Following the July Revolution in Bangladesh, there had been increase of political violence, militant activities, and even insurgent attributed uprisings by the loyalists of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League, the student wing of the Awami League, following the collapse of Hasina's government on 5 August 2024 and the formation of an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.[1] The period was marked by widespread unrest, including armed clashes, vandalism, harassment of opponents, and localized uprisings allegedly involving Awami League activists and student cadres.[2] Analysts have described the phenomenon as a pro-Awami insurgency that emerged in response to the sudden downfall of the country's longest-serving prime minister.[3]
The interim government responded by outlawing organisations linked to Hasina's political base. On 23 October 2024, the Bangladesh Chhatra League was banned under the Anti-Terrorism Act, with the government citing its involvement in murder, torture, sexual harassment, extortion, tender manipulation, and violent attacks during the protests.[4] In May 2025, the ban was extended to cover the Awami League itself and all affiliated organisations, prohibiting their meetings, rallies, and online activities until judicial proceedings against party leaders are resolved.[5] These steps marked the first time in Bangladesh's history that the country's largest political party was legally designated as a terrorist organisation.
Reports from rights groups and media outlets documented numerous violent incidents during the transitional period. Human Rights Watch noted that dozens of police stations were attacked or burned down, and at least 40 police officers were killed in clashes with protesters and loyalists of the ousted regime.[6] Minority organisations reported 205 attacks on Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian communities in 52 districts in the immediate aftermath of Hasina's departure, with allegations that Awami League supporters were involved in some cases.[7] At universities, student activists associated with the Chhatra League were accused of attacking rivals and attempting to reassert control over campus politics despite the government crackdown.[8]
The characterization of these incidents as "militancy" is politically contested. Supporters of the interim government argue that pro-Hasina groups operated in ways resembling insurgent cells, employing arson, armed ambushes, and coordinated intimidation campaigns.[9] However, critics contend that the government has used the label of militancy to justify sweeping bans on political opponents, suppress dissent, and centralise power under the guise of counter-terrorism.[10] The phenomenon remains a subject of domestic and international debate, with implications for Bangladesh's democratic future and regional stability.
Post-uprising violence
In the months following the fall of the Mujibist government in August 2024, Bangladesh experienced a surge in violent unrest and militant-style activities. Organised criminal networks and vigilante groups reportedly took advantage of the weakened law enforcement system, engaging in armed attacks, looting, and mob justice.[11] In some areas, mob violence escalated into large-scale communal riots, particularly targeting Hindu communities. Human rights monitors documented at least 205 attacks on Hindu, Buddhist, and Christian minorities across 52 districts between August and September 2024.[12]
The violence drew concern from neighbouring India, whose officials publicly blamed elements of right-wing and conservative political networks for orchestrating anti-Hindu riots.[13] However, mainstream Islamist parties such as Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami rejected accusations of complicity, and in several cases were reported to have coordinated with the interim government, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and protester coordination bodies from the July Revolution, such as the Students Against Discrimination, to provide protection for Hindu temples and minority neighbourhoods during the unrest.[14]
The contradictory roles of different actors—ranging from Awami League loyalists and Islamist street movements to opposition parties and protester coalitions—have been highlighted by analysts as evidence of the fragmented and volatile security environment that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the uprising.[15]
Role of Sheikh Hasina loyalists and BCL militants
Following the overthrow of the Mujibist government, networks loyal to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina—including factions of the Bangladesh Chhatra League, the student wing of the Awami League—remained active in Dhaka and several district towns.[16] Reports indicated that BCL militants and Hasina loyalist groups carried out reprisal attacks against protesters, opposition activists, and defectors from the Awami League. These groups were accused of using firearms, makeshift explosives, and extortion rackets to reassert influence in local areas.[17]
Several eyewitness accounts described BCL militants setting up roadblocks in parts of Dhaka and Chittagong to disrupt protester supply chains and staging targeted assaults against activists of the Students Against Discrimination.[18] In some districts, particularly in Rajshahi and Khulna divisions, BCL-linked groups were also accused of involvement in communal violence during the post-uprising unrest, although Awami League spokespeople denied organisational responsibility.[19]
While many BCL units disbanded or went underground after the fall of Hasina's government, some elements realigned themselves with emerging pro-Awami League underground networks. Analysts have argued that the persistence of BCL militant activity highlighted the enduring fragmentation of Bangladesh's political order after the uprising.[20]
Resurgence of Maoists
Following the fall of the Mujibist government in August 2024, Maoist groups, long marginalized in Bangladeshi politics, reemerged in the public sphere. These groups had historically been labeled as insurgents, terrorists, or "anti-liberation forces" by the Awami League. Among them, the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (PBSP), which had previously waged an armed people's war against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's BAKSAL regime in the 1970s, became actively involved in post-uprising politics.[21]
During this period, PBSP publicly demanded extortion from business owners in several districts, asserting that the funds would support revolutionary activities. Human rights observers reported that these actions contributed to local instability and increased fears of organized criminality under the guise of political activism.[22]
The Bangladesh Students' Union, led by Meghmallar, openly called for a "red terror" campaign, framing it as defensive measures to protect communist activists during the revolutionary turmoil. This call sparked controversy across political and civil society circles, as critics argued that it encouraged further violence and lawlessness, while supporters claimed it was necessary to counter threats from other militant factions.[23]
Analysts have noted that the reemergence of Maoist groups highlighted the fragmented nature of post-uprising Bangladesh, with multiple armed and semi-armed actors exploiting the weakened state apparatus for political and financial leverage.[24]
Conflict with right-wing Islamists
During the post-uprising period, Maoist groups, including the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (PBSP), frequently clashed with right-wing Islamist factions, particularly street-based movements that had gained influence during the political vacuum. Analysts noted that the Maoists targeted these Islamist groups to assert control over urban and rural territories and to prevent the consolidation of conservative militias.[25]
Eyewitness reports described skirmishes in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Rajshahi, where Maoist units confronted Islamist street cells using improvised weapons and small arms. Several minor explosions and armed standoffs were documented, though large-scale civilian casualties were limited due to the ad hoc nature of the confrontations.[26]
The Bangladesh Students' Union, which had called for “red terror” to defend communist activists, publicly framed some of these confrontations as defensive actions against Islamist aggressors, creating a controversial narrative of ideological struggle. Human rights observers warned that this tit-for-tat violence contributed to further destabilization of urban areas and increased risks for minority communities caught in between.[27]
Analysts argued that these conflicts reflected the broader fragmentation of post-uprising Bangladesh, where multiple armed actors—including Maoists, Islamist groups, Awami loyalists, and vigilante networks—competed for influence, often exploiting gaps in law enforcement and local governance.[28]
It was a security operation launched by the government in October 2024 to dismantle armed networks loyal to the former Awami League government, including factions of the Bangladesh Chhatra League and underground Mujibist militias. The operation was initiated following months of post-uprising violence, including armed attacks, extortion, and clashes with protester coordination groups such as the Students Against Discrimination.[29]
The stated objectives of the operation included the arrest of key Awami League leaders, disbanding of BCL militant cells, and seizure of weapons caches in Dhaka and major district towns. According to government statements, over 120 suspected militants were apprehended in the first week, and multiple safe houses were raided.[30]
The operation reportedly employed combined forces of the police, paramilitary units, and intelligence agencies, who coordinated pre-dawn raids to minimize civilian casualties. Eyewitness accounts described heavy security presence, roadblocks, and cordons in urban neighborhoods identified as strongholds of Awami loyalists.[31]
Human rights observers raised concerns about the conduct of some operations, alleging instances of excessive force, unlawful detentions, and property damage. The government defended the operation as necessary to restore law and order, describing it as a targeted campaign against organized militancy rather than a politically motivated crackdown.[32]
By late November 2024, officials claimed that the majority of high-ranking Awami League militant networks had been neutralized, though sporadic incidents of armed resistance and protester mobilization continued in some districts. Analysts have noted that the operation significantly weakened organized Mujibist networks, though it also contributed to tensions between interim authorities and pro-Awami communities.[33]
Jihadist Activities
Mobilizations of Towhidi Janata
During the post-uprising instability, jihadist and Islamist elements gained visibility in Bangladesh. Towhidi Janata militias were reported to be highly active, mobilizing against Sufi groups and factions loyal to the former Mujibist regime.[34] Nationwide campaigns were carried out targeting shrines and Sufi centers, with rallies and demonstrations described as anti-shrine mobilizations.[35] Analysts noted that these activities contributed to sectarian tension, particularly in areas where Mujibist supporters had been active.
Outlawed politics
Banned or outlawed parties, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, also became visible in public demonstrations. These groups organized calls for a March for Khilafat, which culminated in clashes with security forces near Baitul Mukarram Mosque.[36] Many demonstrators carried black shahadah flags, which some observers labeled as symbols linked to Al-Qaeda.[37] Supporters and defenders, however, argued that the flags represented resistance and unity rather than terrorism.
Pakistani Taliban in Bangladesh
In 2025, legal cases were filed against several Islamic speakers and philosophers, including Asif Adnan and Zakaria Masood, accusing them of attempting to facilitate the establishment of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) cells in Bangladesh.[38] Asif Adnan held a press conference denying all allegations and announced the formation of a new organisation, Intifada Bangladesh, advocating political activism within Bangladesh's legal framework.[39]
In September 2025, Khelafat Majlis Emir Mamunul Haque traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Taliban officials. Haque stated that the meeting was primarily diplomatic and spiritual in nature, rather than political.[40] Later that month, a Bangladeshi citizen affiliated with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan was reportedly killed by Pakistani security forces during counterterrorism operations along the Afghan-Pakistan border.[41]
These events indicated that jihadist and transnational Islamist networks had gained operational visibility in Bangladesh during the period of political instability, though the scope and scale of their activities remained limited compared to domestic militant groups.
Major attacks
Several major violent incidents occurred during the post-uprising instability, involving pro-Awami League militants, Maoists, and Islamist factions. Security analysts described these attacks as indicative of the fragmented militant landscape in Bangladesh during 2024–25.[42]
One of the earliest incidents was the bombing of a National Citizen Party (NCP) office in Dhaka, which police attributed to Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) militants. The explosion caused significant property damage, though no casualties were reported.[43]
In early October 2024, shortly before the launch of Operation Devil Hunt, several students linked to the July Revolution protests were killed in clashes allegedly involving BCL militants. Human rights groups accused Awami loyalists of targeted killings intended to intimidate opposition organizers.[44]
Another significant incident occurred when BCL-linked groups carried out a series of "cocktail bomb" attacks on police patrols in Dhaka and Chittagong, wounding several officers. The use of improvised explosives marked a shift in BCL militant tactics from street violence to more organized forms of insurgent activity.[45]
Other militant groups were also implicated in violent incidents. Maoist cadres of the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (PBSP) were accused of extortion-related killings in Rajshahi and Khulna divisions, targeting businessmen who refused to pay chanda (extortion money).[46]
Meanwhile, Islamist elements including Towhidi Janata organized anti-shrine demonstrations that turned violent in Sylhet, resulting in the destruction of Sufi shrines and at least five civilian deaths.[47]
Outlawed parties such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir were also linked to clashes with security forces. During the "March for Khilafat" near Baitul Mukarram Mosque, demonstrators armed with sticks and crude explosives confronted riot police, leaving dozens injured on both sides.[48]
Collectively, these incidents illustrated the multiplicity of armed actors—ranging from Mujibist loyalists and Maoists to Islamist groups—who exploited the power vacuum during Bangladesh's transitional period.
Violence and Riots
Following the collapse of the Mujibist government, Bangladesh experienced widespread unrest beyond communal riots, involving politically and ethnically motivated violence. Security analysts noted that these events reflected both local grievances and the broader instability of the transitional period.[49]
On July 16, 2025, Gopalganj witnessed significant political violence during a rally organized by the National Citizen Party (NCP) to mark the one-year anniversary of the July Revolution. Supporters of the deposed Awami League, including its student wing Chhatra League, clashed with security forces and NCP demonstrators. The violence resulted in at least five deaths and numerous injuries. The NCP accused the Awami League of orchestrating the attacks, while the Awami League claimed that its members were targeted by the army. Authorities imposed a curfew in the town.[50][51]
Khagrachhari Violence and Tribal Uprisings
In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, particularly in Khagrachhari district, localized violence erupted amid tensions between tribal communities and paramilitary units. Tribal insurgents affiliated with the United People's Democratic Front (UPDF) launched attacks on government outposts, claiming to defend land rights and autonomy. Allegations emerged that external actors, including Indian intermediaries and former Awami League affiliates, were supporting certain factions within the tribal uprisings. While some observers cited cross-border tribal networks and historic grievances, these claims were difficult to independently verify. The Khagrachhari violence resulted in several fatalities, destruction of local infrastructure, and temporary displacement of tribal communities. Security forces conducted limited counter-insurgency operations, though sporadic clashes continued for several weeks.[52][53]
Sunni–Qaumi clash in Hathazari
In Hathazari, Chittagong, a violent clash occurred in August 2025 between local Sunni groups and Qaumi madrasa-affiliated activists. The confrontation reportedly began over control of local religious institutions and escalated into street fights, resulting in at least three deaths and multiple injuries. Police intervened to restore order, imposing temporary curfews in affected neighborhoods. Observers noted that the clash reflected long-standing sectarian tensions exacerbated by the broader post-uprising instability.[54]
Collectively, these episodes demonstrated that post-uprising violence in Bangladesh was multi-faceted, involving politically motivated attacks, tribal insurgencies, sectarian clashes, and the exploitation of local grievances by both domestic and transnational actors.
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Sheikh Hasina 
Saddam Hossain 
