Michigan v. Bryant

Last updated
Michigan v. Bryant
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 5, 2010
Decided February 28, 2011
Full case nameMichigan, Petitioner v. Richard Perry Bryant
Docket no. 09-150
Citations562 U.S. 344 ( more )
131 S. Ct. 1143; 179 L. Ed. 2d 93
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorDefendant convicted at trial; affirmed, case n°247039, 2004 WL 1882661 (Mich. Ct. App., 2004); vacated and remanded in light of Davis v. Washington , 477 Mich. 902, 722 N.W.2d 797 (2006); affirmed anew, case n°247039, 2007 WL 675471 (Mich. Ct. App., 2006); reversed, 483 Mich. 132, 768 N.W.2d 65 (2009)
SubsequentRemanded to Michigan Supreme Court.
Holding
Dying murder victim identification and description of the shooter and of the location of the shooting were not testimonial statements, because they had a “primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”. Their admission at trial did not violate the defendant rights under the Confrontation clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Clarence Thomas  · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer  · Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor  · Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajoritySotomayor, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Alito
ConcurrenceThomas (in judgment)
DissentScalia
DissentGinsburg
Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. VI

Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court further developed the "primary purpose" test to determine whether statements are "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes. [1] In Bryant, the Court expanded upon the test first articulated in Davis v. Washington , "addressing for the first time circumstances in which the 'ongoing emergency' discussed in Davis extended to a potential threat to the respond police and the public at large." [1]

Contents

The Court stated that determination of whether an interrogation's primary purpose was to assist in an "ongoing emergency" was an objective evaluation of the circumstances "in which the encounter occur[ed] and the statements and actions of the parties." [1]

Background

Detroit Police Department officers were dispatched to a gas station parking lot and found Anthony Covington severely wounded lying next to his car. [2] Covington told the police officers that he had been shot by Richard Bryant through the back door of Bryant's house as he turned to leave. The conversation with officers lasted five to ten minutes before ambulance services arrived. [2] Covington died hours later and Bryant was charged with murder. [2]

At trial, the officers testified about what Covington said. Bryant was found guilty of murder. The testimony of the officers was challenged as testimonial hearsay. Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed Bryant's conviction, holding that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, as explained in Crawford v. Washington (2004), rendered Covington's statements inadmissible testimonial hearsay. [3]

Opinion of the Court

The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Michigan Supreme Court's ruling, and held that the victim's statements were not testimonial hearsay, meaning the Confrontation Clause did not bar the admission of the evidence. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to Michigan courts to decide whether the statements were otherwise permissible under state hearsay rules. The test the court relied on was the primary purpose test. That test draws a distinction between statements made to the authorities that are aimed at gathering facts for the purpose of prosecution versus statements made because there is an ongoing emergency. [4]

Scalia's Dissent

In Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent, he criticized the majority opinion for distorting the "Confrontation Clause jurisprudence" and leaving the clause in "shambles." [5] Scalia stated that for a statement to be "testimonial", the declarant must have intended that the statement be "a solemn declaration rather than an unconsidered or offhand remark," and therefore the investigator's intent was irrelevant.

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment enumerating rights related to criminal prosecutions

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied all but one of this amendment's protections to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Hearsay is testimony from a witness under oath who is reciting an out-of-court statement that is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision that reformulated the standard for determining when the admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court held that prior testimonial statements of witnesses who have since become unavailable may not be admitted without cross-examination.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The right only applies to criminal prosecutions, not civil cases or other proceedings. Generally, the right is to have a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses who are offering testimonial evidence against the accused in the form of cross-examination during a trial. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to confrontation applicable to the states and not just the federal government.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and written by Justice Antonin Scalia that established the test used to determine whether a hearsay statement is "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes. Two years prior to its publication, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” The Supreme Court declined to define "testimonial" in Crawford which left lower courts without any guidance. However, in Davis v. Washington, along with Hammon v. Indiana which was consolidated with Davis, the Court clarified the meaning of "testimonial" and articulated a new standard.

In the law of evidence, a dying declaration is testimony that would normally be barred as hearsay but may in common law nonetheless be admitted as evidence in criminal law trials because it constituted the last words of a dying person. The rationale is that someone who is dying or believes death to be imminent would have less incentive to fabricate testimony, and as such, the hearsay statement carries with it some reliability.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court decision dealing with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the person who performed the test. While the court ruled that the then-common practice of submitting these reports without testimony was unconstitutional, it also held that so called "notice-and-demand" statutes are constitutional. A state would not violate the Constitution through a "notice-and-demand" statute by both putting the defendant on notice that the prosecution would submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the scientist and also giving the defendant sufficient time to raise an objection.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2009 term per curiam opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States</span>

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down nineteen per curiam opinions during its 2009 term, which began on October 5, 2009, and concluded October 3, 2010.

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that for testimonial statements to be admissible under the forfeiture exception to hearsay, the defendant must have intended to make the witness unavailable for trial.

Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement is not hearsay only if the statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose.

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), is a significant 6th Amendment Confrontation Clause case decided by the United States Supreme Court. On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court considered the issue whether a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights extend to a non-testifying laboratory analyst whose supervisor testifies as to test results that the analyst transcribed from a machine. In a five to four decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the second surrogate analyst could not testify about the testimonial statements in the forensic report of the certifying analyst under the Confrontation Clause.

Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that felony vehicle flight, as proscribed by Indiana law, is a violent felony for purposes of the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote that vehicle flight requires officers to give chase, resulting in more injuries on average than burglary. Dissenting, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for producing an ad hoc judgment based on vague legislation, suggesting they should declare the residual clause of the law unconstitutionally vague. The court would follow that advice several years later in Johnson v. United States and declare the residual clause unconstitutionally vague.

Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 5–4, that the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution's Sixth Amendment barred the admission, in a joint trial, of a non-testifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant, even if the defendant's own confession was admitted against him.

Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court further refined the test for determining whether federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state law as opposed to federal law under the Erie doctrine. The question in Stewart was whether the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), occupied the field or whether Alabama law's unfavorable stance towards forum-selection clauses should instead be applied. The Court held that the federal statute governed the District Court's decision whether to give effect to the forum-selection clause.

Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning search and seizure. A 6–3 decision reversed the weapons conviction of a Long Island man who had been detained when police followed his vehicle after he left his apartment just before it was to be searched. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and Antonin Scalia filed a concurrence. Stephen Breyer dissented.

Young v. United Parcel Service, 575 U.S. 206 (2015), is a United States Supreme Court case that the Court evaluated the requirements for bringing a disparate treatment claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that to bring such a claim, a pregnant employee must show that their employer refused to provide accommodations and that the employer later provided accommodations to other employees with similar restrictions. The Court then remanded the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to determine whether the employer engaged in discrimination under this new test.

Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015), is United States Supreme Court case opinion that narrowed the standard set in Crawford v. Washington for determining whether hearsay statements in criminal cases are permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio on June 18, 2015. The Court held that the out-of-court statements were admissible because the primary purpose was not to create evidence. Citing a prior related case, Michigan v. Bryant, the Court formulated this test as one asking "whether a statement was given with the 'primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.'"

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held in a 5–4 decision that a pretrial detainee must prove only that force used by police is excessive according to an objective standard, not that a police officer was subjectively aware that the force used was unreasonable.

Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 US 582 (1990), is a U.S. Supreme Court case involving the Self-incrimination Clause of the 5th Amendment and the meaning of “testimonial” under the 5th Amendment. A drunk-driving suspect, Muniz, made several incriminating statements while in police custody, and the Supreme Court held that only one of these statements was inadmissible because it was incriminating and testimonial. This testimonial statement was the suspect’s confused response when the police officer asked him for the date when he turned six years old. The other statements were admissible because they either counted as physical evidence for 5th Amendment purposes or fell under the routine booking exception to Miranda v. Arizona.

References

  1. 1 2 3 Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Coleman, Confrontation's Multi-Analyst Problem, 9 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 165, 171 (2021).
  2. 1 2 3 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 349 (2011)
  3. ↑ Bryant, 562 U.S. at 350.
  4. ↑ Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150, slip op. at 1 (2011).
  5. ↑ "Michigan v. Bryant". Oyez. Retrieved 9 April 2023.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.