Organization Designation Authorization

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FAA document that establishes the ODA program FAA National Policy - Organization Designation Authorization Procedures ORDER 8100.15A.pdf
FAA document that establishes the ODA program

The Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) program was established by FAA Order 8100.15() (image at right). The ODA, in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), grants airworthiness designee authority to organizations or companies. The regulations addressing the ODA program are found in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 183, subpart D, sections 183.41 through 813.67.

Contents

The ODA program's intention is to elaborate on the tasks that are available their organizations design authorizations. While adding in this "final rule" for designs, the ODA also added in a phase-out timeline for design programs.

The FAA asserted that the ODA program does not introduce any type of self-certification. [1] However, the practice has been criticized for substantial manufacturer influence over personnel designation and design certification, particularly after the Boeing 787 Dreamliner battery fires in 2013 and the Boeing 737 MAX groundings in 2019.

Purpose

"The ODA program expands the scope of approved tasks available to organizational designees; increases the number of organizations eligible for organizational designee authorizations; and establishes a more comprehensive, systems-based approach to managing designated organizations." [1]

The ODA program was created for the FAA to standardize the operation and oversight of organizational designees. [1]

This program aims to "increase the efficiency with which the FAA appoints and oversees designee organizations, and allow the FAA to concentrate its resources on the most safety-critical matters." [1]

Types of Organizational Designation Authorizations

The following are the different types of Organizational Designation Authorizations for which qualified organizations may apply. [2]

History

In the "VISION 100—CENTURY OF AVIATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT" of 2003, legislators passed a section entitled "DESIGN ORGANIZATION CERTIFICATES", which instructed the FAA to deputize designers, so that the designers would "certify compliance with the requirements and minimum standards... for the type certification of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances." [3]

In 2005, the FAA granted Boeing "in-house oversight for new planes in production and approval of major repairs and alterations". [4] The manufacturers’ engineer is delegated to review the design, plan and observe tests, and certify they meet applicable standards. [4] FAA staff do attend "many critical tests involving safety issues — such as flammability of new materials and design of flight controls". [4] The ODA status is granted for an aircraft manufacturer to act as the proxy on certification oversight. [5] Previous to the ODA programme, "engineers in that role were approved by and reported directly to the FAA". [4]

In 2011, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety Margaret Gilligan issued National Policy Order 8100.15A to establish the "procedures, guidance, and limitations of authority" the FAA grants to an organization under the ODA program. Order 8100.15A was 293 pages long and composed of 16 chapters and seven appendices. The legislative authority for the ODA program was derived under Title 49 of the US Code § 44702: Issuance of Certificates, which authorized the FAA to "delegate to a qualified private person a matter related to issuing certificates, or related to the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a certificate on behalf of the FAA Administrator". [1] The FAA established the ODA program in 14 CFR part 183, subpart D: Representatives of the Administrator. [6]

Boeing has 1,500 people in its ODA, under supervision by an FAA team of 45 people, of which only 24 are engineers. [7] By 2018, the FAA was letting Boeing certify 96 percent of its own work. [8]

Historical examples

The Boeing 737 series had suffered from rudder issues in the past, resulting in several accidents. A previous model of the 737 also experienced a similar mix of questionable safety assessment, insufficient pilot training, and automated system malfunction when Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 crashed. [9] [10] In February 2020, Boeing and NTSB officials refused to cooperate with a new Dutch lawmakers inquiry. [11]

In November 2019, the online media "The Air Current" reviewed historical parallels between the MAX and the McDonnell Douglas DC-10, which had been grounded after the crash of American Airlines Flight 191. [12] A safety panel was convened by the FAA under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences to investigate both the design of the DC-10 and the regulatory system itself. In its report, published in June 1980, the safety panel highlighted the FAA's reliance on the manufacturer during the certification process and the fact that in most cases it performs only a "cursory review" of the manufacturer's information. [13] [14] The New York Times noted that the panel found "critical deficiencies in the way the Government certifies the safety of American-built airliners". [15]

For Marian Pistik, head of asset management at International Airfinance Corporation, the case of the MAX is unprecedented due to allegations of wrongdoings. The groundings of the DC-10 and of the Dreamliner could not be directly compared to the global B737 MAX grounding: "there was no suspicion that Boeing or any OEM knew of the problem and tried to disguise it or […] any suspicion of wrongdoing or not being compliant or forthcoming with the issues of the 737 Max." [16]

Oversight of delegation policies by SOCAC

The Safety Oversight and Certification Advisory Committee (SOCAC) was created by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The committee will provide advice to the Secretary of Transportation on policies related to FAA safety oversight and certification programs and activities, utilization of delegation and designation authorities. [17] [18]

Controversies

The ODA process has been criticized as detrimental to safety. [5] Since 2012, the FAA had successfully pushed to increase the scope of delegating safety checks to the manufacturer. [19]

On 4 February 2013, an article in The Seattle Times written by journalist Kyung Song [4] critiqued the process by which the airworthiness certificate was obtained for the Boeing 787 because approvals for the lithium ion battery system were akin "to the fox guarding the chicken coop". [5] In the words of an onlooker, "Song stated that Boeing became an FAA designee [sic] with wide latitude in picking the company’s own engineers to sign off on their employer’s work on behalf of the FAA". [5]

Executive-summary - Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft Certification Process 01.svg
Executive-summary – Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft Certification Process [20]
Official report - Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft Certification Process 02.svg
Official report – Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft Certification Process [21]

In April 2019, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Elaine L. Chao, who boarded a MAX flight on March 12 amid calls to ground the aircraft [22] created the Special Committee to Review the FAA's Aircraft Certification Process to review of Organization Designation Authorization, which granted Boeing authority to review systems on behalf of the FAA, during the certification of the 737 MAX 8. The committee recommended integrating human performance factors and consider all levels of pilot experience, but defended the ODA against any reforms. [23] [24] Relatives of those on board the accident flights condemned the report for calling the ODA an "effective" process. [25]

In June 2020, the United States Senate criticized the FAA for failing to turn over 737 MAX documents and accused the FAA of trying "to keep us in the dark". [26] The U.S. Inspector General said that by 2017, Boeing was handling all certification checks on behalf of the FAA. [27]

FAA response to criticisms of excessive delegation

In response to questions from Project On Government Oversight, a FAA spokesperson said “FAA has never allowed companies to police themselves or self-certify their aircraft. With strict FAA oversight, delegation [of certification] extends the rigor of the FAA certification process to other recognized professionals, thereby multiplying the technical expertise focused on assuring an aircraft meets FAA standards.” [28]

In May 2020, the FAA announced a reform of existing processes to improve management of aircraft development and corporate practices. [29] In June 2020, a Senate Bill calling for changes to the existing ODA was being drafted to resolve potential conflict of interest between Boeing, FAA, designated representatives and whistleblowers. [30] FAA Director Steve Dickenson admitted that "mistakes were made" with the 737 MAX and that the implications of MCAS were not fully understood. [31]

In August 2020, the FAA proposed a $1.2 million fine on Boeing for exerting undue pressure on designated inspectors to expedite aircraft approvals. [32]

Further reading

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federal Aviation Administration</span> U.S. government agency regulating civil aviation

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is a U.S. federal government agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation which regulates civil aviation in the United States and surrounding international waters. Its powers include air traffic control, certification of personnel and aircraft, setting standards for airports, and protection of U.S. assets during the launch or re-entry of commercial space vehicles. Powers over neighboring international waters were delegated to the FAA by authority of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Type certificate</span> Document noting the airworthiness of a certain type of aircraft

A type certificate signifies the airworthiness of a particular category of aircraft, according to its manufacturing design. Certification confirms that the aircraft of a new type intended for serial production is in compliance with applicable airworthiness requirements established by the national air law.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Aircraft maintenance</span> Performance of tasks which maintain an aircrafts airworthiness

Aircraft maintenance is the performance of tasks required to ensure the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft or aircraft part, including overhaul, inspection, replacement, defect rectification, and the embodiment of modifications, compliance with airworthiness directives and repair.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Boeing</span> American aerospace and defense corporation

The Boeing Company is an American multinational corporation that designs, manufactures, and sells airplanes, rotorcraft, rockets, satellites, and missiles worldwide. The company also provides leasing and product support services. Boeing is among the largest global aerospace manufacturers; it is the fourth-largest defense contractor in the world based on 2022 revenue and is the largest exporter in the United States by dollar value. Boeing was founded by William Boeing in Seattle, Washington, on July 15, 1916. The present corporation is the result of the merger of Boeing with McDonnell Douglas on August 1, 1997.

A Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR) is a private person designated by the United States Federal Aviation Administration to act on its behalf in the certification of type certificated and amateur-built aircraft for the issuance of airworthiness certificates, special flight permits, import aircraft, export certificates for products and articles, conformity inspections, and field approvals for repair and alterations. Most DARs have limited and/or certain "functions" authorized by the FAA based on their experience and technical background. A DAR may charge a fee for their services. Qualifications and policies for appointment of Designated Airworthiness Representatives are established in FAA Order 8100.8.

An emergency airworthiness directive (EAD) is an airworthiness directive issued when unsafe conditions require immediate action by an aircraft owner or operator. An EAD is published by a responsible authority such as the FOCA, EASA or FAA related to airworthiness and maintenance of aircraft and aircraft parts. It contains measures which must be accomplished and the related periods to preserve their airworthiness. Technical information is addressed to operators and maintenance organisations of affected aircraft only. EADs become effective upon receipt of notification.

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The Boeing 737 MAX is the fourth generation of the Boeing 737, a narrow-body airliner manufactured by Boeing Commercial Airplanes. It succeeds the Boeing 737 Next Generation (NG) and competes with the Airbus A320neo family. The series was announced in August 2011, first flown in January 2016, and certified by the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in March 2017. The first 737 MAX delivered to a customer was a MAX 8 to Malindo Air, which accepted and began operating the aircraft in May 2017.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Lion Air Flight 610</span> Fatal 2018 aircraft crash in the Java Sea, Indonesia

Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610/LNI610) was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Soekarno–Hatta International Airport, Tangerang, to Depati Amir Airport, Pangkal Pinang, in Indonesia. On 29 October 2018, the Boeing 737 MAX operating the route, carrying 181 passengers and 8 crew members, crashed into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff killing all 189 occupants on board. It was the first major accident and hull loss of a 737 MAX, a then recently-introduced aircraft. It is the deadliest accident involving the Boeing 737 family. One diver also died during recovery operations.

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The Boeing 737 MAX passenger airliner was grounded worldwide between March 2019 and December 2020 and again in 2024. – after 346 people died in two similar crashes in less than five months: Lion Air Flight 610 on October 29, 2018, and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, 2019. The Federal Aviation Administration initially affirmed the MAX's continued airworthiness, claiming to have insufficient evidence of accident similarities. By March 13, the FAA followed behind 51 concerned regulators in deciding to ground the aircraft. All 387 aircraft delivered to airlines were grounded by March 18.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System</span> Boeings aircraft control system involved in fatal accidents

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) is a flight stabilizing feature developed by Boeing that became notorious for its role in two fatal accidents of the 737 MAX in 2018 and 2019, which killed all 346 passengers and crew among both flights.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Financial impact of the Boeing 737 MAX groundings</span>

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References

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