Operation Viriato

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Operation Viriato
Part of Portuguese Colonial War
Dornier-do-27-nambuangongo-1962.jpg
Portuguese Air Force Dornier Do 27 in Nambuangongo in 1962.
Date18 July – August 10, 1961
Location
Result Portuguese victory
Belligerents
Flag of Portugal (official).svg Portugal Bandeira da FNLA.svg UPA
Commanders and leaders
Flag of Portugal (official).svg Armando Maçanita
Flag of Portugal (official).svg Oliveira Rodrigues
Flag of Portugal (official).svg Rui Abrantes
Bandeira da FNLA.svg Unknown
Units involved
Unknown
Strength
1,300 men [1] Unknown
Casualties and losses
5 dead, 13 wounded. [2] 150 dead. [2]

Operation Viriato was a military operation carried out by the Portuguese Armed Forces during the Portuguese Colonial War. Its objective was the reoccupation of the Dembos region, particularly Nambuangongo, which had been seized by the UPA and made into their headquarters for subversive action in Angola after the events on March 15 and 16. [3]

At the start of the Portuguese Colonial War in Angola, the UPA enacted a mass uprising with the widespread perpetration of massacres and atrocities against the civilian population, both Portuguese and African. [1] [4] Some territory in the Dembos region in northwestern Angola was occupied by the UPA and Nambuangongo selected as their headquarters. [1] Roads were blocked, communications were cut-off and ambushes were common, therefore relief columns setting off from Luanda roughly a week later found it impossible to reach the beleaguered areas. [5] The densely forested terrain favored the UPA. [5] Portuguese troops were forced to march on foor in small units and most many of them could do was round up survivors and bring them to a safe area. [5] Hundreds of coffee producing estates were abandoned or left for dead and the harvest was a risk. [5] Nevertheless, many Portuguese remained and clung on in defiance of the UPA. [6]

In order to recover Nambuangongo, Portuguese command decided to approach Nambuangongo from three angles, in order to divide UPA forces. [7] mobilized Lieutenant-Colonel Armando Maçanitas 96th Caçadores Battalion, Colonel Oliveira Rodrigues 114th Caçadores Battalion, and the 149th Cavalry Squadron, under the command of Captain Rui Abrantes. They were supported by artillery and engineering personnel and in total numbered about 1300 men. [1] They were also to open up new roads that would ensure the safety of the local population. [1]

The 96th Caçadores Battalion departed from Quibaxe reinforced by an artillery battery, engineering troops and air support. It passed through Mucondo, Quicundo, Maxalundo. [8] It entered Nambuangongo on the 9th of August, after several engagements with UPA guerrillas in which the Portuguese suffered some casualties. [1] The Portuguese flag was then hoisted over the tower of the local church. [1]

The 114th departed from Luanda, passed through Caxito, Anapasso, and Quanta e Quitabo but was unable to pass beyond Quissacala due to heavy resistance by about 500 UPA guerrillas, which managed to surround the force. [1] [8] The forward vehicles were hit and the Portuguese suffered 5 dead and 13 wounded, while inflicting about 150 dead on UPA forces. [2]

The 149th Cavalry Squadron left Ambriz on the 25th of July, supported by engineering and artillery platoons, totalling 250 men. [8] [1] It passed through Quimbumbe and Zala and removed roadblocks along the way, engaged with UPA guerrillas along the way, and reached Nambuangongo on the morning of August 10. [1] [8]

The Portuguese Air Force provided air recon and bombed not just UPA positions with napalm but also villages suspected of aiding the insurgents. [1]

Areas in northwestern Angola afflicted by UPA operations in 1961-1962. Are of FNLA Operations in Angola 1961-1962.png
Areas in northwestern Angola afflicted by UPA operations in 1961–1962.

After losing Nambuangongo, UPA forces relocated to the rugged and heavily forested Pedra Verde mountainrange, which the Portuguese Armed Forces would target next. Operation Viriato was followed by Operation Esmeralda

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Miguel Henriques: "As operações Viriato e Esmeralda" in Jornal A Voz de Ermesinde, 30-11-2021.
  2. 1 2 3 Roberto, 2022, p. 183.
  3. Joaquim José da Cunha Roberto: Ultramar Colonial (1961-1974). O Modo Português de Fazer a Guerra, Manufactura, 2022, pp. 182-183.
  4. "Estate after estate was consumed in a wave of violence that left, according to most estimates, 800 whites - men, women and childred - dead. Thousands more of their workers, drawn from other provinces of Angola, were also murdered in this attempt to extirpate the Portuguese presence from northern Angola and, through the destruction of the coffee plantations, to destroy the colonial economy. As predicted, the violence was not limited to the immediate border area; also affected were the districts of Quanza Norte and Luanda. One of its main staging points was the Dembos area, around the town of Nambuangongo." in Meneses, 2022, p. 467.
  5. 1 2 3 4 Meneses, 2022, p. 467.
  6. "Many personal accounts, horrifying in nature, reached Salazar's desk; there was no hiding from the suffering. Relief columns settig off from Luanda roughly a week later found it imposible to make progress: roads and bridges were cut, boats and rafts destroyed, ambushes were common, and confusion and fear reigned. The terrain, with its dense forests, and tall grass, favored the UPA fighters, who, in the words of one report, 'simply melt into the jungle, where pursuit im possible'. Given the state of the roads, continuously cut by UPA's supporters, Portuguese troops, in small units, had to move on foot; the most many could do was round up surviving civilians and bring them to a safe spot. The coffee harvest was at risk, with hundreds of estates abandoned to their fate. Remarkably, though, many of the settlers remained, holed up in what Jorge Jardim called 'islets of stubbornness', even when evacuation had become a possibility". in Filipe de Meneses (2006). Salazar: A Political Biography, Enigma Books, p. 467.
  7. "A Operação Viriato foi planeada com três eixos de aproximação a Nambuangongo, por forma a dividir as forças da UPA e a reforçar as possibilidades de sucesso." in Roberto, 2002, p. 182.
  8. 1 2 3 4 Roberto, 2022, p. 182.