Bullcoming v. New Mexico

Last updated
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 2, 2011
Decided June 23, 2011
Full case nameDonald Bullcoming v. State of New Mexico
Docket no. 09-10876
Citations564 U.S. 647 ( more )
131 S. Ct. 2705; 180 L. Ed. 2d 610; 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4790
Case history
PriorConviction affirmed, 2008 NMCA 97, 144 N.M. 546, 189 P.3d 679; affirmed, 2010 NMSC 007, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d 1; cert. granted, 561 U.S. 1058(2010).
Holding
A second surrogate analyst's testimony about the statements in the forensic report of a separate certifying analyst violates the Confrontation Clause.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Clarence Thomas  · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer  · Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor  · Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajorityGinsburg, joined by Scalia; Sotomayor, Kagan (all but Part IV); Thomas (all but Part IV and footnote 6)
ConcurrenceSotomayor (in part)
DissentKennedy, joined by Roberts, Breyer, Alito
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. VI

Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), is a significant 6th Amendment Confrontation Clause case decided by the United States Supreme Court. On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court considered the issue whether a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights extend to a non-testifying laboratory analyst whose supervisor testifies as to test results that the analyst transcribed from a machine. In a five to four decision authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the second surrogate analyst could not testify about the testimonial statements in the forensic report of the certifying analyst under the Confrontation Clause. [1]

Contents

The case follows a line of decisions, including Crawford v. Washington (2004) and Davis v. Washington (2006), that altered the Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause guarantee and clarified its application only to "testimonial" statements.

Background

Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. He was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. At the trial, the State used a blood alcohol test that was taken under a search warrant after Bullcoming refused to take a breathalyzer test. At his trial, the prosecution presented a lab report indicating that his blood-alcohol levels were elevated. But rather than calling the technician who had prepared and signed the report, prosecutors called a colleague who had not observed or reviewed the analysis. [2]

Issue

Whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst through the in-court testimony of a supervisor or other person who did not perform or observe the laboratory analysis described in the statements. [3]

Procedural history

On February 12, 2010, the New Mexico Supreme Court issued its written decision, cited at 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d 1. On March 2, 2011, the oral argument before the United States Supreme Court took place, during which Jeffrey L. Fisher argued on behalf of the Petitioner and Gary King argued on behalf of the Respondent. The United States Supreme Court issued its written decision on June 23, 2011.

Decision of the Supreme Court

In a 5 to 4 decision in favor of Bullcoming, Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion for the Court. [2] The US Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him," and that "surrogate testimony" is not good enough. [4]

See also

Related Research Articles

<i>Miranda</i> warning Notification given by U.S. police to criminal suspects on their rights while in custody

In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence and, in effect, protection from self-incrimination; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. Named for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, these rights are often referred to as Miranda rights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings. The idea came from law professor Yale Kamisar, who subsequently was dubbed "The father of Miranda."

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment enumerating rights related to criminal prosecutions

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied all but one of this amendment's protections to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), was a U.S. Supreme Court case involving the Sixth Amendment. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which provides criminal defendants with the right to confront witnesses against them, did not bar the use of one-way closed-circuit television to present testimony by an alleged child sex abuse victim.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), is a landmark United States Supreme Court decision that reformulated the standard for determining when the admission of hearsay statements in criminal cases is permitted under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court held that prior testimonial statements of witnesses who have since become unavailable may not be admitted without cross-examination.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The right only applies to criminal prosecutions, not civil cases or other proceedings. Generally, the right is to have a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses who are offering testimonial evidence against the accused in the form of cross-examination during a trial. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to confrontation applicable to the states and not just the federal government.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States and written by Justice Antonin Scalia that established the test used to determine whether a hearsay statement is "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes. Two years prior to its publication, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” The Supreme Court declined to define "testimonial" in Crawford which left lower courts without any guidance. However, in Davis v. Washington, along with Hammon v. Indiana which was consolidated with Davis, the Court clarified the meaning of "testimonial" and articulated a new standard.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution</span> 1791 amendment enumerating due process rights

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution creates several constitutional rights, limiting governmental powers focusing on criminal procedures. It was ratified, along with nine other articles, in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court decision dealing with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007), was a United States Supreme Court case about the application of the Confrontation Clause and whether Crawford v. Washington (2006) applied retroactively. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled that Crawford did not apply retroactively.

United States criminal procedure derives from several sources of law: the baseline protections of the United States Constitution; federal and state statutes; federal and state rules of criminal procedure ; and state and federal case law. Criminal procedures are distinct from civil procedures in the US.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that it was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation for a prosecutor to submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the person who performed the test. While the court ruled that the then-common practice of submitting these reports without testimony was unconstitutional, it also held that so called "notice-and-demand" statutes are constitutional. A state would not violate the Constitution through a "notice-and-demand" statute by both putting the defendant on notice that the prosecution would submit a chemical drug test report without the testimony of the scientist and also giving the defendant sufficient time to raise an objection.

Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that for testimonial statements to be admissible under the forfeiture exception to hearsay, the defendant must have intended to make the witness unavailable for trial.

Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court further developed the "primary purpose" test to determine whether statements are "testimonial" for Confrontation Clause purposes. In Bryant, the Court expanded upon the test first articulated in Davis v. Washington, "addressing for the first time circumstances in which the 'ongoing emergency' discussed in Davis extended to a potential threat to the respond police and the public at large."

United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), is a United States Supreme Court case that determined the constitutionality of deporting aliens who might give testimony in criminal alien smuggling prosecutions. Because deporting alien witnesses might take away a testimony that would be both “material and favorable” to the defendant, it gives rise to a potential motion from the defense to dismiss the indictment under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2011 term per curiam opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States</span>

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down fourteen per curiam opinions during its 2011 term, which began October 3, 2011 and concluded September 30, 2012.

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court decided that the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution is applicable in state courts as well as federal courts. Jackie Washington had attempted to call his co-defendant as a witness, but was blocked by Texas courts because state law prevented co-defendants from testifying for each other, under the theory that they would be likely to lie for each other on the stand.

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988), is a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held that defense witnesses can be prevented from testifying under certain circumstances, even if that hurts the defense's case. Taylor was the first case to hold that there is no absolute bar to blocking the testimony of a surprise witness, even if that is an essential witness for the defendant, a limitation of the broad right to present a defense recognized in Washington v. Texas (1967).

United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined that it is not necessary to provide full Miranda warnings to a person called to testify before a grand jury; and that false statements given during that testimony may not be suppressed in a subsequent prosecution for perjury.

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the knowing use of false testimony by a prosecutor in a criminal case violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, even if the testimony affects only the credibility of the witness and does not directly relate to the innocence or guilt of the defendant.

Hemphill v. New York, 595 U.S. ___ (2022), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court involving the application of Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In its decision, the Court ruled on when a criminal defendant who opens the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence also opens the door to evidence that would otherwise be excluded by the Confrontation Clause.

References

  1. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
  2. 1 2 "Bullcoming v. New Mexico 564 US 647 (2011)". Oyez: Chicago Kent College of Law. Retrieved 30 January 2014.
  3. "Archived copy" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-10-04. Retrieved 2011-06-26.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
  4. Liptak, Adam (24 June 2011). "Supreme Court Ruling Accepts No Substitutes in Crime Lab Testimony". The New York Times.

Further reading