Motor cognition

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The concept of motor cognition grasps the notion that cognition is embodied in action, and that the motor system participates in what is usually considered as mental processing, including those involved in social interaction. [1] The fundamental unit of the motor cognition paradigm is action, defined as the movements produced to satisfy an intention towards a specific motor goal, or in reaction to a meaningful event in the physical and social environments. Motor cognition takes into account the preparation and production of actions, as well as the processes involved in recognizing, predicting, mimicking, and understanding the behavior of other people. This paradigm has received a great deal of attention and empirical support in recent years from a variety of research domains including embodied cognition, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and social psychology.

Contents

Perception-action coupling

The idea of a continuity between the different aspects of motor cognition is not new. In fact, this idea can be traced to the work of the American psychologist William James and more recently, American neurophysiologist and Nobel prize winner Roger Sperry. Sperry argued that the perception-action cycle is the fundamental logic of the nervous system. [2] Perception and action processes are functionally intertwined: perception is a means to action and action is a means to perception. Indeed, the vertebrate brain has evolved for governing motor activity with the basic function to transform sensory patterns into patterns of motor coordination.

More recently, there is growing empirical evidence from cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive science, as well as social psychology which demonstrates that perception and action share common computational codes and underlying neural architectures. This evidence has been marshaled in the "common coding theory" put forward by Wolfgang Prinz and his colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig, Germany. [3] This theory claims parity between perception and action. Its core assumption is that actions are coded in terms of the perceivable effects (i.e., the distal perceptual events) they should generate. [4] Performing a movement leaves behind a bidirectional association between the motor pattern it has generated and the sensory effects that it produces. Such an association can then be used backward to retrieve a movement by anticipating its effects. These perception/action codes are also accessible during action observation. Other authors suggest a new notion of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origin of action understanding that utilizes the motor system; the motor cognition hypothesis. This states that motor cognition provides both human and nonhuman primates with a direct, prereflexive understanding of biological actions that match their own action catalog. [5]

The discovery of mirror neurons in the ventral premotor and parietal cortices of the macaque monkey that fire both when it carries out a goal-directed action and when it observes the same action performed by another individual provides neurophysiological evidence for a direct matching between action perception and action production. [6] An example of such coupling is the ease with which people can engage in speech repetition when asked to shadow words heard in earphones. [7]

In humans, common neural activation during action observation and execution has been well documented. A variety of functional neuroimaging studies, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography, and magnetoencephalography have demonstrated that a motor resonance mechanism in the premotor and posterior parietal cortices occurs when participants observe or produce goal-directed actions. [8] [9] Such a motor resonance system seems to be hard-wired, or at least functional very early in life. [10] [11]

Shared representations between other and self

The common coding theory also states that perception of an action should activate action representations to the degree that the perceived and the represented action are similar. [12] As such, these representations may be shared between individuals. Indeed, the meaning of a given object, action, or social situation may be common to several people and activate corresponding distributed patterns of neural activity in their respective brains. [13] There is an impressive number of behavioral and neurophysiological studies demonstrating that perception and action have a common neuronal coding and that this leads to shared representations between self and others, which can lead to host of phenomena such as emotional contagion, empathy, social facilitation, and understanding others minds. [14]

Motor priming

One consequence of the functional equivalence between perception and action is that watching an action performed by another person facilitates the later reproduction of that action in the observer. For instance, in one study, participants executed arm movements while observing either a robot or another human producing the same or qualitatively different arm movements. [15] The results show that observing another human make incongruent movements interferes with movement execution but observing a robotic arm making incongruent movements does not.

Social facilitation

The fact that the observation of action can prime a similar response in the observer, and that the degree to which the observed action facilitates a similar response in the observer cast some light into the phenomenon called social facilitation, first described by Robert Zajonc, which accounts for the demonstration that the presence of other people can affect individual performance. [16] A number of studies have demonstrated that watching facial expression of emotions prompts the observer to resonate with the state of another individual, with the observer activating the motor representations and associated autonomic and somatic responses that stem from the observed target. [17]

Mental state understanding

Humans have a tendency to interpret the actions of others with respect to underlying mental states. One important question is whether the perception-action matching mechanism and its product, shared motor representations, can account (or to what extent it does) for the attribution of mental states to others (often dubbed theory of mind mechanism). Some authors have suggested that the shared representations network that stems from the perception-action matching mechanism may support mental state attribution via covert (i.e., unconscious) mental simulation. [18] In contrast, some other scholars have argued that the mirror system and the theory of mind system are two distinct processes and it’s likely that the former cannot account for mental state understanding. [19] [20]

Cognition and action

To understand the relationship between cognition and action, Cherie L. Gerstadt, Yoon Joo Hong, and Adele Diamond of the University of Pennsylvania carried out a Stroop like day-night test [21] on children between the age of 3 - 7 years. They tested one hundred and sixty children on a task that requires inhibitory control of action plus learning and remembering two rules. They found that the response latency decreased from 3 to 4 years. They concluded that the requirement to learn and remember two rules is not in itself sufficient to account for the poor performance of the younger children. [22] Vygotsky’s Theory of Cognitive Development tells us that children are more likely to be cognitively advanced if they are more physically active. This is because playing and physical activity allows children to branch out into new situations and helps them learn strategies for learning new information [23]

Reasoning

A series of experiments demonstrated the interrelation between motor experience and high-level reasoning. For example, although most individuals recruit visual processes when presented with spatial problems such as mental rotation tasks [24] motor experts favor motor processes to perform the same tasks, with higher overall performance. [25] A related study showed that motor experts use similar processes for the mental rotation of body parts and polygons, whereas non-experts treated these stimuli differently. [26] These results were not due to underlying confounds, as demonstrated by a training study that showed mental rotation improvements after a one-year motor training, compared with controls. [27] Similar patterns were also found in working memory tasks, with the ability to remember movements being greatly disrupted by a secondary verbal task in controls and by a motor task in motor experts, suggesting the involvement of different processes to store movements depending on motor experience, namely verbal for controls and motor for experts. [28]

Mirror neurons

Recent discoveries in the field of social neuroscience have heavily implicated mirror neurons and their related systems as a possible neurological basis for social cognition specifically factors that involve motor cognition. In chimpanzees (the closest living relative to humans) mirror neuron systems have been shown to be highly active when the ape is observing another individual (ape or human) perform a physical action such as grasping, holding, or hitting. [29] Mirror neuron regions in the ventral premotor cortex, dorsal premotor cortex, and intraparietal cortex have been found to activate in humans for similar situations of observing an individual perform one of but not limited to the aforementioned physical tasks. [30] The activation of the mirror neuron system is automatic and goes beyond recognition of simple physical actions but is thought to be the reason why an individual is able to guess and understand another individual's actions. [29] [30]

fMRI studies in humans have been gathering evidence that mirror neurons are responsible for the "Physical to self-mapping" [31] In studies where participants had to identify their own face, right hemispheric mirror neurons activated indicating responsibility for the ability of one to represent one’s own physical actions/states. These same areas also fire when the individual views others performing physical actions such as grasping or tearing. [31] [32] This activation implies that there is a unique neural connection going on for an individual. Thus the mirror neuron system allows for a bridge between the self to the actions of others. This has been theorized to enable the understanding of intention or the goals of others. [33] [34] A study by Spunt and Liberman (2013) used an fMRI study to observe mirror neurons in the brain. Participants observed a video of an action being performed under a high or low cognitive load. While watching, they were instructed to observe why the action was being performed, what action was being performed, or how the action was being performed. The end result provided direct evidence for activation and more importantly automaticity of the mirror neurons in the dorsal premotor cortex, ventral premotor cortex, and anterior Intraparietal sulcus. [30]

Although a large amount of supporting evidence indicates that mirror neurons activate in situations where one is analyzing oneself to the actions of others, [33] there is still debate as to whether these activations should be interpreted as intentional understanding. Shannon Spaulding (2013) argues that the neuroscientists who offer up mirror neurons as a physiological answer to social cognition are misinterpreting their results and not using the correct philosophical definitions of goal and intention. Rather than being interchangeable or one leading to the other, she argues they need to be thought of as two separate actions. [34]

The discovery of the link between mirror neurons and social cognition provides further links to a neurological basis found in other social phenomena such as social learning theory, empathy, and observational learning. [29] [35]

See also

Related Research Articles

Empathy Capacity to understand or feel what another person is experiencing

Empathy is the capacity to understand or feel what another person is experiencing from within their frame of reference, that is, the capacity to place oneself in another's position. Definitions of empathy encompass a broad range of social, cognitive and emotional processes primarily concerned with understanding others. Types of empathy include cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, somatic, and spiritual empathy.

In psychology, theory of mind refers to the capacity to understand other people by ascribing mental states to them. These states may be different from one's own states and include beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, and thoughts. Possessing a functional theory of mind is considered crucial for success in everyday human social interactions and is used when analyzing, judging, and inferring others' behaviors. Deficits can occur in people with autism spectrum disorders, genetic-based eating disorders, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, cocaine addiction, and brain damage suffered from alcohol's neurotoxicity; deficits associated with opiate addiction are reversed after prolonged abstinence. Having a theory of mind is very similar to but not identical with having the capacity for empathy or for sympathy.

Brodmann area 44

Brodmann area 44, or BA44, is part of the frontal cortex in the human brain. Situated just anterior to premotor cortex (BA6) and on the lateral surface, inferior to BA9.

A mental image or mental picture is an experience that, on most occasions, significantly resembles the experience of visually perceiving some object, event, or scene, but occurs when the relevant object, event, or scene is not actually present to the senses. There are sometimes episodes, particularly on falling asleep and waking up (hypnopompic), when the mental imagery, being of a rapid, phantasmagoric and involuntary character, defies perception, presenting a kaleidoscopic field, in which no distinct object can be discerned. Mental imagery can sometimes produce the same effects as would be produced by the behavior or experience imagined.

A mirror neuron is a neuron that fires both when an animal acts and when the animal observes the same action performed by another. Thus, the neuron "mirrors" the behavior of the other, as though the observer were itself acting. Such neurons have been directly observed in human and primate species, and birds.

Mu wave Electrical activity in the part of the brain controlling voluntary movement

The sensorimotor mu rhythm, also known as mu wave, comb or wicket rhythms or arciform rhythms, are synchronized patterns of electrical activity involving large numbers of neurons, probably of the pyramidal type, in the part of the brain that controls voluntary movement. These patterns as measured by electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), or electrocorticography (ECoG), repeat at a frequency of 7.5–12.5 Hz, and are most prominent when the body is physically at rest. Unlike the alpha wave, which occurs at a similar frequency over the resting visual cortex at the back of the scalp, the mu rhythm is found over the motor cortex, in a band approximately from ear to ear. A person suppresses mu rhythms when he or she performs a motor action or, with practice, when he or she visualizes performing a motor action. This suppression is called desynchronization of the wave because EEG wave forms are caused by large numbers of neurons firing in synchrony. The mu rhythm is even suppressed when one observes another person performing a motor action or an abstract motion with biological characteristics. Researchers such as V. S. Ramachandran and colleagues have suggested that this is a sign that the mirror neuron system is involved in mu rhythm suppression, although others disagree.

Simulation theory of empathy is a theory that holds that humans anticipate and make sense of the behavior of others by activating mental processes that, if carried into action, would produce similar behavior. This includes intentional behavior as well as the expression of emotions. The theory states that children use their own emotions to predict what others will do. Therefore, we project our own mental states onto others.
Simulation theory is not primarily a theory of empathy, but rather a theory of how people understand others—that they do so by way of a kind of empathetic response. This theory uses more biological evidence than other theories of mind, such as the theory-theory.

Wolfgang Prinz German cognitive psychologist

Wolfgang Prinz is a German cognitive psychologist. He is the director of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences in Leipzig, Germany, and an internationally recognized expert in experimental psychology, cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind. He is the founder of the common coding theory between perception and action that has a significant impact in cognitive neuroscience and social cognition.

Biological motion Motion that comes from actions of a biological organism

Biological motion is motion that comes from actions of a biological organism. Humans and animals are able to understand those actions through experience, identification, and higher level neural processing. Humans use biological motion to identify and understand familiar actions, which is involved in the neural processes for empathy, communication, and understanding other's intentions. The neural network for biological motion is highly sensitive to the observer's prior experience with the action's biological motions, allowing for embodied learning. This is related to a research field that is broadly known as embodied cognitive science, along with research on mirror neurons.

Common coding theory is a cognitive psychology theory describing how perceptual representations and motor representations are linked. The theory claims that there is a shared representation for both perception and action. More important, seeing an event activates the action associated with that event, and performing an action activates the associated perceptual event.

Vittorio Gallese

Vittorio Gallese is professor of Psychobiology at the University of Parma, Italy, and was professor in Experimental Aesthetics at the University of London, UK (2016-2018). He is an expert in neurophysiology, cognitive neuroscience, social neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. Gallese is one of the discoverers of mirror neurons. His research attempts to elucidate the functional organization of brain mechanisms underlying social cognition, including action understanding, empathy, language, mindreading and aesthetic experience.

Motor imagery is a mental process by which an individual rehearses or simulates a given action. It is widely used in sport training as mental practice of action, neurological rehabilitation, and has also been employed as a research paradigm in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology to investigate the content and the structure of covert processes that precede the execution of action. In some medical, musical, and athletic contexts, when paired with physical rehearsal, mental rehearsal can be as effective as pure physical rehearsal (practice) of an action.

The motor theory of speech perception is the hypothesis that people perceive spoken words by identifying the vocal tract gestures with which they are pronounced rather than by identifying the sound patterns that speech generates. It originally claimed that speech perception is done through a specialized module that is innate and human-specific. Though the idea of a module has been qualified in more recent versions of the theory, the idea remains that the role of the speech motor system is not only to produce speech articulations but also to detect them.

Associative sequence learning (ASL) explains how mirror neurons are able to match observed and performed actions, and how individuals are able to imitate body movements. The theory was proposed by Cecilia Heyes in 2000.. A conceptually similar model proposed by Christian Keysers and David Perrett, based on what we know about the neural properties of mirror neurons and spike-timing-dependent plasticity is the Hebbian learning account of mirror neurons.

Cultural neuroscience is a field of research that focuses on the interrelation between a human’s cultural environment and neurobiological systems. The field particularly incorporates ideas and perspectives from related domains like anthropology, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience to study sociocultural influences on human behaviors. Such impacts on behavior are often measured using various neuroimaging methods, through which cross-cultural variability in neural activity can be examined.

The neuroscience of music is the scientific study of brain-based mechanisms involved in the cognitive processes underlying music. These behaviours include music listening, performing, composing, reading, writing, and ancillary activities. It also is increasingly concerned with the brain basis for musical aesthetics and musical emotion. Scientists working in this field may have training in cognitive neuroscience, neurology, neuroanatomy, psychology, music theory, computer science, and other relevant fields.

Embodied cognition Interdisciplinary theory

Embodied cognition is the theory that many features of cognition, whether human or otherwise, are shaped by aspects of the entire body of the organism. The features of cognition include high level mental constructs and performance on various cognitive tasks. The aspects of the body include the motor system, the perceptual system, bodily interactions with the environment (situatedness), and the assumptions about the world that are built into the structure of the organism.

Mirror-touch synesthesia is a rare condition which causes individuals to experience a similar sensation in the same part or opposite part of the body that another person feels. For example, if someone with this condition were to observe someone touching their cheek, they would feel the same sensation on their own cheek. Synesthesia, in general, is described as a condition in which a stimulus causes an individual to experience an additional sensation. Synesthesia is usually a developmental condition; however, recent research has shown that mirror touch synesthesia can be acquired after sensory loss following amputation.

Social cognitive neuroscience is the scientific study of the biological processes underpinning social cognition. Specifically, it uses the tools of neuroscience to study "the mental mechanisms that create, frame, regulate, and respond to our experience of the social world". Social cognitive neuroscience uses the epistemological foundations of cognitive neuroscience, and is closely related to social neuroscience. Social cognitive neuroscience employs human neuroimaging, typically using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Human brain stimulation techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct-current stimulation are also used. In nonhuman animals, direct electrophysiological recordings and electrical stimulation of single cells and neuronal populations are utilized for investigating lower-level social cognitive processes.

Valeria Gazzola is an Italian neuroscientist, associate professor at the Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of Amsterdam (UvA) and member of the Young Academy of Europe. She is also a tenured department head at the Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience (NIN) in Amsterdam, where she leads her own research group and the Social Brain Lab together with neuroscientist Christian Keysers. She is a specialist in the neural basis of empathy and embodied cognition: Her research focusses on how the brain makes individuals sensitive to the actions and emotions of others and how this affects decision-making.

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