (2): 110–125. doi:10.1016/j.lmot.2005.02.010.
  22. 1 2 Schacter DL, Addis DR (May 2007). "The cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory: remembering the past and imagining the future". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences. 362 (1481): 773–86. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.2087. PMC   2429996 . PMID   17395575.
  23. Tulving E (2002). "Episodic memory: from mind to brain". Annual Review of Psychology. 53: 1–25. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135114. PMID   11752477.
  24. Klein SB, Loftus J, Kihlstrom JF (2002). "Memory and Temporal Experience: The Effects of Episodic Memory Loss on an Amnesic Patient's Ability to Remember the Past and Imagine the Future". Social Cognition. 20 (5): 353–379. doi:10.1521/soco.20.5.353.21125. S2CID   19168428.
  25. D'Argembeau A, Van der Linden M (December 2004). "Phenomenal characteristics associated with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the future: influence of valence and temporal distance" (PDF). Consciousness and Cognition (Submitted manuscript). 13 (4): 844–58. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.007. PMID   15522635. S2CID   37248343.
  26. 1 2 Okuda J, Fujii T, Ohtake H, Tsukiura T, Tanji K, Suzuki K, Kawashima R, Fukuda H, Itoh M, Yamadori A (August 2003). "Thinking of the future and past: the roles of the frontal pole and the medial temporal lobes". NeuroImage. 19 (4): 1369–80. doi:10.1016/S1053-8119(03)00179-4. PMID   12948695. S2CID   25549031.
  27. Cheng S, Werning M, Suddendorf T (January 2016). "Dissociating memory traces and scenario construction in mental time travel" (PDF). Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews. 60: 82–9. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.11.011. PMID   26627866. S2CID   35479839.
  28. Hassabis D, Maguire EA (May 2009). "The construction system of the brain". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences. 364 (1521): 1263–71. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0296. PMC   2666702 . PMID   19528007.
  29. Quoidbach J, Hansenne M, Mottet C (December 2008). "Personality and mental time travel: a differential approach to autonoetic consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition (Submitted manuscript). 17 (4): 1082–92. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.04.002. hdl: 2268/2368 . PMID   18508283. S2CID   5654286.
  30. Pezzulo G (2008). "Coordinating with the Future: The Anticipatory Nature of Representation". Minds and Machines. 18 (2): 179–225. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.465.1691 . doi:10.1007/s11023-008-9095-5. S2CID   3071800.
  31. Gaesser B, DiBiase HD, Kensinger EA (September 2017). "A role for affect in the link between episodic simulation and prosociality". Memory. 25 (8): 1052–1062. doi:10.1080/09658211.2016.1254246. PMID   27841093. S2CID   4765256.
  32. Smallwood J, Schooler JW (January 2015). "The science of mind wandering: empirically navigating the stream of consciousness". Annual Review of Psychology. 66: 487–518. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015331 . PMID   25293689.
  33. Steinberg L, Graham S, O'Brien L, Woolard J, Cauffman E, Banich M (2009). "Age differences in future orientation and delay discounting". Child Development. 80 (1): 28–44. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.537.1994 . doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01244.x. PMID   19236391.
  34. Zimbardo PG, Keough KA, Boyd JN (1997). "Present time perspective as a predictor of risky driving". Personality and Individual Differences. 23 (6): 1007–1023. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(97)00113-X .
  35. Ersner-Hershfield H, Wimmer GE, Knutson B (March 2009). "Saving for the future self: neural measures of future self-continuity predict temporal discounting". Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. 4 (1): 85–92. doi:10.1093/scan/nsn042. PMC   2656877 . PMID   19047075.
  36. Addis DR, Wong AT, Schacter DL (April 2007). "Remembering the past and imagining the future: common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration". Neuropsychologia. 45 (7): 1363–77. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.10.016. PMC   1894691 . PMID   17126370.
  37. D'Argembeau A, Stawarczyk D, Majerus S, Collette F, Van der Linden M, Feyers D, Maquet P, Salmon E (August 2010). "The neural basis of personal goal processing when envisioning future events" (PDF). Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. 22 (8): 1701–13. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21314. PMID   19642887. S2CID   32824508.
  38. Cabeza R, Mangels J, Nyberg L, Habib R, Houle S, McIntosh AR, Tulving E (October 1997). "Brain regions differentially involved in remembering what and when: a PET study". Neuron. 19 (4): 863–70. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(00)80967-8 . PMID   9354332. S2CID   924382.
  39. Cabeza, Roberto; Mangels, Jennifer; Nyberg, Lars; Habib, Reza; Houle, Sylvain; McIntosh, Anthony R; Tulving, Endel (1 October 1997). "Brain Regions Differentially Involved in Remembering What and When: a PET Study". Neuron. 19 (4): 863–870. doi: 10.1016/S0896-6273(00)80967-8 . ISSN   0896-6273. PMID   9354332. S2CID   924382.
  40. Roberts WA (May 2002). "Are animals stuck in time?". Psychological Bulletin. 128 (3): 473–89. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.128.3.473. PMID   12002698. S2CID   7729195.
  41. Redshaw J, Bulley A (2018). "Future-Thinking in Animals: Capacities and Limits". In Oettingen G, Sevincer AT, Gollwitzer PM (eds.). The Psychology of Thinking about the Future. Guilford Publications. pp. 31–51. ISBN   978-1-4625-3441-8.
  42. Bischof N (1985). Das Rätsel Ödipus [The riddle of Oedipus] (in German). Piper. ISBN   978-3-492-02962-9.[ page needed ]
  43. Bischof-Köhler D (1985). "Zur Phylogenese menschlicher Motivation" [On the phylogenesis of human motivation]. In Eckensberger LH, Baltes MM (eds.). Emotion und Reflexivität[Emotion and reflexivity] (in German). München: Urban & Schwarzenberg. pp. 3–47. ISBN   978-3-541-14251-4.
  44. Köhler W (2013). The mentality of apes. Read Books.[ page needed ]
  45. Kabadayi C, Osvath M (July 2017). "Ravens parallel great apes in flexible planning for tool-use and bartering". Science. 357 (6347): 202–204. Bibcode:2017Sci...357..202K. doi: 10.1126/science.aam8138 . PMID   28706072.
  46. Mulcahy NJ, Call J (May 2006). "Apes save tools for future use". Science. 312 (5776): 1038–40. Bibcode:2006Sci...312.1038M. doi:10.1126/science.1125456. PMID   16709782. S2CID   8468216.
  47. Osvath M, Osvath H (October 2008). "Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and orangutan (Pongo abelii) forethought: self-control and pre-experience in the face of future tool use". Animal Cognition. 11 (4): 661–74. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.183.6296 . doi:10.1007/s10071-008-0157-0. PMID   18553113. S2CID   207050786.
  48. Raby CR, Alexis DM, Dickinson A, Clayton NS (February 2007). "Planning for the future by western scrub-jays". Nature. 445 (7130): 919–21. Bibcode:2007Natur.445..919R. doi:10.1038/nature05575. PMID   17314979. S2CID   4405897.
  49. Suddendorf T, Corballis MC, Collier-Baker E (September 2009). "How great is great ape foresight?". Animal Cognition. 12 (5): 751–4. doi:10.1007/s10071-009-0253-9. PMID   19565281. S2CID   7364241.
  50. Suddendorf T (May 2006). "Behavior. Foresight and evolution of the human mind". Science. 312 (5776): 1006–7. doi:10.1126/science.1129217. JSTOR   3846137. PMID   16709773. S2CID   29830044.
  51. Redshaw J, Taylor AH, Suddendorf T (November 2017). "Flexible Planning in Ravens?" (PDF). Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 21 (11): 821–822. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.09.001. PMID   28927634. S2CID   20496597.
  52. Wynn T, Coolidge FL (July 2016). "Archeological insights into hominin cognitive evolution". Evolutionary Anthropology. 25 (4): 200–13. doi:10.1002/evan.21496. PMID   27519459. S2CID   12334658.
  53. Ambrose SH (2010). "Coevolution of Composite‐Tool Technology, Constructive Memory, and Language". Current Anthropology. 51: S135–S147. doi:10.1086/650296. S2CID   142657600.
  54. Hallos J (August 2005). ""15 Minutes Of Fame": exploring the temporal dimension of middle pleistocene lithic technology". Journal of Human Evolution. 49 (2): 155–79. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.628.4393 . doi:10.1016/j.jhevol.2005.03.002. PMID   15964609.
  55. Schacter DL, Benoit RG, Szpunar KK (October 2017). "Episodic Future Thinking: Mechanisms and Functions". Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences. 17: 41–50. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.06.002. PMC   5675579 . PMID   29130061.
  56. Suddendorf T, Bulley A, Miloyan B (2018). "Prospection and natural selection". Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences. 24: 26–31. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.01.019. S2CID   53180176.
  57. Gilbert DT, Wilson TD (September 2007). "Prospection: experiencing the future". Science. 317 (5843): 1351–4. Bibcode:2007Sci...317.1351G. doi:10.1126/science.1144161. PMID   17823345. S2CID   19753427.
  58. Suddendorf T, Brinums M, Imuta K (2015). "Shaping one's future self: the development of deliberate practice". In Michaelian K, Klein SB, Szpunar KK (eds.). Seeing the future: theoretical perspectives on future-oriented mental time travel. Oxford University Press. pp. 343–66. ISBN   978-0-19-024154-4.
  59. Bulley A, Henry J, Suddendorf T (2016). "Prospection and the present moment: The role of episodic foresight in intertemporal choices between immediate and delayed rewards". Review of General Psychology. 20: 29–47. doi:10.1037/gpr0000061. S2CID   84178870.
  60. Arnold AE, Iaria G, Ekstrom AD (December 2016). "Mental simulation of routes during navigation involves adaptive temporal compression". Cognition. 157: 14–23. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.08.009. PMC   5143185 . PMID   27568586.
  61. Terrett G, Rose NS, Henry JD, Bailey PE, Altgassen M, Phillips LH, Kliegel M, Rendell PG (2018). "The relationship between prospective memory and episodic future thinking in younger and older adulthood". Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 69 (2): 310–23. doi:10.1080/17470218.2015.1054294. PMID   26018341. S2CID   18755775.
  62. Schacter DL, Benoit RG, De Brigard F, Szpunar KK (January 2015). "Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking: intersections between memory and decisions". Neurobiology of Learning and Memory. 117: 14–21. doi:10.1016/j.nlm.2013.12.008. PMC   4071128 . PMID   24373942.
  63. Byrne RM (October 2002). "Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been". Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 6 (10): 426–431. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(02)01974-5. PMID   12413576. S2CID   18582118.
  64. Klein SB, Robertson TE, Delton AW (January 2010). "Facing the future: memory as an evolved system for planning future acts". Memory & Cognition. 38 (1): 13–22. doi:10.3758/MC.38.1.13. PMC   3553218 . PMID   19966234.
  65. Osvath M (September 2010). "Great ape foresight is looking great". Animal Cognition. 13 (5): 777–81. doi:10.1007/s10071-010-0336-7. PMID   20607575. S2CID   6931050.
  66. Martin-Ordas G, Haun D, Colmenares F, Call J (March 2010). "Keeping track of time: evidence for episodic-like memory in great apes". Animal Cognition. 13 (2): 331–40. doi:10.1007/s10071-009-0282-4. PMC   2822233 . PMID   19784852.
  67. Clayton NS, Bussey TJ, Dickinson A (August 2003). "Can animals recall the past and plan for the future?". Nature Reviews. Neuroscience. 4 (8): 685–91. doi:10.1038/nrn1180. PMID   12894243. S2CID   11064341.
  68. Redshaw J, Suddendorf T (July 2016). "Children's and Apes' Preparatory Responses to Two Mutually Exclusive Possibilities". Current Biology. 26 (13): 1758–1762. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2016.04.062 . PMID   27345164.
  69. Hudson JA (2006). "The Development of Future Time Concepts Through Mother-Child Conversation". Merrill-Palmer Quarterly. 52: 70–95. doi:10.1353/mpq.2006.0005. S2CID   144754946.
  70. Atance CM (2015). "Young Children's Thinking About the Future". Child Development Perspectives. 9 (3): 178–182. doi:10.1111/cdep.12128.
  71. Suddendorf T, Nielsen M, von Gehlen R (January 2011). "Children's capacity to remember a novel problem and to secure its future solution". Developmental Science. 14 (1): 26–33. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.00950.x. PMID   21159085.
  72. Prabhakar J, Coughlin C, Ghetti S (2016). "The Neurocognitive Development of Episodic Prospection and its Implications for Academic Achievement". Mind, Brain, and Education. 10 (3): 196–206. doi:10.1111/mbe.12124.
  73. Cheke LG, Clayton NS (August 2013). "Do different tests of episodic memory produce consistent results in human adults?". Learning and Memory. 20 (9): 491–8. doi: 10.1101/lm.030502.113 . PMID   23955172.
  74. Tranel D, Jones RD (January 2006). "Knowing "what" knowing "when"". Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology. 28 (1): 43–66. doi:10.1080/13803390490919344. PMID   16448975. S2CID   23283480.
  75. Hirst W, Phelphs EA, Buckner RL, Budson AE, Cuc A, Gabrieli JD, Johnson MK, Lyle KB, Lustig C, Mather M, Meksin R, Mitchell KJ, Ochsner KN, Schacter DL, Simons JS, Vaidya CJ (May 2009). "Long-term memory for the terrorist attack of September 11: Flashbulb memories, event memories, and the factors that influence their retention". Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 138 (2): 161–76. doi:10.1037/a0015527. PMC   2925254 . PMID   19397377.
  76. 1 2 Dritschel BH, Williams JM, Baddeley AD, Nimmo-Smith I (March 1992). "Autobiographical fluency: A method for the study of personal memory". Memory and Cognition. 20 (2): 133–40. doi: 10.3758/bf03197162 . PMID   1565011.
  77. Baddeley A, Wilson B (1986). "Amnesia, autobiographical memory, and confabulation". In Rubin D (ed.). Autobiographical memory. pp.  225–252. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511558313.020. ISBN   9780521303224.
  78. Levine B, Svoboda E, Hay JF, Winocur G, Moscovitch M (December 2002). "Aging and autobiographical memory: Dissociating episodic from semantic retrieval". Psychology and Aging. 17 (4): 677–89. doi:10.1037/0882-7974.17.4.677. PMID   12507363.
  79. 1 2 Miloyan B, McFarlane KA (2019). "The measurement of episodic foresight: A systematic review of assessment instruments". Cortex. 117: 351–370. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2018.08.018. PMID   30274668. S2CID   52899584.
  80. MacLeod AK, Tata P, Tyrer P, Schmidt U, Davidson K, Thompson S (November 2005). "Hopelessness and positive and negative future thinking in parasuicide". British Journal of Clinical Psychology. 44 (4): 495–504. doi:10.1348/014466505x35704. PMID   16368029.
  81. Williams JM, Ellis NC, Tyers C, Healy H, Rose G, MacLeod AK (January 1996). "The specificity of autobiographical memory and imageability of the future". Memory and Cognition. 24 (1): 116–25. doi: 10.3758/bf03197278 . PMID   8822164.
  82. Addis DR, Wong AT, Schacter DL (January 2008). "Age-related changes in the episodic simulation of future events". Psychological Science. 19 (1): 33–41. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02043.x. PMID   18181789. S2CID   205573448.