Operation Kutuzov

Last updated
Operation Kutuzov
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
Orel T34 by Moskovskaya Street 1943.2.jpg
Soviet T-34 tanks enter Orel, 1943
Date12 July – 18 August 1943
(1 month and 6 days)
Location
Result Soviet victory
Belligerents
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg  Germany Flag of the USSR (1936-1955).svg  Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Walter Model
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Lothar Rendulic
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Günther von Kluge
Flag of Germany (1935-1945).svg Robert von Greim
Flag of the USSR (1936-1955).svg Konstantin Rokossovsky
Flag of the USSR (1936-1955).svg Ivan Bagramyan
Flag of the USSR (1936-1955).svg Vasili Sokolovsky
Flag of the USSR (1936-1955).svg Markian Popov
Strength
300,700 men [1]
625 tanks and assault guns [1]
610 aircraft [1]
5,500 guns [1]
1,286,000 men [2] [ full citation needed ]
2,409 tanks and assault guns [2]
2,220 [3] –3,023 [2] aircraft
26,379 guns [2]
Casualties and losses

86,454 men [4]

14,215 killed
11,300 missing
60,939 wounded
unknown tanks [N 1]
unknown guns
218 aircraft [6]

429,890 men [7] [8]

112,529 dead or missing
317,361 wounded or sick
2,586 tanks destroyed [9]
892 guns lost [9]
1,014 aircraft destroyed [9]

Operation Kutuzov was the first of the two counteroffensives launched by the Red Army as part of the Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation. It commenced on 12 July 1943, in the Central Russian Upland, against Army Group Center of the German Heer . The operation was named after General Mikhail Kutuzov, the Russian general credited with saving Russia from Napoleon during the French invasion of Russia in 1812. Operation Kutuzov was one of two large-scale Soviet operations launched as counteroffensives against Operation Citadel. The Operation began on 12 July and ended on 18 August 1943 with the capture of Orel and collapse of the Orel bulge.

Contents

Background

As the end of the rasputitsa or rainy season approached, the Soviet command considered their next steps. Stalin strongly desired to seize the initiative and attack the German forces but was convinced by his senior commanders to take an initial defensive posture and allow the Germans to weaken themselves in attacking prepared positions. After this the Soviet forces would go over onto the offensive. [10] Operation Kutuzov was the offensive plan for the Soviet forces before Moscow facing the German forces of Army Group Center. It was carried out by three Soviet Fronts or army groups: the Western Front, the Bryansk Front and the Central Front. The offensive was directed north of the Kursk area against the German 2nd Panzer Army, with the intention of cutting behind and trapping the German 9th Army then conducting offensive operations against the Kursk salient. [11]

The Germans had spread their forces thin all across the front in an effort to provide as much men and material as possible for Operation Citadel. Holding the front before the Soviet offensive were the 2nd Panzer Army and elements of the 9th Army. The region had been held by German forces for nearly two years and despite Hitler's admonition not to build defensive works behind the front, some preparations had been made. A defensive line had been started that was 5–7 kilometres (3.1–4.3 mi) in depth, consisting of minefields, interconnected trench works, and strong points. Wherever possible, the Germans took advantage of terrain features such as streams, ravines and gullies but the positions were thinly held. [12]

The Soviet high command planned two offensives as part of a large general offensive throughout the eastern front. [13] Operation Kutuzov was the northern offensive (the other being the Donbas offensive south of Kursk), with its objective being to collapse the Orel salient, cut behind the 9th Army engaged in offensive operations at Kursk, encircle and annihilate it. In doing so they hoped to cause a general collapse of the German forces in the Soviet Union. The attack was to begin once the German panzer units engaged in Operation Citadel were locked into combat and weakened by their offensive at Kursk. The initial attack was to be made simultaneously on the northern and eastern faces of the Orel salient, with the Central Front along the southern face of the salient joining in as well, once the German offensive had been stopped.

German intelligence had revealed the Soviet forces massing opposite the 2nd Panzer Army and these had caused great concern to Kluge and Model. The Soviet armies earmarked for the operation had amassed a force of 1,286,000 men and 2,400 tanks. These were supported by 26,400 guns and 3,000 aircraft. [14] [15]

Map of Operation Kutuzov Operation Kutusov (map).jpg
Map of Operation Kutuzov

The Soviet offensive was aided by partisan attacks behind the German lines. Approximately 100,000 Soviet partisans (according to Soviet reports) were working to disrupt German efforts to supply and reinforce their forces. German movements of ammunition and reinforcements were hampered throughout the operation by attacks on German communications and supply routes, especially railway lines. The partisans operated under the guidance of the Red Army. [16]

Offensive

On 12 July, a heavy artillery barrage marked the launching of the offensive. The armies of the Bryansk Front and the Western Front attacked along the north and north-east flanks of the 2nd Panzer Army. The Western Front assault was led by the 11th Guards Army under Lieutenant General Hovhannes Bagramyan, supported by the 1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviets attacked with overwhelming numbers. Along one 16-kilometre (9.9 mi) attack sector near Ulianovo, six Soviet rifle divisions attacked two German infantry regiments. At 5–7 kilometres (3.1–4.3 mi) in depth, the German defensive lines were deeper than the Soviets expected. The Soviet spearheads sustained heavy casualties but pushed through and in some areas achieved significant penetration. [17] [18] The defenders were overwhelmed by the afternoon of the first day, with the 11th Guards Army advancing some 23 kilometres (14 mi). The German 5th Panzer Division attempted to fill the breach but they were met by the Soviet supporting armour and were forced back.

The initial attacks on the eastern face by the Bryansk Front were less successful. The 61st, 3rd, and 63rd armies advanced 8, 14 and 15 kilometres (5.0, 8.7 and 9.3 mi) respectively. The following day the German LIII Army Corps counter-attacked and brought the Bryansk Front to a halt. The open terrain favored the longer ranged guns of the Germans. Kluge and Model had anticipated the Soviet attack and were quick to transfer units from the Kursk area to reinforce the defenders. Their timely arrival helped check the Soviet advance.

Farther north the 11th Guards Army was forcing its way through the German defences. The Germans lacked the reserves to block these penetrations. With the danger of a breakthrough and subsequent encirclement of their forces, the situation soon became serious for the 2nd Panzer Army. [18] Army Group Centre transferred command of the 2nd Panzer Army to Model by the end of the second day. As Model was already commanding the German 9th Army making the north portion of the Kursk attack, the command transfer meant he was now in command of all German units in the Orel area.

A Panzer III of the 2nd Panzer Division near Orel Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-154-1964-24, Russland, Panzer III.jpg
A Panzer III of the 2nd Panzer Division near Orel

Three days later the second phase of Operation Kutuzov was initiated, with attacks on the German 9th Army by several Soviet armies. The total Soviet troops now engaged in Operation Kutuzov numbered 1,286,049 men supported by 2,409 tanks and 26,379 guns. [19] [ full citation needed ] The Soviets broadened the offensive, adding supporting attacks by the 50th Army to the north of the 11th Guards Army. Between the 50th Army and the Bryansk Front was a thrust by the 20th Tank Corps aimed at Bolkhov, along with a push by the Central Front on the south face. To increase the momentum of the attack the Soviets now committed the 3rd Guards Tank Army and 4th Tank Army from the reserves. The 3rd Guards drove straight for Orel, attempting to develop the eastern attack, while the 4th Tank Army drove from the north along the wider breach made by 11th Guards Army. In doing so they threatened to trap the German forces defending the east face of the Orel salient. German defensive efforts were hampered by partisan attacks to their communications and rail supply lines.

As Soviet breakthroughs developed the situation for the Germans became serious. The entire 9th Army was threatened with being cut off. Model sent nearly all of his Panzer units to aid the 2nd Panzer Army, whose northern front was about to collapse, while to the north the 4th Army sent down the 253rd Infantry Division. The Germans achieved a temporary stabilization of the front while the 9th Army began to withdraw from their captured ground. The Soviet Central Front followed them hesitantly at first but increased the intensity of their attacks from the ground and the air. [18] On 18 July the 9th Army was back at its starting points of 5 July.

Soviet soldiers follow T-34s near Bryansk RIAN archive 613694 Red Army men are on offensive near Bryansk.jpg
Soviet soldiers follow T-34s near Bryansk

A series of engagements developed in the Orel salient between arriving German reserves and Soviet tank formations. Though Hitler forbade retreat, the Soviets gradually gained ground. By 26 July the German troops were forced to desert the Orel base of operations and begin a withdrawal to the Hagen position to the east of Bryansk. With the 11th Guards reaching the outskirts of Karachev, midway between Orel and Bryansk, they threatened to cut the main rail line which was the main route of supply. On 29 July Bolkhov was liberated, and on 4 August the struggle for Orel commenced. After one day of hard fighting Orel was taken. With their position untenable, the Germans were forced to evacuate back to prepared positions at the Hagen line. By 18 August Soviet troops had reached the Hagen line east of Bryansk at the base of the Orel salient. With the German defeat the counter-offensive began to grow into a general Soviet offensive.

Contest for air superiority

The Soviet Air Forces supported the attack on German ground positions in conjunction with the preliminary artillery bombardment. The 1st Air Army and 15th Air Army performed 360 sorties against German rear areas, dropping some 210 long tons (210 t) of bombs. [20]

In the Southern sector of the bulge, the Germans logged over 1,000 missions on the first day, countered by the 737 missions of the 15th Air Army. The Luftwaffe destroyed some 35 tanks, 14 guns and 50 motor vehicles of the Bryansk Front, slowing their progress. By the end of the first day the Soviets had failed to breach the first line. [21] While the 2nd Panzer Army was gradually being forced back, the Luftwaffe battled the VVS, destroying 94 Soviet aircraft on 13 July, including 50 Sturmoviks.

In the southern region of the battle the Luftwaffe's 1. Flieger-Division maintained air superiority in defense of the German 9th Army, dealing the Soviets some significant losses in aircraft between 13 and 16 July. After six days of heavy fighting the strength of the Luftwaffe began to wane. The 1. Flieger-Division flew 74 intercept missions against the 868 sorties conducted by the 16th Air Army. Though the Soviets continued to lose in tactical air engagements, their overall presence in the air was dominant. The VVS helped the 11th Guards Army achieve their breakthrough. [21]

The VVS flew 60,995 sorties and dropped 15,000 tonnes of bombs in support of Kutuzov, while the German 1. Flieger-Division flew 37,421 sorties and dropped over 20,000 tonnes of bombs on Soviet targets. [22]

Aftermath

The battle was the bloodiest of the three major operations during the Battle of Kursk. Overall German losses suffered during the battle were 86,454 men KIA, MIA or WIA. [5] Casualties for the Red Army were 112,529 men killed, with a further 317,361 wounded. [23] Tank and assault gun losses for the Red Army were particularly high, with 2,586 vehicles destroyed or damaged during Kutuzov. [9] German tank losses are not available for this battle but Army Group Center is known to have lost 343 armoured fighting vehicles during both Citadel and Kutuzov. [5]

Some of the Soviet commanders were displeased with the results, complaining that an even greater victory might have been won. Said Marshal Rokossovsky: "Instead of encircling the enemy, we only pushed them out of the bulge. The operation would have been different if we had used our force for two heavy punches which met at Bryansk". Zhukov held a similar opinion. [24] Operation Kutuzov was successful in diverting German reserves earmarked for Operation Citadel and the Soviets reduced the Orel salient and inflicted substantial losses on the German army. The Soviet victory set the stage for the battle of Smolensk several weeks later. With Operation Kutuzov, the Soviets seized the strategic initiative, which they would hold through the remainder of the war.

Notes

  1. 343 tanks and assault guns were lost from 5 July till the beginning of August. [5]

Citations

  1. 1 2 3 4 Frieser 2007, p. 177.
  2. 1 2 3 4 Koltunov p.81
  3. Bergström 2007, p. 83.
  4. Frieser 2007, p. 154.
  5. 1 2 3 Frieser 2007, p. 188.
  6. Frieser 2007, p. 189.
  7. Krivosheev 1997, p. 133.
  8. Beevor 2012, p. 485.
  9. 1 2 3 4 Krivosheev 1997, p. 262.
  10. Glantz & Orenstein 1999, p. 28.
  11. Nipe 2011, p. 443.
  12. Encyclopedia of World War II, No. 37 p. 665
  13. Willmott p.188
  14. Frieser 2007, p. 175.
  15. "Орловская операция".
  16. Frieser 2007, p. 187.
  17. Rendulic, Die Schlacht von Orel, p. 134.
  18. 1 2 3 Frieser 2007, p. 185.
  19. Koltunov, p. 82.
  20. Bergström 2007, p. 82.
  21. 1 2 Bergström 2007, pp. 83–85.
  22. Hooton 2016, p. 179.
  23. Glantz & House 1995, p. 297.
  24. Zhukov p. 188.

Bibliography

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Kursk</span> 1943 tank battle in the Soviet Union

The Battle of Kursk was a major World War II Eastern Front battle between the forces of Germany and the Soviet Union near Kursk in southwestern Russia during the summer of 1943; it ultimately became the largest tank battle in history and resulted in a Soviet victory. It is considered by some to be the turning point of the European theatre of war instead of the Battle of Stalingrad several months earlier.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Third Battle of Kharkov</span> 1943 series of battles on the Eastern Front of World War II

The Third Battle of Kharkov was a series of battles on the Eastern Front of World War II, undertaken by German Army Group South against the Soviet Red Army, around the city of Kharkov between 19 February and 15 March 1943. Known to the German side as the Donets Campaign, and in the Soviet Union as the Donbas and Kharkov operations, the German counterstrike led to the recapture of the cities of Kharkov and Belgorod.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Citadel</span> German operation to capture Kursk from the USSR during WWII

Operation Citadel was the German offensive operation in July 1943 against Soviet forces in the Kursk salient, proposed by Generalfeldmarschall Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Manstein during the Second World War on the Eastern Front that initiated the Battle of Kursk. The deliberate defensive operation that the Soviets implemented to repel the German offensive is referred to as the Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation. The German offensive was countered by two Soviet counter-offensives, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev and Operation Kutuzov. For the Germans, the battle was the final strategic offensive that they were able to launch on the Eastern Front. As the Allied invasion of Sicily began, Adolf Hitler was forced to divert troops training in France to meet the Allied threats in the Mediterranean, rather than use them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front. Germany's extensive loss of men and tanks ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army enjoyed the strategic initiative for the remainder of the war.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Bagration</span> Large Soviet military offensive in WW2

Operation Bagration was the codename for the 1944 Soviet Byelorussian strategic offensive operation, a military campaign fought between 22 June and 19 August 1944 in Soviet Byelorussia in the Eastern Front of World War II, just over two weeks after the start of Operation Overlord in the west, causing Nazi Germany to have to fight on two major fronts at the same time. The Soviet Union destroyed 28 of 34 divisions of Army Group Centre and completely shattered the German front line. It was the biggest defeat in German military history, with around 450,000 German casualties, while 300,000 other German soldiers were cut off in the Courland Pocket.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Günther von Kluge</span> German field marshal (1882–1944)

Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge was a German Generalfeldmarschall during World War II who held commands on both the Eastern and Western Fronts. He commanded the 4th Army of the Wehrmacht during the invasion of Poland in 1939 and the Battle of France in 1940, earning a promotion to Generalfeldmarschall. Kluge went on to command the 4th Army in Operation Barbarossa and the Battle for Moscow in 1941.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battles of Rzhev</span> Series of Soviet operations in World War II

The Battles of Rzhev were a series of Red Army offensives against the Wehrmacht between 8 January 1942 and 31 March 1943, on the Eastern Front of World War II. The battles took place in the northeast of Smolensk Oblast and the south of Tver Oblast, in and around the salient surrounding Rzhev. Due to the high losses suffered by the Soviet Army, the campaign became known by veterans and historians as the "Rzhev Meat Grinder".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Prokhorovka</span> Part of Battle of Kursk, World War II (1943)

The Battle of Prokhorovka was fought on 12 July 1943 near Prokhorovka, 87 kilometres (54 mi) southeast of Kursk, in the Soviet Union, during the Second World War. Taking place on the Eastern Front, the engagement was part of the wider Battle of Kursk and occurred when the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Soviet Red Army attacked the II SS-Panzer Corps of the German Waffen-SS in one of the largest tank battles in history.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Belgorod–Bogodukhov offensive operation</span>

The Belgorod–Bogodukhov offensive operation was a combat operation executed as part of Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev by the Red Army against the Wehrmacht forces. It was one of the operations that was launched in response to the German offensive Operation Citadel.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation</span> German forces defeat by Red army in 1943

The Belgorod–Kharkov strategic offensive operation, or simply Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation, was a Soviet strategic summer offensive that aimed to recapture Belgorod and Kharkov, and destroy Nazi German forces of the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf. The operation was codenamed Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, after the 18th-century Field Marshal Peter Rumyantsev and was conducted by the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in the southern sector of the Kursk Bulge. The battle was referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">60th Army (Soviet Union)</span> Military unit

The Red Army's 60th Army was a Soviet field army during the Second World War. It was first formed in reserve in the Moscow Military District in October 1941, but soon was disbanded. It was formed a second time in July 1942, and continued in service until postwar. The 60th Army was commanded by Gen. Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky for much of the war, and it was while in this command that he proved himself worthy to be promoted to the rank of General of the Army and command of a Front at the age of 38 years. Elements of the army went on to, among other things, liberate the Auschwitz concentration camp.

The 16th Guards Tank Division was a tank division of the Soviet Army and later the Russian Ground Forces.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Operation Roland</span> German offensive of WWII

Operation Roland was a local German offensive inside the Soviet Union during the Second World War on the Eastern Front, and was conducted as a local operation within the overarching German summer offensive, Operation Citadel, on the southern side of the Kursk salient. The German forces of the III Panzer Corps and the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich of the II SS Panzer Corps attempted to envelop and destroy Soviet forces of the Voronezh Front. This operation was necessitated by the failure of the German II SS Panzer Corps to break through Soviet forces during the Battle of Prokhorovka on 12 July. Therefore, German commanders decided to first link up the III Panzer Corps, which had been lagging behind due to heavy Soviet resistance, with the II SS Panzer Corps, in order to consolidate the German positions into a continuous frontline without inward bulges and enable the two panzer corps to overrun Soviet forces defending Prokhorovka together. The linking up of the two German pincers was planned to effectuate the envelopment of the Soviet 69th Army and other supporting units.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Donbas strategic offensive (July 1943)</span> Battle on the Eastern Front of WW2

The First Donbas strategic offensive was a military campaign fought in the Donets Basin from 17 July to 2 August 1943, between the German and Soviet armed forces on the Eastern Front of World War II. The Germans contained the Soviet offensive in its northern portion after initial gains and pushed the southern portion back to its starting point.

The 26th Guards Rifle Division was reformed as an elite infantry division of the Red Army in April, 1942, based on the 1st formation of the 93rd Rifle Division, and served in that role until after the end of the Great Patriotic War. It would soon after provide the headquarters cadre for the 8th Guards Rifle Corps. It was soon assigned, with its Corps, to 20th Army of Western Front and saw extensive fighting, while also suffering extensive casualties, in two campaigns against the German 9th Army in the Rzhev salient through the rest of 1942. The division, again with 8th Guards Corps, joined the 11th Guards Army when it was formed in April, 1943 and, apart from a brief reassignment in early 1944, remained under those commands for the duration of the war. During that summer the division took part in the liberation of Bryansk. By December, after fighting through western Russia north of Smolensk it was in 1st Baltic Front, attacking south towards Gorodok and won the name of that city as a battle honor. By the start of the offensive against Army Group Center in the summer of 1944 the 26th Guards had been redeployed with its Army to the south of Vitebsk as part of 3rd Belorussian Front, where it would remain for the duration. Driving westward during Operation Bagration the division advanced north of Orsha and then helped to seize a crossing over the Berezina River for which it was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. It continued to advance through Lithuania to the border with East Prussia later that year. As part of the East Prussian Offensive the 26th Guards entered that heavily fortified region in the winter of 1945 and helped gradually break the German resistance there, particularly at Insterburg and Königsberg, winning the Order of Suvorov for its part in the battle for the former place. The division ended the war at Pillau. The 26th Guards remained in the Kaliningrad Oblast well after the war, becoming the 26th Guards Motorized Rifle Division in 1957 and not finally disbanded until 1989.

The 83rd Guards Rifle Division was reformed as an elite infantry division of the Red Army in April 1943, based on the 2nd formation of the 97th Rifle Division, and served in that role until after the end of the Great Patriotic War. Throughout its combat path it was considered a "sister" to the 84th Guards Rifle Division.

The 84th Guards Rifle Division was reformed as an elite infantry division of the Red Army in April 1943, based on the 2nd formation of the 110th Rifle Division, and served in that role until after the end of the Great Patriotic War. Throughout its combat path it was considered a "sister" to the 83rd Guards Rifle Division.

The 211th Rifle Division was an infantry division of the Red Army, originally formed just after the start of the German invasion, based on the shtat of September 13, 1939. In fact the division remained chronically short of equipment, particularly heavy weapons, throughout the existence of the 1st formation. Assigned to 43rd Army of Reserve Front it first saw combat along the Desna River at the time of the Yelnya offensive and several of its subunits were overtaken by panic when counterattacked by German tanks. During the first day of Operation Typhoon its line was breached and it was soon encircled and destroyed.

The 212th Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army after a motorized division of that same number was badly damaged and then redesignated about five weeks after the start of the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

The 217th Rifle Division was an infantry division of the Red Army, originally formed in the months just before the start of the German invasion, based on the shtat of September 13, 1939. It was formed at Voronezh and was considered a "sister" to the 222nd Rifle Division. When Operation Barbarossa began it was in 28th Army but soon after moving to the front it helped form the 43rd Army before being reassigned to 50th Army in Bryansk Front. After barely escaping disbandment during Operation Typhoon it took part in the defense of Tula; in the following counteroffensive one of its rifle regiments was so reduced by casualties that it had to be replaced by a Tula militia regiment. During the rest of 1942 and into 1943 it served in a largely defensive role as part of 49th Army and 16th Army although it took part in one abortive offensive in March 1943 north of Zhizdra. It remained in the latter Army when it was redesignated 11th Guards and fought under its command in the July-August offensive against the German-held Oryol salient before being transferred to 11th Army and winning an honorific in the advance through western Russia. In recognition of its role in the battle for Gomel it was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. After winter battles in eastern Belarus the 217th played leading roles in the liberation of Zhlobin and Bobruisk in the early stages of Operation Bagration as part of 48th Army. During the Vistula-Oder offensive it took part in the liberation of Mława and then crossed into the western part of East Prussia, winning the rare distinction of the Order of Lenin in the process. It ended the war in East Prussia and remained in the Königsberg area until the spring of 1946 when it was converted to the 3rd Rifle Brigade.

The 235th Rifle Division was an infantry division of the Red Army, originally formed in the months just before the start of the German invasion, based on the shtat of September 13, 1939. As part of the 41st Rifle Corps it was soon sent to Northwestern Front to defend the distant approaches to Leningrad. Along with its Corps the division became part of the Luga Operational Group. After Novgorod was captured the Luga Group was largely encircled and had to fight its way north toward the city, suffering considerable losses in the process. The losses to the 235th were greater than those of some others and after officially carrying on in the reserves of Leningrad Front for some time the division was officially disbanded in late December.